

EARLY MONGOL RULE IN THIRTEENTH- CENTURY IRAN

A Persian renaissance

George Lane



RoutledgeCurzon

Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

**Also available as a printed book
see title verso for ISBN details**

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

EARLY MONGOL RULE IN THIRTEENTH- CENTURY IRAN

A Persian renaissance

George Lane

 **RoutledgeCurzon**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

EARLY MONGOL RULE IN THIRTEENTH-CENTURY IRAN

For a long period both before and after the Arab conquests of the seventh century, the people of the Iranian plateau and surrounding countries had been living in political and cultural turmoil, interspersed with bouts of stability and development. Despite this, a sense of historical identity and continuity prevailed, albeit tenuously, and it was the so-called catastrophic thirteenth century that finally saw the rebirth of Persia as a central cultural, spiritual and political player on the regional – if not the world – stage.

After the traumatic years of anarchy following the collapse of the Great Saljuqs in the latter part of the twelfth century, the 1250s saw the arrival of Hülegü Khan. This study demonstrates that Hülegü Khan was welcomed as a king and a saviour after the depredations of his predecessors, rather than as a conqueror, and that the initial decades of his dynasty's rule were characterised by a renaissance in the cultural life of the Iranian plateau. Freed from the spiritual and political oppression imposed by Baghdad and fed on a rich diet of Asian cultural, commercial and mercantile influences, Persia, its language, the 'state' and culture all prospered.

The voice of this unique era of renaissance still echoes in modern Iran and beyond.

George Lane spent twenty years living, working and seeking adventure in the Middle East and then later, the Far East. During this time he has been an English teacher, a freelance writer and journalist, and a businessman. He returned to a more concentrated academic life in 1991 when he took up work and studies at SOAS. Since then, he has been primarily concerned with Medieval Islamic History, and with Iran and Central Asia in particular.

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF IRAN AND TURKEY

**Edited by Carole Hillenbrand University of
Edinburgh**

This series publishes important studies dealing with the history of Iran and Turkey in the period AD 1000–1700. This period is significant because it heralds the advent of large numbers of nomadic Turks from Central Asia into the Islamic world. Their influence was felt particularly strongly in Iran and Turkey, territories which they permanently transformed.

The series presents translations of medieval Arabic and Persian texts which chronicle the history of the medieval Turks and Persians, and also publishes scholarly monographs which handle themes of medieval Turkish and Iranian history such as historiography, nomadisation and folk Islam.

HISTORY OF THE SELJUQ TURKS

The Saljuq-nama of Zahir al-Din Nishpuri

Translated by Kenneth Allin Luther Edited by Edmund Bosworth

THE ANNALS OF THE SALJUQ TURKS

Selections from al-Kamil fil-Tarikh of Ibn al-Athir

D. S. Richards

EARLY MONGOL RULE IN THIRTEENTH-CENTURY IRAN

A Persian renaissance

George Lane

EARLY MONGOL RULE IN THIRTEENTH-CENTURY IRAN

A Persian renaissance

George Lane



RoutledgeCurzon

Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2003
by RoutledgeCurzon
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by RoutledgeCurzon
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003.

RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

© 2003 George Lane

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Lane, George, 1952– Early Mongol rule in thirteenth-century Iran : a Persian renaissance / George Lane.

p. cm. – (RoutledgeCurzon studies in the history of Turkey and Iran)
Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Iran-History-1256-1500. 2. Iran-Civilization. I. Title. II. Series.

DS289.L36 2003

955'.02-dc21

2002031695

ISBN 0-203-41787-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-41936-7 (Adobe eReader Format)

ISBN 0-415-29750-8 (Print Edition)

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

[2.1](#) The Chinggisids

[5.1](#) The Qutlugh-Khanids

[5.2](#) The Salghurids

[A1](#) ‘Irāq ‘Arab and ‘Irāq ‘Ajam. Azerbaijan and the southern Caucasus

[A2](#) Khorasan, Turkestan, Sind and Sīstān

[A3](#) Hülegü’s campaigns

[A4](#) The Mongol Empire, post-Hülegü

Plates

[0.1](#) Saint Hülegü and Dokuz Khatun

[0.2](#) East meets west: a Persian prince entertaining a Mongol princess

PREFACE

The misconceptions concerning the rule of Hülegü Khan and his immediate successors are due primarily to the dwarfing of this period by those decades preceding it and by the emphasis placed on the succeeding Il-Khans after Islam had been officially embraced. The traumatic invasions of the hordes of Chinggis Khan and Tolui Khan with the years of uncertainty, instability and anarchy which followed these irruptions, have dominated most reporting of the history of Persia in the thirteenth century and, by the emphasis which has been placed on the reign of Ghazan Khan and his so-called reforms so cleverly propagated by his chief vizier, Rashīd al-Dīn, it is the last four decades of the Il-Khanate which have come to represent the period of recovery from the initial Mongol onslaughts. Later historians, the politically driven, the religiously tempered, and outsiders with their own agendas have overlooked the reality of the years of early Il-Khanid rule and the attitude of the subject people to their new king and have instead painted this whole period in the dark colours of violent transition, extending the years of trauma and chaos to include the relatively stable, culturally vigorous and socially defining years of the early Il-Khanate merely on the grounds that it was nominally non-Muslim. Hülegü Khan ruled with the apparent non-opposition and cooperation of his subjects. Many of those loyal subjects earned the approbation of their contemporaries and, since their passing, have had their virtues and talents subsequently eulogised by the chroniclers, the *‘ulamā’* and the learned. Rarely if ever has the charge of ‘collaborator’ been levelled at these faithful servants of the infidel king and conqueror of Persia by either their peers or later Muslim historians and commentators.

A reappraisal of this whole period is long overdue. Whereas the violent advent of Chinggis Khan heralded the end of an era in the lands of Persia, the coming of his grandson, Hülegü Khan, marked a new beginning. The relative ease and the leisurely pace which typified the drawn out journey from Qaraqorum to the pastures of Azerbaijan stand in sharp contrast to other earlier Mongol campaigns. Hülegü’s train was peopled by a large Persianised administration and from the first time he entered Khorasan, his party was joined by local princes, notables and amirs there to offer their homage and loyalty. Often these were people already acquainted with the Mongols with family

and clansmen already integrated members of the *ordus*. The opposition was mainly from the widely detested and despised Ismāīlis and his destruction of these perceived heretical blasphemers, for many, seemed proof of divine justice working its mysterious designs through the agency of Hülegü's horde. The fall of the caliphate like that of Baghdad itself was a process which had been under way from long before the Mongols began stirring in the east. But the decline of the 'City of Peace' and the transformation of its hinterland into marchlands were countered by the rise and prosperity of Azerbaijan. Baghdad was replaced by Marageh and then Tabriz as the capital and the hub of international trade in the region, and, cut loose from a degenerate and impotent caliphate, Islam was invigorated by transformation and cultural nourishment. This was manifest in the growth of Shi'ite sects, the influx of impassioned Turkish converts, the popularisation of Sufi orders, and the emergence of an emboldened and vocal Sunni *ulamā*.

This was a period of great change. Traditionally the turning point which saw the ending of the cultural and spiritual anarchy brought about by the irruption of the Mongol hordes is seen to have occurred during the comparatively short reign of Ghazan Khan. This view was initially propagated by Ghazan's able and justly renowned wazir, Rashīd al-Dīn, and such was the influence of this remarkable Il-Khanid functionary and his histories that this interpretation of the events of this period has endured. This and the fact that Ghazan officially adopted Islam as the religion of state and so weakened the ties between the Il-Khanate and Qaraqorum irretrievably, has underlined the significance of Ghazan Khan's reign at the expense of the earlier years. So great was the impact of Rashīd al-Dīn's '*Jāmaal-Tavārikh*' that the wazir's self-interest in exaggerating the chaos of the preceding forty years and the significance of the reforms that he had drafted, is too easily overlooked.

This study will concentrate on the first decades of the Il-Khanate particularly on the period which witnessed the ascendancy of the Juwaynī family. The relationship between the subject people and their Mongol overlords will be explored as will the paradox that the 'subject' administrators have rarely received censure for their crucial role in upholding the 'infidel' government. The nature of the early Il-Khanate state and the extent to which Rashīd al-Dīn's harsh criticism was warranted will also be investigated. The Il-Khanate Empire incorporated a number of subject states such as the Salghurids of Shiraz, the Karts of Herat, and the Qara Khitai of Kerman that would appear to have prospered and culturally flowered to varying degrees during these decades of Mongol rule. The history of these three statelets will be critically examined and compared as a representative

sample of the Iranian state under Mongol rule. Two architects of the Il-Khanid polity, the Juwaynīs brothers, have a chapter devoted to their careers as does the intellectual giant of that whole period Naṣīr al-Dīn ẓaṣī. In broader terms a chapter will also be devoted to a survey of the spiritual and cultural life of the Il-Khanate and will look at the system of patronage which flourished at that time. Finally, an attempt will be made to assess the legacy of Hülegü Khan's establishment of a Persian Mongol state in the Persian heartland and evaluate his influence in a wider historical context.

For too long the history books have referred to the Mongol invasions of Persia. A more realistic title would be the Mongol irruption of Chinggis Khan and the later establishment of the Persio-Mongol state. Hülegü Khan came at the invitation and request of the people of Iran who petitioned Möngke Qa'an for the need of stable government and security for their provinces. Their complaints were against the general anarchy and the failure of the Mongol officials then in charge. They did not want an end to Mongol rule but rather they desired the umbrella of Mongol rule established more firmly and protectively over their 'clime'. The Mongols, by the mid-thirteenth century, were no longer an alien threat. Hülegü Khan represented the future and hopes of Iran whose eyes naturally looked to the east rather than to the Arab west. The Il-Khanate represented the rebirth of Iran and the re-establishment of Persian culture in the forefront of Islam. The culture that flowered in this newly born Iran was one fused with many elements from the east. The Mongols solidified the bridge between China and Iran. They then became cultural brokers facilitating the transfer of goods, food, agronomy, learning and artisans, the apex of which exchange was overseen by the remarkable Rashīd al-Dīn and Palād Chinksānk aka Bolad Cheng Hsiang.¹ But before the rise of these two long recognised figures, the process of transformation had already begun. Chinggis Khan might have come with vengeance but his grandson, Hülegü, came with justice and vision. It is hoped that this study will make this distinction clear.



2. VATICAN, Bibl. apost. Syr. 559
f° 223 v

Plate 0.1 Saint Hülegü and Dokuz Khatun (Vatican collection, f. 223v).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book was conceived in 1994 and first saw life as an undergraduate essay on the period of Mongol rule in Iran between the years 1227 and 1256. It was primarily the encouragement of my then teacher and later supervisor, David Morgan, that ensured the subsequent development of that first essay into an extended essay, a Masters essay, a Masters dissertation and finally into a Ph.D. thesis and dissertation upon which this present work is based. Over these years much help and more encouragement has been generously offered and gratefully received. Inspiration has come from Professor K. S. Walker and Dr Wi Imu Khatun, valuable advice and assistance from Professor Reuven Amitai, guidance throughout from Professor David Morgan, practical help has always been available from Sandy Morgan, Dr Michael Brett, Professor Gerald Hawting, Dr Peter Jackson, and my friends and colleagues Alison Ohta, Muhammed al-Matrafi, Muhammed Yadalloh Nabi, have been a constant source of strength. My own family Assumpta, Oscar and most recently Ella must also receive thanks for their forbearance and patience in allowing my self-indulgence over these past few years.

For all this help I am most grateful but I alone remain responsible for the deficiencies for which I must apologise.

Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder who is not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of this book.

TRANSLITERATION

Place names have been given in their current anglicised forms where applicable, as have terms and names such as *Mamluks*, *sultan*, *wazir*, which have entered the English language. With Mongolian and Turkish names and terms the Mongolian *č* and Turkish *ç* have been replaced with *ch*, *y* with *gh*, *ŷ* and *c* with *j*, *š* and *ş* with *sh*, and long vowels have not generally been highlighted. Where no other guide has been available some Turkish names have been transliterated directly from their Persian spelling.

Persian and Arabic characters have been transliterated according to the table given below.

ا	a, i, o, e
آ	ā
ب	b
پ	p
ت	t
ث	th, <u>s</u>
ج	j
چ	ch
ح	h
خ	kh
د	d
ذ	ḍ
ر	r
ز	z
ژ	zh
س	s

ش	sh
ص	\$
ض	z
ط	t
ظ	z
ع	c
غ	gh
ف	f
ق	q
ك	k
گ	g
ل	l
م	m
ن	n
و	v, w
ه, هـ	h
ي	i, y
ئ	‘
و	ū
ی	ī



Plate 0.2 East meets west: a Persian prince entertaining a Mongol princess

(frontispiece of the Munis al-ahrār, from the Dār al-Āthār al-Isāmiyya collection, Kuwait).

1

THE SOURCES

After being proclaimed Great Khan of the nomadic tribes of the Asian steppe lands Chinggis Khan and his progeny went on to establish the largest ever, continuous land Empire on earth. At its apogee in the mid-thirteenth century this empire was to stretch from the China Sea and Manchuria in the east to the Carpathians and Anatolia in the west, from the Sind valley in the south to the lands of the Bulgars and the Ural Mountains in the north. The Mongols' advent was so resounding and sudden that their impact has been recorded in the history books of all the lands and cultures they overran. A Persian witness has summarised this initial impact in one harrowing sentence, 'They came, they sacked, they burnt, they slew, they plundered and they departed'.² In Russia a chronicler from Novgorod who was unfortunate enough to have witnessed the legendary reconnaissance trip of the Mongol generals, Subedai and Jebe, in 1222, expressed the stunned and horrified bemusement of the peoples of the Russian steppes when he wrote:

*No one exactly knows who they are, nor whence they came out, nor what their language is, nor of what race they are, nor what their faith is . . . God alone knows who they are and whence they came out.*³

If nothing else the legacy of the Mongol decades is a wealth of rich source material fully expressive of the impact they created on all whose paths they trampled.

The lands of Persia and Anatolia became one of the divisions of this great Empire and it was these western lands that were supposedly royally bequeathed to Hülegü Khan, a grandson of Chinggis through his son Tului, by his brother, Möngke. The effects of the Mongol-led nomadic movements into Persia and the west were profound and this has been reflected in the prodigious output of superior histories and chronicles as well as other literary and artistic expressions which have become a hallmark of the Il-Khanate years of ascendancy, from Hülegü's destruction of the Ismāīlis at Alamūt in 1256 until the death of Aba Saīd in 1335. The aim of this study is to demonstrate the marked contrast between the initial in-roads of the Mongol armies and

military governors into Iran and the later advance of the armies under Hülegü Khan and the establishment of a Mongol-dominated administration. The initial encounters between the advancing tribes of Turan and the population of Iran were often hostile and aggressive. When, over a generation later, Hülegü led his host southward the meeting was, in contrast, one between a king and his subjects and for the most part one of welcome. The Il-Khans did not come as conquerors nor did they come as aliens. The *ordus* in which the Mongol princes were nurtured were not the rough camps of the steppe but were more akin to mobile cities. These cities were alive with the life of the empire, intellectual, cultural and political. The élite of the Persian city-states were no strangers to the Mongol *ordus*. For the Turco-Persian establishment, the Mongols were in many ways welcome allies in their struggle to regain the glory of a Persian past. The reigns of Hülegü and his son and successor, Abaqa, reflected this changed relationship.

Though source material for the Mongol invasion and their subsequent rule of Western Asia is hardly scarce and can be found both extant and indirectly in a number of languages including Persian, Arabic, Chaghataid Turkish, Armenian, Georgian, Syriac as well as eastern languages such as Mongolian and Chinese, what is sadly lacking is the type of administrative documentation which to this day continues to delight and excite the historians of the Ottoman Empire. The extant source material for the Mongol invasion and the rule of the Il-Khans for the most part was written by high ranking politicians, leading clerics, literary figures and ranking administrative notables rather than anonymous bureaucrats filling royal cellars with the minutiae of the kingdom's daily life. Much that would have been recorded must have been lost. Unlike the Mamluks whose capital, Cairo, remained a continuous and principal city throughout their own rule and, after their demise, continued until the present day as a capital city, the Il-Khanid capital changed from the original site at Maragheh, today a leafy, provincial market town, to Tabriz and then to, now largely abandoned, Sultaniyya over the eight decades of their rule. It was only the most valued of their written material which was able to survive the ravages of Persia's very turbulent history and often harsh climate. Even the enormous lengths to which the Grand Vizier, Rashid al-Din went in order to ensure that his work was saved for posterity, failed to preserve more than a fraction of the manuscripts that he had copied of his writings.⁴ Though these chronological sources are rich with the flavour of their times and alive with the political intrigues of the feuding royal courts their content is invariably subjective to varying degrees in a way in which dry lists of figures and sackfuls of uncommented upon data would never be. It is

the lack of hard administrative data and the subjective nature of much of the narrative material which can act as both a boon and a bane to the historian. A boon in the sense that the sources are extremely conducive to speculation and interpretation but a bane in that so much speculation and clever interpretation can rarely be backed up by hard statistical data and reliable figures.

Persian had become an important medium of communication for much of the Mongol Empire by the mid-thirteenth century and Persian merchants, bureaucrats and administrators could be found throughout the Mongol dominated lands. The Persian histories written from this period onward reflect this universality and the great Persian chronicles have become sources not only for knowledge of local events but for the study of the medieval world as a whole. Two early histories of this period are the *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā* (History of the World Conqueror) of Aṭā Malik Juwaynī completed around 1260 and the *ẓabaqāt-i Nāsiri*⁵ of Minhāj al-Dīn Jūzjānī similarly completed around 1260. They were written by unacquainted authors writing from radically different circumstances but whose subject matter was often convergent. They are representative of other histories composed at that time in that, although partisan, the direction and influence of this bias is not difficult to detect and compensate for and for the most part the histories are reliable. These two particular histories clearly demonstrate this reliability in that one was composed by a leading member of Hülegü's administration and someone obviously sympathetic to the Toluid cause while the *ẓabaqāt* was completed in the Delhi Sultanate by an exile from the west who held no love for the Mongols and blamed them for the destruction of his homeland and who was also beyond their reach, and yet both histories are in agreement over the basic chronology and accounts and sometimes even their assessment of those turbulent years.

Juwaynī (1226–83) came from a distinguished line of high court officials who had reputedly served under rulers from the Abbāsids, the Saljuqs and the Khwārazmshāhs before excelling themselves under the Il-Khans. He had been brought up after the horrors of the initial Mongol invasions of Persia in the royal *ordu* with presumably other nobles of Mongol, Turk and Persian background and spent his whole working life in the service of the Mongol rulers of his homeland. He wrote with a unique insider's knowledge of the Mongol administration and society and of many of the events he came to describe. Before entering Hülegü Khan's service in c.1255 Juwaynī by his own account had oft travelled east.⁶ Appointed to Hülegü's service by Arghun Aqa, the former Mongol administrator of Iraq 'Ajam and Anatolia, Juwaynī was to accompany his King on the triumphant march across Khorasan to the new capital at Maragheh in Azerbaijan and was an active

witness to the destruction of the Ismā'īlī strongholds in the Elborz mountains in 1256. It was Juwaynī's hand that drafted the *Fath-nameh of Alamūt*,⁷ the official account of the final fall of the Imam of the Assassins, the young Rukn al-Dīn Khurshāh. Juwaynī was crucial to the negotiations which brought about the surrender of the 'Heretics' fortresses and it was Juwaynī who was first given access to the famed libraries of Alamūt to salvage whatever was his want. After the fall of the Abbāsid caliphate in 1258 he was made governor of Baghdad, a post he held almost until his death. Juwaynī has often come under attack for his supposed sycophancy to his masters with historians from the nineteenth-century d'Ohrsson who considered Juwaynī and his like, 'the most corrupt persons, taking service under these ferocious masters, obtained, as the price of their vile devotion, wealth, honours and the power to oppress their countrymen'⁸ to the modern scholar David Ayalon berating him for his 'servile flattery'⁹ not only to the Mongols but to his master's particular branch of the Chinggisid family. This dismissal of Juwaynī as a 'partisan panegyrist'¹⁰ of the Tului Chinggisids and Ayalon's 'nauseous'¹¹ reaction to Persian ceremonial politeness is vastly overstated and imbues literary filigree with undeserved gravity. Even E. G. Browne's half hearted defence of the man 'whose circumstances compelled him to speak with civility of the barbarians whom it was his misfortune to serve.'¹² does grave injustice to an able administrator, an astute historian, a gifted writer and moreover a man who gained the praise and respect of his compatriots and co-religionists then and in succeeding generations and whose family has been revered in Iranian literary tradition prior to and subsequent to his time.¹³ David Morgan's partial rehabilitation of Juwaynī's reputation¹⁴ is to be welcomed in that it has at least started a trend not only of re-examining the historians and bureaucrats of the Il-Khanate but also of reappraising the nature of Mongol and in particular Il-Khanid rule itself.

The existence of an independently written parallel history with which to contrast and compare Juwaynī's work has done much to strengthen the credibility of the *Jahān Gushā*. Minhāj al-Dīn Sarāj Jūzjānī's *ẓabaqāt-i Nāṣiri* is basically a history of the Ghūrīds of central Afghanistan, though it purports to be a universal history, and it is broken into twenty-three sections opening with an account of Adam and the patriarchs and closing with a long section on the Mongols until 1260. Jūzjānī was born and then entered service under the Ghūrīds (c.1000–1256).¹⁵ He was witness to the excesses of the Mongols and was forced to flee his native lands in 1226 and seek refuge in the Sultanate of Delhi. His attitude towards the conquerors of his homeland is never left in any doubt. Throughout the section detailing the irruption of the Mongols in Islam, Chinggis's name is

repeatedly coupled with the epithet ‘*mal’ūn*’ or ‘the Accursed’ and Mongols and their soldiers never merely die but are invariably ‘consigned to Hell’ in contrast to Muslim casualties who always ‘attained martyrdom’. Jūzjānī delights in recording the gory details of the atrocities committed by the Mongols though he is usually careful to cite the sources of his information and his own assessment of their reliability. The basic outline of both accounts of the initial Mongol invasion and the subsequent arrival of Hülegü Khan are in agreement in both histories which reflects credit on both chroniclers and more importantly provides a reliable framework upon which to judge other sources as to their accuracy and impartiality.

Though, with understandable reasons, Jūzjānī remains openly antagonistic toward the Mongols this does not blind him to any virtues that they might have possessed. Where praise was due, such as in matters of military prowess and discipline, Jūzjānī does not hold back.

*The Chinggis Khan moreover in [the administration of] justice was such, that, throughout his whole camp, it was impossible for any person to take up a fallen whip from the ground except he were the owner of it; and, throughout his whole army, no one could give indication of [the existence of] lying and theft.*¹⁶

Nor does he refrain from treating Chinggis Khan’s son and successor, Ögödei Qa’an, who was generally credited with having shown compassion and great sympathy for his Muslim subjects, with respect and positive treatment. For his part Juwaynī did in no way attempt to whitewash the effects of the Mongol invasions and he made no attempts to conceal the horrors which his masters rained upon those who were foolish enough to oppose them. Juwaynī’s history in particular became a major source for the subsequent historians who were to write about the Mongol years and, regardless of these later writers’ attitude to the subjects of their pens, their view of the historian and Mongol administrator, Juwaynī, is generally one of the greatest regard.

What quickly becomes evident when dealing with the source material which relates to this period of the early Il-Khanate is that not only an assessment of the actual material is important but that an assessment of the compiler of the material and his situation and circumstances is also of crucial significance. A later, perhaps better known historian of the Il-Khanate was the Grand Vizier of Ghazan Khan (1295–1304), Rashīd al-Dīn (1247–1318), whose remarkable *Collection of Histories*¹⁷ was commissioned by his king to ensure that the glorious history of the Mongols would not fade from men’s

memories, demonstrates this point. Though he made extensive use of Juwaynī's *Tārikh-Jahān Gushā*, Rashīd al-Dīn as chief minister and official historian of the Il-Khanate, had access to a vast wealth of material from Mongol and Chinese sources as well as from the rich libraries of the domains under his own control. He wrote in a straightforward, unadorned Persian and it is this plain factual presentation of his subject matter, in such glaring contrast to other Persian writers of the time, that has lent his work such authority and given his interpretation of events their general acceptance by so many subsequent historians. A great deal of his history concerns his own time and the administrative reforms of his master Ghazan Khan which he had been instrumental in formulating. Ghazan was the Il-Khan who made Islam the official religion of the Mongols of Persia and ended the so-called interregnum¹⁸ of infidel rule in Persia. Rashīd al-Dīn details at great length the ambitious programmes of reform that his sovereign, the Pādishāh of Islam, would implement in order to put to an end the grave injustices, the widespread anarchy and corruption, and the chronic economic plight of the country that existed on his ascension of the Il-Khanate throne. Edicts, proclamations and legal rulings are given verbatim and, of course, since it was Rashīd al-Dīn himself who was responsible for drawing up, planning and implementing these laws these documents are undoubtedly the genuine articles. On the basis of these histories with their unique documentary contents and unembellished style, the picture of Ghazan that emerged and has persisted is that of the king who saved Persia from barbarian rule, re-established Islam in its rightful place in the life of the country, and lifted the exploitative, wealth draining and destructive taxation practices of Mongol oppression. However, as David Morgan has pointed out,¹⁹ Rashīd al-Dīn's relationship with his master has rarely been taken into account when assessing the *Jāmial-Tavārikh* and it is also overlooked that Rashīd al-Dīn was a politician and was very consciously writing for future generations and that it was very much his own role in history that he was committing to universal memory. With these points taken into account traditional views of the years preceding Ghazan Khan must surely be carefully re-examined. Since Rashīd al-Dīn provided the basis for many of the works of contemporary and later historians his bias has infiltrated the writings and interpretations of many of the subsequent scholars of Mongol rule in Persia, inside and outside the country. One very positive influence that Rashīd al-Dīn passed on was a universality of vision obvious in such writers as Abū Sulaymān Banākātī²⁰ of Transoxiana who was a poet-laureate from 1301–2 for Ghazan Khan. Whereas many Persian historians neither had interest in, nor wrote about, other cultures, religions or histories not directly associated with

Islam or Persian history, writers such as Banākātī inspired by Rashīd al-Dīn and the Mongol court of Persia recorded information concerning Europeans, Jews, Chinese, Indians, Mongols and others. This same universality is found in that other intellectual giant of the age, ‘the Supreme Mawlānā, the Teacher of Mankind, the Sultan of Philosophers, the Most Excellent of the Moderns, the Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn zaṣī (may God envelop him in his mercy)’²¹ especially in the introduction to his *Zij al-Ilkhani*.²²

It is the lack of archival evidence that makes the assessment of the writers and compilers of the histories of this time so important. The gaps left in the story of the Il-Khanate were filled most notably by two other court officials, namely Abdallāh ibn Faẓlallāh of Shiraz or *Waṣṣāf-i Ḥaẓrat* (Court Panegyrist), a contemporary of Rashīd al-Dīn, and Abū al-Qasem Abdollah Qāshānī, probably a researcher in Rashīd al-Dīn’s employ. *Waṣṣāf*’s history, *Tārīkh-i Waṣṣāf*,²³ was intended as a continuation of Juwaynī’s *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā*, and it was submitted with its author by the chief minister, Rashīd al-Dīn, to Sultan Öljeitü in Sultaniyya on June 1, 1312. *Waṣṣāf* was a collector of government revenue and a protégé of the Grand Vizier and unfortunately for the modern reader, an indispensable source for the period. ‘Unfortunately’ because ‘the highly artificial character and tedious redundancy of [his chronicle’s] style’²⁴ makes for painfully laborious reading, a view almost universally shared by modern scholars. To the great relief of many, an abridged version of *Waṣṣāf* is now available.²⁵ Qāshānī was also a contemporary of Rashīd al-Dīn and in fact after the Grand Vizier’s execution in 1318 he claimed authorship of the great statesman’s histories.²⁶ It is probable that Qāshānī might have been employed by Rashīd al-Dīn as a research assistant and might well have had a hand in the compilation of the *Collection of Histories* but as the editor of Qāshānī’s *Tārīkh-i Öljeitü*, Mahin Hambly, concludes, ‘the contrast in styles between [the two histories] makes it highly improbable that the same hand could have written both.’²⁷ Qāshānī’s work lacks the professionalism of the other great Persian histories of the Il-Khanid period. It has no literary pretensions, it has been compiled rather haphazardly and contains a number of inaccuracies but it remains an invaluable source of information about the month by month workings of Öljeitü’s court and after the torture of wading through the hyperbole and obscure allusions of *Waṣṣāf* it is a relief to read plain, factual Persian.

A crop of excellent histories were written after the Il-Khanid period yet they remain valuable sources since they had access to material no longer extant and their attitudes towards this period of pagan rule can be indicative of the consensus of contemporary opinion. Ḥāfiẓ Abrū (d.1430), Abd al-Razzāq of Samarqand (d.1463), and Faṣīḥī of Khwāf

(b.1375–6) have all made invaluable contributions to the understanding of the Mongol period. Mention should also be made of a much later source, Khwāndamīr, a court historian who served under the Safavids and had access to much more material than is available today. Khwāndamīr's²⁸ (1475–1535) interpretation of the events of two centuries before his own time is important and revealing in that the Safavid dynasty traced its roots back to the patronage of the Il-Khans and the official retrospective attitude to that period of infidel rule in Persia should reveal something of the consensus of opinion that developed during the reign and after the demise of the Mongol Persian kings. Even though Shāh Ismail, the first Safavid Shah (r.1501–24), sought legitimacy through claimed descent from the Shi'ites holy family,²⁹ the legacy of the Central Asian steppes and of Mongol rule in Persia was still very much evident in the Safavid court and administration.

Another government official whose works have proved valuable is Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī of Qazvin whose *Select History* or *Tārīkh-i Guzīda* was finished in 1330 and whose very revealing geographical work, *Nazhat al-Qulab* was completed a few years later after the death of the last Il-Khan (d.1335). He also composed a history of the Mongols in verse in the style of the Shāhnāme of Ferdowsi, the *aafarnāmah*. This neglected work though based largely on Rashīd al-Dīn's work provides details, comments, descriptions and insights found nowhere else.³⁰ Mustawfī had been appointed the superintendent of finances of Qazvin, Abhar, Zanjan and Tarumayn by Rashīd al-Dīn whom he considered his mentor and his geographical survey the *Nazhat al-Qulūb* has proved a mine of information for economic and demographic data relating to medieval Persia with scholars such as Le Strange basing his study, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*³¹ on the book and more recently A. K. S. Lambton making valuable use of its information for her classic and essential studies of the period, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*³² and *Continuity and Change*.³³ An earlier financial adviser of considerable reputation, the enigmatic figure of the philosopher/vizier Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī (1201–74) described variously as a 'double-dyed traitor'³⁴ and as 'the most perfect and wisest man in the world'.³⁵ held a prominent position in both Hülegü's and Abaqa's courts and though most of his considerable literary output was devoted to theology, philosophy, astrology and the sciences he also wrote a factual, unembellished account of the fall of Baghdad (1258)³⁶ in which he took part and a memorandum on finance³⁷ presumably written as part of his duties as overseer of *waqfs* or religious endowments. As mentioned above, the introductory passage to a manuscript of Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī's astrological tables reveals something of the cosmopolitan company in which he mixed in

Apart from the great histories written from within the Il-Khanid court a number of other histories and commentaries have survived which cast more light on this period and the men who shaped, charted and also recorded the events. The cities and provinces of Yazd, Shiraz, Kirman, Shabānkāra, Mazandaran and Sistān all have local histories of differing qualities and detail which contain a great deal of information inaccessible elsewhere.³⁹ Local histories such as the *Tārīkh-nāmeḥ-ye Harāt*⁴⁰ written c.1320 which charts the turbulent history of the city from the invasion of Chinggis Khan, provide different perspectives on the great events of the day and their effects on the affairs of the provinces. Again these histories must be judged in the context of the time and place of their composition. Sayfī, the author of the *Tārīkh-nāmeḥ-ye Harāt* incurred the displeasure of the Mongols at one time for his writing which almost cost him his life. Later he fell under the patronage of one of the Kart⁴¹ princes whose favour did not survive his death and left the author attempting to ingratiate himself with the royal successors. Whereas Juwaynī had been writing under the patronage of one who relished his family's bloodied reputation and whose position on the throne was as secure as could have been hoped for at that time, Sayfī was writing for a prince of a minor dynasty, vassals to the mighty Il-Khans, who was very much a slave to the vagaries of fate and the chronicler's words would therefore have been more circumspect and politically conscious of any present and future impact of his writing. It is Sayfī who has been partly responsible for the ongoing debate about the extent of the Mongol devastation of Khorasan with his wildly exaggerated figures for the death toll in Herat itself and also in the city of Nishapur after the first irruptions of the Mongols in Khorasan.⁴²

Two other local histories composed however after the death of Abū Saīd, the last Il-Khan, throw a quite different light on the years of Mongol rule. Āmulī, writing a history⁴³ of one of the Caspian provinces, speaks glowingly of the golden years of Mongol rule in Persia, as does Abū Bakr al-Quṭbī al-Aḥarī,⁴⁴ a writer at the court of the Mongol Jalayirids, successors to the Il-Khans. Writing in 1362, twenty-five years after the demise of the Il-Khanate, Āmalī's rather nostalgic vision of an Il-Khan Golden Age perhaps says more about the anarchy and insecurity of his own time than of the prosperity and tranquillity of the eighty years of Mongol rule. He in particular remarks on the rule of Ghazan Khan, Öljeitü and Abū Saīd as having been quiet and peaceful, 'in that time of [those Il-Khan] Kings, Iran was tranquil and free from the aggression of intruders'.⁴⁵ It was an age he even compared to an earthly paradise, admirable and luxuriantly cheerful like the Garden of Paradise, tranquil and secure like the

sanctuary of the Kaba'⁴⁶ This view is echoed by the Jalayirid historian (c.1360), Abū Bakr al-Qutbī al-Aharī, who saw the turn of the century during Ghazan's reign as a time of peace and justice, During that time the whole of Iran was graced by the justice of the King of Islam, who held back the oppressor's hand from (harming) the oppressed'⁴⁷ and that this prosperity continued under rule of his brother, Öljeitü Khodabandah, 'The country (was) flourishing and the army well organised'⁴⁸ but reached its apogee in the time of Abū Saīd, 'The time of his government was the best period of the domination of the Mongols'.⁴⁹ However such views taken in hindsight and from a period of great political instability and economic chaos must be judged accordingly. The abrupt collapse of the Il-Khanate following the death of the heirless Abū Saīd left anarchy and a time of great confusion in its wake and the nostalgia and tinted memories of this period's chroniclers must be taken into account.

Further west, Anatolia has produced two major histories both detailing the Saljuqs of Rum. Aqsarā'ī under-exploited *Musâmerat al-Akḥbār*⁵⁰ describes Anatolia during the chaotic period from 1282–1323 from which information it can be deduced that he must have occupied an important position in his native city's financial administration and was privy to the activities of the Mongol governors sent from Azerbaijan by the Il-Khans. The better-known work of Ibn Bibī, a panegyrist at the Saljuqid court, *History of the Saljuqs*, was written at the request of Juwaynī and covers the history of Rum from 1192–1282 describing the major events in Anatolia and Cilicia. Ibn Bibī's family had served at a succession of Persian courts and the historian's fine education is mirrored in his florid, allusion-filled style. A later anonymous writer compiled an abridged version of Ibn Bibī's history eliminating the wearisome mythological allusions and the worst excesses of the contrived florid diction.⁵¹

Il-Khanid poetry and Sufi-related literature, another rich source of material dating from the Mongol period, has long been readily available and has been the subject of much learned study but as a reflection of political, social and economic history it has rarely been exploited. That these Sufis and poets lived in an age when patronage of the arts was active and encouraged in the highest circles is in itself revealing of the nature of the times. The Juwaynī family were keen patrons of a number of poets prominent among whom was Sa'dī of Shiraz. The correspondence between Shams al-Dīn, the *Īlāḥīy Dīwān* (Chief Minister) and his brother Aṭā Malik Juwaynī, the governor of Baghdad, and the poet of Shiraz, Sa'dī is considerable and reveals an intimate relationship. Their regard for the poet is revealed in the story concerning Sa'dī's apparent meeting with Abaqa Khan.⁵² Before Hülegü's march into Persia Sa'dī had been in self-imposed exile from

the turmoil of his homeland but in a poem in the introduction to his *Gulistan* the poet explains that he had returned home in 1258 since a time of peace and stability was now heralded in the land replacing the anarchy which had prevailed for over three decades.

A poet such as the satirist Pūr-i Bahā' also received patronage from the Juwaynis and his work belies the commonly held assumption that the Persian intelligentsia were afraid ever to raise the hand of dissent or criticism against their Mongol masters. His poems, which present the greatest difficulty for the translator, being full of Turkish and Mongol imports, are unafraid of lambasting the harsh taxes then currently imposed.⁵³ These Turkish and Mongol idioms were manifestly words then in common daily usage, a fact not readily obvious from reading the court language of the usual sources. Another poet, Majd al-Dīn Hamgar, who also dedicated his poems to the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*, wrote verse exalting his love of travel and his epicure's taste for regional food⁵⁴ with the clear implication that under the rule of the Il-Khans, the so-called barbarians from the east, trade in fine foods and free travel were very much possible.

Compilations of poets and poems were mixed with historical narrative just as the histories were usually spiced with selections of poetry. As is the case with Dawlatshāh's *Ta.kirat al-Shu'arā*, written c.1487, these compendiums are not always very accurate in their historical and anecdotal detail. The *Mu'nis al-Aḥrār*⁵⁵ of Muḥammad b. Badr al-Jājarmī completed c.1341 is another lesser known source and contains much of the work of Pūr-i Bahā'. The works recounting the lives of saints and Sufis must likewise be treated cautiously but can still offer up valuable insights into the times that they are describing. Ibn Bazzāz Ardībīlī's *Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā*,⁵⁶ though composed c.1358 after the death of his subject, Shaykh Ṣafī, offers some intriguing perceptions and anecdotes among its fantastic and magical stories and legends as does Ibn al-Karbalā'ī (d.1590),⁵⁷ the sixteenth-century chronicler of Persian Sufism. Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī is another source of knowledge about the political and social climate of his times, directly and indirectly. His collection of discourses touch on his relationship with the Mongols' ruler in Rum, the Parvāna, while the sometimes fantastical history of the Mevlevi Sufi order by Aflākī (written 1318–53) recounts the legends, myths, and sometimes, it would seem, the 'reality' of the early years of Ramī's family and their flight from the east to the sanctuary of Anatolia.⁵⁸ Another contemporary of Ramī, Farīdan Aḥmad Sepahsālār, wrote a shorter work on his master after much reluctance because of his own inadequacy and persuasion, 'Though the Āmayeh cannot be drained dry, enough can be tasted to slate one's thirst',⁵⁹ and this work is generally considered to be more biographically accurate.

Though undoubtedly the major sources for current knowledge of the Il-Khanate, the Persian texts are by no means the only important basis for study. Another memorable history composed under the auspices of the Il-Khans was first written in Syriac and later translated by the author into Arabic. Bar Hebraeus' *Political History of the World*⁶⁰ is presented as a universal history and plots the course of mankind's history from Adam until Hebraeus' death in 1286. His later history of the early Il-Khans, the Ayyabid statelets and the rise of the Mamluks of Egypt were often based on his own experiences and he was allowed access to the Il-Khans' libraries in Maragheh and Tabriz. By profession a leading Jacobite cleric, by inclination a scholar and historian, and by disposition a truly humble mystic Bar Hebraeus' universal history is a remarkable and invaluable piece of scholarship. Unlike other chronicling clerics Abū Faraj, as he was also known, was not prone to emotional diatribes, verbal subterfuge, patent exaggeration, or deliberate lying and since he was not in the pay of any particular court and was only answerable, in his view, to God but also possibly to his own small Christian community he was under no undue pressure to imbue his narrative with any political slant. Noticeably lacking in his contemporary narratives are any excessive praise or over strong denunciations. His aim was objectivity and his audience, as his widely requested Arabic version demonstrated, was not exclusively Christian but Muslim and Jewish as well. Unfortunately other Christian writers of this time did not follow the example of this worthy Syriac cleric.

The Armenians found themselves at the forefront of all the Mongols' western wars, both as victims and as allies and partners. Their chronicles switch from cursing these half-human emissions from hell to eulogies in praise of the Tatars' military prowess, moral integrity and impartial justice. Some of the Armenian material such as the *Lytell Cronycle*⁶¹ of the historian and member of the Cilician court, Hetoum, is blatant propaganda and was written in an attempt to persuade the European Christian powers to throw their forces behind the Il-Khan/Armenian alliance against the Mamluks. Georgian and Armenian forces, after years of oppression from the Tatars, willingly joined Hülegü in his assault on Baghdad and many of them achieved high military office under their Il-Khanid masters some of whom themselves professed Christianity including Hülegü's major wife and his most prominent general, Kitbuqa. The Armenian and Georgian sources generally written by clerics often reflect this ambivalent attitude. The main criticism of these sources apart from the lack of objectivity is their parochial and self-serving attitude and their obsession with their own petty but often bloody and fratricidal disputes.

Translations of Armenian texts have appeared in English since the late Middle Ages. A *Lytell Cronycle*, Hetoum's history of the rise of the Mongols, the subsequent conflicts between the Il-Khans and the Mamluks of Egypt with the involvement of the Armenians of Cilicia, and the final plea to the Christians of Europe to join in an anti-Muslim alliance was written in French and Latin c.1307. The history, *La Fleur des histoires de la terre d'Orient*, from the pen of an Armenian aristocrat enjoyed great popularity when it first appeared and the anonymous English translation printed by Richard Pynson eventually followed around 1518. An earlier chronicle from the Cilician court was written by the Constable Smpad (1208–76) who, in 1248–50, had preceded his king, Hetoum I in visiting the Mongol capital, Qaraqorum and as Commander-in-Chief of the Cilician army was privy to many of the negotiations between the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia and the Mongols. Like other histories from Cilicia, Smpad's chronicle⁶² has proved valuable to historians of the Crusades. Another history written in Armenian Cilicia by the Abbot of Akner, Grigor, and completed in 1273 illustrates some of the worst qualities of some of the Armenian sources. In Grigor's *History of the Nation of Archers*,⁶³ oral sources account for much of his information and the many inaccuracies and sometimes the plain fantasy that results jeopardise the credibility of the rest of the material. One of his stories claims that Hülegü forced Muslims to wash and feed pigs and decapitated any who refused to eat pig flesh.⁶⁴ Such a story has not appeared in any other sources.

Kirakos of Ganjak (1201–72) is maybe the most important of the Armenian sources⁶⁵ and he had the unfortunate advantage as a historian of living in Greater Armenia and of having first hand experience of the Turco-Mongol invasion and occupation of the Caucasus. He was captured by the Mongols and served for a time as one of their secretaries along with his distinguished teacher and historian, Vanakan (d.1251), and while in captivity he learnt Mongolian, as a result of which he produced a lexicon of some fifty-five Mongolian terms with their Armenian equivalents.

Though Kirakos expressed some grudging praise for his new masters he was nowhere as converted a fan as other educated notables of his time. A contemporary of Kirakos, Vardan Arewelci,⁶⁶ became a confidant of Hülegü Khan and a religious intimate of his wife, Dokuz Khātūn and his history composed around 1267 reflects his pro-Mongol sentiments. He records the death of Hülegü thus; 'At the beginning of the year 714 of the Armenian era [1265] the final summons reached that great man, and broke the staff of the powerful, valiant, and victorious Hulawu.'⁶⁷ Like Vardan, the cleric and historian Stepannos⁶⁸ of the illustrious Orbelean family who prospered under the Il-Khans, was befriended by his Mongol overlords and his

admiration for their religious tolerance and wisdom was expressed in his historical work.

One other major source from this area deserves mention since it has not been studied specifically for its relevance to the early Il-Khanate as yet. The Georgian *History of Kart'li* and specifically that part of it known as the *Anonymous Chronicle: 1207–1318* dispenses with flowery, repetitive language and minimises the use of tales of the fantastic and the miraculous which tend to plague other medieval histories and makes use of a wide variety of materials, some of which are no longer extant, in many languages including Mongolian.⁶⁹ These 'Christian' sources provide a very useful alternative view of the Il-Khan kingdom from that of the insider Persian historians. Though the Cilician Armenians became early allies of the Mongols and the nobles of Greater Armenia achieved distinction and honour at the Il-Khans' court and on the battlefield under the Tatar flag, they never achieved the intimacy and the understanding that existed between the Mongols and their Persian courtiers and this fact must be remembered in studying their manuscripts.

Arabic literature of course abounds in references to the Mongols, though the controversial Ibn FuwAṭī is one of the few Arabic sources writing from a position within the Il-Khanid administration.⁷⁰ The historian Ibn al- Athīr's harrowing words have etched an image of a murderous avalanche which is still present today. 'O would that my mother had never borne me, that I had died before [the Mongol invasion] and that I were forgotten . . . the evil spread everywhere. It moved across the lands like a cloud before the wind'.⁷¹ Ibn al-Athīr (1160–1234) was however no eyewitness and his accounts are at best second hand. He was born and begun his scholarly career in Mosul. He travelled throughout Syria and the Levant before retiring to his books. His chronicles so vividly conveying the horrors of the Mongol approach would have been most welcome by the Tatar generals if they had been literate since the relatively small Mongol soldiery depended for their success to a large degree on the amount of terror they were able to generate in the towns and garrisons that they hoped to invest. The Arabic sources most useful for the study of the early Il-Khanate are those which deal with the Mamluk/Mongol wars and which are often eye-witness accounts. The main Persian sources do not dwell on matters west of the Euphrates possibly because they were considered peripheral to the major events affecting the kingdom namely relations with the northern Golden Horde and the Chagatai threat on the eastern borders. For a study of the Mongols' relationship with the Mamluks and the Crusader states it is Arabic and European sources that must be consulted.

As well as local histories and the evidence left by archaeology, art

history and the mapping of trade patterns the accounts and attitudes of later medieval historians can also be most revealing. As well as having access to sources no longer extant these later historians such as the Safavid Khwāndamīr or the Timūrids, Nizam al-Dīn Shāmī⁷² and Ḥāfiẓ Abrū,⁷³ the Jalayirid historians and even the Egyptian Ibn Taghribirdi⁷⁴ divulge much through the attitude which these later writers adopt toward their subjects, an attitude which would have been reflective of the political views regarding this pivotal period then prevalent. Though the Il-Khans are considered to have disappeared with the demise of Abū Saīd in 1335, Hülegü and Chinggis Khan were still regarded as a source of royal legitimacy long after this.

Numerous strands emanate from the early Il-Khanate years but a comprehensive study has yet to be made concentrating on the first decades of the era in order to weave these loose wefts into a compact warp. Many scholars have covered the early Il-Khan period but the focus of their studies has often been elsewhere. David Morgan's publications have dealt with the Mongol settlement of Persia in the wider context of the growth and expansion of the Mongol Empire and its place in the evolving history of nomadic rule in Persia. Ayalon, Amitai and Irwin have studied this epoch from the Mamluk point of view concentrating on Il-Khan–Mamluk relations, both Cahen and Vryonis have covered aspects of the Il-Khanid impact on Anatolia, Petrushevsky has published work on the economic and social conditions of the Il-Khanate as a whole while Lambton has looked at this period in comparison with the earlier influx of nomadic groups. Vernadsky, Halperin and Fennell have all considered Hülegü's kingdom from the point of view of Russia and the Golden Horde. These studies all provide invaluable information and insights concerning the early years but their primary concern was not with defining the first decades of the Il-Khanate as a distinctive development in the evolution of the Persian state. Instead they have, to different degrees, accepted the ascendancy of Ghazan Khan as the pivotal point in the Mongol conquest of Persia, a view which is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.

What is emerging from the continuing reassessment of much of the very varied source material pertaining to Persia in the second half of the thirteenth century is that the traditional view of Hülegü as a blood-thirsty warlord and of his son and heir as a barbarian tyrant, and of the opening years of Mongol rule in Persia as a blemish on that civilisation's proud history is erroneous. The sources must be reappraised and the picture redrawn and this period from 1256 until 1282 recognised as the period of cultural growth and vitality it increasingly appears to have been.

2

DIVINE PUNISHMENT OR GOD'S SECRET INTENT?

Whether Hülegü (1215–65)⁷⁵ embarked on this vast expedition to the west with the intention of founding the Il-Khan dynasty or whether it was intended that, the task of completing his father's discontinued punitive subjugation of Persia executed, he should return to Qaraqorum has been the cause of much contention since 1978.⁷⁶ Rashīd al-Dīn infers that the commission was intentionally vague.

*Now although Menggu [Möngke] Qa'an was resolved and determined in his mind that Hülegü Khan with the armies he had given him, should remain permanently in Persia as the ruler of that country, and that it should be settled, as it is, upon him and his illustrious descendants, nevertheless he ostensibly commanded him, when he should have completed this mission, to return to his original encampment.*⁷⁷

However since the Mongol princes of the Golden Horde, who became rivals and later military adversaries of their southern neighbours, neither made mention of, let alone exploited, such a possible lack of legitimacy and apparent usurpation of their own territorial rights other than those claims in the Caucasus, it would appear that Hülegü's kingly assumption of power was generally recognised.⁷⁸

The court official and historian, Aṭā Malik Juwaynī, who was intimately connected with the Mongol court all his working life, did not express awareness of any ambiguity in Hülegü's appointment and suggested that it was the Qa'an's recognition of his master's qualities of kingship and proficiency for conquest which determined him to select his brother for the task of fully integrating the west into the Empire.

*Mengu [Möngke] Qa'an had seen in the character of his brother Hülegü the indications of sovereignty and had detected in his enterprises the practices of conquest. . . . and charged him with the conquest of the western parts.*⁷⁹

This was a man widely respected, a deference evident in Juwaynī's work where praise is neither too excessive nor wholly uncalled for and where disproportionate praise was doubtfully obligatory. Juwaynī himself does not seem to be indulging in empty panegyrics when he describes Hülegü as,

*renowned for his firmness and dignity, his vigilance and caution, his powerful protection and his jealous sense of honour.*⁸⁰

Writing much later toward the end of the Il-Khanid period (c.1335) Mustawfī Qazwīnī was profuse in his praise of Hülegü and in his *aafar-nāmeḥ* he recounts the following tale of the Qāzī from Qazvin at Möngke's court. After warning the new Qa'an of the ever-present danger of the Ismāīlīs the Qāzī uncovers one of their agents at the heart of the Mongol administration. So impressed is Möngke with the Qāzī's insight that he invites him to choose from amongst the assembled courtiers, princes and nobles the man most suited to lead the Mongol forces across the Ama Daryā to crush the Ismāīlī threat.

*[Möngke] said to the qādī [qāzī], 'Whom would you wish, out of all these exalted ones, to go to Iran to undertake the war and raise an army against the heretics and drive them out?' The qādī looked around at the nobles and princes and the kinsmen of the Qa'an. He chose Hülegü, seeing on him the countenance of farr. [magnificence, glory, power, dignity, etc.] He said to Möngke, 'Apart from this young man, there is none here that should be sent to Iran.'*⁸¹

Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī's *aafarnāmah* not only claims that confirmation of the appropriateness of Möngke's choice of Hülegü came from the *qāzī al-quṣāt* of Qazvin who had come to Qaraqorum to petition the Qa'an about the lawlessness and oppression then prevalent in Iran but also that the idea of the Qa'an Möngke sending his forces westward was, claiming his story to have been related by one Baqaī son of Bolād Timar, at the request of an Iranian merchant again unhappy at the lawlessness and in particular of the oppression from the Mongol commander, Baiju's tax-collectors. This merchant pleaded with Möngke to build a bridge across the mighty Oxus and when the Qa'an objected saying such a feat was impossible even for him the merchant elaborated.

O illustrious and magnanimous Qa'an we do not speak of a bridge made of stone, or brick, nor a bridge of chains. I want a bridge of justice over that river, for where there is justice, the world is prosperous. He who comes over

the river Amu Darya finds the Qa'an's justice, and on this side of the river there is justice and a path. [p. 6] On that side of the river, the world is evil, and some people become prosperous through injustice.⁸²




Figure 2.1 The Chinggisids.

Note Roman numerals refer to the ruling Il-Khans of Iran.

Hülegü's reputation for ability and wisdom is echoed in the verse history of the Chinggisids written for Abū Saïd and completed in 738/1337-8 by Aḥmad Tabrizi⁸³ where he is described as 'having the power of both wisdom and ability . . . a king among lions' and he is depicted as being urged to claim the lands 'from the Āma to the Nile, now yours'.⁸⁴ Though writing some two and a half centuries after the events the Safavid historian Khwāndamīr had wide access to earlier contemporary sources⁸⁵ and his account reflects a perception born of that Chinggisid legacy still alive in the Safavid court. Khwāndamīr records that Möngke Khan enjoined his brother to:

*'Go from Turan into Iran and make your name shine like the Sun'. You must bring all the regions from the Oxus to the furthest reaches of Egypt under your control through bravery and battle.*⁸⁶

Such an injunction suggests that more than a punitive raid to deal with rebels, potential and actual, and the emplacement of military outposts and tax collecting garrisons was envisaged. Juwaynī had

already noted that the earlier expedition across northern Iran, the Caucasus and around the Caspian by the legendary generals Jebe and Subedai who with their force of 30,000 had subdued and conquered so many kingdoms, signalled the end of an era and the dawn of a new age for the people of the region.

[For an army to achieve such victories] having on all sides such foes and adversaries as no created being might resist or oppose, this can mean nought but the end of one empire and the beginning of another.⁸⁷

Hülegü Khan came to Persia to restore justice, stability and prosperity, to claim his inheritance and to found a dynasty. He recognised the hegemony of Möngke Qa'an and accepted equal status with Qubilai Khan.⁸⁸ It was for the Mamluks and the wavering statelets of Syria that he had held his wrath in reserve.

The composition of the vast army which accompanied Hülegü westward further suggests the significance of the expedition with which he had been charged. A fifth of the manpower of the eastern and western Mongol armies along with Mongol princes bringing their own troops to represent each of the ulus and the great tribes of the empire and in addition military technicians and armaments experts from Khitai were assigned to accompany Hülegü Khan. Hülegü's forces would be a truly representative Imperial army paralleled in the east by the army of his brother Qubilai Khan (1209–94), and Rashīd al-Dīn was later to observe the descendants of those diverse nobles of the vast Chinggisid Empire would become an integral part of the Il-Khanid state.

Hence it is that there always have been and still are in this country amīrs who are the descendants and kinsfolk of each of Chingiz Khan's amīrs, each of whom occupies an hereditary office.⁸⁹

The army was not composed solely of Mongol troops. Turks would have represented a large percentage of the manpower. In addition Muslim troops and even Iranian troops would have joined the swelling ranks as the army made its way slowly westward. Indeed Juwaynī emphasises that for the

*making of **holy war** and uprooting the castles of Heresy all the forces in that region [Khorasan/Badghis], whether Turks or Taziks, put themselves in readiness.⁹⁰ [my emphasis]*

Such a force would not have been charged with mere mopping up

operations around the troublesome frontiers of the Jochid state of the Golden Horde. Its wide mix of noble blood and ethnic groups, its rich provisioning with all the available military technology of Khitai and the prolonged and elaborate festivities to mark the expedition's launch suggest the special status that Hülegü's advance had been awarded.

However it was the leisurely pace of Hülegü's initial progress westward that suggests that this second coming of the Mongol hordes was not yet the wrath of God delivered by his sanctioned holy armies with which the Mamluks and Syrians were later to be threatened,⁹¹ but was rather the return of an appointed king come to still the anarchy that raged in a headless, troubled region of the World Empire.

For the Armenians it was the return of two kings and they were later, for the benefit of the audience of potential western allies, to depict Hülegü and Hetoum as almost equals riding westward with their great company of men-at-arms.

And then [after having baptised Mangke Qa'an and all his household] Halcon and the King of Armenia, with a great company of men of arms, rode till they came to the flodde of Physon (River Oxus).⁹²

Juwaynī seems to have been unaware of the great Armenian King's presence. However both chroniclers capture the essential majesty of the ride into the West. Hülegü is generally portrayed as coming more as a rightful claimant than as another mighty usurper.

The period between the *Quriltai* when the decision was taken to dispatch Prince Hülegü westward and his actual arrival in Transoxiana and the border-lands of Khorasan was considerable. That time would have been needed to effect the mobilisation and movement of such a sizeable army is indisputable but this vast military machine never showed any signs of haste or need for urgency. If any meaningful opposition had been anticipated such a delay would have given the enemy ample opportunity to have strengthened their defences. It can therefore be assumed that there was little resistance expected to Hülegü's eventual march across his new lands and that where resistance was anticipated it could be expected to be dealt with easily with the forces already at Hülegü's disposal. Möngke Qa'an had determined to send his brother westward in 1252 and by February 1253 Hülegü Khan was back at his *ordu* ready to make preparations for departure. By February 1254,⁹³ Hülegü had set out at the head of his huge army having left his heavy baggage behind with his brother. It would be September 1255 before his party was encamped outside the gates of Samarqand where they were able to take the opportunity to spend nearly forty days in traditional *suyur-mishi* or merry-making and revelry.

Both Samarqand and the other great city of the region, Bokhara had revived somewhat since the violence they had endured three decades earlier. By 1259 'the prosperity and well-being of these districts have in some cases attained their original level and in others have closely approached it'.⁹⁴ Bokhara in particular was to make a quite dramatic recovery:

*no town in the countries of Islam will bear comparison with Bokhara in the thronging of its creatures, the multitude of movable and immovable wealth, the concourse of savants, the flourishing of science and the students thereof and the establishment of pious endowments.*⁹⁵

During this prolonged journey only Juwaynī, who was an eye-witness to these events, mentions violence befalling the great army, and that only being the violence of the sun's rays in the mountain pastures, '[they] set out again when the violence of the Sun's rays had abated',⁹⁶ or cites examples of being waylaid, the incident cited being a welcome respite. 'When they came to the region of Almaligh the ladies of Ulugh-Elf and Orqina Khātūn came out to welcome them and gave feasts (in their honour)'.⁹⁷ This was not the progress of an army of conquest. It was to the encampment 'in the meadows of Kan-i Gul (the Rose Mine) at the gates of Samarqand'⁹⁸ that Malik Shams al-Dīn Kart of Herat came to offer homage in advance of his peers and fellow rulers from Iran and his loyalty 'was distinguished by all manner of favours'.⁹⁹ Shams al-Dīn was summoned into Hülegü's presence and ordered to approach the Ismāīlī Muḥtashim of Qohestan, Naṣīr al-Dīn, and to demand his submission. The Muḥtashim was old and feeble and readily agreed to Shams al-Dīn's suggestion that he should accompany him back to Hülegü's *ordu*. Bearing various gifts the old man prostrated himself in front of Hülegü and kissed the ground, and Hülegü demonstrated his favour by accepting these gifts and rewarded the old man with a *yarligh* and *paiza* and the governorship of Tun.¹⁰⁰

In Kish closer to the Oxus, Hülegü set up his camp again in order to receive the tribute and pledges of loyalty from the rest of the nobility and royalty of his new kingdom.

*From Rum came the two sultans, Izz al-Dīn and Rukn al-Dīn, from Fars Sa'd, the son of the Atabeg Mu'ẓaffar al-Dīn and from Iraq, Khurasan, Azerbaijan, Arran, Shirvan and Georgia the maliks, adrs and notables joined the royal presence, all of them bearing suitable gifts.*¹⁰¹ s.

Having taken his time in reaching the borders of his new kingdom Hülegü continued to demonstrate his lack of anxiety concerning any

opposition by idling and making merry, *suymishi* and receiving his subjects' tributes before feeling the necessity of tackling the troublesome issue of the Ismā'ilis.

It was concerning his loyal subjects, who were now presenting themselves to the prince, and to their lands that the Qa'an's parting strictures had been directed. 'Thou must keep thy subjects relieved from unjust contributions and charges, and restore the ravaged provinces to a state of prosperity.'¹⁰² Hülegü was early able to demonstrate his policies of justice for all when after having crossed the Oxus by means of a platoon bridge made up of commandeered boats and ferries, he abolished a tax which had previously been levied on the ferrymen and their passengers for crossing the great Amdaryā.¹⁰³ However though now within his own territory and in direct dealings with his subjects Hülegü continued to exhibit the mannerisms of an established World-Conqueror. His instinct upon seeing some wild lions in the forests of what is now the desert lands of northwestern Afghanistan was to immediately order the formation of a *nerge* using 'rutting Bactrian camels' and the result was a scene which moved Juwaynī to eulogise,

*ten tigers of the meadow were bagged by the tigers of the battlefield, . . .
Whoever bags eight lions (tigers) in one charge, mere humans are nothing
to him.*¹⁰⁴

Thus was Hülegü well able to demonstrate his great prowess and his magnanimity and in contrast to the terror tactics of his father and grandfather, he was usually able to impose his authority through such displays of pomp and majesty and through his ability to command the deference of so many of the Iranian nobility.

Hülegü's progress across Khorasan in the early 1250s as described by Juwaynī contains scant references to desolation and wilderness though mention is made of restoration and prosperity. This was no avalanche of destruction in legendary Mongol style nor a series of lightning raids after the manner of Subedei and Jebei. Before departing for his journey back to Qaraqorum, the great Amīr Arghun Aqa (d.1273, long-serving top administrator in Persia 1240?–73) built Hülegü a magnificent audience hall in the meadows of Shafurqan (modern Shibarkhan) which Rashīd al-Dīn describes in far more detail and colour than does the eye-witness Juwaynī.¹⁰⁵

It was from here that Arghun Aqa left Hülegü's party to return to Möngke's court and in his place he appointed three courtiers, his son Kerei Malik, Aḥmad Bitikchi and Aṭā Malik Juwaynī, to administer the affairs of Khorasan and Iraq for the King.¹⁰⁶ As a Persian administrator, Juwaynī's interests would have been in the renewed

and continued prosperity of the land and he would have seen the avoidance of protracted and unnecessary hostilities as serving the interests of all parties. A prosperous citizenry not only fed the tax coffers but denied fuel for sedition.

As a historian Juwaynī, who was well aware of his family's proud and long genealogy, would also have been aware of the role in which he was casting himself in the annals of Persian history and would have sought to distance himself from the legacy of destruction which marred the memories of his sovereign's father and grandfather. Juwaynī mentions camping in the garden of Mans.uriyyah 'which after falling into ruin had been restored by the Amīr Arghun and was now such that its extreme beauty made it the envy of all the gardens of the world'¹⁰⁷ and remarks on the ease with which provisions were obtained from this billowing, prosperous land, 'And from all the provinces, far and near, from Merv, Yazir and Dihistan wine was drawn like water and unlimited provisions transported and deposited at every stage [of the route].'¹⁰⁸ Near Tus mention is made of gardens also restored by Arghun Aqa which Juwaynī claims were to become 'the rendezvous of amīrs'.¹⁰⁹ In these gardens the royal party again lingered for a few days of mirth and revelry for which purpose another 'gilded cupola and heaven like tent' were erected the details of which Juwaynī takes pains to itemise.¹¹⁰ It was on this journey that this illustrious historian made good on some previous property speculations and 'having observed the King's interest and pleasure in restoring ruins'¹¹¹ persuaded Hülegü to finance the total restoration of the town of Khabashān (Quchan) and its irrigation system. The work was such that 'All the *qanāts* flowed once again after a [long] interruption and the inhabitants returned after years of exile bringing peasants and *qanāt*-diggers from Quhestan whom they settled there'.¹¹² Juwaynī while omitting to mention his personal benefit from these 'good-works' emphasises that the cost of this extensive renovation did not fall on the citizens of the town but was borne almost wholly by Hülegü from the treasury though the Supreme Minister (*Sāhib-i a'Um*) Sayf al-Dīn Aqa Bitijchi donated 3,000 dinars to cover the expenses needed to begin work on rebuilding the mosque and graveyard.¹¹³

The World-Conqueror, Hülegü's coming was everywhere heralded and the way prepared long before his arrival.¹¹⁴ His expected route was cleared of obstructions, bridges were constructed and ferries were readied. That such measures were even considered enforceable 'in all countries from Turkestan to Khorasan and uttermost Rum and Georgia'¹¹⁵ is some indication of the prestige that the brother of the Great Khan held and the power he was able to exercise even in advance of any actual demonstration of his might. 'At the same time

the Mongol and Muslim amīrs brought herds of mares and each in turn manufactured *qumiz* until the troops passed on to another amīr.¹¹⁶ Even representatives of the Ismā‘īlī leader, Kharshāh, approached Hülegü’s camp to offer their king’s submissions and were duly honoured and shown appropriate respect at the Mongol court before returning with Hülegü’s demands. When the Ismā‘īlī *muḥtasham* of Quhistan returned with Shams al-Dīn Kart whom Hülegü had sent to that region as his ambassador, he too was treated with kindness and respect. His excuse that he had been unable to take with him the garrison of the town on the grounds that they answered only to Kharshāh in Alamut was accepted and the old man was awarded honours and authority and sent as governor to the town of Tun.¹¹⁷ Hülegü was not in Persia spoiling for a fight and where possible like other Mongol generals, he avoided conflict and would accept proffered homage and *tikishmishi*.¹¹⁸

It had been with the expressed intention of destroying the Ismā‘īlīs and of receiving the submission of the Caliph of Baghdad, Mustāṣim, that Hülegü had embarked on his journey westward. Ultimately he was to destroy the Assassins’ power base and scatter their adherents, and also to effectively extirpate the Abbāsīd Caliphate and for these two deeds history has judged Hülegü to be both ruthless and cold-bloodedly efficient. However though there is no reason to doubt that the resolution to subjugate both parties was ever present in Hülegü’s mind the assumption that he was determined on bloody confrontation and physical extermination is not borne out by the sources.

This might seem surprising since in Qaraqorum the Ismā‘īlīs’ own propaganda had been particularly effective. The fear and loathing they inspired was way out of proportion to their size or any actual threat that they could realistically have posed. Their strength lay to a great extent on the legend of their ability to strike any time, anywhere and at anyone that they so chose. This fear of the Assassins’ hidden daggers had even penetrated to the core of the great Mongol Empire and stringent security had been imposed in the Qa’an’s court for fear of the *Mulāḥidas*’ infiltration. William of Rubruck, who travelled to the Mongol court between 1253 and 1255, experienced this paranoia before gaining admission to Möngke Qa’an’s inner sanctum.

This interrogation [prior to the monk’s admission] was being conducted because Mangu Chan had been informed that four hundred Assassins, in various disguises, had made their way in with the aim of killing him. ¹¹⁹

The chief Judge of Qazvin had alerted the Mongols to this ever present menace when he arrived at Qaraqorum dressed in mail from fear of the Assassin’s dagger. ‘One day [the Chief Qāzī Shams al-Dīn

Qazwīnī] appeared before the Qa'an wearing a coat of mail and declared that he always wore that armour under his clothes for fear of the Heretics.¹²⁰ Jūzjānī gives this Qāzī's taunts of the Ismā'īlīs' prowess as one of the reason for Möngke's determination to crush the sect.¹²¹

Though the eventual sanguinary solution to the Ismā'īlī question undoubtedly made Möngke's brother many friends and ensured him many later eulogists, Hülegü's initial approaches to the young Rukn al-Dīn, the Heretics' Imam, were very conciliatory if tactical and the demands that he gave the first Ismā'īlī ambassadors which included a royal brother, Shāhanshāh, and ministers of state, that Kharshāh should demolish his castles and that he should present himself before Hülegü were the same as those demanded of all would-be Mongol subjects. Juwaynī, who was an influential member of Hülegü's court, records his King's initial reluctance to embark immediately on a war-footing against the Assassins however popular such a move might have been at Qaraqorum and with his Muslim entourage. Force was the option he chose when other tactics failed.

*It became clear to the King that his fortune was reversed and that civility and kindness would effect nothing; and he set out from Khurqan to make war (ghazā – holy war (G.L.)) upon him.*¹²²

The protracted assaults on Rukn al-Dīn's lair and the other Ismā'īlī strongholds reveal Hülegü in his determination to achieve his stated aims but they also throw light on a less obvious characteristic of the World-Conqueror; his self-confident preference for the pursuit of non-violent conclusions to conflicts. Even as he mobilised his considerable forces from all the corners of his new kingdom, Hülegü extended the hand of peace.

*If he [Rukn al-Dīn Kharshāh] would make his heart sincere again and come forward to meet the King, he would read the lesson: What is past is past over his crimes, and cast the glance of forgiveness and condonation upon his offences, and show the teeth of assent in the face of his requests.*¹²³

Though some would question Hülegü's sincerity there is no compelling evidence that he was not prepared to keep his word. At each stage of the advancing siege Hülegü kept open his lines of communication and received honourably all Kharshāh's emissaries including a young boy who was falsely claimed to be Rukn al-Dīn's son. Hülegü understood Kharshāh's subterfuges and his attempts to

delay his inevitable fate but he nevertheless patiently continued to press his insistence on total surrender. Though Juwaynī makes no mention of Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī's crucial role in persuading the young king that there was no alternative option other than capitulation, most subsequent chroniclers make much of the efforts of 'the Supreme Mawlānā, the Teacher of Mankind, the Sultan of Philosophers, the Most Excellent of the Moderns, the Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī (may God envelop him in his mercy)'¹²⁴ in effecting the peaceful surrender of the last king of the 'People of the Mountains' in the fortress of Maymundiz and his acceptance of Hülegü's 'universal beneficence and utter compassion [which] with the pen of power [had] inscribed upon the pages of his and his people's actions the verse: "*Forgive with kindly forgiveness*" (Koran, xv, 85).¹²⁵

After his surrender, Hülegü treated the young king kindly and allowed him his considerable retinue. The young Rukn al-Dīn had, according to Kāshānī, won the favour of the king.¹²⁶ A Mongol wife¹²⁷ who had caught the boy's fancy was even permitted and 'Rukn al-Dīn's feelings of loneliness and foreboding [changed] into a mood of ease and happiness.'¹²⁸ and he began to cooperate with his new found benefactor. This consideration shown to Rukn al-Dīn was not caused solely by Hülegü's paternal instincts but stemmed rather from the World-Conqueror's wish to avoid unnecessary conflict with disgruntled elements of Rukn al-Dīn's following with the resulting loss of Mongol blood. Rukn al-Dīn was expected to earn his comforts and he was invited to join Hülegü's expeditions against those Assassin castles still to surrender. On Kharshāh's orders the majority of the strongholds in the vicinity of Gird Koh and Rudbar and in Qohestan, one hundred in total, opened their doors and surrendered. The two greatest of his castles, Alamāt and Lamassar, refused to obey the divine words of their Imam perhaps assuming that speaking under duress he was practising *taqiyya* though eventually, Alamāt after a few days and Lamassar by 1258, were both overrun by Mongol forces. Only in Gird Koh were the Ismā'īlīs successful in their resistance to the Mongols and it was twenty years, in the reign of Abaqa Khan, before they finally surrendered.

Rashīd al-Dīn claims that so awed was Hülegü by the size of the rock of Alamūt that 'he bit the finger of astonishment and the teeth of amazement'.¹²⁹ Meanwhile Juwaynī reports his own absorption in the famed libraries, the maze of tunnels and galleries and water conduits, the 'ocean-like' storage tanks for 'wine, vinegar, honey and all sorts of liquids and solids'¹³⁰ the contents of which showed no signs of deterioration, and the lead strengthened ramparts. He claims to have burnt all the books he found in the library which were concerned with the Ismā'īlī heresy and those 'neither founded on tradition nor

supported by reason'.¹³¹ However, since in his *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā* he quotes liberally from Ḥasan-i Šabbah's autobiography, admittedly always careful to invert praise to blame and to add the appropriate pious admonishments, and from other books dealing with the Ismā'īlī heresy, this claim can be taken with a degree of scepticism. Scholars, book-lovers, learned poets and aristocratic historians do not generally make clamorous book-burners. Only Mustawfī makes reference to the magical pavilion where the *fidā'ī* were supposedly kept, drugged and dreaming of paradise, until summoned by their master.¹³²

The resistance of the Ismā'īlīs broken, the surviving retinue of Rukn al-Dīn Kharshāh who now had a *yarligh* and a *paiza*, was invited to reside as Hülegü's guests in Qazvin while the deposed Imam himself accompanied Hülegü to his *ordu* in Hamadan. It was there that Rukn al-Dīn personally requested that Hülegü should give him leave to travel east to the court of Möngke Qa'an. His request approved he set out with nine companions and some *ilchīs* led by Bujrai to the east and to his own demise. Rashīd al-Dīn suggests that Hülegü, having made use of the young king to bring the castles of the Assassins under his command, sent him to his death. Juwaynī puts the blame for his murder on Kharshāh's falling out with Bujrai and the *ilchīs* and his own duplicity in failing to ensure the surrender of Gird Koh. Whether Rukn al-Dīn actually reached Qaraqorum is disputed but he failed to see Möngke who was reportedly annoyed that time had been wasted and animals unnecessarily tired when it had already been unequivocally stated that all Ismā'īlīs were under sentence of death.¹³³ Following Möngke's timely reminder, *ilchīs* were hastily dispatched and a general massacre of the Ismā'īlīs ensued including all of the royal family in Qazvin, 12,000 in all. Rukn al-Dīn had been treated royally to the end and was regally kicked to death in the traditional Mongol manner, 'He and his kindred became but a tale on men's lips'.¹³⁴ It is significant that Juwaynī absolves Hülegü from responsibility for this murder and implies that the orders for the general massacre were issued from Qaraqorum. Mustawfī in his *aafarnāmah* also remarks on Hülegü's hesitancy in spilling blood unnecessarily putting these words of advice for Kharshāh into the mouth of Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī.

*He will not gladly put men to the spear, for his heart is torn by this affair.*¹³⁵

With the fall of the Ismā'īlīs, Juwaynī concludes his history and his final paragraph is a dire condemnation of the Assassins and their heresies and a tribute to the king who freed the world of their mischief and for whose continued prosperity he enjoins his readers to

pray.

*Pray for the [continued] fortune of the happy King who uprooted their [Ismailis'] foundations and left no trace of any one of them. And in truth that act was the balm of Moslem wounds and the cure to the disorders of the Faith.*¹³⁶

His action in destroying the Ismā'īlis, Juwaynī compares to the Prophet's conquest of the Jews of Khaybar and through the ridding from the world of this evil, the historian and ranking administrator was able to fathom the divine reason behind the years of trouble and pain suffered by the Moslem world.

*The truth of God's secret intent by the rise of Chingiz-Khan has become clear and the benefit afforded by the passing of dominion and sovereignty to the World-Emperor Mengü Qa'an plain to see.*¹³⁷

As directed, Hülegü Khan had destroyed the Ismā'īlis and had taken possession of his kingdom. It now remained for him to seek an accommodation with the caliph in the City of Peace and then to again don the mantle of the wrath of God and to lead his armies created by God in his anger, against the forces of the regicidal Mamluks of Egypt. Just as the irruption of the Mongols into the lands of Iran in the first quarter of the thirteenth century must be differentiated from the arrival of Hülegü Khan in the fifties, so too must the campaigns he launched against Baghdad and the lands under the sway of the Mamluks south-west of Azerbaijan, be distinguished from the relatively peaceful occupation of Irāq Ajam whose lands had been allotted to him by Möngke Qa'an.

3

BAGHDAD AND ITS AFTERMATH

Though the sources suggest that he may have been present, Juwaynī chose not to write about the fall of Baghdad. This might well have been due simply to the pressure of work which as governor of Baghdad he would have experienced, as both Boyle and Muḥammed Qazvinī opine in their introductions to the history. Juwaynī had already explained the difficulty he experienced fitting in his literary work. His time for writing had to be ‘snatched’ from the demands of his other duties.¹³⁸ Evidence that Juwaynī failed to complete his history is scattered through out the *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā*, with references to non-existent chapters and uncompleted accounts. Alternatively it is quite conceivable that Juwaynī wished to conclude his work on a positive note, with the destruction of the Assassins viewed as a victory for Islam, rather than on the dubious triumph of the fall of the house of Abbās which he would have been hard pressed at that time to interpret as any kind of plus for the Islamic faithful.¹³⁹ The only writing of Juwaynī’s after his *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā* which has survived, is his account of his later personal travails.¹⁴⁰ Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī’s eye witness account of the fall of the ‘Abbāsīd dynasty and the destruction of the ‘City of Peace’ has often been appended to Juwaynī’s historical work apparently with the author’s approval since one of the three earliest manuscripts bearing the signature of Juwaynī himself includes ḡasī’s appendix.¹⁴¹

Although in later histories the fall of Baghdad was described as the greatest calamity to have ever befallen the world, whether from the twentieth century:

*[The destruction of the Caliphate and Baghdad] raised a cry of horror throughout prostrate Islam. One million of the inhabitants of Baghdad are said to have been massacred, and the loss to civilisation was terribly heavy. . . . Muslim civilisation has never recovered from the devastation.*¹⁴²

or from the thirteenth century:

*Hardly ever has Islām survived a more disastrous and more mournful event than the destruction of Baghdad.*¹⁴³

The feared and predicted reaction from the heavens and from the Muslim community never happened. No divine or earthly retribution appears to have been visited upon Hülegü or upon his close advisor Naşir al-Dīn zāsī. Hülegü's original mandate from Möngke Qa'an was specific in the three initial aims of his brother's westward march. He was to destroy the Ismā'ilīs,

turn their heads downward and their bodies upwards. Let there not be a single castle in the world, nor even one heap of earth.

This was to be followed by the eradication of the threat caused by the Lurs and the Kurds, 'who are always practising brigandage in the highways'. And finally he was to secure the submission of the Caliph of Baghdad with the caveat that 'should he tender his submission in no way molest him'.¹⁴⁴ The caliph did, of course, resist and was duly given the honour of a lethal regal kicking, a form of dispatch designed in order to avoid the spilling of royal blood and the resultant possibility of misfortune.¹⁴⁵ There is little in the sources to suggest that Hülegü decided on the caliph's fate or indeed the fate of Baghdad out of malice, a thirst for blood, or a particular penchant for violence. The caliph, Mustāşim, had clearly defied Hülegü having listened too long to his dubious, partisan advisors, and the sacking of Baghdad was the inevitable result. Though Hülegü was resolute once he had determined upon destruction, it should be noted that the devastation was selective and not all were killed and not all was destroyed.

A later chronicler, the hagiographer of Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī and the Mevlevi order Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Aflākī, recounting the use of prayer and fasting by infidels, in this instance the Mongols, reports how Hülegü anxious to avoid further bloodshed and battle urged Naşir al-Dīn zāsī to compose a letter to the caliph beseeching him to see reason and to desist from his continued stubbornness. Hülegü promised good fortune and a robe of honour for the caliph Mustāşim if he should comply with the inevitable. However Naşir al-Dīn zāsī's letter was rejected and the caliph sent as his response insults and verbal abuse. Certainly no apologist for the Mongols, Aflākī had no hesitation in repeating this story of Hülegü's initial reluctance to destroy Baghdad, his desire to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and the caliph's role in bringing about his own downfall.¹⁴⁶

The sacking of Baghdad though brought about by the command of an unbeliever, Hülegü Khan, was carried out by Christian and Muslim troops as well as Mongols and Turks, and some of Hülegü's closest advisors and strategists were also Muslim including Sunnis. Hülegü was accompanied on the siege of Baghdad among others by the prominent Atabegs of Shiraz and Mosul and their armies.¹⁴⁷ The

destruction of the Abbāsid Caliphate cannot be viewed solely as an act of aggression by an alien and wanton invader divorced from the reality of the Dār al-Islām. There is little evidence of any great ground swell of grief or despair as news of the caliph's death spread around the world¹⁴⁸ just as there were no earthquakes, no drought, no failing plants, no outbreak of plague among the troops or horses, and no halt to the Sun's daily cycle. The only king to die at that time was the caliph.¹⁴⁹

The caliph's fate was sealed from two directions. From outside, a huge force of local, Khorasani and Turanian troops was massing on his borders while from inside court intrigues were aborting any attempt at decisive action. Primarily it was the conflicting advice of his own ministers that ensured that the wrath of Hülegü would be sufficiently riled to bring about the total destruction of the city and its caliph. The wazir al-Alqamī cautioned humility and sacrifice in the face of an irresistible threat but the caliph's other courtiers and advisors dismissed these words as intimidation and scaremongering. They portrayed such advice as being an attempt by the wazir to empty the royal treasury.¹⁵⁰ The caliph had already angered Hülegü by his failure to send troops to assist in the operations against the Ismā'ilīs. Mustaşim had again listened to the paranoid advice of some of his ministers who insisted that the request was merely a ploy to empty Baghdad of its defenders.¹⁵¹

As was normal practice and as was stipulated by the Mongols' *yasa*, the caliph had been presented with the clear option of submitting peacefully to Hülegü and in return of receiving Hülegü's assurances of safety.

*Of a surety if he obeys our command it will not be necessary for Us to exact revenge and he will be left with his land, his army and his subjects.*¹⁵²

Mustaşim sent a contemptuous and provocative reply to Hülegü, a 'young man . . . who because of ten days' luck and good fortune' would deign to challenge an army of millions, all faithful to and waiting for his, the Caliph of Islam's call to arms. He dismissively suggested that Hülegü go back to Khorasan and assured him that he, Mustaşim, would shortly be putting the world back to rights and that no one could prevent him, adding insolently.

*By counsel and armies and a lasso, how shalt thou bring a star into thy bonds?*¹⁵³

Even more seriously antagonistic than such verbal taunts, was the treatment Hülegü's ambassadors had received. They had been treated most disrespectfully and exposed to the taunts and abuse of the rabble of Baghdad. Though these emissaries did manage to arrive home physically unscathed, Hülegü was slowly being goaded into war. It was the intrigues within the caliphal court that undermined Mustāṣim's strategy of confrontation. His chief wazīr Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Alqamī, who was a Shi'ite, was mistrusted by the other court officials who suspected him of colluding with the Mongols. Juzjānī is unequivocally damning of this wazīr who he claims held a bitter grudge against the caliph's son, Amīr Abū Bakr, on account of the latter's treatment and murder of the Shi'ites of Karkh and who had early entered into what the amīr considered a treasonable correspondence with Hülegü.¹⁵⁴ Accusations of the wazīr's treachery had been made by the Dawāt-dār, Mujāhid al-Dīn Ay-Beg, who was in command of the caliphal army. These claims of perfidy were raised supposedly to counter accusations levelled by the wazīr of the commander's own treacherous intrigues with other members of the 'Abbāsids. The caliph ordered his *Ṣāhib Dīwān*, Fakhr al-Dīn Dāmghānī to quell the unrest in the city which was being fomented by rumours of these machinations and to announce the caliph's continued faith in his Dawāt-dār.¹⁵⁵ These palace intrigues were to feed conspiracy theories for generations to come. The eventual fate of the principal protagonists merely fuelled these theories. Whereas the Dawāt-dār was eventually executed by Hülegü, the wazīr retained his post after the capture of Baghdad partly due to the recommendations of fellow Shi'ite Naṣīr al-Dīn zaṣī.

Mustawfī in his *aafarnāmah*, paints a fuller and perhaps more balanced account of the events and intrigues preceding the fall of Baghdad. He first points out that the city had been devastated before Hülegü's arrival by a particularly destructive flood:

*The river Tigris rose that year, and the region became like a sea. There was great destruction from the floods, and the place of joy became a place of discord. Buildings erected with farr and elegance became ruined from the floods of that fearful sea. Palaces which had been the object of eternal admiration became flattened to the grounds by the floods. Pleasant buildings were ruined and their place deserted.*¹⁵⁶

Sectarian conflict followed this catastrophe almost immediately and according to Mustawfī open conflict broke out between the Sunnis and the Shi'a. He claims that Alqamī personally protected the caliph from the bands of Shi'ites rampaging in the city but that this was insufficient to protect the wazīr from the machinations of the lesser

Dawāt-dār, Mujāhid al-Dīn Ay Beg who by destabilising the city hoped to seize the throne of the caliphate for himself. The caliph, a man 'short of intelligence',¹⁵⁷ succumbed to the lesser Dawāt-dār's words and as a result

the world became unkind to him, through hatred, and did not allow him to survive on Earth. Undoubtedly he was not fit for kingship and greatness was far beyond him.

During the siege, messages had been arrowed into the stricken city assuring some of the inhabitants that their safety would be guaranteed since it was known that they were not fighting against Hülegü. Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī reports that these groups were 'sayyids, dānishmands (in Mongol usage, Muslim divines), erke'ün (Christian priests), and shaykhs'.¹⁵⁸ However in Bar Hebraeus' Arabic version of his Chronography in which he recorded these events based on Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī's version with a few significant modifications, the message sent into Baghdad attached to arrows and written in Arabic was as follows; 'Archons (Christian priest), Alāwīs, and scholars, and in short anyone not engaged in fighting, may feel secure for themselves, their families, and their property.'¹⁵⁹

Support for the suspicion that the Shi'ites were sympathetic to Hülegü is borne out by the behaviour of the people of Ḥilla and other Shi'ite towns before and after Hülegü's victory. In Ḥilla the people received Hülegü's envoys with glee, 'building a bridge across the Euphrates and rejoicing at their arrival'¹⁶⁰ and the gates of other cities such as Basra, Kufa and Najaf were willingly opened to the invaders. The Amīr Sayf al-Dīn Bitikchi requested a contingent of 100 Mongol soldiers to guard the tomb of 'Alī and the people of that holy city.'¹⁶¹ The Shi'ite scholar and thinker, Ibn ḡāwas (1193–1266),¹⁶² was in Baghdad during Hülegü's siege and destruction of the Abbāsīd capital. By his own account neither he nor his family other than one brother, Sharaf al-Dīn Abū al-Faḡl Muḡammad,¹⁶³ were harmed. After the plundering and killing had ceased, in recognition of the esteem that Ibn ḡāwas was held in by Baghdad's *ulamā*, his endorsement of Hülegü, and his ruling that a just infidel ruler was preferable to an unjust Muslim ruler, was accepted by all. Hülegü, aware that his legitimacy was derived from sources outside the Muslim world and that he had just terminally abolished the traditional authority for Islamic endorsement, had sought a *fatwa* to resolve the question 'Who is preferable, an infidel ruler who is righteous, or a Muslim ruler who is unjust?' and it was Ibn ḡāwas, wise man, who found in his favour.¹⁶⁴ Subsequently, Hülegü provided safe conduct to Ibn ḡāwas, his family and friends, 1,000 persons in all, and the group was

escorted to Ḥilla. In 1258 Ibn zāwas was appointed by Hülegü *naqīb* of the ‘Alids in Baghdad¹⁶⁵ and in 1262–3 according to Ibn Fuwatī, he was made *naqīb al-nuqaba* of all the ‘Alids of Iraq.¹⁶⁶

Waṣṣāf repeats the story that the citizens of Ḥilla had contacted Hülegü prior to the fall of Baghdad in the name of three of their leading Shi’ite divines including Ibn zāwas. In their message they pledged their loyalty [‘il] and obedience and claimed that Hülegü’s victory had been foretold in their traditions and that ‘Alī ibn Abī T. ālib himself had spoken of the destruction of Baghdad, ‘mother of cruelty and home of injustices, Oh mother of adversity’, by the sons of Kantara (Turks descended through Abruham’s second wife, Ketura) who never ‘enter a land without conquering it, and approach no flag without overturning it’.¹⁶⁷ Hülegü was greatly pleased with this *hadīth* and the Alids’ pledge and appointed Alā al-Dīn the Persian and Takla, a Mongol, as *shaḥnas* of Ḥilla. In an aural and visual pun Waṣṣāf observed that ‘the people of Ḥilla (*ḥillah*) [had] donned the robes (*ḥollah*) of security and drunk from the cup of the peacock’s (*zāwas*) sincere friendship (*Khullat*)’,¹⁶⁸ a hardly censorious attitude for a Sunni minister to have taken on what could be conceived as treacherous behaviour. The father of the theologian al-ʿAllāma al-H. illī (d.1325), Yasuf bin al-Matahhar, was another of the three divines whose letter convinced Hülegü of the people of Ḥilla’s loyalty and who later travelled to Hülegü’s *ordu* to convince the Il-Khan of the sincerity of the people of Ḥilla.¹⁶⁹

If the Shi’a were as welcoming to Hülegü as these episodes from Ḥilla suggest, more credence must be given to the rumours that the wazir Muayyid al-Dīn Muh. ammad ibn al- Alqam ī had been working against the caliph’s interests if not for the interests of the Il-Khans. Jūzjānī is so vitriolic in his condemnation of the wazir as to make some of his alleged facts and interpretations suspect. After being prompted by the wazir, Hülegü supposedly received the caliph’s son Abū Bakr on bended knees assuring Abū Bakr of his intentions of becoming a Muslim himself just like his cousin, Berke. When this was reported back to the caliph, the ‘cursed Wazir’ was then able to advise

*that the Lord of the Faithful, himself, should move out, in great state and solemnity, surrounded by the cavalcade of the Khalifāt, in order that Hulāa may be able to observe the ceremony of receiving him, and perform the rites of homage.*¹⁷⁰

Ibn Kathīr is equally unequivocal in his condemnation of the wazir Ibn al-Alqamī, again blaming the ill-feeling felt towards the ‘Abbāsids on attacks by the Caliph’s armies on local Shi’ites including his own relatives. He held the wazir directly responsible for bringing ‘down on

Islam and its people the most appalling calamity that has been recorded'. Ibn Kathīr claims that after the capture of Baghdad which in return for rich rewards the wazīr had helped bring about, Hülegü was intent on making an accommodation with the caliph. However, Ibn al-Alqamī and 'a clique of Shi'ites and other hypocrites advised Hülegü not to make peace with the Caliph'. The Mongols took their advice and the only people to survive the massacre were 'the Jewish and Christian *dhimmis*, those who found shelter with them or in the house of the vizier Ibn al-Alqamī the Shi'ite'.¹⁷¹

The attitude of other historians towards Ibn al-Alqamī is sometimes ambiguous. Rashīd al-Dīn mentions the wazīr's recommendation to submit¹⁷² and Waṣṣāf attributes a long speech of sound advice to Ibn al-Alqamī. In this speech the wazīr explains that surrender appeared the inevitable option and that the prospect of temporary humiliation followed by the marriage of an Il-Khanid daughter to a royal son and the possibility of future recovery and ultimate triumph was well worth considering, 'a pearl of the shell of the Imamate shall be threaded onto the nuptial necklace . . . so that empire and religion shall fuse'.¹⁷³ This would appear eminently sensible advice. Waṣṣāf adds that when the caliph finally emerged to meet Hülegü he was accompanied by his two sons and a great following of '*Alāwiyān o dānishmandān*'¹⁷⁴ and then the usual court favourites.

The sixteenth-century chronicler, Diyārbakrī, while predictably insulting of Hülegü, 'the stubborn tyrant, the destroyer of nations (*mubīdu al-Umam*), recognises the role that the sectarian riots had in the initial destruction and plundering of Baghdad. He claims that it was exasperation at this deplorable situation that drove al-Alqamī to seek help from the Mongols to restore peace and exact vengeance on the Sunnis.¹⁷⁵

Ibn Fuwatī refers to the suspicions surrounding the loyalty of the wazīr. It was said that some verses of poetry attributed to the wazīr had come to Hülegü's ears. In these verses the wazīr seemed to suggest that the people of Baghdad deserved their fate on account of the dereliction of their religious duties. Further these verses reportedly claimed that the people listened to one who did not deserve to be listened to, and obeyed one devoid of wisdom, while he (wazīr or Hülegü) who was the possessor of wisdom, they ignored. Such words would have acted as encouragement to the Mongol invader.¹⁷⁶ The wazīr was the first to call on the people to desist from attacking and throwing missiles at the besiegers¹⁷⁷ and during the plundering of the city after its capitulation the wazīr's house along with those of Christians, certain traders, and also the house of the *Ṣāhib Dīwān*, Fakhr al-Dīn Dāmghānī was saved from destruction.¹⁷⁸ His reappointment as wazīr together with Dāmghānī's as *Ṣāhib Dīwān*,

occurred immediately after Hülegü had ordered a halt to the looting of the city and on the very day that the caliph met his death.¹⁷⁹ The wazir died shortly after the fall of Baghdad at the age of sixty-three and was buried in the Shi'ite shrine, the '*Mashad-i Masā bin Jafar*'. Ibn Fuwatī was so fulsome in his praise of the wazir as an educated, cultured and religious man that the modern Iraqi editor saw fit to interject a footnote reminding readers that, '[Ibn al-Alqamī's] treachery to his master is indicative of his bad origins'.¹⁸⁰ The thirteenth-century chronicler of the caliphs, Hindashāh b. Sanjar b. Abdallāh Ṣāḥibī Nakhjavānī is sympathetic to the wazir and recounts how his sound but unwelcome advice failed to deter the caliph from his suicidal course of inaction. This failed attempt on the wazir's part at a negotiated and peaceful solution to the crisis gained the minister the favour of Hülegü and explains why, after the massacre, Ibn Alqamī was rewarded, not for treachery, which would have probably earned him a Mongol death sentence regardless of whom his perfidy might have benefited, but for his sound but disregarded judgement.¹⁸¹

Even though the verdict on the role of the Shi'a in the fall of the House of 'Abbās must remain open with only Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī's role clearly attested to, Iranian, in its widest sense, and Muslim involvement and complicity in the destruction of Baghdad must be acknowledged and considered when apportioning blame and assessing the impact of this so-called catastrophe. Rashīd al-Dīn's account of Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī's decisive role in reassuring Hülegü that the act of destroying the caliph would be far from detrimental to his fortunes is quite unambiguous and to the point. "What then," asked Hülegü, "will happen?" "Hülegü," [ḡasī] replied "will reign in place of the Caliph."¹⁸² This report of the widely respected philosopher/wazir's major role in reassuring Hülegü that his proposed destruction of the caliphate and of Baghdad was without danger of divine retribution was later echoed in the stories and legends of the early Safavids, in Ibn Bazzāz's hagiography of Ṣafī al-Dīn, the *Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā*, 'First, bind me [ḡasī], then kill Mustāṣim; if the day is [then] disturbed and the sun and the moon are eclipsed you must publicly torture me also!'¹⁸³

Though ample evidence can be cited to attest to Hülegü's ruthlessness and of his swift and cruel infliction of retribution such as his treatment of Malik Ṣālīḡ of Mosul and his infant son¹⁸⁴ and his savage execution of Malik Kāmīl of Mayyāfāriqīn,¹⁸⁵ evidence also exists of a compassionate, intellectually inquisitive and relaxed man. Rashīd al-Dīn concludes his history of Hülegü with mention of the Il-Khan's love of building and of his great interest in philosophy and alchemy.¹⁸⁶ When the Kurdish Shabānkārāī appealed to Hülegü in their bid to remove their king, Quṭb al-Dīn Mubārāz, Hülegü immediately ordered a *yarghu* formed to investigate the claims of his

disgruntled subjects. The Shabānkāraī lords had been scandalised by Quṭb al-Dīn's profane and sacrilegious behaviour which they felt was greatly disrespectful to his father, Malik Mu'āffer al-Dīn, and they hoped that Hülegü would legitimise their removal of their errant ruler from the throne. However after his court's investigation of the affair Hülegü concluded that Quṭb al-Dīn had not digressed from the *Yasa*, nor had any evidence been found of insubordination, rebellion or disobedience, and that if the *malik* drank wine that was a matter for Quṭb al-Dīn Mobārāz alone. Hülegü therefore handed Quṭb al-Dīn back to his detractors and left it to them to fabricate some other evidence against the unfortunate imbibing *malik*, and then to bribe a judge in order to justify their subsequent execution of their king. The Shabānkāraī lords were able however to eventually obtain a *yarligh* for their choice of successor, NiOām al-Dīn Ḥasan.¹⁸⁷ Accounts reported in the Mamluk sources which were generally hostile to the Mongols and under no pressure to paint their enemies in a sympathetic light, also contain revealing testimony of an alternative image of Hülegü consistent with the image gleaned from some of the Armenian sources. While these Armenian sources could be viewed with suspicion because of the political relationship between the Caucasians and their overlords such considerations do not of course apply to the Mamluk chroniclers.

The son of the Ayyabid prince al-Mughīth, al-Azīz Uthmān, was sent to Hülegü's *ordu* in Azerbaijan to present his father's submission and to request guarantees of safe conduct, *amān*, and he later repeated independently his account of his visit to two Mamluk historians, al-Nuwayrī and Qirtāy al-Khaznadārī.¹⁸⁸ Both accounts speak of the boy who was about eight at this time, 1262–3, being graciously received and reassuringly treated while seated beside the Il-Khan and his wife. Hülegü's Christian major wife, Dokuz Khātūn, led the conversation and asked the boy about his family and home. She enquired through an interpreter, a young man related to al-Azīz Uthmān and conversant in Mongolian, whether the young prince would like to stay with her or whether he would prefer to return home to his family.

'I do not have a child, and this King is an old man, and no child will come from him.' al-Azīz Uthmān said: *I was silent and [then] said, 'I want my mother and father.'* Dokuz Khātūn turned to Hülegü and spoke with him two words.¹⁸⁹

Al-Azīz Uthmān received his *amān* and was allowed to leave with a *shaḥna* for the journey to his home. Another young Ayyabid, in this case al-Ṣārim Özbeg, a Mamluk of al-Malik al-Ashraf of Homs found himself outside Aleppo in the camp of the Mongol conqueror. When

he gained an audience with Hülegü he found before him,

*a king of majestic demeanour, high distinction, and great dignity, of short stature, with a very flat nose, a broad face, a loud voice, compassionate eyes. The ladies sat at his side, with the Lady Doqуз Khātūn sitting at his left.*¹⁹⁰

His experience within Hülegü's camp was pleasant and Hülegü appreciated his eloquence and quick wit and it appears from the text that the young Mamluk was equally impressed by the Mongol chief. So great was his trust and favourable impression of Hülegü that he embarked on a mission for the Il-Khan to bring his master al-Malik al-Ashraf to submit in person before the Khan. When al-Şārim Özbeg's master, al-Malik al-Ashraf, arrived at the Mongol camp he too was greatly impressed by what he saw. Far from being dismayed and insulted by the humble lodgings he was offered, when he realised that he was being treated the same as any other noble, al-Malik al-Ashraf proclaimed, 'That is how kings should be. With this life and these men, kings conquer countries.'¹⁹¹ When al-Ashraf, invited by Hülegü to choose for himself a gift and buoyed by al-Şārim's assurances that 'The Mongols do not kill those who are with them as guests',¹⁹² presumptuously chose the tower of Aleppo in which were hiding the Ayyabid prince's female relatives, Hülegü's initial reaction was anger. This anger was caused by his reluctance to comply with the request which would undermine his intention to present these captive women to his wife, Dokuz Khātūn. However with Dokuz Khātūn's gracious urging he relented and granted al-Ashraf his wish.

These anecdotes were recorded by enemies of the Il-Khanid state and the portrait they present is not of a brutal, unthinking or insensitive man. Hülegü was a man with a new kingdom to administer. He had to preside over not only his own court and his army command but over the more recently acquired territories of the two Iraqs, Syria, and the Caucasus.¹⁹³ He could appoint wazirs but it was to him that ultimate responsibility for government fell and it was in his interest that justice was seen to be carried out and that those from among his entourage, whether Mongol or Persian, must be set a high standard to emulate.

4

THE UNEASY BORDERS

During the early decades of Mongol domination of the Iranian plateau, the main threats to the consolidation of their power and their rule came from without rather than from within. Hülegü's advance had generally been welcomed, his rule apparently anticipated with enthusiasm, and opposition minimal and passive. The advance westward had slowed and eventually halted as Hülegü had consolidated his hold over his kingdom following the fall of Baghdad. The defeat of his forces at Ayn Jālat had defined and established the broad battle lines. As a direct result of this defining battle, the Mamluks of Egypt confronting their pagan 'brothers' from across the western marches, and the Il-Khans' relationship with the Christians of the region and to a lesser extent the European powers became an issue for the rest of the century. To the north the rivalry with their cousins of the Golden Horde, the bitter dispute over the prized steppe lands of Azerbaijan, and, for the first time, the introduction of outside foreign allies into the Mongol polity hastened the collapse of Chinggisid unity. To the east this split was merely confirmed and intensified as rivalries, ideological, political and cultural, rent the Great Empire irrevocably apart.

In the west, the Christians played a central role in safeguarding the borders, particularly those of Armenian Cilicia, though the Christians of both Greater Armenia and Georgia also assumed the role of frontline troops. The Armenian king of Cilicia, Hetoum, had early pledged his loyalty and had been among the first to greet the new Mongol king advancing westward on his mission from his brother Möngke, the Qa'an. The Armenian saw the prize of Jerusalem as a beacon for his continued loyalty. However when events proved otherwise he trod instead a political balancing act and sought the dangerous position of acting as an intermediary between Abaqa and the Mamluk court. The Armenians never received much for their loyalty and suffered greatly at the hands of the Mamluks on their excursions north into Rum.

The Crusader states played a far more cautious game with their pagan neighbours, mindful of the possible wrath of their closer neighbours to the south. Letters and embassies from the Mongols to the European powers continued to flow throughout Abaqa's reign and

the Crusader states remained potential allies in any united campaign envisaged to crush the Egyptians, but the Outremer states remained ever mindful of their immediate realities and the local environment into which they were becoming increasingly absorbed. The Mongols themselves seemed to have been playing a double game and their Christian sympathies were often donned for political expediency rather than from conviction. Their behaviour was rarely dictated by religious bias and Christians were not exempted when it came to the dispensing of massacres and enslavement.

The treatment of the Caucasian Christians, for example, demonstrates the point that the Mongols differentiated only between faithful servants and rebels and that their world view was not essentially sectarian. Christians just like other religious groups achieved high office and were well represented in the military and the administration, while the divided clans of the Caucasus found their representatives in both the central *diwān* and in its dungeons. Abaqa's chief concern was the integrity of his empire, from the Oxus to the Euphrates, and his courtship of the peoples of the west, many of whom happened to be Christian, was with this aim in mind.

The trouble from the north was a far greater threat to the emerging Il-Khanate than that posed by the Egyptians. The Mamluk-dominated areas of Syria served more as a training ground, and a source of plunder, rapine, sport and useful diversion for the soldiery. Those lands south of the Caspian and the Caucasus which had been 'reached by Tatar hoof'¹⁹⁴ became a serious source of dispute after Möngke's death though arguably the tension had already been there for a long time, barely hidden beneath the surface. The lands to the west had been granted to the Jochids by Chinggis Khan, so that Hülegü's assumption of power in Iran and Azerbaijan was seen as not only a usurpation of power by the Tuluids at the expense of the House of Jochi but was, in addition, seen as a direct challenge to Berke in his role as *aqa*. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that Berke Khan initiated hostilities between the Golden Horde and the newly emerging Il-Khanate. The excuse was the poisoning of three of Berke's princes by Hülegü, and later the religious element was introduced but at heart it was the rivalry between the two most powerful houses of the Chinggisid empire that pitted the two cousins irrevocably against each other.

There was deep resentment felt by the Jochids at the continued lack of recognition of their claims to the Qa'anate and there was genuine apprehension at the sudden expansion of the lands under the direct control of the three Tuluid brothers, Möngke, Hülegü, and Qubilai, stretching from the far east to the far west. Added to this was the encroachment by Hülegü on to land which had been grazed and

claimed by tribes loyal to the Jochids for three decades. Berke also believed that edicts existed proving his rights to these lands so that therefore Hülegü was guilty of contravening the *yasa*, a crime and a sin which, in Berke's view, damned Hülegü irredeemably. When he realised that others, the Mamluks in particular, did not share his outrage at this disregard for the Great *Yasa*, Berke introduced Islamic objections to strengthen his condemnation of, and opposition to, the Il-Khanate.

Moreover, while Jochid domination of Iran had never been explicit, it had long been implicit in the rather chaotic governance of the region. Baiju, a Jochid dependant, had been a prominent figure throughout the region since 1229 when Chormaghun was first appointed. He eventually replaced Chormaghun and considered himself answerable first to Batu. Baiju was much maligned by the Il-Khanid historians and Hülegü was quick to undermine his power and remove him. Other personages in Iran prior to Hülegü's assumption of power were well aware of Jochid interests. Arghun Aqa kept Batu closely informed of his affairs, and local Armenian and Georgian notables knew the benefit of close connections with the Golden Horde. In particular, the main tax collectors over the years, Chin Temür, Körgüz and Sharaf al-Dīn, were all Batu's men.

With such claims and interests in the region, Hülegü's assumption of power over areas which were arguably within the Jochid sphere of influence, could be viewed as hostile. However two developments were unforeseen. First Hülegü's goal had been the suppression and defeat of the Mamluks and the original intention was to have extended the empire far further to the west in which case Hülegü's base would have been in Syria, possibly the Beqaa valley. If this had come about, the claims on the pasturelands of the southern Caucasus and Azerbaijan might not have been so urgent nor the conflict so bloody. Second, after Batu's death, Berke's accession to the throne had not been foreseen and was initially actively opposed. The Il-Khan's subsequent political strategies and military reaction must be viewed in relation to Berke's assumption of power as distinct from the underlying rivalry between the two branches of the Chinggisid empire.

Events to the east were less centred on the Il-Khanate and were never as threatening to Mongol Iran as the events which loomed so darkly to the north. The troubles which spilled over the Oxus and into the Il-Khanate in the second half of the thirteenth century were the indirect result of Qaidu Khan's struggle to promote his own power base in, what was then, the Chaghataid Khanate and to re-establish the position of the toppled House of Ögödei, after the empire had been effectively split into four by Qubilai c.1264. Hülegü ruled from the Oxus westward across the Iranian plateau to Mesopotamia, Berke had

the Qipchāq plains and Russia, Alghu, son of Baidar and grandson of Chaghatai, ruled the lands between the Oxus and the Altai Mountains, while the lands east of the Altai remained under the direct command of Qubilai, the Qa'an. The house of Ögödei had been absorbed by the Chaghataids. The political vacuum created by the deaths of Hülegü, Alghu and then Berke between 1265 and 1267, however, presented Qaidu with an opportunity he was not slow to exploit. After a military encounter with the new Chaghataid ruler Baraq in which Qaidu was successful, a new configuration of power bases began to emerge and with it a direct threat to the Qa'an himself. Qaidu established himself in Talās and northeast Turkestan and after his victory was able to manipulate Baraq almost at his will. He also sought an alliance with Möngke Temür of the Golden Horde. To placate Baraq who would have felt great frustration at losing lands to the Ögödeids, Qaidu Khan encouraged him in his designs on the lands to the west under the control of the Il-Khan, Abaqa. Qaidu saw himself the winner whatever the outcome. If the war against Abaqa was lost, he was rid of Baraq. If it was won then Baraq was placated and through him Qaidu's influence was expanded. For the Il-Khanate, Baraq was more an irritant than a serious threat but this cruel and short-sighted Chaghataid prince inflicted great suffering and hardship on those areas unfortunate enough to fall under his control. The cities of Transoxiana and Khorasan including Herat all experienced much oppression and misrule not only as a direct result of his government but also because of the disastrous conflicts in which he involved the region. From 1268 until 1282 when Qaidu restored Masad Beg to Bokhara and the region returned to a semblance of its former stature, rich, fertile and safe for Tajik and Turk,¹⁹⁵ Transoxiana's history is bleak in the extreme and stands as a contrast to life in the Il-Khanate during those same years.

These threats to the stability and integrity of the Il-Khanate came exclusively from outside the newly formed state. Hülegü had acted swiftly to stifle any hint of rebellion on his initial march across Iran and the city states which found themselves within his jurisdiction appeared content if not happy to cooperate with his agents, viewing his armies in Azerbaijan as a force for long awaited stability and possible prestige and prosperity. Of the external threats, that from the Golden Horde was by far the most serious and potentially destabilising. Whether the Mamluks were a threat or were rather threatened is a legitimate subject of debate, and how seriously the Il-Khans sought or desired their defeat is also a source of contention. For the Cilician Armenians and the Ramīs the threat from the Mamluks was of course extremely real and, but for the government in Maragheh, the danger posed by the Mamluks lay in their relationship

with the cousins to the north. Had Baraq been wiser, less bloodthirsty and more diplomatic he might well have posed a greater threat. The fact that he was unable to inspire any loyalty, love or trust did little for his chances of long-term success. This coupled with others' ability to recognise and manipulate these failings ensured that his adventures remained just that.

For over twenty years, therefore, the Il-Khanate successfully countered these external threats while internally the country prospered and grew. Hülegü established a dynasty and a territorial kingdom which would endure against many expectations. The stability his advent inspired at home provided the strength that was needed to counter the dangers which threatened outside.

Abaqa Khan and the west

The reign of Abaqa Khan has often been cited as an era of great prosperity. Historians, contemporary and later observers, have, in general, been generous to the second Il-Khan. In particular his reign like that of his father has often been cited as a period of great prosperity for the Christians under Mongol rule.¹⁹⁶ The flurry of diplomatic activity between the courts of Europe and the Mongols is interpreted as indication of the Il-Khan's favour toward Christians under the influence of his Byzantine wife, Maria Despina Khātūn, and the legacy of his stepmother, the veritable Doquz Khātūn. The evidence suggests however that Abaqa, like his father, had never abandoned his faith in a Shamanism with strong Buddhist leanings, and that his dealings with the Christians, since Muslim sources also considered his a reign of justice and compassion,¹⁹⁷ were for the most part tactical. Grigor of Akner has pointed out the martial reputation of the Christians.¹⁹⁸ The Armenians and Georgians in particular, like their fellow Christian Caucasians the Alans,¹⁹⁹ were famed and valued for their military prowess, and the Latin church and the Franks in general were seen as potential allies in the Mongols' fight against the infidel Mamluks. As the Il-Khanate state became more established and the need for secure borders became paramount, so the courting of all the various groups and communities within the kingdom ensued.

Abaqa's position on the Il-Khanid throne was not as secure as his father's had been and his prime preoccupation throughout his reign was with the security of his borders. To the south-west the Mamluks were a constant worry, to the north, even though an uneasy peace had been established after Berke's death, the Golden Horde was a very real threat, and in the east Baraq had initiated hostilities which were to plague Abaqa's rule even after the Chaghatai Khan's death. Abaqa's main concern on assuming the throne on 19 June 1265, an auspicious

date chosen by the court favourite, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn zāsi, was consolidating the lands already under the direct command of his court and bringing those lands in the east and south over which he held suzerainty under tighter control. In the west the instability generated from the lands under Mamluk influence had to be contained and to that end the western Christians were systematically wooed.

‘Aba[q]a was the handsomest in appearance, and the best built of his thirty brothers, and in the days of his Khanate there was abundance of all things throughout the land.’²⁰⁰ Such sentiments were commonly expressed by the Christians under Il-Khanid rule who had also held Hülegü in great regard. The Armenian historian Hetoum who informs his readers that Qubilai Qa’an had endorsed Abaqa’s succession because he knew that Abaqa was ‘the best and wisest son that Hülegü had’²⁰¹ finds fault with the new king only in that he ‘would not become Christian as his father Hülegü was (sic)’ but rather describes the Il-Khan ‘much valiant and [who] kept wisely his lordship, and was much fortunate in all manner of things.’²⁰² Kirakos seemed to think that Abaqa in fact had been baptised before his marriage to the Byzantine princess, Maria Despina.²⁰³ Vardan claims that after the death of her husband, Doquz Khātūn sought out the Armenian cleric and requested his blessing for Abaqa’s succession. He replied ‘We declared that it is [ordained] by the scriptures to appoint the eldest, and the testament is irrevocable by definition – which indeed took place.’²⁰⁴ When the widow and champion of her fellow Christians herself died four months and eleven days later,²⁰⁵ Vardan was able to take consolation from Abaqa’s choice of wife, the illegitimate daughter of Michael VIII Palaeologus who had supposedly insisted on Abaqa’s baptism before the marriage.²⁰⁶

Such wishful thinking was not a characteristic of the respected and generally reliable Christian chronicler, Bar Hebraeus. His account of the succession suggests that there was a general consensus among all the notables of the Il-Khanate concerning the choice of Abaqa.

*The sons of the kings and the Mongols agreed together that his eldest son should sit upon the throne of his father, because they saw that God had adorned him with understanding, and wisdom, and a good disposition, and mercifulness. And when the kingdom was established for him, he showed himself triumphant in his wars, and the conqueror of his enemies, and he was beloved by all the peoples who were under his dominion.*²⁰⁷

With Abaqa’s accession to the throne expectations among the Christian communities were high and for some desperately so.

Hetoum I of Cilician Armenia, who is said to have ruled over the Golden Age²⁰⁸ of Armenia, had been far-sighted in 1247 when he had

sent his brother Smpad to pay homage to the Qa'an in far-off Qaraqorum. Smpad had been well received and had been 'made a vassal and [had been given] a great *iarlax*, a golden tablet, and a real Tatar queen with a crown'.²⁰⁹ King Hetoum I had followed up this fruitful visit with his own journey eastward to the throne of the Great Khan Möngke in 1253 from whom he received 'a rescript bearing a seal saying that none should presume to molest him or his land: [the Qa'an] also gave him a letter of enfranchisement for the churches everywhere.'²¹⁰ When the time came to show his loyalty, Hetoum was ready and during the destruction of Baghdad the Armenian cavalry and troops were willing participants and if the words of the historian, Hetoum, are to be accepted, they were also believers in their own propaganda that the Mongols were decidedly anti-Muslim.

*[Hülegü] put the Saracens in great servitude ever after. A woman that was called Descotacon (Doquz Khātūn), which was a good Christian woman and was of the lineage of the three kings . . . made to be built again all the churches of the Christian men; and caused all the temples of the Saracens to be put downe, and put them in so great slavery and subjugation that they dared not come abroad.*²¹¹

Grigor, a Cilician monk (1250–1335?) and possibly the abbot of Akner,²¹² relates another current story unsubstantiated elsewhere.

*[Hülegü] loved the Christians so much that he took pigs for the one yearly tribute from the Armenians – 100,000 shoats, and he sent 2,000 pigs to every Arab city, and he ordered Arab swineherds appointed to wash them every Saturday with a piece of soap, and in addition to give them fodder every morning, and at evening to give the pigs almonds and dates to eat. Every Arab man, were he great or small who did not eat the flesh of swine was decapitated. So he honoured the Arabs. This was an object lesson for the Armenian and Georgian forces.*²¹³

The question of the veracity of these reports is not so significant as the fact that these stories were undoubtedly believed by their audience, an audience which certainly in Hetoum's case included Franks and Western embassies. The authors and consumers of these reports would have expected a continuation and development of these policies and practices with Abaqa on the throne. Encouragement of these expectations could have originated from Hülegü himself who in 1262 dispatched a letter to King Louis of France describing himself as both an 'eager ravager of the faithless races of the Saracens' and as a 'kindly exalter of the Christian faith' though making it plain that his

divine mandate was from Mengü-tengri, the living God.²¹⁴

It was not only security that had prompted Hetoum I to so willingly submit to the Mongols, though initially at least, this had paid a handsome dividend, but also the lure of richer pastures which a continuing alliance with his irresistible masters would seem to promise. He appeared to believe that Hülegü's ultimate aim was the subjugation of Egypt and that such a campaign would involve the conquest of Palestine and that as a loyal Christian vassal he could expect the governorship of such dominions to be placed with him. The historian Hetoum places such a promise in the mouth of Hülegü, '[Hülegü] sent for the King of Armenia that he should come to him, for he was disposed to go and deliver the Holy Land and to restore it again into the Christian men's hands.'²¹⁵ He claimed that this promise was later endorsed also by Abaqa.²¹⁶ Hetoum sent at least five raiding parties into northern Syria between 1261 and 1264 sometimes bolstered with Mongol troops and soldiers from Antioch. Though these raids achieved little, Hetoum must have assumed that he would have received more substantial backing from the main Il-Khanid forces. If these forays had been to escalate, he must have presumed that such constant provocations would invariably provoke Baybars.

However, the death of Möngke Khan, followed by Hülegü's partial withdrawal of his forces from Syria, and finally, the disastrous defeat of Kitbuqa at Ayn Jālat all following each other within a few years radically altered the configuration of power in the region. When early in Abaqa's reign the Mamluks unleashed their armies northward into Syria and the lands of Cilicia, Hetoum's pleas for help from his Tatar overlords went unanswered. 'Without the *pukdana* (*yarligh*) of the King of Kings I am unable to come.'²¹⁷ So answered Nafshi, the Tatar commander in Rum, to the king's entreaties. When eventually Mongol troops did arrive it was too late; the invaders had withdrawn, Lesser Armenia had been ravished and the King had lost two sons, one 'martyred' and the other a hostage of the Mamluks. So distracted was Hetoum with grief at his loss that he retreated to the cloisters of the monastery at Akner before initiating negotiations. Hetoum had already established a line of communication with Baybars in order secretly to moot the possibility of peace. The reception given to the Armenian ambassadors in Egypt in December 1266 was warm and their price for the release of Prince Leon, was the return of a Mamluk captive and friend of Baybars, Sunqur al-Ashqar, held by the Mongols and in addition some forts taken in an earlier Mongol incursion into Syria. Hetoum was given a year's reprieve from the threat of invasion in which to secure the Mamluk noble and he went in person to Abaqa to seek assistance. Abaqa acquiesced and had the captive fetched from imprisonment in Samarqand²¹⁸ and Hetoum was able to send word to

Baybars of Sunqur's imminent release. He now hoped that he could avoid surrendering the six fortresses that had also been demanded.²¹⁹ By the time this news reached Baybars he was in Antioch and the Sultan saw little reason why he should have to barter further and informed the king that the deal was off if he did not receive the fortresses. With the Mamluks in such close proximity to his kingdom Hetoum had little choice but to agree. Upon Leon's release, Hetoum escorted his son to the Il-Khan's court and Leon was officially recognised as the successor to the Armenian throne which came to pass on the royal pairs' return to Cilicia when Hetoum abdicated and retired to a monastery before dying in 1270.²²⁰

King Hetoum's last move in playing this dangerous balancing act between his warring neighbours who were rapidly achieving local military parity was in early 1268 when he offered his services to Baybars as an intermediary with Abaqa. His aim was to help negotiate a peace settlement and also to gain the release of Sunqur's children born to a Mongol wife while in his recent captivity. Even though the Sultan accepted only a limited modification of this offer Hetoum went ahead with his efforts since he could only gain from such a peace. However the characteristically belligerent note which he delivered from Abaqa stood little chance of enticing Baybars to the Il-Khan's court.

When the King Abaqa set out from the East, he conquered all the world. Whoever opposed him was killed. If you go up to the sky or down into the ground, you will not be saved from us. The best policy [maṣlaḥat] is that you will make peace [ṣulḥ] between us. You are a mamluk who was bought in Siwas.²²¹ How do you rebel against the Kings of the earth?²²²

Abaqa claimed that once again the Mongol Empire stood united²²³ but that Baybars should not fear since he was not to be held responsible for the crimes of his predecessor Qutuz.²²⁴ Baybar's dismissive reply as well as making it clear that the expected unconditional surrender was unrealistic in view of recent history, namely Ayn Jālat,²²⁵ emphasised that the Armenian king had no right to deal as his envoy other than in matters related to Sunqur's children.²²⁶ Even in this matter no results have been recorded and the outcome of these negotiations was inconclusive, weakening further the position of the Cilician Armenians.

Leon, though he did enjoy a few years of peace after his release and at the start of his reign when he was able to build up his port city of Ayas, fared no better than his father had from his alliance with the Il-Khan. Ayas, on the northern shores of the Gulf of Alexandretta, had benefited from the decline of Antioch following the Mamluk raids of

1268 and had become a link between the Il-Khanate and the Mediterranean, Europe and even England whose Edward I had visited Acre in 1272.²²⁷ In 1271 the Genoese had been granted privileges and this plus the growing prosperity of the port city had attracted the covetous attentions of the Mamluks. Though in 1271 Abaqa, at Leon's request, had dispatched 20,000 Mongol troops with a promise that Abaqa would follow in person,²²⁸ this was not enough to hold off the Mamluk attack when it did eventually come in 1275. Bar Hebraeus claims that the Armenians were able to stem the initial invasion but then a much larger force of 8,000 men 'burst upon that miserable country'²²⁹ and the Egyptians were allowed to rampage throughout the country without being seriously challenged. Leon III, perhaps still traumatised by his experiences in 1266, is nowhere recorded as having mounted any kind of resistance to the Mamluk invaders and it was not until after they had withdrawn that he is said to have taken his revenge on the Turcomans who it was believed had taken part in the depredations.²³⁰

In 1277 it was again the Armenians who attempted to rouse their Tatar overlords to respond to yet another Egyptian invasion.²³¹ While Leon III fled to the safety of a Tatar stronghold, Baybars swept north and through Cilicia into the lands of the Saljuqs of Rum where he expected support from the Mongols' representative, the *Parvāna*, and the local Turcoman tribes. The Mongols suffered a major defeat in April 1277 at Abulustayn and this enabled Baybars to have himself crowned as Sultan of Rum. However, the devious *Parvāna* did not present himself before the Mamluk conqueror as had been expected and the Turcoman bands did not show as much enthusiasm for the invaders as had been hoped for and, consequently, when the news that Abaqa was on the move reached Baybars he beat a tactical retreat. In Damascus he fell ill and thirteen days later, on 30 June 1277, he died. The historian Hetoum, mindful of his audience of potential European military allies, played up this Mamluk retreat and claims that Abaqa in fact engaged some of the fleeing troops,²³² and claims that Abaqa turned back from assailing Egypt itself out of consideration for his overworked horses.

The fate of the traitor, the *Parvāna*, is recounted with relish with Hetoum reporting that at the Il-Khan's command all that he should encounter should partake

*of the flesh of Pervane; and so Abaqa did eat of the flesh, and gave some to his men. And that was the vengeance that Abaqa took of the traitor Parvāna.*²³³

The Armenians of Cilicia had thrown their lot in with the Mongols

and any arrangements that they came to with their Muslim neighbours were to remain tactical.

The Crusader states of the Franks continued to keep a much more ambivalent attitude toward the power to the east even though the Il-Khans were conducting a relatively vigorous campaign to recruit the European powers to their cause. Bohemond VI, the Prince of Antioch, had, under his Armenian father-in-law's influence, welcomed Hetoum's pro-Mongol policies. In 1260 Bohemond's deference to Hülegü on his foray into Syria was rewarded with the return of Latakia and other forts and towns to his principality.²³⁴

Runciman adds that Bohemond was also obliged to install the Greek Patriarch, Euthymius,²³⁵ to replace the Latin bishop of Antioch, a move which Hülegü calculated would please his 'friend' the Emperor of Nicaea.²³⁶ To the Crusader states to the south this act on the part of Bohemond was seen as disgraceful subservience and an insult to the Latin Church. However, as with most passionate religious or ideological disputes there was a sound economic basis for their displeasure. The sea trade of the Kingdom of Jerusalem with its capital at Acre was dominated by the Venetians and in order to keep their vital trade routes via the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf open to the Indian Ocean the Venetians maintained good commercial ties with Egypt. For them the newly established trade links from the Mediterranean through Armenian Cilicia and the Principality of Antioch posed a very unwelcome development. The Principality of Antioch and Cilicia gave another outlet to their Italian rivals, the Genoese, who being on good terms with the Byzantine court, were developing links with the growing commercial and cultural centres in Azerbaijan and the Il-Khanate as well as maintaining strong economic relations with the Golden Horde via the Black Sea ports.

Abaqa initiated contacts with the European powers in the hope of forming an alliance against the Mamluks into which he might also be able to tempt the southern Outremer states. Abaqa resumed a correspondence with the Pope begun by his father. Hülegü had originally been approached in 1260 by envoys from the Apostolic Legate and the Regent of the Kingdom of Jerusalem who were anxious to know the intentions of the invader who had penetrated deep into Syria. Their delegation was headed by an Englishman, the Dominican friar David of Ashby,²³⁷ and their favourable reception resulted in Hülegü dispatching his own delegation westward to Rome. It is believed that only one of this party, a Hungarian named John, reached Rome to deliver the communiqué²³⁸ to Urban IV and it was John's interpretation of the message from Hülegü which inspired Urban's short written response, *Exultavit cor nostrum*. Assistance from the west, military and otherwise, would be forthcoming on confirmation of

Hülegü's baptism.²³⁹

Abaqa sent two follow-up letters to this correspondence, in 1267 and 1268. Although only the latter is extant the contents of the former can be deduced from the other and from the reply of the Pope, Clement IV. In contrast to those missives of his father and other Mongol Khans, Abaqa appeared to downplay the necessity of vassalage and the acceptance of universal Mongol supremacy as prerequisites for any alliance, and surprisingly did not appear to have taken exception to the tone and language and assumptions of Pope Urban IV's letter, if he ever actually saw it. His first letter was written in Mongolian due to the absence at the time of a Latin translator as he subsequently explained, but his ambassador was able to adequately communicate to the Papal court that Abaqa had plans for the Pope's armies to link up with the forces of his father-in-law, Michael Palaeologos, so that with his own armies approaching from the east they would then be able to trap the Mamluks in a pincer movement. He wanted to know what route the Pope proposed taking to reach Palestine. The reply was enthusiastic but non-committal.²⁴⁰

Abaqa's second letter²⁴¹ was written in Latin and dated 23rd of the sixth month in the year of the Dragon which corresponds to 3 August 1268, a time when the Il-Khan would have been in his summer camp in the pastures of southern Azerbaijan. In this letter he emphasised his credentials as a friend of the Christians and the protection he had always afforded them and their churches. He then continued with the details of the battle strategy that he envisaged. He would dispatch his brother Ejei with his troops from one side while the Pope's army under presumably St Louis would, together with the King of Aragon, launch their attack on the Mamluks from the west so that the enemy, caught between the two, would be utterly destroyed.

This ill-fated campaign which the ailing Louis IX had been pressed into embarking upon was doomed from the start and opposed by his trusted advisor and friend, Jean, Lord of Joinville.

*I considered that all those who had advised the king to go on this expedition committed mortal sin. . . . seeing that he was physically so weak that he could neither bear to be drawn in a coach, nor to ride.*²⁴²

St Louis died in Tunis in 1270 and the only remnant of his crusading expedition to reach Palestine was the under-equipped Prince Edward of England. On landing in Acre in the spring of 1271, Edward found to his dismay the Crusader forces in disarray, the Saracens strong and united under the able Baybars, the land under 'Christian' control steadily shrinking, the Venetians openly trading with Egypt selling them among other things material for the

construction of military hardware, and even the Genoese making their own inroads into the trade with Egypt with their control of the slave trade.²⁴³ With a force of only 7,000 men and with little hope of additional support from either Cyprus, where Hugh III of Cyprus and the Kingdom of Jerusalem was unable to prevail upon his knights to serve on the mainland,²⁴⁴ or from the other Outremer states, Edward dispatched envoys to Azerbaijan to contact the Il-Khan, Abaqa. Reginald de Rossel, Godefroi de Waus and John de Parker undertook this mission and they were welcomed at the Il-Khanid court where they received a pledge of military aid under the control of the Mongol commander of Anatolia, Samaghar.²⁴⁵

However these plans came to little and though a Mongol force did invade Syria with a relatively small force of between 10,000 and 12,000 men attacking as far south as the environs of Harim and Afamiya before withdrawing in the face of a Mamluk response, the only gain this allowed Edward was the opportunity to launch a coordinated²⁴⁶ pillaging raid on the town of Qaqun from which he quickly retreated. The Sultan exacted his revenge later, despite a peace treaty signed on 22 May 1272 with the government of Acre, with the secreting of an Assassin into Edward's court.

*The Sultan thought to have killed him by an Assassin; by which Assassin the King was hurt with a knife that was poisoned, but he was whole again by the grace of God.*²⁴⁷

Abaqa was later to apologise to Edward, who became king on his return to England, for his failure to provide sufficient aid to the Prince's forces though he offered no explanation as to why this support had not been forthcoming. Since the war on his eastern front had been concluded the previous year, there seems no obvious reason why Abaqa had not dispatched a more realistically sized army to challenge the formidable Mamluks.

Not discouraged by the failure of this initial attempt at a coordinated campaign against his Mamluk enemies Abaqa continued to send envoys to the courts of Europe in further attempts to enlist them into an alliance against their common enemy. In May 1274 the XIVth Ecumenical Council, a grouping of Church leaders, was convened in Lyon by Pope Gregory X, who had been in Acre with Edward, to explore the possibilities of cooperation and even union between the churches of the West and the East and their joint efforts at securing the 'Holy Lands', and it was to this that Abaqa sent his next envoys that included the previously mentioned David of Ashby, now in the employ of the Il-Khanate. To impress the Church leaders three of Abaqa's sixteen ambassadors were actually baptised during

the course of their mission in a ceremony conducted by the Bishop of Ostia, the future Pope Innocent V, though it has been said that the audience was, not surprisingly, sceptical of the converts' motives.²⁴⁸ Abaqa claimed that the history of the Il-Khans proved their good faith towards the Christians and that he now sought a formal peace and an alliance. He cited his father's action in freeing Christian pilgrims from Arab slavery and on learning the Pope's true status as supreme spiritual leader rather than the Emperor of the Franks, of his father's restoration of Jerusalem and Latin lands and assets to Latin sovereignty.²⁴⁹ The report to the Ecumenical Council also spoke of the intimacy that had existed between Hülegü and his Christian confidants and even refers to Hülegü's baptism.²⁵⁰ Abaqa, it was explained, had been hampered in his efforts in the past by wars on his other borders but since these were now resolved he was in a position to now concentrate his forces on the Mamluk enemy. The Council closed with a resolution to form a new crusade and an intention to plan a joint strategy with the Il- Khanate before the campaign should be launched.

Abaqa responded to the Council's resolution by sending further envoys to Europe in 1276. An earlier envoy to Edward I's court in 1275 led by David of Ashby received a courteous but non-committal reply, dated 26 January 1275.²⁵¹

Abaqa's envoys to Europe were John and James Vassalli described alternatively as Greeks, as their name suggests, or as Georgians²⁵² and they were received in audience first by the Pope with an assembly of Cardinals before being sent on to the courts of France and England. Their message seemed to place the onus for the attack on the European powers who the Mongols' envoys promised would receive aid from the Il-Khan when they landed in Acre. Such an invasion of the 'Holy Land' would also be viewed very favourably by their master's uncle, Qubilai Qa'an, who it was implied had converted to Christianity and was in want of missionaries. Though such envoys were welcomed and their news of conversion was greeted with pleasure a degree of scepticism remained not merely toward the Mongols themselves but to their envoys as well. Guillaume de Nangis in his *Chronique de St. Denis* opined his distrust.

*Were they really envoys or spies God knows. At least they were not Tartars, either by birth or manners, but Christians of the sect of Georgians.*²⁵³

This same distrust of the eastern Christians had been expressed some years before by William of Rubruck who had witnessed the influence and preponderance of Armenians at Qaraqorum.²⁵⁴

The only practical response to this embassy was the dispatch of five

friars to the east to carry out their 'good works' first at the court of Abaqa Khan and then at the distant court of the Great Khan for whom they carried a papal message. Abaqa issued a safe-conduct pass for Baracirqun (Brother Gerard),²⁵⁵ representative of the Pope, which commanded all governors of the towns on his journey, all post relay station commanders to desist from any acts of violence to the bearer or to his property and to offer him food, drink and rations according to his requirements.²⁵⁶ One practical reason to explain this plateau in the relationship between the Mongols and the European courts was the distance their envoys were forced to travel to exchange even diplomatic pleasantries making military liaison difficult if not impractical. This was to be Abaqa's last diplomatic overture to the west before his death. He entrusted the invasion of Egypt, which was to prove a debacle, to his brother Möngke Temür in 1281 without securing any backup from the European powers but as usual supported by his faithful Armenian and Georgians. He died on 1 April 1282 without having been able to take his desired revenge upon the Mamluks for his brother's defeat.

Though the eastern Christians made their allegiance with the Mongols openly, the Outremer states were never convinced that their salvation lay with this new devil from the east rather than with the devil they knew and with whom they were already in profitable trading arrangements. Crusading parties that arrived in the 'Holy Land' would sometimes report immediately to the Il-Khanid court apparently by-passing the Frankish kings. Ibn al-Furāt has a report of the failed mission in 1269 of James I, King of Aragon, whose kinsmen arriving before their king made straight for Abaqa's court to report the expected though not-to-materialise arrival.²⁵⁷

However the Mamluks were not assuaged by the Franks' prevarication and it is reported by Qirtāy al-Khaznadārī c.1271–2 that Baybars was extremely concerned for the security of his dominions. He envisaged a potential pincer movement by the Franks from the west and the Mongols from the east.²⁵⁸ On another occasion Ibn al-Furāt recounts that in May 1272 an envoy from Möngke Temür of the Golden Horde, was waylaid on route by sea to Sultan Baybars. The Sultan was insistent that the envoys be passed safely on to him so afraid was he lest the Franks should use such an opportunity to open up more diplomatic channels to Azerbaijan.²⁵⁹

This distrust of the Frankish statelets did not interfere with the lucrative commercial ties between not only the Genoese who held a monopoly with trade with the Golden Horde but with the Venetians who were developing excellent ties with the Il-Khanid markets, evidence of which is recorded from Tabriz as early as 1264.²⁶⁰ The tight grip of the Genoese on their position as middlemen in the highly

profitable and most important Golden Horde – Mamluk slave trade would ensure that too close an alliance between the European Princes and the Mongols which might be to the detriment of their trading partners would have been viewed with great alarm by this influential Italian city-state.

Within the heterogeneous Il-Khanid administration of Abaqa Khan and in its military structure Christians certainly held positions of power and influence. However, since the Il-Khanate was not a sectarian state such appointments were not necessarily indicative of trends, power bases or of sectarian ascendancy. During Abaqa's rule the Persian and Sunni Juwaynī brothers continued, if at times very tenuously, to hold high office. The Shi'ite, one time Ismā'īlī Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī remained a powerful court favourite up until his death in 1274, Rashīd al-Dīn was still a follower of Judaism when he was appointed Abaqa's court physician, and Maragheh and then Tabriz were both magnets for academics, scientists, poets, artists and philosophers of the east and the west hailing from a multitude of backgrounds and faiths. The encouraging instances of favour shown to the Christians and the fame some of the members of their communities achieved were often seized upon by their chroniclers and apologists to convince themselves and any would-be allies that they were indeed the chosen people of 'God's avengers'.

However it is not difficult to cite instances where the Christians did certainly not fare well under the spreading Mongol umbrella. Peter Jackson has catalogued a string of massacres inflicted on various Christian communities during Hülegü's early conquests which could appear to belie any pro-Christian Mongol bias towards them.²⁶¹ Such stories also suggest the validity of the more traditional view of the Mongol leader's character though it could be argued that the marchlands of Syria and Iraq demanded a harsher regime than that of the more subdued and less turbulent east. The Dominican Ricoldo recounts how Christians were massacred at the express orders of Hülegü for sheltering Muslims from the Mongol army,²⁶² and both Bar Hebraeus and Rashid al-Dīn chronicle other examples of widespread killing of the Christian populations of whole towns. The killings in Aleppo were particularly dreadful and at Hārim though the citizens were willing to yield, their demand for guarantees so angered Hülegü that he massacred the lot save one Armenian blacksmith.²⁶³ In Sassun though their prince Sa'dun was favoured by Hülegü, massacres were carried out apparently under the Il-Khan's orders.²⁶⁴ In another incident a group of Christians from Takrit were denounced to Hülegü for looting the possessions of slain Muslims. The Il-Khan's response was swift and terminal save for a few old people and children who were carried off into slavery.²⁶⁵ In fact Hülegü did not encourage any

acts of vandalism by Christians against Muslims and he is recorded as taking extreme measures in other incidences where such acts were committed. Just as he could be considerate and equitable on occasion, so too could Hülegü be harsh and brutal when he deemed it appropriate.

That Christians were well represented at Abaqa's court as they had been at his father's is indisputable. Despina, Abaqa's royal Byzantine wife, was credited with founding the 'Church in the Camp' used by the Jacobites²⁶⁶ but both William of Rubruck and the historian Hetoum provide ample evidence of the permeation of the Armenian and Nestorian churches throughout the Mongol Empire long before this with William's account of the Armenian Easter celebrations in Qaraqorum with the large clerical procession to the Great Khan's residence²⁶⁷ clearly indicative of a large established Christian community. But religious persuasion was not a decisive feature in Mongol assessment of worth or worthiness for office. Politically disunited in their highland homelands the Armenian and Georgian warlords allowed their internecine squabbles to open the way for the Tatars to manipulate their weaknesses and despite their representation at the Mongol centre of power before the establishment of the Il-Khanid court the Caucasian Christians suffered severely for their discordance.

The peoples of the Caucasian states after initial resistance to what they perceived as more raids by unbelieving barbarous Turks and once they had realised their impotence before these invaders, were quick to become enthusiastic allies of the Mongols. By the time of Hülegü's advent they were fulsome in his praise and became willing combatants in his armies.

*When the wise princes of Armenia and Georgia realised that God was giving power and victory to them (Tatars), to take our countries, then they became reconciled and became obedient to the Tatars, and agreed to give the tribute known as mal and t'agar and came out to them with their Cavalry wherever they (Tatars) led them. The Tatars, agreeing to this, ceased their killing and destroying the country and themselves returned to their place, the land of Muqan.*²⁶⁸

By the time that Abaqa had ascended the throne the Caucasians were identifying their own fate with that of their mighty overlord.

The army [of Berke and the Golden Horde] advanced as far as Tiflis. Many Christians were massacred. While [Berke Khan] encamped in the Garesdj mountains, God took pity on our land and Abaqa Khan. Berke fell

Just as they fought and died for Abaqa against Berke so too did the Georgian and Armenian lords flock to his banner in 1268 to defend his lands against Tegüdar, brother of Baraq, Abaqa's great foe in the east. According to the Monk Grigor the lords of the Caucasus had complained to Abaqa of the unruly and barbarous behaviour of Tegüdar and sought permission to stop his outrages.²⁷⁰ Shiremün, son of Chormaghun, led a combined force of Mongols and local troops to put an end to his depredations and his treachery.

The exploits of Armenian and Georgian heroes in the service of the Tatars who were quick to employ their skills on all their war fronts, were sung in the chronicles. Such legends as Tarsayic Orbelean, renowned for his exploits 'in Khurasan, Syria, Rum, in Ҳимş and Ҳамā, against the Egyptians and in Darband' were honoured by the Mongols as well as their fellow countrymen.²⁷¹

This particular hero whose brother Smbat Orbelean was a valuable member of Hülegü's *Dīwān* went on to achieve greater acclaim under the rule of Abaqa Khan.

*So respected was he [Tarsayic Orbelean] before Abaqa-Khan that on numerous occasions the latter removed from his own person his own royal garments and clothed Tarsayic in them from head to toe, and girdled him with a belt of pure gold studded with costly gems and pearls.*²⁷²

Such was the extent of the Caucasian lords' enthusiasm for their new masters that Hülegü was disposed to appoint them to sensitive positions throughout his *Dīwān* and even grant them Mongol wives.²⁷³ Not only staunch allies in subduing those foolish and blasphemous enough to defy the Mongols' divine right to rule, the Caucasian lords were also enthusiastic partners in plunder.²⁷⁴

Those Armenian and Georgian princes who did not find fame and glory battling the foes of their adopted masters were able to seek honour in the *Dīwān* of the triumphant Mongol Prince, joining their Persian brothers and Turkish neighbours in the service of the Tatar Khans. Some *naxarars* (Armenian nobles) became pillars of the Mongol administration after 1256, notably Smbat Orbelean and Sa'dun Arcruni/Makhanaberdeli. Hülegü deputised Smbat as his overseer of construction for the new Il-Khanid summer residence of Ala-Tagh to the east of Lake Van. Stephannos claimed that

[Smbat] was a skilled rhetorician, unbeatable at Dīwān court – for he spoke five languages: Armenian, Georgian, Uighur, Persian, and even

*Mongolian. . . . Hülegü so heeded his words that [Smbat] could have killed whomsoever he chose, or granted life to whomever he wanted. Consequently, everyone quaked with fear because of him, and everyone's eyes were upon him.*²⁷⁵

These favours toward the lords of Greater Armenia and Georgia were continued under Abaqa's reign though sometimes the bestowal of such favours as *inju* status were a convenient way for the Mongols to pre-empt the build up of power bases and possible resistance, and reward faithful service. Sargis Jaqeli who had reputedly saved Hülegü's life in battle was honoured by Abaqa with *inju* status.²⁷⁶ There were many lords who were not reconciled to such close identification with their conquerors but these often ended up in the service of the Cilician Armenians who although they enjoyed more independence remained faithful allies of the Il-Khans.

For many of the Christian communities the reigns of Hülegü and Abaqa of all the Il-Khans must have held the promise of the Golden Age. Their social status might have seemed to have risen as compared to their position under previous regimes but the reality of such a perception is very difficult to judge since there had existed very little stability in this whole region for generations. It was stability and comparative security and some kind of accountability which marked the first decades of Il-Khanid rule. Abaqa was not a conqueror and it was into his mouth that writing some four or so decades later Rashīd al-Dīn, his one time physician, put the following admonishment against Baraq:

*You set ablaze and burned cities; from whom did you learn world-ruling?*²⁷⁷

The fact that their traditional enemies were receiving what many Christians deemed to be just reward at the hands of the Mongols proved that their new rulers were on the right side. However though so many of their subjects viewed the world through sectarian eyes this was not the perception shared by their masters. The Mongols generally differentiated only between faithful servants and rebels or traitors. It often mattered little to them what religious mantle these slaves garbed themselves in and their only interest in religious disputes was in what way they might manipulate them to serve their own greater cause. This can be seen most clearly through the developing style of their correspondence with the European powers. Güyük Khan wrote early to the Europeans ordering either their submission or else preparation for their annihilation, but by 1262, post Ayn Jālat, with Hülegü's letter to Louis IX, the tone of the letters,

while still commanding and arrogant, conceded a recognition that allies were needed for the battle against the Mamluks. Abaqa appeared fully to recognise the need for a new approach and also appreciated the advantages to be gained by exaggerating his own 'Christian' credentials. His letters were appeals for assistance and joint effort, and he addressed his fellow kings and rulers on more equal terms. His change in attitude was reflected by that of the Popes who after Urban IV with his demands for conversion before alliance limited themselves to heavy propaganda and constant emphasis on the advantages to be enjoyed after conversion.

How committed any of the parties were to not only forming an alliance but also to launching a full scale assault on the 'Holy Lands' is very debatable. For the Latin states strung along the coast of western Syria the crusades were of questionable value. The European raiders would arrive, which in itself caused considerable disruption to the settled population, and then embark on raids of plunder and rapine, antagonising the neighbouring Muslim states before retreating and leaving the whole area in disarray. It would be the Latin states that would have to suffer the consequences, and the reprisals would invariably be suffered by these vulnerable Outremer lands. Commercial ties with the Ayyabids had been good and dialogue and trade was an ongoing process with the Mamluks. This commercial dialogue was such that the Crusader states were quick to declare a neutrality with a distinctly neighbourly bias, when Hülegü dispatched Kitbuqa south to quell the Egyptians.

Though sometimes considered mere colonists, the Latin states of the Levant had been in existence for two centuries and they had become an integral part of the Syrian ethnic and cultural mosaic. Acre was a prosperous port crucial to the economic well-being of not only the Latin coastal strip but of the Syrian hinterland as well. The Crusader states showed enthusiasm neither for crusades themselves nor for an alliance with the Mongols. The situation for the Armenians was quite different from that of their Christian neighbours, their links with the Tatars being considerably more intimate and historical. As an isolated and often threatened minority grouping in the region, the Armenians had acquired a distinctly sectarian interpretation of the power configurations around them or so it would appear from the evidence of their chroniclers. They placed great value on their contacts with Europe and were very reluctant to give up the hope that the Christian West would join forces with their powerful and some time Christian Tatar overlords and assist in the delivery of the 'Holy Land' to their righteous safe keeping. They alone among these thirteenth-century would-be allies appeared to whole-heartedly endorse the concept of an all out united war to rid Syria and Egypt of the infidel Muslims.

The profession of lofty ideological and spiritual causes aside, the motivation behind the later crusades must be questioned. Had the Cilicians been aware of other, ulterior motives behind the heralding to the cross, it is debatable whether they would have shown the same enthusiasm for the proposed foreign invasion as they had put into their propaganda for the Mongol/ Christian cause. The rulers of Europe though they too professed their eagerness for the escalation of the crusades failed to match their words with action on the ground whether because of lack of finances, a shortage of human resources, dwindling support from their lords or the want of sufficient belief in the gains or advantages to be had from such an expensive, time consuming enterprise. Abaqa, though he did not desist from keeping diplomatic channels open, appeared to have no great faith in any meaningful support from the West. His one serious, though futile, assault on the Egyptians led by his brother Möngke Temür was undertaken without consultation or regard to the European armies. Prior to this he appeared to have been waiting for the Westerners to take the initiative. The Mamluks had posed no real threat to the core lands of the Il-Khanate and Abaqa's lack of response to the plight of his vassals, Bohemond of Antioch and the Cilician Armenians, when they came under attack can only suggest that he viewed these client states if not as dispensable then as a buffer zone to occupy both the aggression of his potentially dangerous neighbouring power and the energy and blood lust of his own troops and allied soldiery when they might be used in the region to assist or avenge his supposed protégés. The Mamluk assault on the Saljuq Sultanate of Rum did arouse Mongol anger and if Rashīd al-Dīn is to be believed the sight of so many Mongol casualties after the Battle of Abulustayn moved Abaqa to tears.

*When he saw the slain who had fallen together at Abolustan [Abulustayn], [Abaqa] cried for them and . . . became extremely morose.*²⁷⁸

The defeat of Abaqa's brother's armies was a humiliation that Abaqa was not prepared to accept but his untimely death due to a presumed alcohol overdose precluded any personally led revenge attack. Syria was to remain a playground for restive Il-Khanid troops until the reign of Abaqa's grandson, Ghazan Khan and the western marchlands which were populated by many Christians were to suffer accordingly.

Abaqa had the ear of many supplicants. His loyalty however remained toward his uncle and his primary concern was to the integrity of his Empire, from the Oxus in the east to the Euphrates in the west. His God was all powerful as had so effectively been proven and his family, the descendants of Tului, son of Chinggis, had been

entrusted with the well being and administration of the many lands and all their peoples. These people with all their diverse conceptions of God were all subservient to him and his family and his laws and his God. His was a world vision; that of many of his subjects was parochial and limited. Sympathy he might have felt for the faiths of his servants but for him their beliefs were only one part of the total mosaic which his God, Tengri, encompassed. The Christians might have experienced a resurgence of hope and expectations upon Abaqa's ascension of the Il-Khanid throne and for many, living in the proximity of his court or away from the western marchlands, life must have undoubtedly been prosperous and heartening. For the Il-Khan, however, the various Christian communities were just pieces among the many classes and cliques with which he played upon the chessboard of West Asian politics and diplomacy. The Christian star might have risen but it rose in the company of others who also faithfully served the Il-Khan, the King of Persia.

Berke Khan and the north

The rivalry between two branches of the Chinggisid clan, the Tuluids and the Jochids, can be traced back to before the outbreak of hostilities between Hülegü and Berke in 1260. The dispute between these two princes was seemingly over possession of the grasslands of Azerbaijan and the southern Caucasian steppes. Not only the extent of his territories but the very nature of Hülegü's rule were under question when the armies of the Golden Horde finally rode aggressively south. The ambiguity of the ultimate nature of Hülegü's mission to the West has been enshrined in Rashid al-Dīn's account of Möngke Qa'an's parting directive to take control of Iran Zamīn and his ostensible command to his brother to return home when the job was complete.²⁷⁹

This episode which occurred in Qaraqorum after Möngke's inauguration as Qa'an, is dealt with in far more detail in Juwaynī's history and the assumption that Hülegü's appointment to subdue the west was to be permanent and hereditary is implicit in Aṭā Malik's account.²⁸⁰ It is not however spelt out so clearly as to silence those that would claim that the Tuluid Hülegü was usurping Jochid lands. If, over two and a half centuries later the Safavid courtier, Khwāndamīr, could quote Rashid al-Dīn and add with confidence and surety that Möngke Qa'an had commanded his brother to 'bring all the regions from the Oxus to the furthest reaches of Egypt under your control through bravery and battle. Observing the stipulations of Genghis Khan's customs and *Yasas*'²⁸¹ and continue that the dispute with Berke concerned personal rivalry and righteous anger over

Hülegü's terminal treatment of the Caliph of Baghdad²⁸² it must appear that history has glossed those details in the favour of the winners, the House of Hülegü. The conflagration between the armies of Berke and Hülegü was symptomatic of the fissures and breaches within the Great Chinggisid Empire which had been apparent and had been increasingly snaking throughout the fabric of the Empire since before even the Great Khan had died in 1227. That Möngke Qa'an had found it necessary to resort to subterfuge in order to secure his own family into positions of power suggests that all was not well in the Mongol state and that paranoia and insecurity governed its leaders' actions.

It was not Berke's Islamic sensibilities that Hülegü had slighted when he founded his kingdom in Iraq and the steppes of Azerbaijan and unseated the caliph from the 'City of Peace'. In Berke's view Hülegü's crime was far more monstrous, for in his view Hülegü had usurped the lands awarded by Chinggis Khan to the Jochids and had therefore violated the *Yasa* of their founding father, a view he expressed in a letter to the Mamluk Baybars when he sought an alliance with the Muslim Egyptians against the Il- Khanate. The letter contained a message 'informing [Baybars] about how he [Hülegü] had been contradicting the *yasa* and the sacred law of his own people'²⁸³ a view Berke was confirmed as having held by a biographer of Baybars, Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād (d.1285) who recorded Berke's reaction to the fratricidal war. The extent of the killing was said by these Mamluk sources to have greatly upset Berke but that he was able to justify this fratricidal slaughter on the grounds that Hülegü had contravened the sacred laws of Chinggis Khan.

*It pains me to see the Mongols kill each other with their own swords, but what [else] can be done about a person who has altered the yasa of Chinggis Khan.*²⁸⁴

Chinggis Khan had awarded the lands to the west 'as far as the hoof of Tatar horse had advanced'²⁸⁵ to Batu as grazing lands and this being after the legendary reconnaissance trip of Jebe and Subedai these lands could have been presumed to include the territories to the immediate south and west of the Caspian. Berke rose in anger against his cousin Hülegü because he saw the tacitly agreed 'division' of the Empire between the House of Jochi and that of the Tuluids with his role as *aqqa* respected, challenged by the presence of Hülegü and under direct threat from the growing might of the House of Tului. It should be remembered that this early division of the Empire, to part of which Berke was possibly referring, was a vague and general assignment of abodes or *yurts* to all Chinggis Khan's vast family, 'more than ten

thousand, each of whom has his own position'²⁸⁶ and of which Juwaynī had time to record only those lands allotted the principal princes. That these tracts were later to develop into individual Khanates was not necessarily envisaged by the Great Khan. However for the Jochids this was irrelevant and suddenly they had created a belief in a *Yasa* which would support their case.

The actual *casus belli* was the execution of one and alleged poisoning of two Jochid princes who had all accompanied Hülegü on his march across Persia.²⁸⁷ The three Jochid princes, Tutar, Balagha, and Quli, whom Rashīd al-Dīn records as having taken part in the siege and destruction of Baghdad,²⁸⁸ became the spark which provided the excuse for Berke to mobilise his forces.

*When his [Berke's] kinsmen, Tutar, Balagha, and Quli, met their deaths, enmity and hatred arose between them [Hülegü and Berke], which increased day by day.*²⁸⁹

Hülegü had previously found reason to find fault with Tutar and Balagha,²⁹⁰ and the account of their final demise given by Rashīd al-Dīn is perfunctory and dismissive.²⁹¹ Other sources speak of a general massacre of Jochids following the deaths of the three princes, particularly the Armenian historians who recount the details with relish, having borne the forces of the Muslim Berke no great love. 'They killed so many that the mountains and plains stank from the bodies of the slain Tatars.'²⁹² Grigor had earlier expressed his dislike of the Jochid princes, especially Quli who he claimed unabashedly described himself as 'the brother of God'²⁹³ and blamed these 'eaters of men' for much of the wanton destruction, oppression, torture and killing which occurred in the Christian territories.²⁹⁴ That many of the surviving followers of the princes made their way back to Berke's *ordu*²⁹⁵ is confirmed by various sources and their treatment at the hands of Hülegü was the pretext which enabled Berke to rally his forces for an invasion.

The cracks and fissures which had been growing within the Mongol Empire from the time of Chinggis Khan have been studied in depth by Peter Jackson in his paper, 'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire'²⁹⁶ an interpretation later tempered by Thomas Allsen in his *Mongol Imperialism*. A summary of the long history of ambiguous sovereignty of the lands 'south of the Oxus' will re-enforce the impression that Berke's invasion of the Caucasus was a reaction to a perceived usurpation of ancestral rights and an inherited sphere of influence and a response to a direct challenge to his own position within the Mongol hierarchy rather than a *ghāzī*-like act of retribution for the murder of the caliph, or even an over-heated border dispute concerning

admittedly choice pasture lands. Whether Berke's perception was contrived or actual cannot be known but it is significant that actual hostilities broke out only after Möngke's death.

Prior to Hülegü's triumphal march across Persia in the 1250s the lands of Iraq-i Ajam had been in a state of anarchy with its city states often at the mercy of warring armies, marauding bandits and rival warlords. Jalāl al-Dīn Mīnkubirni²⁹⁷ Khwārazmshāh with his notorious bands of mercenaries, 'was at that time leaping all over the countries of Khorasan like a stag',²⁹⁸ and in Qohestan and in the Elborz and their southern foothills the Assassins held sway, while the Mongol armies were kept busy engaging local rebellions wheresoever they occurred including skirmishes with the Caliph's forces. The newly installed Great Khan, Ögödei, had dispatched Chormaghun Noyan as military governor of Persia in 1229 accompanied by representative Noyans from the Empire's *ulus* prominent amongst whom was Baiju, a Jochid dependant, and an army numbering three, four or five *tūmens* depending on which source is consulted.²⁹⁹ Rashīd al-Dīn describes this army as *tamma*³⁰⁰ which suggests that the troops were intended to become an army of permanent occupation and in the *Secret History* Ögödei is quoted as saying:

*Chormaqan-qorchi shall stay in that country as garrison commander, and every year the people will bring him tributes: yellow gold, gilt, gold brocade and damasks, pearls both large and small, sleek Arab horses with long necks and legs, dull-brown workhorses, camels and small-humped camels, pack mules and mules for riding. All this shall Chormaqan-qorchi send to me.*³⁰¹

Chormaghun was principally a soldier rather than an ambitious administrator and though he is credited with subduing Azerbaijan and Arran and bringing the Georgians and Armenians to tributary status he accepted as his personal share of the many lands he had subjugated a headquarters at Ganja³⁰² and the lands surrounding Ani and Kars.³⁰³ Chormaghun was by-passed first by Ögödei's appointment of Chin Temür as governor of Khorasan and Mazanderan in 1232–3 and then in 1239–40 by the designation of the ruthless Uighur, Körgüz as fiscal administrator and tax collector of all the lands that Chormaghun had effectively conquered. Rendered deaf and incapacitated by a paralytic disease Chormaghun was succeeded in 1242 by Baiju (d.1259).³⁰⁴

Baiju, of the Besut tribe and a kinsman of the legendary general, Jebe,³⁰⁵ had been Chormaghun's second in command according to Grigor³⁰⁶ and it was on Ögödei's orders that he became Chormaghun's replacement when paralysis struck the general.³⁰⁷ Apart from his highly successful military campaigns in Anatolia and the Caucasus

Baiju's career is noteworthy for its comparative longevity. Though not on a par with the remarkable Arghun Aqa³⁰⁸ whose consummate survival skills and adeptness at ingratiation delivered him an aged and natural death, Baiju managed to survive the upheavals of the Güyük period and continued at his post in western Asia under Hülegü until the outbreak of hostilities with the Golden Horde. It was about this time that accusations of excessive conceit and adverse reaction to his boasting of the major part he had played in the subjugation of Rum and the implication inherent therein, led apparently to his execution and his command passing on to Chormaghun's son, Shiremün.³⁰⁹ Prior to these charges Hülegü had already upbraided this most able commander just as the destruction of Baghdad was about to be launched. He accused Baiju of having achieved nothing since his predecessor's death except 'frighten[ing] the Mongol army with the splendour and might of the Caliph'³¹⁰ for which a suitably contrite Baiju then galloped off to accomplish more glories for his master though the chronicler, Rashīd al-Dīn, seems somewhat confused as to the actual names of the victories the general was to win.³¹¹ Bar Hebraeus in fact records one incident in the siege of Baghdad where Baiju was ignominiously defeated by the caliph's men.³¹² The reason that Baiju was able to survive so long and then to so suddenly fall foul of Hülegü just when the Tuluid prince was about to make his 'audacious move'³¹³ of establishing his own kingdom, is that though appointed by Ögödei and answering first to Chormaghun and then of course to the Qa'an, Baiju was in fact a representative of Batus. Ibn Bībī records that after the decisive battle of Köse Dagħ in 1243 in which Baiju commanded the victorious Mongol forces, the defeated Saljuq Sultan Kai Khosrow II sent his envoys to Batu's *ordu* in the north to sue for peace.³¹⁴ The Mongol army which invaded Anatolia in 1243, widely known to have been under the control of Baiju, is described in the encyclopaedia of the Mamluk historian Nuwayrī as coming 'on behalf of Batu'³¹⁵ while another Mamluk source speaks of the conversion to Islam of 'all those [*Noyans*] who had gone out with Baichu'³¹⁶ with the implication being that these troops originated from the north where Islam was spreading among the Mongols. The hostile reception afforded the Papal mission headed by Ascelin was blamed on the fact that the pagan Baiju was closely surrounded by Muslim advisers.³¹⁷ If Baiju had indeed been the representative of Batu's *ordu* it would have been natural for him to have assumed the position of Ögödei's man, Chormaghun's, second in command since Batu exercised joint command over the region with the Qa'an. If Rashīd al-Dīn and Juwaynī, both Tuluid loyalists, were reluctant to stress any role Batu might have exercised south and west of the Amu Darya, the Delhi historian and Mongol antagonist, Minhaj al-Dīn

Jūzjānī showed no such hesitancy in emphasising the influence the eldest Chinggisid grandson had over the lands of Persia.

*[Of] every province in Iran which had come under Mongol control, [Batu] had his allotted share, and his representatives used to take away [that] part in proportion to his share; and all the Mongol grandees and generals obeyed him.*³¹⁸

Though in itself this might be unremarkable since the same could probably be said of every province of the Empire, it is the fact that this was isolated and stressed which lends it significance.

Ousted from the Mughan plains when Hülegü arrived and laid claim to those choice pastures as his own wintering grounds, Baiju moved his own *ordu* further to the west and set up his camp in Bithynia³¹⁹ on the Black Sea coast and within easy reach of the Pontic steppe lands. Izz al-Dīn the Saljuq Sultan of Rum tried to exploit what he perceived as ill-feelings between Baiju and Hülegü and complained to Hülegü of Baiju ‘alienating [Izz al-Dīn] from the kingdom and from the inheritance of his fathers’³²⁰ but to little avail.

If Batu’s representatives in the military were eminent in Persia, for other than Baiju there was also Qunan, a commander of one of Jochi’s personal thousands, and Tainal Noyan,³²¹ it is also evident that the administrators, if not directly answerable to Batu, were certainly well aware of his interests in the country. As late as 1254 Arghun Aqa maintained close contact with Batu’s *ordu* as he conducted his censuses and implemented his ‘tax reforms’. The amīr’s first port of call before embarking on the general survey of the lands of Armenia and Georgia was Batu’s domains³²² to the north in order

*to survey and record those soldiers and warriors who had gone with the senior and junior Noyans campaigning, and to stipulate according to their worth the uluf, which is a gift for those who have taken to the road and recompense for horse and saddle.*³²³

Local Armenian warlords still saw it expedient to travel north in their quest for ‘justice’. The highly regarded cleric, Nerses, experienced such distress from Arghun Aqa’s strictures that the prince, Ḥasan Jalāl, c.1256 took his complaint to Batu Khan’s *ordu*. The Armenian prince

received a document guaranteeing freedom for Lord Nerses, Katolikos of Albania, for all his properties and goods, that he be free and untaxed and allowed to travel freely everywhere in the dioceses under his authority, and

that no one disobey what he said.³²⁴

In this particular case this document proved of little value, doubtless indicative of the Jochid's declining influence in what was fast becoming the kingdom of Hülegü, and the complaints had to be later presented in Qaraqorum.

Further to the east in Khorasan local people had long recognised the suzerainty of the House of Jochi. As early as 1221, the general Eljigitai (not to be confused with his later namesake) who had recaptured Herat was appointed as Jochi's military representative in the region³²⁵ and he was still in position in 1239–40 when the Qa'an and Batu jointly carried out an assessment and reconfirmation of the civilian administrators of Herat and its environs.³²⁶ The *malik* Majd al-Dīn appealed directly to Batu when he sought permission to restore his town of Kalyun³²⁷ and would later shower largesse on Batu's envoys³²⁸ in marked contrast to his treatment of the Chaghatai Prince Yesü-Möngke³²⁹ and even the Qa'an's ambassadors.³³⁰ In recognition of this Malik Majd al-Dīn was seized and stoned to death³³¹ by agents of Arghun Aqa, the new governor of Khorasan and appointee of Batu's rivals, and Majd's son, Shams al-Dīn newly back from confirmation of his succession at Batu's *ordu*, was poisoned.³³² South and west of the Āmayeh remained front-line country and a theatre for quiet rivalry but it was also a region where Jochid influence was usually paramount and never disregarded. It is significant that Jūzjānī just before his own death in 1260 wrote how the *khutba* was read in Berke's name throughout Transoxiana, Khorasan and Iran following Möngke's death³³³ though these countries were not listed in the lands which eventually passed to Berke after his brother Batu's death.³³⁴

Of the tax officials and chief administrators appointed during the period prior to the establishment of the Il-Khanate, Chin Temür,³³⁵ Körgüz³³⁶ and the much-maligned Sharaf al-Dīn³³⁷ were all dependants of Batu.³³⁸ Even, Arghun Aqa who had been appointed governor by the Regent Töregene and was later subordinated to Eljigitai, the general designated by Güyük Khan to take over military command and overall administrative control of Persia and Anatolia, made sure that he kept his channels to Batu's *ordu* open, as well as his contacts with the House of Tului intact.³³⁹ Although Juwaynī mentions all the princes sent to Persia to represent the houses of the empire under Chin-Temür, 'Chormaghun placed at [Chin-Temür's] disposal an amīr to represent every prince and prince's son, Kul Bolat representing Qa'an, Nosal Batu, Qizal-Buqa Chaghatai and Yeke Sorqotani Beki'³⁴⁰ only the Kereit Nosal, Batu's representative, figures in subsequent developments to any major degree. Nosal died in 1240 still retaining control of the army though the administrative control of

the province passed to Kōrgüz. However, certainly in the time of the Qa'an, the rivalry that existed in these lands south and west of the Oxus was kept low key and did not break out into open hostility. Conflicts were by proxy and not all battle lines were partisan as Ögödei's promotion of some of Batu's protégés proves. With the succession of Güyük and in particular his appointment of Eljigitai to challenge Batu's hold over Anatolia, discord became more open.

Behind this Mongol conflict in this highly volatile region, lay a far longer history of conflict, rivalry and land disputes. Whether or not any credence is given to claims by such Azerbaijani historians as Abdul Karim Alī- Zādeh, that Azerbaijan had been populated by Turkish speaking tribes since long before the arrival of Islam and the later movements of the Turkish Ghaznavids and Saljuqs,³⁴¹ the southern Caucasus had certainly long felt the influence and interest of northerners including Turkish tribes such as the Khazars while its sedentary populations had often sought allegiance with the Persian speaking southerners from Iran. In the seventh century 'In great hordes the Khazars emerged and fell upon our country [Albania or today's Azerbaijan]' and it was Khosrow, the king of Persia who marched to the Caucasians' defence.³⁴² In later years the Qipchaq Turks established close ties and extended their grazing lands south into the Caucasus. In Georgia the Qipchaq presence was particularly felt. Davut' II of Georgia, himself married to a Qipchaq, used 40,000 Qipchaq fighters in his standing army and had their families perhaps numbering up to 225,000 people settle in Georgia. The renowned Azerbaijani poet, NiOāmī of Ganjeh, had a Qipchaq wife. A Qipchaq *ghulām* Il-Dengis (1133–72) founded his own short-lived dynasty, while, under Queen Tamar in the twelfth century as well as under Giorgi III, Qipchaqs were prominent politically. They all suffered with the advent of Jebe and Subedai. Many of those who suffered, or at least their offspring, ended up in the Mamluk armies of the Egyptians, and those close ethnic ties were not lost on Berke and the subsequent rulers of the Golden Horde. Whatever their attitude towards Berke's claims to the southern Caucasus, the Qipchaqs of the Golden Horde would have felt his invasion of the south fully consummate with their own aims and claims.³⁴³

Theoretically, conquered territory was the joint possession of the Chinggisid family and the armies of occupation referred to as *tamma*, reflected this concept in their composition with the prince in charge of the expedition being accompanied by representatives of each of the other branches of the family and their attendant troops. Campaigns were planned through high-level representative *Quriltais* which were answerable to the Qa'an, a tradition which persisted and was much decried by the Armenians of Cilicia.³⁴⁴ Though land was jointly

owned, some among the ruling élite were more equal than others and the customs of Turco-Mongolian patterns of inheritance and of seniority were rigidly observed but ambiguously interpreted. This last was to be, indeed had already been, a major source of friction amongst the Chinggisids who could be ultra sensitive where matters of status and hierarchy were questioned. Chinggis Khan's first son to his principal wife, Borte Fujin, was born shortly after her release from Merkit captivity and a doubt had always existed over Jochi's true parentage and whether Temujin or Chilger of the Merkits was the real father. Both Ögödei and Chaghadaï had taunted their elder brother over his questionable birth though significantly the youngest son, Tului, whose Kereyit wife was Jochi's wife's sister, abstained.³⁴⁵ Rashīd al-Dīn's treatment of the affair is extremely circumspect and implied and his actual narrative of the events simply falsifies this 'shameful' episode.³⁴⁶ Since Jochi was to die³⁴⁷ before his father, the painful decision of choosing or by-passing his eldest son as his successor did not become an issue for Chinggis Khan.

The length of the regencies between each of the successions however is strongly indicative of the political and military wrangling that was happening in the background to the ascension of the Qa'ans.³⁴⁸ It was the *Quriltai*s which ultimately yielded the consensus which permitted the ascension but from the first there existed a dichotomy between the wishes of the heads of the *ulus* to pass on their privileges and lands to their chosen offspring and the demands of the greater community which decided through 'election' the next in seniority who should rightfully inherit the position and privileges of the ailing leader. Even with all Chinggis Khan's prestige there was opposition voiced to his selection of Ögödei as successor Qa'an. Tului, as youngest son, acted as regent after the death of the Great Khan and Chinese sources claim that he had to be coerced into calling the *Quriltai*³⁴⁹ and Chinggis Khan's youngest brother, Temüge Ot-chigin, with the rights of seniority on his side also forwarded his candidacy. But it was during the regency of Ögödei's widow Töregene that the rivalries became considerably more obvious with Temüge Ot-chigin rising in open though short-lived rebellion.³⁵⁰ The ill-will between Batu and Güyük erupted during the Russian/Qipchaq campaign of 1236–42 and arose over the issue of seniority and status³⁵¹ which in fact harkened back to the old questions regarding the legitimacy of Jochi's birth. Rashīd al-Dīn suggests that it was Batu's deliberate delaying tactics in attending the *Quriltai* that lengthened the interregnum but in the end 'Before his arrival and without the attendance of *aqā* and *ini*, they arbitrarily settled the Khanate upon Güyük Khan.'³⁵² Güyük sought a final showdown with his rival and in anticipation of the confrontation he dispatched Eljigitai to Persia to

deal with the Ismā'īlis to be followed significantly by the full subjugation of Anatolia, Aleppo, Mosul and Georgia 'that no one else might interfere with them and the sultans and governors of those parts might be answerable to him for their tribute'.³⁵³ The Mamluk writer Umarī claims that Eljigitai was ordered to arrest Batu's lieutenants in the Caucasus³⁵⁴ and confirms the warning sent to Batu by Sorqoqtani Beki, Tului's eldest wife, of Güyük's own hostile military movements westward.³⁵⁵ William of Rubruck heard rumours of the extent of the hostilities between the two camps when he passed through Batu's realms a few years later³⁵⁶ as did the companion of Carpini and author of the *Tartar Relation*.³⁵⁷ What this rivalry made very clear was that to dislodge Batu, Güyük clearly had, at the same time, to deal with the lands south and west of the Āmayeh for this was, in the new Qa'an's view, within Batu's sphere of influence if not under his direct control.

As has already been seen, the House of Tului and that of Jochi were close and the marriage of the two sisters and nieces of Ong Khan, Bek-Tutmish Fujin to Jochi and Sorqoqtani Beki to Tului,³⁵⁸ bound them closer. On Güyük's death Batu strongly supported Tului's eldest son, Möngke's bid for the Qa'anship. As *aqā* Batu had the recognised right³⁵⁹ to summon a *Quriltai*, but defying convention he called upon the Mongol élite to gather within his own *ulus* in present day Kazakhstan and then proceeded to offer Möngke the throne without awaiting the arrival of all the princes and nobles, the senior members of the houses of Ögödei and Chaghadaï being noticeably absent. Batu was able to justify his action with a short rejoinder, 'With the agreement of the *aqā* and the *ini* we have settled this matter and the discussion is over.'³⁶⁰ What followed was a bloody struggle for the leadership of the Empire of Chinggis Khan with the widespread slaughter of many of the senior members of the houses of Ögödei and Chaghadaï.

*[Möngke] ordered the amīrs that were imprisoned and those who had incited the princes to rebellion and cast them into the gulf of so great a crime to be put to the sword of public execution. There were seventy-seven persons, all of whom were put to death. Amongst them were two sons of Eljigitei, whose mouths were stuffed with stone until they died. As for their father, he was arrested in Badghis and taken to Batu to join his sons.*³⁶¹

The round-up of the opponents of this Tuluid/Jochi alliance was carried out through the formation of a vast *nerge* composed of 'ten *tüimens* of valiant youths and spirited Turks'.³⁶² Among those captured and executed were Güyük's widow, Oghul Qaimish and Shiremün's mother who were both dispatched in Sorqaqtani's *ordu*. William of

Rubruck heard that some three hundred Tatar nobles plus their womenfolk who had been 'beaten with brands to make them confess',³⁶³ had been executed on Möngke's orders while others had been exiled or sent on campaign where some including Shiremün and the Chaghatai prince, Qadaqchi subsequently died.

If this slaughter represented a victory for the House of Tului and the newly installed Qa'an Möngke, it was a victory won with the power and support of the House of Jochi. Supreme power might now rest with Möngke but his indebtedness to Batu could not easily be dismissed. According to Juwaynī it had been Batu 'the eldest of the princes and the leader amongst them' who possessed the right to decide upon the next Qa'an and 'it was for him to decide whether he [Batu] should become Khan himself or suggest another as Khan'.³⁶⁴ Jūzjānī echoes these words but places even greater emphasis on Batu's status, suggesting that the son of Jochi would remain the real power behind the throne. ' "I, Batu, shall place him [Möngke] on the throne, in reality I shall be the sovereign." All [the Tatar nobles] ratified this opinion'.³⁶⁵ In some manuscripts of Juwaynī's work the words 'In this meeting we have all promised to abide by Batu Qa'an's commands'³⁶⁶ are put into the mouth of Tului's eighth son, Moge Oghul, as he pressurised Möngke to accept the Khanate. Even Rashīd al- Dīn writing at a time when it was hardly politically expedient to proclaim the pivotal role the Jochids had played in the fortunes of the Tuluids could not avoid mentioning that it had been Batu as *aqā* who had had the right to decide on the nomination of the Qa'an ' "For Batu," they said, "is the *aqā* of all the princes, and all are subject to his command".'³⁶⁷ When William of Rubruck was travelling across Central Asia a few years after these events there seemed no doubt in his mind that the Great Empire of the Tatars had been equanimously divided into two and that the 'great king of the Tartars'³⁶⁸ Batu ruled in the west while his nominee the Qa'an Möngke presided over the east with the other *ulus* marginalised accordingly. Early on, the Latin Friar noticed the joyous welcome his party would be given by Möngke's people because their guide was an envoy from Batu. This exuberant greeting afforded as a token of respect was mutual though the Franciscan wryly noted that 'Baatu's people, however, give themselves rather more airs and are not as careful to observe the practice [of glad salutation]'.³⁶⁹ Möngke himself appeared content to acknowledge the apparent equality of his own and Batu's authority over their empire. 'Just as the sun spreads its rays in all directions, so my power and that of Baatu are spread to every quarter.'³⁷⁰ This shared responsibility even extended to foreign affairs and Friar William had been commanded by Möngke to return home via Batu's *ordu* where he was to submit the letter addressed to Louis IX from the

Qa'an to Batu's scrutiny in case the king 'should see fit to add, delete or change anything'.³⁷¹ If equanimity reigned in the last years of Batu's life the peace was shattered shortly after his death c.1255.³⁷²

Since his *ulus* was well represented militarily in Hülegü's campaign westward in 1253 it can only be supposed that Batu's approval had been given for the stated aims of subduing the Ismā'īlīs, crushing the Kurds and Lurs, curbing the power and influence of the caliph and extending the empire's borders through Syria toward Egypt. The intention of Hülegü's permanent settlement and the establishment of the Il-Khanate had presumably not yet been broached publicly and this would have accounted for the ostensibility of Möngke Qa'an's parting remarks to his younger brother. Though claims to Arran and Azerbaijan for the Jochids were later made dating the division to Chinggis Khan³⁷³ and Waṣṣāf himself claims that the lands as far as Darband had been formally granted to Jochi while his people's habit of wintering further south in Arran and Azerbaijan meant that these lands fell to them by default,³⁷⁴ those regions south and west of the Āmayeh for the main having been administered by Jochid dependants, would generally have been assumed to have fallen under Batu's sphere of influence. If Hülegü were to stabilise and extend those regions south of the Caspian, the presence in his camp of a sizeable proportion of Batu's agents and the presence in the field of Baiju, a ranking Jochid commander, would guarantee that Batu's interests were not infringed upon. There is a suggestion in a letter from Özbeg Khan (1312–41) to the Il-Khan Öljeitü, that all the regions of Iran Zamīn had been the subject of a deal struck between Möngke and Batu³⁷⁵ possibly in return for the latter's support in Hülegü's campaign.³⁷⁶ This is unlikely since it was in Batu's interest to send his own troops along with Hülegü's expedition to safeguard his interests and Möngke was hardly in a position to distribute lands which were already effectively under the control of his very powerful partner and already constituted the winter quarters of Batu's Noyan, Baiju. In addition, Özbeg's predecessor Toqtoa had already made representations to Ghazan Khan claiming Arran and Azerbaijan as having been granted to the Jochids by Chinggis Khan.³⁷⁷ If Hülegü had continued his mission westward and southward and had succeeded in subjugating the Syrians and the Egyptians, the matter of the settlement of north-west Iran might not have arisen and the Il-Khanid capital might well have been established in the sweeping Beqaa valley or the hills of northern Mesopotamia. If this had been the stated aim, Möngke's secret agenda might have envisaged more a consolidation of his own power base and to this end he would have needed the leverage offered by fraternal links, Hülegü in the west and Qubilai in the east, to act against his over-powerful relative to the north.

According to Jūzjānī, Batu had foregone the Qa'anship in favour of Möngke because he felt that the lands already under his jurisdiction were sufficient an empire in themselves and that the addition of Persia, Chin and Turkestan would be too great a burden. 'I and my brother, which is Barka, possess [already] so great a sovereignty and empire in this part [unspecified!], that to rule over it, together with possession of, and sway over, the states of Chin, Turkestan, and 'Ajam, would be impossible.'³⁷⁸ Here there is no suggestion of Batu surrendering any sovereignty but more the division of total sovereignty, and it was Batu, as a kingmaker appearing to have strong widespread support and respect, who alone was in the position to dictate terms. It was Batu who for many of the Mongol nobility was first choice for Qa'an.

*When Kyuk departed from this world, all the great chiefs of the Mughal armies³⁷⁹ turned their faces towards Batu [son of Jochi] saying: 'It behoveth that thou shouldst be our sovereign, since, of the race of Chinggis Khan, there is no one greater than thou; and the throne and diadem, and the rulership, befitteth thee best.'*³⁸⁰

If Möngke deemed it prudent to keep his own true agenda undefined when he dispatched his brother westward, events dictated developments following Batu's death c.1255.³⁸¹ Batu's brother Berke was not the choice candidate as successor for the Qa'an Möngke nor for Hülegü in Iran. Rather their choice was the Christian son of Batu, Sartaq,³⁸² whose questionable death Kirakos describes³⁸³ as a great setback for not only the Christians of western Asia but for the House of Tului. This view is supported by Vardan who, repeating the charge of murder against Berke, claims that Sartaq's territories had also been extended by Möngke.³⁸⁴ Jūzjānī endorses the claim that Sartaq was the welcome choice of Möngke Qa'an³⁸⁵ and though he acknowledges a role for Berke in his nephew's untimely death, he claims that it was carried out through the agency of God and the power of prayer.³⁸⁶

On receiving the news of this death Möngke immediately dispatched emissaries to Batu's widow, Boraqchin Khātūn, to ensure the proper preparation and education of Ulaghchi, the infant son of Sartaq, to continue until he should be old enough to succeed his father.³⁸⁷ However this infant died soon after and in Jūzjānī's account Berke assumed possession of not only all of Batu's territory in which significantly, Jūzjānī states, was included Rum, but also all of his brother's wives, a practice hardly in keeping with the strictures of the *Shari'a*. Ominously, Jūzjānī mentions almost as an aside that 'there were fifteen sons and grandsons of the generation of Tushi Khan, all of whom departed to Hell',³⁸⁸ hurried there, presumably, by Berke.

Family bloodletting on such a scale is suggestive of an intense power struggle to which sources such as Nuwayri have made reference.³⁸⁹ It is Kirakos who stresses that Sartaq's death promised to be a major misfortune for the western Christians and also in particular to Möngke and Hülegü.³⁹⁰ Jackson suggests that Möngke's efforts to prevent Berke's ascension were based on apprehension that he would oppose any assault on the caliphate in Baghdad. However, though once hostilities had broken out between the Jochis and the Tuluids the righteous banner of Islam was raised, there is little evidence that Berke sought to withdraw his troops from any of Hülegü's operations until after the sack of the 'City of Peace'. Rubruck noted that there had been friction between Batu and his Muslim brother as early as 1252 concerning contacts between Berke and Muslim envoys en route to the Khan's *ordu*.³⁹¹ Whether the order from Batu for his younger brother to move from the vicinity of the Darband and Georgia was occasioned from fear of insurrection by Berke and his Muslim friends or more simply from annoyance that his younger brother was having his pick of the choice and rich gifts passing through his territory although they were rightfully destined for the Khan of the Golden Horde's tables, is not made clear from Rubruck's few words. 'He had no wish for Saracen envoys visiting him [Berca], since he viewed it as detrimental to his own interests [*quia videbatur sibi dampnosum*]'.³⁹² Though Berke's attachment to his faith led him to ban pork from his camp, Rubruck's choice of words in describing the prince's religious commitment 'He makes himself out to be a Saracen [*facit se sarracenum*]',³⁹³ suggest, if the missionary's judgement is to be accepted, that contrary to the Muslim sources he was not convincing in his Islamic guise. Berke's adherence to the *Shari'a* seems to have lapsed when he took possession of his dead brother's wives and it would appear from his initial correspondence with Baybars³⁹⁴ that it was Hülegü's supposed contravening of Chinggis Khan's *yasa* that provoked his greatest ire after hostilities had become open. Just as Hülegü flagrantly manipulated any Christian credentials he possessed in his appeals to the Latin West so too did Berke realise the importance of using his own conversion to Islam in furthering his contacts and alliance with the Muslim Mamluks. The fact that it took some three years for his indignation over the sacking of Baghdad to manifest itself raises obvious questions about the sincerity of his spiritual sentiments. In Rashīd al-Dīn's account of the dispute, Berke was more troubled by Hülegü's failure to consult *aqā* and *inī* before dispatching the caliph than by the actual killing.³⁹⁵ There is a record of troops loyal to Berke defecting to Mamluk territory in search of asylum on 8 November 1262³⁹⁶ but prior to this, mention is made of other Mongol troops being captured who, after questioning, were then

released because they were Muslims, presumably to return to their own camps.

There seems little doubt that Berke was a Muslim before he succeeded Batu and the Bokharan Shaykh and Sufi, Sayf al-Dīn Bākharzī³⁹⁷ is widely attested to have played a major part in Berke's Islamic development³⁹⁸ while Jūzjānī claims that the Jochid prince's religious training had already begun in his youth, and surrounds his birth, upbringing and early history in Islamic topoi.³⁹⁹ How deep and 'orthodox' was his conversion is difficult to judge since one source of information relating to this, his letters to the Mamluk court, would have played up his devotion to Islam and the Sunna for political reasons and with a political aim, though the Arabic sources do refer to 'most of his people' and 'most of his army' as being converts and to his amīrs as maintaining muezzin and prayer leaders in their service.⁴⁰⁰ As DeWeese has pointed out, the role of the Sufi Shaykh became a popular paradigm in later accounts of the conversion of various 'royals' and the influential role of the less flamboyant jurists and theologians at the courts of the Golden Horde should not be underestimated. The historian Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-Mans.arī (d.1325) names the Mongol households and Berke's various relatives and amīrs who had accepted and practised Islam which the chronicler claimed were listed in a letter from the newly installed Khan to the Mamluk Sultan, Baybars.⁴⁰¹ Certainly Berke's conversion was not a solitary or isolated act and later tensions in the court of the Golden Horde were often translated as strife between Muslims within the ruling élite and those traditionalists who would still uphold the *Yasa* and the customs of the steppe. Muslim historians would later make reference to the Jochid *ulus* not as the Dasht-i Qipchaq, the name by which it was commonly known, but as the Dasht-i Berke where Berke's name shared a common spelling with the Arabic word *Barakah* (spiritual grace, or blessing).⁴⁰²

In the light of these later developments the wording of Berke's opening letter to Baybars assumes greater importance. In this letter the cited justification for continuing and escalating hostilities against Hülegü was the Il- Khan's breaching of the sacred *Yasa* of Chinggis Khan, and his insults against Islam are secondary reasons. The enormity of Berke's decision to approach an outside agent for help against another member of the sacred family must surely have forced him into a radical reassessment of himself and the role and identity of his kingdom. As Jackson has dramatically commented:

It signifies the first occasion on which a Mongol prince was prepared to collaborate with an independent external power against fellow Mongols; and in this vital sense – remembering the claims to world-wide dominion

that the Mongols had hitherto expressed – it may be said to signify the dissolution of their empire.⁴⁰³

His subsequent letters to Egypt and his rhetoric against his southern neighbours would take on an increasingly strident and Islamic tone as the war progressed. As Berke's fervour became more vocal so too the welcome afforded his followers seeking sanctuary in Egypt.

*Then letters came announcing the approach of another large group of Tatars. The Sultan [Baybars] paid great attention to them [too], riding out to meet them. [Moreover] when a third group arrived, he took the same measures with them . . . They met those Tatar amirs who had arrived before them and everyone of them was immediately confirmed in the rank of amir. Then the Sultan offered them Islam and they all accepted it through him and they were all circumcised.*⁴⁰⁴

However, it should be noted that the underlying cause for hostilities remained land and the rights to the collection of its revenue as the continued existence of enmity between the two states under future Muslim and non-Muslim rulers attests. However deep Berke's Muslim convictions might have been, Islam was a highly effective rallying flag for the northerners in their war against the perceived usurpation of their lands, income and rights by the Il-Khanid southerners.

The unexpected and sudden death of Möngke Khan in 1259 heralded the eclipse of any pretence of unity within the Mongol empire. The resulting conflict between Qubilai and Arigh-Böqe had a direct bearing on developments in the western provinces of the empire. As mentioned above, Möngke's death led to the *khutba* being read in Berke's name as *aqqa*, throughout what was now effectively the kingdom of Hülegü, while Kirakos immediately assumed the successor to be the youngest son of Tului, brother Arigh-Böqe. Bar Hebraeus recounts the reasoning behind Arigh-Böqe's claims on the throne.

*[Möngke with Qubilai] went to the inner countries of the Chinese. And he left in his place his brother 'Arigh-Buqa, who was the youngest of them all. And having gone and engaged that king in battle, by ill-luck an arrow came to him, and there ended [his life].*⁴⁰⁵ *And his brother Kublai took all the armies of the Mongols, and went forth from that inner country, in the great town which is called Khan Balik, and his brothers agreed that he should be Khan. But his younger brother 'Arigh-Buqa said, 'It is meet that the kingdom should be mine, because Munga Khan handed it over to me when he went to war, and during his lifetime he made me sit in his place.'*⁴⁰⁶

A cursory reading of Rashīd al-Dīn would suggest that Arigh-Böqe was a mere would-be usurper of Qubilai, Möngke's rightfully appointed heir. Since Rashīd al-Dīn was an employee of the Tuluīd Khans of Persia, and his principal collaborator and source of information for the first three volumes of his *Collection of Histories* was Bolad Cheng-Hsiang, a ranking Mongolian official in the employ of Qubilai,⁴⁰⁷ this bias is hardly unexpected. He puts the charge of duplicity into Arigh-Böqe's very mouth, 'Since Qubilai has some inkling of our guile and treachery, it is expedient that we summon the princes and the amirs.'⁴⁰⁸ and Arigh-Böqe's actions are everywhere referred to as rebellion. Aware that it was Berke who as *aqā*, the senior member of the royal family, had the right to confer legitimacy on the Qa'an just as his brother Batu had done for Möngke, Rashīd al-Dīn suppresses any reference to Berke's support for Arigh-Böqe's candidacy with suggestions that such rumours of backing from Berke and Hülegü were disinformation put about by the pretender's agents.⁴⁰⁹ In fact there exists evidence that Berke struck coins in Arigh-Böqe's name.⁴¹⁰ Urangtash who, as Möngke's youngest son by his chief wife, had the right to the possession of Möngke's hearthlands and to the regency, came out in support of Arigh-Böqe but the significance of his support is initially underplayed by Rashīd al-Dīn who merely lists him in a group of supporters.⁴¹¹ But when eventually Urangtash came across to Qubilai, Rashīd dwells on his status and reports how he commanded the rebel Arigh-Böqe to surrender his father's great jade *tamgha* or seal which he then proceeded to present to Qubilai Qa'an.⁴¹² What is clear however is that Hülegü Khan gave his strong support to Qubilai Khan, though here again Jackson suggests that this support was not necessarily forthcoming from the beginning and that the disinformation supposedly put about by Arigh-Böqe's agents might well have contained some elements of truth. If then Hülegü and Berke found themselves supporting opposing candidates in another bloody struggle for the Qa'anship this would have been another major element in the developing polarisation of the two camps. While Qubilai declared himself in the Chinese city of Kai-ping in May 1260, Arigh-Böqe was proclaimed Qa'an not by a rump assembly as Rashīd al-Dīn implies but by at least the heads of two *uluses* of the empire, in Qaraqorum which was more in keeping with Mongol tradition. Qubilai prevailed over his rival however through force of arms. He was quartered in China with command of a vast army and access to plentiful supplies of food and equipment and by 1264 he had forced Arigh-Böqe into submission.⁴¹³

According to the Cilician Armenian chronicler, Hetoum, Hülegü had originally been informed that it was he that was to be proclaimed Qa'an and that he had left on the journey eastward on this

understanding, '[Messengers] brought him word that his brother was dead and passed out of this world and how the barons sought for to have him emperor.'⁴¹⁴ On hearing the news of Qubilai's election, Hetoum claims that Hülegü discontinued his journey. For Hülegü the death of his mentor, Möngke, whose ambiguous directive on the status he was to assume in Persia were as yet ill defined, was a severe blow. Immediately upon hearing the news of Möngke's death Hülegü recalled a consignment of treasure and gifts he had sent to Mongolia.⁴¹⁵ Conflicts of interest had already become manifest even in Khorasan and Hülegü had been unequivocal in enforcing the primacy of his own rulings and court. Sayfī recounts the experiences of Shams al-Dīn Kart when the *malik* defies the authority of Jochid agents sent to take him to their camp and is rescued and rewarded by Hülegü.⁴¹⁶

Hülegü's primary concern must have been the consolidation and strengthening of the position he now held in the west and that would have included the confirmation of the permanency of his capital in Maragheh and his hold on the pasturelands of Azerbaijan and Arran, so recently the preserve of Baiju and the Jochid lords of the Qipchaq steppes. This intention towards permanency could be indicated by the fact that the term *Il-Khan*⁴¹⁷ does not appear on Hülegü's coins until after Möngke's death where previously *Hülegü Khan* had been inscribed.⁴¹⁸ Grigor, though often a fanciful chronicler and inaccurate in the details perhaps, summarises the turmoil of these years between 1258 and 1261 when he states that following the sacking of Baghdad Hülegü sought confirmation of his position over his territory from the Qa'an (erroneously Möngke in Grigor's account) which he received and this led to a rupture with the Jochid lords who refused to make their submissions. Then followed the murders of the three princes and the massacre of their followers and the escape of the remnants of these Jochid loyalists back to the Dasht-i Berke.⁴¹⁹ Jackson has suggested that it was on receipt of the Qa'an's confirmation of his status that Hülegü established his allegiance firmly behind Qubilai. Rashīd al-Dīn has Qubilai Qa'an send an edict to Hülegü c.1260 clearly granting him authority over the lands south and west of the Āmayeh while at the same time charging Alghu, whom former ally Arigh-Böqe had appointed head of the Chaghatai *ulus*, with control of the lands from the Altai to the northern banks of the Oxus. Berke is reported to have been acting as a broker between the warring parties of Qubilai and Arigh-Böqe.⁴²⁰

In his account of Hülegü's actual battle against Berke's forces, Rashīd al-Dīn again refers to Hülegü's new status with the clear implication that the edict had been issued comparatively recently. 'A *yarligh* has been issued to Hülegü stating that he is king of all the

lands from the Oxus to the confines of Syria and Egypt and that 30,000 horsemen, chosen from famous young Mongols, have been sent to his aid.'⁴²¹ Jackson cites Hülegü's eldest son Jumughur's loyal support of Arigh-Böqe, in 1253–4, as commander of his father's *ordus* in Mongolia, as evidence of Hülegü's possible initial sympathy, or even support, for Arigh-Böqe and points out that Jumughur's recall did not occur until Arigh-Böqe's campaign against Alghu was under way in 1262 after the latter's 'defection' to Qubilai.⁴²² Kirakos⁴²³ has suggested that, subsequently, Prince Abaqa was redeployed to the east at Alghu's request to help the Chaghatai prince root out Berke's agents, which he had already been doing with such apparent gusto that even the Shaykh al-Islam, Burhān al-Dīn, the son of Berke's spiritual mentor, Sayf al-Dīn Bākhārzi was 'martyred'.⁴²⁴ What does appear to be clear is that Hülegü made full use of the turmoil and strife which engulfed the whole heart of the Mongol empire following his brother's death to regularise and establish his position in the west and, in the process, he laid formal claim on those rich Jochid pasturelands in the Caucasus which he subsequently entrusted to his son, Yoshmut. 'Arran and Azerbaijan up to the Sibe he entrusted to Yoshmut.'⁴²⁵ It was this apparent blasphemous breach of Chinggis Khan's *Yasa* which caused so much anger in Berke that the Jochid ruler appealed for help from outside forces. Though they were Muslim he fully expected the Mamluk regime to appreciate the gravity of Hülegü's apparent profanity and the extent of the sacrilege committed against the Holy Laws of Chinggis Khan. Peter Jackson has succinctly summarised these events:

*The major cause of the conflict of 1261–2 was the successful misappropriation by the Toluid prince of the territories south and west of the Amuya which had hitherto been regarded as part of the Jochid sphere of influence by virtue of Chinggis Khan's own edict: that this was the specific yasa of Chinggis Khan which Berke, in his correspondence with the Mamluk Sultan, accused Hülegü of infringing seems an inescapable conclusion.*⁴²⁶

What exactly this edict was which Hülegü is supposed to have breached, is unclear. Whether the edict of Chinggis Khan refers to the extent of the 'Tatar hoof' and the inclusion of Azerbaijan in the allotted Jochid lands, or to Hülegü's failure to share equally the spoils of battle and conquest is not specified. However a great wrong was perceived to have been grievously committed and Berke saw vengeance fully justified. An example of the *Yasa* being all things to all men at all times.

Rashīd al-Dīn puts the cause of the conflict as Hülegü's growing

impatience with Berke's arrogance and repeated demands on his person, '[Berke] was constantly sending ambassadors to Hülegü Khan and making all manner of demands, and Hülegü Khan because Berke was his *aqā*, put up with this behaviour'⁴²⁷ while he claims that the source of Berke's anger was the harm done to the Muslims and their kings.

*[Hülegü] has destroyed all the towns of the Muslims and overthrown the houses of all the kings of Islam; he has made no difference between friend and foe and has put the Caliph to death without consulting the aqā and ini.*⁴²⁸

However, it is again noteworthy that it is the slight to Mongol tradition in not consulting the *aqā* and *ini* rather than the execution of the caliph that would appear especially to rile Berke.

The battles that followed were fierce and inconclusive. Around August 1262 Hülegü set out from Ala-Tagh to meet Berke's army, led by Noghai Noyan, who had advanced southward into Shirwan, and victory for this initial encounter went to the northerners. However it must have been a hard won victory for shortly afterwards there was another clash near Kuba, north of the mountains, and Noghai was put to flight and, on 8 December, Darband itself was taken and a week later Noghai's forces were decisively routed. Prince Abaqa pursued the defeated army stopping only to feast and carouse in one of their well stocked abandoned encampments in a fateful move which was to become a hard-learned but advantageous lesson for the prince in his later dealing with the Chaghataid Baraq in Khorasan. The partying Persians were ambushed by Berke himself and Abaqa's army was forced to retreat in disarray. Their losses were increased when the weight of their fleeing numbers proved too much for the ice covering the river Terek which subsequently claimed the lives of many of the Il-Khanid troops.⁴²⁹ Berke, who the Armenian cleric Vardan and self-described confidant of Hülegü claimed 'was not turbulent, and hated bloodshed',⁴³⁰ chased his enemies until they were south of Darband and then returned to his own *ordu*.⁴³¹ Hülegü did not live to see his plans for a counter attack come to fruition and that task awaited Abaqa. Hostilities broke out within a short time of Hülegü's death and again Berke appeared with a huge army of 300,000 men to confront Abaqa who had launched another attack and this time had wounded Noghai in a battle fought on 19 July 1265. *The History of Kartli* records these fateful skirmishes.

[Berke's] army came as far as Tiflis. Countless Christians were killed,

while Berke Khan encamped in the Garaj Mountains. Then God pitied the land and Abaqa Khan. Berke was seized with some sort of illness and he died. Now his troops when they saw their Khan's decease, picked up the corpse and passed through the Darband gates. So the land was pacified.⁴³²

Following their leader's death, Berke's troops dispersed to their homes while his corpse was returned to Sarai for burial.⁴³³ Abaqa constructed a lengthy palisade, the Sibe, flanked by a deep canal⁴³⁴ along the south bank of the Kur River and left his brother with a mixture of Mongol and Muslim troops to defend the border against future incursion from the north.⁴³⁵ Though Berke's immediate successors did not inherit his spiritual allegiance to Islam they enthusiastically continued his political alliances and rivalries with the Mamluks and against the Il-Khanate. With the Caucasian dyke the Mongol Empire's division became concrete.

As open hostilities were flaring in the north-west of his empire against the forces of Berke, Hülegü immediately became exposed in the east where troops loyal to the House of Jochid were also firmly entrenched and provocative actions were not long in occurring. Acting under Berke's orders the Jochid Noyan, Negudar, gave military assistance to a local commander, Tāj al-Dīn, to seize the fortress of Mastung from the equivocally loyal Hülegüid vassal, Shams al-Dīn Kart. This occurred around the same time as Berke's troops and princes were being attacked further west so that when some of these refugee Jochid troops entered Khorasan in their attempt to regain friendly ground north of the Āmayeh, Negudar immediately rode to their assistance summoning Tāj al-Dīn to aid him. Tübshin, a son of Hülegü, ably supported by the Kart King routed Negudar's forces and forced them to retire to Bīnī-yi Gāv.⁴³⁶ Eventually Negudar recovered and seized the lands 'from the mountains of Ghazna and Bīnī-yi Gāv to Multan and Lahore',⁴³⁷ but neighbouring regions, once under Jochid's command, still remained resistant to unquestioning Il-Khanid control. The *Tārikh-i Sistān* recounts that after his defeat by the Il-Khan army:

*a vast army consisting of two Great Amīrs, Baghu and Orus Nuyin, and 12,000 horsemen, King Shams al-Dīn Kart along with all the troops of Ghar, Khorasan, Isfizār, Farah, Neh, and other localities, together with all the kings and amīrs of the areas – all the enemies of Sistān (my italics),*⁴³⁸

the Jochid Noyan, Junjudar, readily found shelter with a local warlord, Nās. ir al-H. aqq wa al-D ī n of S ī st ā n,⁴³⁹ who like many of the other am ī rs of the region remained sympathetic to the House of Jochi. Though not such a threat as that posed by the armies of the

Dasht-i Qipchaq or the Mamluks of Egypt, the eastern border was becoming yet another unstable frontier for Hülegü's nascent kingdom.

The inherent fragility of Chinggis Khan's Empire had been latent from early in his campaigns in the west. The sheer size of the landmass under the Chinggisids' control and the vast number of highly disparate people and cultures that they sought to rule conspired against the establishment of a unified polity. Sibling rivalry was present from the first and the early forged alliances had been politically motivated. The deep insult felt by the House of Jochi at their continued denial of the Qa'anate and the resentment that Möngke could well have harboured against his dependency on his cousin and the knowledge of the debt that he therefore owed him, were not the emotions with which to cement together the bricks of imperial unity. By dispatching his two brothers to east and west Möngke was effectively outflanking his cousin Batu. With an empire stretching from Egypt to the China Sea he could quite happily allow his cousin a free reign in the Dasht-i Qipchaq and Europe but he would no longer feel the need for apprehension from a threat from the western steppes. If Hülegü had been privy to these grandiose schemes he must have been acutely aware of the vulnerability of his situation after the unexpected death of his mentor Möngke, and of the need to establish his own *ulus* within relatively secure and defined borders at the soonest possible opportunity. It was to reaffirm the hidden agenda of his elder brother that Hülegü offered his support to the successful 'rebellion' of Qubilai who immediately confirmed his younger brother in the lands south and west of the Āmayeh without prior consultation with Berke whose *ulus* had traditional and actual claims on much of that territory. It was of course the annexation of the rich pasturelands of Arran, Azerbaijan and the other Caucasian regions which had caused the deepest anger and ensured that the war would endure for generations. Those steppes had been traversed and utilised by northern Turks for centuries. They had been grazed and controlled by the Jochid tribes for three decades and the Jochids felt additionally that they had been granted not only grazing rights but overall possession of this land by the actual edicts of Chinggis Khan, a claim for which no evidence exists. Annexation of these lands was a far baser crime than the murder of some Arab king. Scratch any Holy Warrior and you will find land, money and power underneath. The religious dimension to the conflict was exaggerated by the Mamluks and exploited by the Jochids. Realising that an infringement of Chinggis Khan's *Yasa* did not cause the same revulsion among the Mamluks as among the Mongols, Berke changed tactics and harnessed the spiritual fervour of the newly converted which he himself might have passionately shared. However since Hülegü and later Il-Khans

employed similar tactics as regards Christianity with a view to recruiting new allies and the fact that the war continued to be prosecuted by non-Muslim successors even after the death of Berke strongly suggests that religion was not a primary cause of the conflict. The war between Berke and Hülegü represented a classical power struggle between two dominant neighbours whose spheres of influence were entangled and ill defined.

Baraq Khan and the east

Like the origins of the hostilities that had erupted earlier between the Golden Horde and the Il-Khanate, the root of the conflict on Iran's eastern borders can be found in the continuing disintegration of the Mongol Empire. Baraq Khan might be seen to have instigated hostilities but the causes for his ambition and presumptions have a less obvious source than mere greed and arrogance. The instability which caused such havoc and destruction in Khorasan and Transoxiana during the reign of Abaqa Khan was not instigated by the Il-Khanid regime but was a result of intrigues exploited and often initiated by Qaidu Khan of the house of Ögödei in his own pursuit of power. Baraq Khan acted as a willing lackey dancing to the drums of his eastern cousin. His rule stood in stark contrast to that of his two powerful neighbours, Abaqa and Qaidu, and the intrigues behind his rise to power and ultimate fall provide insight into the dissolving Mongol polity.

Baraq owed his initial success not solely to his noble birth and the positions to which it gave him access but to his own fastidiousness and doggedness. He was born the son of Yesün Toa and grandson of the prince Möetüken who had been the favourite son of his father Chaghatai Khan and mother Yisulun Khātūn.⁴⁴⁰ Baraq had however been brought up at the court of Qubilai Qa'an where his ministrations had been considered exemplary. As a result of such praiseworthy service he had been appointed to take joint control of the administration of the Chaghataid *ulus* along with his cousin Mubārakshāh, the son of Qara-Hülegü, another son of Möetüken.⁴⁴¹ Qubilai Qa'an was not fully satisfied with the accession of Mubārakshāh which had not apparently been authorised by himself,⁴⁴² and was conscious of the support that Mubārakshāh's Oirat mother Orqina Khātūn had previously given to Arigh Böqe. The Qa'an was also aware of how fully entrenched the pair were in their control over the Chaghataid *ulus*. When Baraq arrived at the Chaghataid court, c.1263, he too became aware of how firmly mother and son were in control of the army and administration of the *ulus* and would appear to have thought it presently prudent not to mention the *yarligh*

he carried from the Qa'an giving him joint authority. The Qa'an would have done well to note then Baraq's actions for they would have told him much of the young noble's character and subsequent behaviour. Like so many other of the Mongol élite, Baraq's loyalty was no longer to the greater glory of the house of Chinggis but more to the security and preservation of his own small niche in the unfolding drama of the Mongol world empire. Over two centuries later the Safavid historian, Khwāndamīr, was to write:

*As is agreed upon by all historians, Baraq Khan was a harsh, tyrannical ruler who was overfond of confiscating his subjects' goods, known for his bravery and courage, and renowned for his overbearing pride and conceit.*⁴⁴³

Baraq was a determined, cunning and strong man, both physically and mentally. A Timūrid historian, Muīn al-Dīn Natanzī, writing c.1413 described him as 'a king, able, crafty and powerful'⁴⁴⁴ who ruled in accordance with Chinggis Khan's *Yasas* and related the following story to illustrate his character. Baraq is supposed to have contracted frostbite after having passed through the village of Qillambashi, reputedly the coldest place in the whole of Turan, during which time he exposed himself to forty days of the most extreme weather. So cold it was that he fell from his horse and upon regaining consciousness he realised that the cold had gripped his leg. With his own hands he seized a piece of wood and delivered seventy strokes to his afflicted limb. The reason for this behaviour was that he deemed his leg to have contravened the *Yasa* by playing dead and that therefore the guilty limb must suffer the consequences. Though Natanzī is not the most reliable of sources the story illustrates well the reputation that Baraq had woven around himself.⁴⁴⁵

Baraq's story though at one level presenting a timeless tale of blind ambition overreaching itself and reaping its just rewards, conceals between its folds the power struggles and machinations which were continuing to rend apart the Chinggisid empire at many levels. The figure and presence of Qaidu was dominant throughout Baraq's short-lived career. It was said that a king with a brave and unified army such as that under Qaidu's command, with the justice and diplomacy of Qubilai, and with the sure-footed horses of the 'Qipchaq', would never see his sultanate decline.⁴⁴⁶ Qaidu was a soldier of legendary ability described by Rashid al-Dīn as 'exceedingly intelligent, competent, and cunning . . . [who had] accomplished all his affairs by means of craft and guile'.⁴⁴⁷ 'It was said that his beard consisted of nine grey hairs; he was of medium height and build and never took wine, *kumys*s, or salt.'⁴⁴⁸ He was also reported to be more sympathetic

to Islam than to other religions and to be capable of holding his own in learned discussions with scholars.⁴⁴⁹ Most significantly, Qaidu was said to cherish the tradition laid down by Chinggis Khan that 'so long as there remains a laudable infant who suckles from the seed of Ögödei, the grandsons of that progeny shall be entitled to, by the rights of heritage, the royal crown and standard'.⁴⁵⁰ With the justification of this tradition, Qaidu was able to rally many to his standard and in this way he soon achieved ascendancy over Talās, Kenjek, Otrār, Kāshghar and the lands of Trans-oxiana. However Qaidu was ever the realist and he made rare if any overt claims⁴⁵¹ to the overall leadership of the Mongol leadership and the perceived disenfranchisement of the house of Ögödei by the Tuluids, even though after his death Qāshānī, a research assistant and continuator of Rashīd al-Dīn's histories, supported his right to be the Qa'an.⁴⁵² Qaidu's aims, certainly short-term, were the restoration of the Ögödeid appanages and the revival of the status of the Ögödeid *ulus*. Grander ambitions would remain inconceivable until these more modest targets were realised and the Ögödeids had at least established a power base and a figure around which to rally.

Qaidu's estrangement from his royal relatives in hindsight had long been recognisable. As early as 1256 he had given an implicit challenge to Möngke Qa'an's authority when he had imprisoned Möngke's emissary, the judge Shi Tialin, for no apparent reason.⁴⁵³ When c.1264, after Arigh-Böqe's surrender, Qubilai Qa'an called together the princes of the empire to acknowledge his sovereignty, Qaidu ignored repeated entreaties to attend, pleading that his sickly animals were in no fit state to make the journey to the new distant capital in Shangdu in northern China. By this time the Qa'an had already divided up the empire between the major princes. Hülegü was awarded the lands from the Oxus westward to the gates of Egypt, the Qipchaq steppes and the lands overrun by Batu went to Berke, Alghu took command of the lands between the Oxus and the Altai mountains, while all the lands east from the Altai remained under the direct control of Qubilai Qa'an. The Ögödeid appanage had effectively been incorporated into the Chaghataid lands by this division. However with the Qa'an's capital now so far to the east, when in 1265/6⁴⁵⁴ Alghu died so soon after Hülegü's death in 1265, and not long before Berke's demise in 1267 a power vacuum developed in Central Asia that Qaidu quickly strove to fill. He regrouped his armies, which had been scattered after the fall of his former ally, Arigh-Böqe, and he seized Talās, a stronghold that subsequently became his power base.⁴⁵⁵

It was for this eventuality that Qubilai Qa'an had appointed Baraq to the Chaghataid court and now that Qaidu had acted, the Qa'an

urged Baraq to move against the rebel prince. Baraq had already disposed of Mubārakshāh with the help of the Amīr Bitikchi and some army leaders, and had become 'absolute ruler, while Mubārakshāh was reduced to the position of being his head cheetah-keeper'.⁴⁵⁶ He had his own agenda for opening hostilities with Qaidu. When he received news of Qaidu's advances west from Talās, Baraq feared for the safety of those cities and lands now under his control, especially Bokhara and Samarqand. It was in anticipation of an attack from Qaidu that Baraq Khan moved his armies to the banks of the Khojand (Jaxartes) River devastating the land on the way and there engaged his enemy's forces. Rashīd al-Dīn suggests that it was the Qa'an's prompting which led Baraq into this military confrontation but Waṣṣāf views only Baraq's self interest as the overriding incentive. According to Waṣṣāf, Qaidu won a decisive victory after this first encounter and Baraq's army was forced to retreat toward Bokhara though this version is not universally agreed upon. Alternative sources have Qaidu calling on Möngke Temür for assistance after his armies suffered an initial defeat.⁴⁵⁷ However all sources agree that Baraq was finally and decisively routed by Qaidu and that Möngke Temür provided political and probably military support.⁴⁵⁸

Down but not beaten, Baraq immediately began preparation for a counter attack and to this aim he ordered an immediate evacuation from Bokhara and Samarqand of the populace to enable his troops to pillage the cities for wealth and provisions. However representatives from the cities interceded with him and it was agreed that they would hand over their treasuries and that their artisans and workhouses would toil and labour night and day in order to provide the prince with the necessary tools of war needed for his expected offensive.⁴⁵⁹

It was during these renewed preparations for war that an envoy arrived bringing proposals for peace from Qaidu. Qibchāq Oghul, a grandson of Ögödei and a friend of Baraq, entered the camp accompanied by only five horsemen to plead with Baraq to put an end to the torment of the people of Samarqand and Bokhara and to turn from the path of war. He invoked the memory of their common ancestor Chinggis Khan and reminded his friend that Chinggis Khan had endured so much hardship and had expended so much anger and violence in the hope that his children and their descendants could live in peace and prosperity. Qibchāq implored Baraq to withdraw his hand from war and fury and rather put that hand assisted by his armies to the re-creation of a green and prosperous land.⁴⁶⁰ Rashīd al-Dīn records the supposed conversation between Qaidu, Qibchāq and Berkachar (of the Golden Horde) and demonstrates the overriding concern felt by Qaidu for the destruction and harm inflicted by Baraq on the land by his continued war-mongering. Qibchāq elected to

travel to Baraq's camp because as he explained, great friendship existed between the two and he felt that with words suitably 'greasy and sweet (*charb o shirīn*)' he would be able to beguile Baraq into any agreement. Owing to Qibchāq's reputation for eloquence his plan was readily accepted and he was dispatched with two hundred horsemen, a more realistic figure than Waṣṣāf's reported five mounts.⁴⁶¹

Though initially suspicious of these overtures for peace, reputedly greeting the first message with an aside to his lords, 'It is impossible to know what war lies beneath this peace!',⁴⁶² Baraq eventually welcomed Qibchāq into his court and bestowed on him the greatest honour and respect. On Qibchāq's arrival, Baraq descended from his throne and after embracing his friend led him by the hand back up on the dais and the two drank each other's health. Baraq assured Qibchāq that he was among family and like-minded friends, while Qibchāq began with his famed magniloquence to speak of compromise, unity and their personal ties. Baraq was ready to respond positively to these overtures encouraged by the governors of the province, Masad Beg and an unspecified Tāifu or *t'ai-fu* an army commander.⁴⁶³ Baraq lamented the fact that he and Qaidu had been in conflict over an inheritance passed down to them from their ancestors' great victories in contrast to others of their relatives who had meanwhile grown rich and prosperous within their own fine cities.⁴⁶⁴ Aware that he would be unable to defeat Qaidu on the battlefield and that his desperate situation left little choice, Baraq accepted from Qibchāq that the past should be put aside, a *Quriltai* should be called and that a final settlement should be agreed. Such a *Quriltai* would 'cleanse [their] hearts of ancient hatreds'⁴⁶⁵ and after one week Qibchāq received permission to return to Qaidu with news of their agreement, a delivery which earned the envoy much appreciative applause on his arrival.

According to Rashīd al-Dīn this *Quriltai* took place in the meadows of Talās and Kunjek around 1269 though Waṣṣāf seems to date the congress earlier around 1267, as does Mīrkhwānd, and has it held in the plains of Qatwān, south of Samarqand, in the vicinity of the Rābat of Abū Muḥammad.⁴⁶⁶ After the initial weeklong revelries in traditional Mongol fashion (*toi* ⁴⁶⁷) Qaidu, Baraq and Berkachar from the Golden Horde along with their respective princes and courtiers began the task of defining their spheres of influence and land rights. Baraq insisted that his interests be equally considered and appeared to place Qubilai Qa'an on an equal standing with not only Qaidu but also with himself.

I am also an offspring of the same branch, I also need a Yurt [pastures]⁴⁶⁸ and a secure livelihood. Chaghatai and Ögödei were [both] sons of

*Chinggis Khan; Qaidu remains a memorial to Ögödei Qa'an and I to Chaghatai; and to Juchi who was the older brother of those two, [there is] Berkachar and Möngke Temür, and to Tului who was the youngest brother, Qubilai Khan.*⁴⁶⁹

For Baraq, Qubilai Qa'an's lands were excessive,

*to the east [Qubilai Qa'an] has taken the countries of Khitai and Khotan, countries of which the Great God alone knows the length and breadth, and to the west from the banks of the Āb Āmayeh to the furthest reaches of Syria and Egypt, Abaqa !. . . And between these two ulus the province of Turkestan and Qipchaqbāshī, and [they] in the realm of your authority.*⁴⁷⁰

Baraq's speech was answered with assurances that right was on his side, that the recent regrettable events would be consigned to the past and that the allotment of his summer and winter pastures would be fair and just. It was decided that they would all restrict their pasturelands and camps to the mountains and to those areas of the plains that were either uncultivated or had been ruined by 'events'. The location of the pasturelands was fixed in such a way that Bokhara was separated from Baraq's camp by the presence of a detachment of Qaidu's people. Within Bokhara and Samarqand themselves the artisan workshops and military units already established⁴⁷¹ were divided between the two princes, Qaidu and Baraq. It was agreed that the cities and their environs would remain off-limits to their camp followers and that their animals would no longer be able to wander onto cultivated land. It was also stipulated in the proposed administrative reforms that no unreasonable claims or demands would be made on the people. The administration of the area was again placed in the hands of Masad Beg with the injunction given that he should restore the lands and buildings to their former prosperity and should settle the many displaced persons scattered throughout the province.⁴⁷²

In all Baraq was granted two-thirds of the province of Transoxiana while the remaining third was to be divided between Qaidu and Möngke Temür whose seal of approval finalised the *Quriltai*. However Qaidu retained seemingly intrusive control over his own interests within this area and its cities. According to Waṣṣāf the Chaghataid prince was not over pleased with these arrangements.⁴⁷³ However, to placate him Baraq's proposal that come the following spring he should tackle the problem of his shortage of land by crossing the Āb Āmayeh and seizing pastures and property sufficient for the needs of his own armies from those belonging to Abaqa Khan was also endorsed, Qaidu

doubtless quietly pleased that this would fit in comfortably with his own agenda.

Qaidu, wishing him to be absent from the region [of the *ulus* of Chaghatai] and being hostile to Abaqa Khan, gave his agreement and dispatched Qibchāq Oghul together with Chabat, the son of Naqu, the son of Güyük Khan, each with an army, to Baraq's assistance.⁴⁷⁴

For Qaidu the advantage lay in ridding himself of Baraq. If Baraq were to be victorious over Abaqa then he would henceforth be preoccupied with subduing Khorasan and Qaidu would be rid of another potential adversity, whereas if the Il-Khan defeated Baraq, Qaidu would at least be free from the problem of disposing of the troublesome prince. Möngke Temür, though nominally at peace with Abaqa, would hardly have been averse to an attack on and subsequent weakening of his southern neighbour, nor, if events were to have been dictated otherwise, would he have been aggrieved if Baraq were to suffer a resounding defeat.⁴⁷⁵ It was with these hidden thoughts, Baraq dissatisfied with the share-out of the land and Qaidu eager to rid himself of this dangerous relative, that they swore allegiance with each other, 'drank gold' after the Mongol fashion or according to Waṣṣāf 'drank the blood of the vine and dressed themselves in each others' clothes' and awarded one another the title *anda*, 'blood-brother', pledging everlasting loyalty and fidelity.⁴⁷⁶

The oaths and sworn pledges, however, did not appear particularly binding. Both Rashīd al-Dīn and Waṣṣāf note that shortly after the *Quriltai*, when other events had taken Qaidu and his armies away from the area to confront Möngke Temür who was possibly attempting to claim his own share of Transoxiana, Baraq was quick to seize the opportunity of returning to his old ways. Finding 'the arena of his desires empty'⁴⁷⁷ he again raided Bokhara for booty and subjected the people yet again to his reign of tyranny. He confiscated local livestock and allowed his own animals to extend their grazing onto cultivated land and only Masad Beg's intervention and the preparations for the invasion of Iran prevented further outrages and blatant breaches of the newly agreed treaty.⁴⁷⁸

The threat to Iran's borders from the east first became evident in 1268 shortly after the visit to Abaqa's *ordu* of Masad Beg in this year of the snake.⁴⁷⁹ The renowned and widely respected Masad Beg, wazir and administrator and son of the near legendary Maḥmad Yalavach, had come to the west ostensibly to collect the dues owed to Baraq and Qaidu from their *injus*, though his ulterior motive proved to be intelligence gathering. Masad Beg was shown the greatest honour when he arrived at the *ordu*. Dressed in the garb of Chinggis Khan, he was seated above all the assembled amīrs with Ilaga Noyan where he was assured that his request for the revenues owed the Mongol princes

would be completed within the week by Khwāja Saïd Shams al-Dīn Alkānī.⁴⁸⁰ The Safavid historian Khwāndamīr repeats Waṣṣāf's story that Masad Beg was initially met and welcomed to the court by the Ṣāhib Dīwān Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī. According to this version omitted by Rashīd al-Dīn, the Ṣāhib Dīwān dismounted upon seeing the minister's approach and came forward to kiss his foot, to which respectful gesture the Khwārazmian minister responded disdainfully adding with contempt that the Ṣāhib Dīwān's worth belied his reputation, 'You are the *dīwān* chief? Your name is better than your title.' Juwaynī 'who thought himself so grand that any of his underlings was equal in status to Solomon's vizier', is reported to have restrained his indignation and said nothing, knowing that the time for an appropriate response was not yet at hand.⁴⁸¹ Masad Beg, ever fearful that his hosts might realise the true nature of his mission to Azerbaijan, soon sensed that all was not right at the court and hastily made his excuses and after only one week set out for his return to the east. Masad Beg had been dispatched by Baraq to gain military intelligence concerning the state and readiness for war of Abaqa's army. Anticipating an abrupt departure from Abaqa's *ordu*, Baraq's high-status agent had left fresh horses and trusted men at every post station from the Oxus to Azerbaijan and he was able to make the long and arduous journey, according to Waṣṣāf, in an amazing four days' continuous travel. Abaqa's own envoys who had been dispatched shortly after the spy's departure when news of Baraq's military build up had become known, had no chance of apprehending Masad Beg whose intelligence, upon delivery, convinced Baraq to launch his invasion forthwith.⁴⁸²

The actual unravelling of subsequent events is reasonably straightforward and covered by a number of sources. The conflict was given substance when Baraq began to make designs on Abaqa's north-eastern territory with the tacit consent of his eastern neighbour, Qaidu. After having claimed that the territories of Badghis and south of that region to the banks of the Indus belonged to his *ulus*, Baraq demanded the evacuation from all these lands, of Abaqa's younger brother Tübshin (Tubsīn), commander of the armies of Khorasan and Mazanderan, and with him his military forces. Tübshin, who was deputised by Arghun Aqa, replied that these lands belonged to his *agha*, Abaqa Khan who was the King of the lands of Iran, and that Baraq should return and look after his own territories. Messengers were then immediately sent to Abaqa to inform him of these developments.⁴⁸³ Both sides prepared for war and by the time that Baraq had sent his forces across the Oxus and on toward Moruchogh, Tübshin and Arghun Aqa were waiting for them. However at the Chaghatais' approach the Khorasani forces of the Il-Khan, rather than

face a possibly more powerful foe, decided to withdraw tactically to Mazanderan in order to await Abaqa and the main army which they knew at this time to be still preoccupied with mopping up the suspected insurgency of Tegüdar, the Chaghataid representative in the Il-Khan's army.⁴⁸⁴

Baraq's sojourn in Khorasan was a traumatic experience for the people of the areas he and his armies visited. With supposedly 100,000 horsemen, which can possibly be translated as 'a large cavalry', he conquered the whole land from Badakhshān, through Kishim, Shibarghān, Tālaqan Bandeh, Mervjuq and Mervshāhjān to the environs of Nishapur.⁴⁸⁵ In April 1269, he fell upon Nishapur and abandoned it almost immediately after a day of massacre and plunder. He then appointed some of his amīrs to take charge of the sacking of Herat and the slaughter of its people. However, he was strongly counselled by Qutlugh-Timūr that such actions would alienate not only Shams al-Dīn Kart, the ruler of the districts of Herat, Sabzevar, Ghar, Sistān as far as the Indus and who was a potential ally against the Il-Khans, but would shock and foment ill-will amongst the notables and other *maleks* throughout the region. Bowing to this advice Baraq dispatched Qutlugh-Timūr with 500 men to the fortress of Kheisar to urge the Kart king to embrace this insurrection (*qiyām*) and join the conquering forces on their glorious march on Iraq, Azerbaijan and Baghdad. Shams al-Dīn Kart's reward would be the whole country of Khorasan. Shams al-Dīn's fateful response was an emphatic 'I hear and obey!' (*samān wa tāat*). After two days he accompanied Qutlugh-Timūr back to Baraq's camp but the sight of the massed troops filled his heart with hatred, a fear-filled antipathy fuelled by the impetuous and harsh language of the soldiers whose talk was solely of slaughter and plunder, and their plans for seizing Tabriz and Baghdad.⁴⁸⁶

Baraq was determined to bring Shams al-Dīn Kart into his fold and apparently impervious to the Kart king's true feelings continued to tempt him with revelry, feasting and promises of lands and extended authority to be granted when victory was theirs. But the catch was not long concealed and Shams al-Dīn Kart was commanded to reveal the names of all those of wealth in the province so that their details could be recorded in an official register. Shams al-Dīn for the present complied for, as Rashīd al-Dīn notes, he was an extremely canny and shrewd man and he understood the inherent fragility of Baraq's fortunes. Escorted by a company of Mongols he returned to Herat, dressed in a robe of honour, to carry out Baraq's command to collect from all those in a position to give, property, armaments and livestock. He was received on his return by all the citizens of the city but any hopes for their future they might have harboured were soon

crushed and ‘every person, lord and noble fell into despair’ (*Tamāmat az jān o Khan o māl nā-omīd shodand*)⁴⁸⁷ Shams al-Dīn’s escorts informed the citizens ‘plebeians and nobles alike’ that they must pray and recite the special incantation for their new ruler and that tax collectors would be positioned at the gates of the city and at the mint to oversee trade and manufacturing.⁴⁸⁸ The fact that when news of Abaqa’s approach became known to the people of Herat, the gates of the city were closed to Baraq’s army and even the entreaties of Masad Beg could not persuade them to open them, did not ultimately save Shams al-Dīn Kart from his fate.⁴⁸⁹ For his vacillation and apparent cooperation with Baraq he had earned the wrath of Abaqa and he was soon forced to seek refuge in his stronghold of Keisar. Eventually he was duped into visiting Tabriz where he was finally to meet his fate and was poisoned in his bath after eating a watermelon sent to him by Abaqa Khan.⁴⁹⁰

Meanwhile, according to various sources, Prince Tegüdar at Baraq’s instigation, had initiated the tension with Abaqa after the former had refused the latter’s summons to his *ordu* and followed this by provoking some particularly vicious raids on the Georgian and Armenian villages of the Caucasus. Tegüdar who had originally set out with Hülegü Khan’s army in 1253, was the commander of a *tamen* under Abaqa, and it was to him that Baraq had appealed when planning his incursions into Khorasan. Tegüdar’s holdings included parts of southern Georgia and in Armenia, the Gegharkunik’ area around Lake Sewan. He had his summer camping grounds in the mountains around Ararat while he wintered along the banks of the Araxes in Nakhchivan and retained tax-gathering rights over land in the area allotted to Baraq. Armenian sources paint him as rich and cruel and overweening.⁴⁹¹ A message from Baraq had been transmitted secretly to him from some emissaries sent from Baraq to Abaqa’s court. According to Waṣṣāf the messenger was Tegüdar’s own brother, Gurkan Ilchi.⁴⁹² Others⁴⁹³ relate how the message was hidden in a special arrow made of white poplar known to the Mongols by the name ‘Royal Falcon’. The message informed Tegüdar of the preparations for the invasion of Khorasan and sought his aid. Intending to join Baraq’s Chaghataid forces by travelling north of the Caspian Sea via Darband, Tegüdar had sought permission for leave from the Il-Khan before returning to his allotted lands in the Caucasus. A suspicious Abaqa had granted him permission but as news of events and manoeuvring in the east reached his court he soon regretted his action and summoned the prince back to the royal court. In response to Tegüdar’s failure to present himself, and to the pleasure of his loyal Georgian and Armenian subjects, Abaqa began gathering together an army to subdue the would-be rebel. He hoped that swift punitive

action might deter others from temptation to tread the path of sedition and that ‘the diseases of iniquity would not infect other princes’.⁴⁹⁴ He placed Shiremün, son of Chormaghun, in command of a force of 100,000 Mongols, which again no doubt means ‘an impressively large force’, and a full consignment of Armenian and Georgian forces including Shāhnshāh’s son, Iwane, and Tegüdar’s rebel army was ruthlessly vanquished.⁴⁹⁵ Shire-mün’s vanguard had been led by Alinaq backed up by the troops under Abatai Noyan and according to Rashīd al-Dīn, when the two armies met Tegüdar’s troops were routed without any real resistance. The defeated rebels then turned their horses toward Darband but in the confusion they became lost in the wild, thicketed uplands of the Caucasus.⁴⁹⁶ Many of the rebels were killed in a landslide but their leader escaped and with the consent of the once honoured Sargis Jaqeli⁴⁹⁷ Tegüdar made his way across Georgia to the court of King David in Kutais in Imereti province where he was received in regal fashion.

*Frequently King David went to Tegüdar and managed all the rituals and ceremonies, and so served before him. . . . The same was done by the queen, the daughter of the great Palaeologus, ruler of Constantinople.*⁴⁹⁸

Waṣṣāf claims that Sargis Bahā’dur (Jaqeli?) lent military support to Tegüdar killing nearly 500 of Shiremün’s allies in the process, and for that aid he subsequently paid with his life. Waṣṣāf further claims that after seeking asylum with King David, Tegüdar became aware of a secret plot being hatched by the Georgians to have him killed and that as a consequence he fled David’s court and himself sought sanctuary and forgiveness at Abaqa’s court.⁴⁹⁹ Rashīd al-Dīn’s version of these events has it that the defeated army was prevented from fleeing to Darband by Abaqa’s forces and was compelled to scatter into the wild lands of the Central Caucasus from where, King David informed them through messengers, there was no escape. Tracked down again by Shiremün, the rebel army was again decimated and Tegüdar, his wife and children were all taken into custody and sent back to Abaqa’s *ordu*. Tegüdar was pardoned and exiled with a fifty-strong Mongol guard to the sea of Kabudān (Oromiyeh?), and a year later after the fall of Baraq he was released.⁵⁰⁰ Waṣṣāf also records Abaqa’s willing forgiveness for the errant prince but details Tegüdar’s confession and his own account of his temptation. The prince claimed that Baraq had sent him messengers and had attempted to seduce him with his offers and suggestions. He had at first been able to steadfastly resist all his relative’s endeavours. Eventually, however, Tegüdar had felt unable to resist any longer and he succumbed to the entreaties and persuasion of two amīrs whom he named as Ilader Bahā’dur and Kukaji. These two

lords did not benefit from Abaqa's legendary justice and mercy when they were confronted with these accusations. According to Waṣṣāf they were both immediately executed whereas Tegüdar son of Mochi-Yebe was entrusted into the care of Quramishi Noyan.⁵⁰¹

Leaving Azerbaijan on 27 April 1270 Abaqa Khan's progress across Iran is painted in glowing terms, Rashīd al-Dīn detailing the new second Il-Khan of Persia as 'commanding from his perfect justice and the righteousness of the *Yasa* that no one should molest [even] an ear of corn'.⁵⁰² Tübshin and Arghun Aqa met the King in Qumis and together they travelled on to the meadows of Radkan, the place which would in the near future become Arghun Aqa's final resting place.⁵⁰³ Through emissaries Abaqa made generous peace offerings to his foe but these were rejected by the belligerent Baraq and the Il-Khan's army continued on into Badghis.

The final battle was set in a plain of Abaqa's own choosing after first delivering some clever misinformation into the enemy camp and then in classic Mongol fashion feigning retreat. This had become possible after the capture of three of Baraq's spies sent to determine whether Abaqa himself was riding out with the army and what his true intentions might be. After the interrogation of these spies, one of whom fully confessed, Abaqa arranged that a messenger should be allowed to burst into his presence bringing tragic news of fresh rebellion in the west now supported by armies from beyond Darband and the Qipchaq steppes and of the resultant massacres and defeats which demanded Abaqa's personal and immediate attention. It was ensured that this little scene be witnessed by the captured spies as also was the command that the Il-Khan then gave for the mobilisation of his troops for a hasty return to Azerbaijan and for the execution of the three spies. Two of the spies were duly dispatched but the third, the one who had confessed their mission, was allowed to escape and he it was who brought news of Abaqa's supposed return to Azerbaijan back to his master Baraq.⁵⁰⁴ When Baraq rushed after Abaqa whom he had been led to believe had abandoned camp and was now heading west to defend Il-Khanid lands from an attack from the Golden Horde, and he first espied the hastily deserted plain he is recorded as declaring, 'Oh Great God, this which I see [before me], is it a dream or is it real?'⁵⁰⁵ When Abaqa's subterfuge eventually became clear the expected rout did not initially occur and the left wing of the Il-Khanid army commanded by Arghun Aqa, Shikturnoyan, Yasuf Atai and Abdullah Aqa was broken with heavy fatalities and the remnants of this army were pursued by the commander Jalairtai to Pushang (Ghurian) within four *farhang* of Herat.⁵⁰⁶ The pursuing army soon fell into disarray and salvation came for Arghun Aqa's routed soldiery when Abaqa's main forces again struck and the Il-Khanids finally

proved victorious. Jalairtai fled in terror much to the despair of Baraq, and on Abaqa's orders NulaTemür was dispatched to capture and execute him and any other Baraqians he should find.⁵⁰⁷ Jalairtai along with Maraghawal were first wounded and then with many of Baraq's other supporters they were killed.⁵⁰⁸

It was during this battle that the story of the ninety-year-old Mongol General, Sonatai (Subotai?)⁵⁰⁹ occurred. Seeing the disarray and agitation all around him after the collapse of Arghun Aqa's forces, the General is said to have dismounted, left his horse and sat himself down on a chair. None of the sources explain from where this chair appeared. He admonished the troops and rallied them to yet greater effort.

*If they kill Sonatai, they kill an old man of ninety. If you abandon me, your women and children, where will they be safe from the hand of Abaqa Khan and the descendants (ôrôgh)⁵¹⁰ of Chinggis Khan? Once again strive with courage and put your faith with God so that victory and triumph will be given to us.*⁵¹¹

Suitably invigorated, the troops rallied round again and launched a fresh attack on their foes. With the third assault after much fierce fighting they succeeded in breaking the opposition and Baraq himself was unhorsed. Rashîd al-Dîn notes how Baraq was left abandoned on the battlefield, wailing and calling for aid, but ignored by his comrades and subjects until a certain Sâli from among his guards recognised him and, in exchange for some arrows, dismounted and allowed the fallen king to take his own horse. The following day Baraq reached some of his own troops and so there gathered about him the remnants of his naked and horseless army. Broken, Baraq then, without halting, led his defeated troops numbering some 5,000, to safety across the Oxus, 'his eyes streaming tears, overwhelmed with grief.'⁵¹² The poet Kamâl Fushnaji recorded Baraq Khan's defeat in these words:

*One without sword and one without shield,
One without hat and one without belt,
One without bridle and one without saddle.
It was such as these that trailed from the army of Baraq.*⁵¹³

This confrontation proved to be decisive and for Baraq the routing was complete. Abaqa was triumphant and 'galloped from left to right [of the field of battle] and killed everyone that he found.'⁵¹⁴ The 'Battle of Herat' was fought on 22 July 1270. Baraq is reported as

having returned with 5,000 horsemen to Bokhara. According to Waṣṣāf he was by this time suffering from palsy and was forced to travel in a litter. It was at this time also that Baraq claimed to have converted to Islam and hence taken the name Sultan Ghiyath al-Dīn. He sent an envoy to Qaidu to explain the defeat and the scattering of his army and suggested that the cause of his plight lay with the desertion of the two princes, Qibchāq and Jabad (Chabat) both nephews of Qaidu.⁵¹⁵ Qaidu replied to Baraq that these princes had become hostile to him because he had broken his own promises to them. He further admonished Baraq for his greed and inability to be satisfied with the lands that had already been granted him and ordered him to remain the winter in Bokhara until such time as a council could be called to decide on his fate.

Meanwhile Qaidu moved his armies toward Baraq ostensibly to provide him assistance but in reality to crush any hint of further independent actions by the Chaghataid prince. He encircled Baraq's camp with some 30,000 troops. Waṣṣāf claims that most of Baraq's commanders had defected to Qaidu before Baraq himself was forced to seek the protection of his 'ally'. Baraq's pursuit of the Chaghataid prince, Aḥmad Burī, upon whom some blame for his defeat had also been laid, and the subsequent execution of the prince at the hands of Baraq's agent, Baraq Bitakchī, caused widespread anger amongst all the other princes in his army who consequently abandoned him. When these commanders and princes approached Qaidu they were received graciously and were granted lands. Baraq was left alone with his wife Khātūn Tukai and a single servant with no option but to seek asylum with Qaidu.⁵¹⁶ According to this version, in the year of the goat, 1270 he went to Qaidu Khan where he was administered a poisoned drink that was to cause him his death.⁵¹⁷ Rashīd al-Dīn claims that Baraq died before any confrontation between the two had had a chance to occur and that Baraq's death occurred while Qaidu's troops were massing around the sick man's defeated camp. Qaidu, aware of Baraq's rapidly failing health, that night ordered his troops to surround the actual *ordu* since a feigned retreat to entice a battle on the plain could no longer have been thought an option. In the morning the sounds of wailing and mourning could be heard issuing from the camp and shortly afterwards Baraq's remaining commanders presented themselves before Qaidu to offer their allegiance. Qaidu himself led the weeping and mourning ceremonies which followed and he sent a messenger from his personal élite to inform Khātūn Tukai (Nuga Khātūn) of her husband's death, offer her his condolences and let her know that they were holding a wake for Baraq. He was buried high in the mountains on Qaidu's orders and following the burial Mubārakshāh, Chubai, Qaban with all the commanders of a

thousand and of a *tumen* came and offered genuflection before Qaidu, to which actions they added suitably servile promises to their new lord and appropriate invective against the old.

*After today Qaidu Aqa is our aqa and whatever he commands we will be obedient and submissive. During his life Baraq was tyrannical towards us and to all his own aqa and ini and his estates, inherited and acquired, were seized. If Qaidu Aqa should show us consideration and sympathy we shall serve him with devotion for the rest of our lives.*⁵¹⁸

Baraq's treasury was emptied and his possessions seized, '*naqd u jens* – coin and kind', and the proceeds were distributed and shared out until nothing remained. Mubārakshāh is even reputed to have removed a pair of costly pearl earrings from Nuga Khātūn's (Khātūn Tukai) ears and taken them for himself.⁵¹⁹

Eighteen months after the Battle of Herat, seventeen months after Baraq's death, Abaqa, fearful that other disgruntled Chaghataid princes might be harbouring designs on his eastern orders, had his army enter Bokhara though his intentions did not include any widespread massacre or mistreatment of the citizenry.⁵²⁰ It was upon the advice of the Šāḥib Dīvān, Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, that he commanded the mobilisation of his troops heeding the minister's words that Transoxiana was a persistent temptation to Qaidu and the various princes of that region and vulnerable to their military machinations.⁵²¹ If, Shams al-Dīn reasoned, the Il-Khan were to reduce the region to ruin who would there remain who might still turn the eye of covetousness on the resulting waste, 'Destruction in order to [render] occupation fruitless'.⁵²² Abaqa dispatched Nikchī Bahā'dur, Jārdu, and Aqbeg Turkmān, the local commander, to Bokhara and also sent an army under the command of Yasuf and Qarghadai, the sons of ChinTimūr, with Jurghadai and Ilabuqa to Khwārazm in order for one final time to obliterate all traces of any building from that country. When news of the Il-Khanid army reached Bokhara and Samarkand there occurred a general exodus of the populace including the renowned wazir, Masad Beg, to the surrounding country. The minister fled to Qaidu's court. Also among those who sought exile was the Sufi poet, Azīz Nasafī who was later to recount the episode in his major work, the *Unveiling of Realities*, completed in 1281.

In that year [1273] the infidel armies came to Transoxiana and they destroyed the province, and at that time this helpless one was in the city of Bokhara with the community of dervishes. At dawn on Friday, at the

*beginning of the month of Rajab, we left the city – or should I say, that they forced us to make an exit – and we passed the waters of Khorasan and arrived at the cities of Khorasan. From that time onwards, each day we were in one location and each night at another, having no security anywhere.*⁵²³

After Nikchi Bahā‘dur entered Bokhara his troops set about a general massacre of the inhabitants. Over a period of a week ‘10,000 people had taken up abode in the flourishing belly of the earth’ and ‘other than beating, plundering, killing, sifting, poking, and burning [the invaders] did nothing’.⁵²⁴ Meanwhile the sons of ChinTimür had descended on Gurganj, the capital of Khwārazm, and Qarāqash and massacred all those that they had found. In Bokhara the famed madresseh and mosque built by Masad Beg, inside of which nearly one thousand students were studying, was put to the torch. It was said that this was the Şāhib Dīwān’s sneering reply to Masad Beg’s previous encounter with him in Azerbaijan.⁵²⁵ In recounting this episode Rashīd al-Dīn adds the interesting point repeated by Mirkhwand, that before giving his consent to the expedition to attack Bokhara, Abaqa stated firmly that if, as was likely, the approach of his armies precipitated a general exodus of the city’s population towards Khorasan, the refugees were not to be harmed and were to be allowed to enter the province. Rashīd al-Dīn further claims that it was rogue elements in Bokhara who brought about the furious Mongol reaction after they had murdered the Il-Khan’s young envoy, Zīrak (clever), son of Lāchīn and servant of the expedition commander Aqbeg Turkmān, while he was delivering Abaqa’s message urging them to pack up their belongings and household goods and animals and to head for Khorasan.⁵²⁶

When the invaders left off from their plunder leaving the city’s gutters flowing with blood,⁵²⁷ they rounded up ‘50,000 blossoming virgins and graceful boys’⁵²⁸ for transportation back west. However they were intercepted at the Āmayeh by the sons of Alghu, Qaban and Chūbai, along with 10,000 horsemen who demanded their share of the booty including half the captives. Having only around 5,000 horsemen to resist this request Aqbeg ceded to their demands and the Chaghataid brothers turned back towards Bokhara. The city then suffered another bout of extreme pillage at the hands of these same brothers, Waṣṣāf relating that any person found in possession of gold dinars or even so much as a *mann* of grain was subjected to torment and torture. For three further years the city and its environs suffered periodic attacks from Aqbeg, Qaban and Chubai, and for seven years the land remained desolate and abandoned until Qaidu eventually ordered the return of Masad Beg to Samarqand from where the

minister oversaw the revival of this neighbouring district.⁵²⁹

Aqbeg himself was executed some time later when, wanting to retain as much of the booty from his raids on Bokhara as was possible, he had sent out messengers to Qaidu and then sought refuge at the prince's court. However one of his brothers had meanwhile informed Prince Arghun Khan of these developments and Aqbeg was soon seized and then dispatched to the Il-Khan's *ordu* where after the usual beating he confessed and was hence put to death on the shores of the Kubda Lake (Lake Oromiyeh).⁵³⁰

After Baraq's defeat by Abaqa, Qaidu's subsequent tirade against his supposed ally suggests that the spirit of union engendered in the two *andas* must have been very short lived if it had ever existed in the first place. Qaidu complained that after their promises and pledges made in good faith and even after having 'drunk gold' to seal their friendship, Baraq *anda* reneged on the agreement and prevented Qaidu's tax-collectors from carrying out their business in those areas where Baraq held sway, even going so far as to physically assault these agents for attempting to do their 'legitimate' duties.⁵³¹ Qaidu obviously thought it his right to continue to collect taxes in those areas which were included in Baraq's two-thirds of Transoxiana. Even though he did commit the princes, Qibchāq and Chabat, with their armies to Baraq's expedition against Abaqa the sources make it clear that his aim was not to promote Baraq's greater glory. Addressing Qibchāq and Chabat before their departure to join Baraq's forces he commanded that they 'should find some pretext and return since Abaqa Khan with his armies . . . will shortly return to repel Baraq.'⁵³² Waṣṣāf claims that Qaidu readily agreed to the request for aid because he hoped that Baraq 'would soon be suffering the cold blast of Abaqa's wrath'.⁵³³ When Qaidu first received news that Qibchāq had finally left Baraq's camp, he immediately had a message sent to Abaqa to inform him, the result of which was that henceforth 'foundations of friendship [would be] established' between the two and that hereafter they would address each other as *Ortāq* or ally.⁵³⁴ Whether these endearments were any more ingenuous or sincere than those that had arisen as a result of the *Quriltai* is most doubtful. For Qaidu these events and treaties were merely steps and side shows in the steeply rising path of his own calling.

Though the significance of the *Quriltai* held between Qaidu, Baraq and Berkachar has been overstated,⁵³⁵ it did represent a challenge to the authority of the Qa'an, Qubilai Qa'an. If Qaidu's intention was to challenge the legitimacy of the House of Tului he would first have to establish the independence and legitimate rights of the House of Ögödei. However, though matters of territory and policy were discussed and acted upon without consultation with the other

branches of the 'royal' family nor even with reference to the Qa'an himself, the real reason behind the *Quriltai* of Talās was primarily to curb and control Baraq Khan. The participants expressed their own contempt for the event by their subsequent disregard for so many of the provisions of the diet. Far more important to Qaidu's rise to power than the *Quriltai* of 1269 was Baraq's rout at the battle of Herat in 1270 which after his death resulted not only in his military commanders pledging loyalty to Qaidu but the vizier, Masad Beg, joining the Ögödeid ranks as well. It is from this date rather than from the earlier events that Qaidu's economic and military power base began to match his growing political status.⁵³⁶ Qaidu's clever manipulation of Baraq resulted in his being welcomed by the cities of Transoxiana that had experienced so many years of hardship under Baraq and from outside invasions.

Baraq's brief reign over Transoxiana is a catalogue of ill treatment, oppression and violent exploitation. When Baraq needed a census in order to impose taxes he simply emptied the cities, driving the people out into the plains. He indulged his troops and provided much scope for them to immerse themselves in such soldierly pursuits as rapine, massacres and pillage. Often his threats to unleash his followers was sufficient to coerce the local governors, including Masad Beg, to cooperate and agree to delivering gold, provisions and livestock and even control over the city workshops.⁵³⁷ One of the reasons for Qaidu's sweeping administrative reforms and regulations was to curb such excesses as had been practised by Baraq. Baraq presents a stereotype of the 'barbaric' Mongol ruler which is belied by the emerging states which neighboured his. Though excesses were hardly unknown in Abaqa's Iran and those troops that descended on Bokhara some years after Baraq's death wreaked terrible destruction, the almost gratuitous violence and short-sighted avarice which became the hallmark of Baraq's reign is rarely associated with the rule of either Qaidu or the early Il-Khans. That both Abaqa and Qaidu sought to distance themselves from, and indeed eventually sought to destroy, Baraq Khan not solely because he presented a threat to their own rule but because of the destructive nature of his regime, indicates the changes that were occurring throughout the Mongol polities. Historians have remembered Abaqa for the prosperity he brought to the land and the justice with which he ruled. '[Abaqa] was the handsomest in appearance, and the best built of his thirty brothers, and in the days of his Khanate there was abundance of all things throughout the land',⁵³⁸ '[Abaqa] was a pādeshāh powerful and courageous, prudent and provident'.⁵³⁹ On taking the crown he 'proceeded to rule with justice and compassion, and during his reign the welfare of the military and civilians was attended to.'⁵⁴⁰ Qaidu

similarly is remembered for his justice and compassion; 'He was renowned for his kindness and generosity, and he treated his subjects and underlings extremely well',⁵⁴¹ though it was the iron discipline and efficiency of his army that became legendary.⁵⁴² In stark contrast Khwāndamīr states bluntly that when Baraq ascended the Chaghataid throne,

*he deviated from the path of justice and equity, and since he did not prevent his soldiers from practising tyranny, the heathen Mongols pursued their ungodly course in Transoxiana and Turkestan, casting the peasantry and subjects into the utmost misery.*⁵⁴³

It is this contrast which is made between Baraq and Abaqa Khan which is revealing. Baraq in many ways conforms to history's stereotype of the Mongol invader. He was ruthless, unnecessarily cruel, uncultured and dismissive of urban sophistication, and blind to economic realities. He was a disaster and people rightly trembled when his horsemen appeared. Abaqa, it would seem, was the opposite and other than excessive drinking, had few of these vices which so liberally adorned his foe. If Baraq was the old face of the Mongols' Warrior Man, Abaqa was an early version of their Renaissance Man.

5

THE PROVINCES

The Il-Khanate spread over many regions, cities and states. The new regime's presence was felt to varying degrees in different places. In a general sense security, especially on the roads, was increased and this greatly increased and promoted not only commercial exchange but also cultural exchange.⁵⁴⁴ In Rum the Il-Khans' impact on daily life was minimal, in Azerbaijan, especially in the areas east of Lake Urumiyeh, their presence would have been unavoidable. In general over the first decades, the Mongol rulers were content to encourage cooperation in order to ensure that trade, agriculture and industry flourished and taxes continued to be paid. The process of cultural integration, already apparent at the highest levels in the princely *ordus*, had centuries of contact between the steppe and the sown on which to further develop. Often the ruling élites were themselves Turks only two or three generations removed from the steppe and both parties appeared to agree it desirable and possible that a symbiotic relationship be established.

The three states examined in the following chapters provide examples of comparison and contrast among the Il-Khanid provinces. The Qarā Khitāi commander and recent convert to Islam, Baraq Ḥājib, established the Qutlugh Khanid dynasty of Kirman. Its rulers worked closely with the Mongols and the province prospered especially under the enlightened reign of the remarkable Qutlugh Terkān. In Shiraz the Turkoman dynasty of the Salghurids was also led by a woman during part of the Il-Khanid period. However in sharp contrast to her namesake in Kirman, Shiraz's Terkān Khātūn did not have, never earned, and would not deserve the respect or support of her subjects and the years of her ascendancy and the early decades of Il-Khanid dominance were grim for this southern province. In Khorasan circumstances were again different. The Karts of Herat were an indigenous Afghan dynasty who could claim successor status through marriage from the Ghurids. Maintaining close personal and military contacts with the Mongols from the first, Kart rule saw their capital, Herat, prosper and flourish laying a strong commercial and cultural basis for the city's eventual heyday under the later Timurids.




Figure 5.1 The Qutlugh-Khanids.

In Kirman, Baraq Ḥājjib was an adept political manoeuvrer. Of East Asian origin and with the culture of the steppes still fresh in his outlook, Baraq Ḥājjib (1222–35) was astute enough to realise the merits of conversion to Islam for a ‘Persian’ ruler. He gained the endorsement of the Abbāsīd caliph as well as of the Mongol Qa’an and for him the arrival of the hosts of Turan would have been an opportunity for advancement rather than a threat of curtailment. This close connection with the Mongols continued with his family and was strengthened with the arrival of the Il-Khans. Marriage and political ties welded his dynasty to both the Mongol overlords and fellow Iranian rulers and his children continued this tradition.

The central role of women in the Qutlugh Khanid dynasty of Kirman is a clear indication of the cultural affiliation that these rulers still maintained with their central Asian background. Stories abound of the prowess of Turkic women who were admired for such gifts. Qaidu’s daughter, Qutulun Chaghan, whose feats of physical combat not only served her well on the battlefield but kept her suitors at bay enabling her to stay faithful to her true love, her father, was one such highly regarded woman.⁵⁴⁵ That these traditions and values of the steppe should continue once the tribes were partially settled and Persianised is hardly surprising. Indeed one of these women, the remarkable Ṣafavat al-Dīn Pādeshāh Khātūn, expressed unequivocally in verse her identification with the Turks and of herself as a daughter of the Turkish people, ‘I am the child of a mighty Sultān and the fruit of the

garden that is the heart of the Turks'.⁵⁴⁶ Pādes̄hāh Khātūn like her mother maintained very close relations with the Il-Khan's *ordu* in Azerbaijan before, during and after her marriage to Abaqā Khan. Though strictly prohibited under Islamic law, Terkān Khātūn raised no objection to the marriage between her Muslim daughter and the heathen ruler. The reputedly extremely beautiful and variously talented Pādes̄hāh Khātūn was quick to insinuate herself into the fabric of the court and the bonds between capital and province, rulers and ruled, 'conquerors' and 'conquered', Iranian and Turanian became all the more solid.

Terkān Khātūn's twenty-six or so years at the centre of power have been portrayed as Kirman's Golden Years. She was an able and popular ruler at home but perhaps more importantly she was able to establish and maintain excellent relations with the Mongol overlords and their agents. It often appeared that the Mongol appointed *basqaqs* in Kirman represented her interests at the central *dīwān* rather than that of their ultimate masters. She had challenges to her rule but it was her close connections with, and deferment to, the Il-Khanid court which often underlined her successes. Her own son, Mu'ʿaffar al-Dīn Hajjāj, her daughter's son, Soyokshāh, and her husband's son, Suyurghatmish, all sought to unseat her but it was not until she was an old woman that she was forced to yield any ground and eventually Kirman was divided between her and her stepson, Suyurghatmish. Her favourite daughter did eventually claim her mother's full throne but the brutality Pādes̄hāh Khātūn displayed to her half-brother, Suyurghatmish, in achieving her goal caught up with her in her own violent demise. 'Pādes̄hāh Khātūn quaffed the same potion she had given her brother. "When you have done evil, do not think you can remain safe from the retribution of fate."' ⁵⁴⁷

The chaos and hardship that characterises Shiraz over this same period can perhaps be explained by the lack of cooperation with the Mongol rulers in Azerbaijan shown by the regimes in this southern province. Shaykh Sa'dī of Shiraz had returned to his beloved homeland full of optimism and hope that the advent of Hülegü Khan augured a period of stability and prosperity for the country. Though for many in Iran this was the case, in Shiraz after the death of Abū Bakr such tranquillity and plenty remained for the most part elusive. Qutlugh Khan Abū Bakr came to power in 1226 and he immediately sought accommodation with the Mongols. His 36 years of rule were strict though in the main the historians have been kind to him and, notwithstanding the raids from brigands such as Jalāl al-Dīn and his Khwarazmian exiles, his reign brought peace and prosperity to the state. Within seventeen days of Abū Bakr's death his son and successor, Sa'd II, also tragically died and so commenced the city's

decades of chaos and intrigue.

When Terkān Khātūn, Sa'd II's wife and regent for their young son, Muḥammad, duly assumed power, she was initially greeted by the citizenry with joy and the comparisons with the prospering neighbouring state of Kirman began. However this joy was short-lived and the comparisons soon changed to contrasts. She was not to enjoy the support of her peers or countrymen. Murders and intrigue followed Shiraz's Terkān Khātūn to her own gruesome death at the hands of her jealous and drunken husband, Saljūqshāh, who, amid rumours of secret contacts with the Mamluks, then made the fatal error of murdering envoys from the Il-Khan's court. Hülegü's response was to execute Saljūqshāh's brother and to order the plunder and destruction of Shiraz. Despite his history of debauchery and misrule, Saljūqshāh is often lauded by the chroniclers for his brave stand against the Mongols, a stand Hülegü himself appreciated as was demonstrated by his offer of clemency, an offer which was, of course, refused. When the Mongol army moved against the errant amīr it was with the full backing of the forces of Kirman, Eigg and Yazd.

In 1264 after the killing of Saljūqshāh, the destruction of Shiraz was averted when it was argued that the reason for the rebelliousness of the city-state was the absence of political and administrative support from the central *dīwān*. Shiraz won a reprieve but its saviour Altaju, Hülegü's representative, decided against governing the province himself and instead appointed Terkān Khātūn and Sa'd II's baby daughter, Abish, Atabeg with a Mongol *shaḥna* in overall charge. The *shaḥna*, Basatu, was unable to prevent financial and social anarchy and he soon had a revolt on his hands.

Again, Shiraz narrowly escaped the Il-Khan's wrath but it was not until Abaqa appointed Angāna as governor of Fars in 1268 that any semblance of order and discipline was returned to the province's affairs. In fact, so effective were Angāna's measures that he soon became extremely unpopular with the local notables. Eventually, their conspiratorial and contrived complaints to the Il-Khan bore fruit and Angāna was summoned to Tabriz to answer the charges laid against him, which would suggest that equality before the law was respected by the Il-Khan. Though found guilty, Angāna escaped the usual death sentence, arguing successfully that he was a mere cog in a bureaucratic wheel.

To replace Angāna, the mighty Suqunjaq Noyan assisted by an accountant, Shams al-Dīn Ḥussein Alkānī, was dispatched to Shiraz in 1271 and initially all went well. A rich landowner and entrepreneur, *Shams al-Dīn* Muḥammad bin Malik Tāzīga, with connections to the *Şāḥib Dīwān* Juwaynī, assumed control of the province and Suqunjaq was able to depart but again within a few years the province was in

financial chaos and taxes were in arrears. Waṣṣāf blamed the situation on Il-Khanate neglect and local corruption. In 1279 the great Suqunjaq returned but to no avail and not long after his return local interests conspired against the noyan and Suqunjaq was summoned back by Abaqa in disgrace. Thereafter the history of Shiraz becomes increasingly complex as conspiracy follows conspiracy and intrigue undermines chicanery until eventually Hülegü's son and husband of Atabeg Abish, Tash-Möngke,⁵⁴⁸ arrived to take his cut of the shrinking cake. This was a man who the Shirazi historian, Waṣṣāf, openly described as being stupid, dishonest and polluted.⁵⁴⁹ By the time his wife, Abish, arrived coinciding with his own departure, the citizens of Shiraz were desperate and they greeted their 'queen' with jubilation and optimism and nowhere was it mentioned or commented upon that she had committed the blasphemous crime of marrying an infidel. However, their hopes were to be short-lived and Abish in the recent tradition of Shirazi notables began immediately to look to the welfare of her own considerable interests. When a representative of the new Il-Khan, Arghun, made moves to curtail her activities she had no compunction in arranging the curtailment of his life. Though summoned to Tabriz and ordered to pay retribution to the families of those she had murdered, Abish escaped execution. Interestingly, though she was known to be a practising Muslim, when she died she was buried in the Mongol fashion in Tabriz, with jugs of wine accompanying her body. Her death occasioned great dismay in Shiraz with people dressing in black and the mosques observing three days' mourning. Following her fall, Shiraz finally achieved some semblance of stability with the establishment of direct Mongol rule.

The remarkable Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart (r.1245–78) founded a Herat-based Korasani dynasty which lasted until 1381. He sought accommodation with Qaraqorum and was among the first to welcome Hülegü on his triumphant march into the west. The new Kart *malik* became Möngke's man in contrast to his predecessor, Malik Majīd, whose loyalties lay with Batu of the Golden Horde. He served his new masters well while at the same time protecting the interests of his Muslim neighbours, and he rightly earned the respect and admiration of both parties for his efforts. However his success and political acumen also engendered intense jealousy among those, Tajik, Turk and Mongol, whom he invariably crossed. It was this ill-will which was to dog his whole career and would ultimately precipitate his downfall.

Shams al-Dīn Kart was foremost a soldier and it was his military prowess which initially brought him recognition and respect amongst the Mongol warriors who accepted him as an equal. He fought in the Mongol ranks willingly and with pride and it is obvious that in his

mind there existed no conflict of interests between serving his city-state, Herat, and serving the Emperor and Il-Khan. Shams al-Dīn's early life and his rise to power illustrate vividly the close relationship between the young nobles of Iran and Turan. It was not a relationship of conqueror and conquered. The young nobles grew up together, fought together, lived together. For one such as Shams al-Dīn Kart the aliens hailed from the west not from the east.

However, though Shams al-Dīn might well have welcomed the advent of the Il-Khans and enjoyed intimate relations at the Mongol courts, he was no puppet of his masters and he was never afraid to challenge those who might thwart his ambitions. It was this side of his nature which eventually led to his undoing. When Herat was besieged by Baraq Khan in 1270, Shams al-Dīn's role appeared equivocal to Abaqa. It is doubtful that someone as astute as this Kart king would have been beguiled by the entreaties or promises of one such as Baraq but when news of his fêting and reception at the Chaghataid Khan's camp reached Abaqa, the Il-Khan believed the worst. Shams al-Dīn tried to play Baraq in order to avoid the Khan's wrath being visited on Herat and at the same time he had no wish to switch his loyalties. Abaqa from his position did not read Shams al-Dīn's actions in this way and instead saw treachery. After Baraq's defeat, Abaqa remained highly suspicious of the 'cunning and impetuous' *malik* and from then until the *malik*'s death, a prisoner of the Il-Khan, the two played a cat and mouse game whose outcome was inevitable. Even the Kart *malik*'s close friendship with the Şāhib Dīwān, Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, a friendship preserved in their letters, could not save him from Abaqa's deep distrust and dislike. Whether the poison which ended his life was self administered or delivered on Abaqa's orders is irrelevant. It was Abaqa who brought about the legendary Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart's demise.

These three city-states represent three quite different reflections of Il-Khanate rule. In Herat, Shams al-Dīn Kart, the quintessential Persian military hero, at home in the Mongol court and happy fighting in the Mongol army, brought prosperity to his people and his fall from grace was due to the clash of personalities rather than to any clash of culture. Under the early Il-Khans, Kirman saw its golden age with its legendary and widely loved and respected queen, Terkān Khātūn, at ease amongst her Persian courtiers and welcome and at home at the *ordu* of the Il-Khan. For the people of Kirman, Hülegü heralded a time of plenty and peace. In sharp contrast, those same decades in Shiraz were characterised by anarchy, intrigue, violence and the threat of annihilation and the blame, levelled by the city's own chronicler, was at the people of Fars themselves and if blame was to be splashed on the Mongols, it was for the sin of neglect and their crime was not

involving themselves more in the city-state's affairs.

Much was hoped from Hülegü's advent. Shaykh Sa'dī returned in the belief that the years of anarchy were finally at an end and that Hülegü represented the return of a king. In Kirman and possibly Herat some of those expectations were met and justified, but in Shiraz the people and notables of the city seemed unable to rise to the challenge and peace of sorts came only with direct Mongol rule. Möngke had responded to the entreaties of the people of Qazvin and he had dispatched his brother Hülegü. Unfortunately the Shirazi rulers, the Salghurids were too immersed in their own petty rivalries to grasp the opportunity which the Il-Khanid armies brought with them.

Kirman

Rashīd al-Dīn records an early incident in the career of Baraq Ḥājib, the founder of the Qarā Khitāi dynasty of Kirman, which reflects well the relationship the Qutlugh Khans of Kirman were to enjoy with their Mongol overlords. After the death of their father at least two of the sons of Alā al-Dīn Muḥammad, the Khwārazmshāh at one time sought refuge with their 'loyal vassal' Baraq Ḥājib. Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn and his mother only recently bereaved before being pressured into remarriage with Baraq Ḥājib, were to enjoy Kirman, their southern Iranian haven for only a short while. Having strangled them both and murdered the Sultan's entourage, Baraq Ḥājib in 1228, sent the following message accompanied by Ghiyāth al-Dīn's head to the new Qa'an Ögödei in Qaraqorum. 'You have two enemies, Jalāl al-Dīn and Ghiyāth al-Dīn. I have sent you the head of one of them.'⁵⁵⁰ The main aim of this new dynasty was its own survival and its loyalty lay with those who could best contribute to its continued prosperity. The Qutlugh Khans attempted to ensure their survival under their new masters, the Mongols, by marriage and cooperation, and this policy succeeded at least until the early 1300s.⁵⁵¹ As a case study, the province of Kirman exemplifies how a local dynasty could survive and prosper under the new regime.

The founder of the Kirman dynasty early proved his political dexterity. Baraq Ḥājib had seized Kirman in 1222 after the province's governor, Shuja al-Dīn Abū al-Qasim Zawzānī,

*greedy for money and weapons, waylaid Baraq, and a battle broke out in which Baraq was the victor and Abū al-Qasim took flight. Baraq Ḥājib entered Kirman in 619 [1222] and placed the crown on his [own] head.*⁵⁵²

With an eye to the prevailing situation and a canny foresight into the trend of the shaping post-Chinggis world Baraq Hājib had recently converted to Islam as a means of consolidating his hold on Kirman and its environs⁵⁵³ and had appealed to the caliph to confirm him in office. This the caliph duly did c.1230 and according to both Juwaynī and Waṣṣāf honoured him with the title ‘sultan’, and henceforth addressed him as ‘Qutlugh- Sultan’ (Fortunate Sultan).⁵⁵⁴ Had the stories of Mongol anti-Muslim sentiments carried much currency it is doubtful that the Qara-Khitai leader would have chosen such a time to proclaim his new-found spiritual allegiance.

It was at this time also that Baraq’s growing prestige attracted the notice of the local Mongol commander Tayir Bahā’dur who was at that time occupied with the siege of the Sistani capital of Zaranj. Here again Baraq seized the opportunity to utilise his shrewd political skills. He immediately acceded to the Mongol commander’s demands for submission and rather than merely contribute men to the Tayir Bahā’dur’s war effort, he insisted that, ‘he would deal with Sīstān with his own men without incommoding the Mongol army’.⁵⁵⁵ Baraq Hājib was a pragmatist without the self-delusions of grandeur that had crippled many of his contemporaries and predecessors. By the time of his death in 1235 he had secured two honorifics. Not only had he been named Qutlugh-Sultan by the caliph but the Mongols had awarded him the title Qutlugh-Khan.⁵⁵⁶

Nasir al-Dīn Munshī, head of the chancery under Pādeshāh Khātūn c.1295, recorded a conversation between an embittered Sultan Ghiyāth al- Dīn and the new Qutlugh Sultan demanding that Baraq Hājib justify his adoption of the royal title.

When Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn arrived in Kirman he saw that Qutlugh Sultan was a king who possessed great majesty.

The hatred of envy began to speak and intoxication drove [his] words.

‘Who gave you the Sultanate?’ Qutlugh Sultan answered, ‘I was given the sultanate by that Lord of the Kingdom who took the sultanate from the head of the Samanids and placed it on the head of the slaves of that family, Sabaktakin and Maḥmad, and whose angry hand raised the imperial robes from the Saljuqid sultans and [who] bestowed [those] robes and tokens of honour on that House’s slave children who were the Khwārazmians and your ancestors!’⁵⁵⁷

Aware of the fragility of his claim and his hold on the kingdom, Baraq Hājib’s primary objective was securing and extending his power base. To this end he dispatched his son Rukn al-Dīn to the Mongol capital and arranged tactical marriages for his daughters. One daughter, the eldest Sevinch Terkān, he gave to the Mongol prince,

Chaghatai Khan.⁵⁵⁸ Another, Maryam Terkān, he married to Muhiyy al-Dīn Sam who eventually became an Atabeg of Yazd.⁵⁵⁹ She was noted for her charitable works and her founding of the village of Muriabad.⁵⁶⁰ A third daughter Yāqat Terkān married the Atabeg of Yazd, Alā al-Dawla Qutb al-Donya va al-Dīn Maḥmad-Shāh, while his fourth daughter Khān Terkān was wed to his nephew and successor, Qutb al-Dīn Muḥammad.⁵⁶¹ Juwaynī makes mention of another daughter whom Baraq Hājib hastily married to Jalāl al-Dīn Mīnkubirni in order to forestall that harried prince's entrance into Baraq's new stronghold, Kirman.⁵⁶²

By the time of Möngke's accession, followed after a couple of years by Hülegü's majestic move westward, the Kirmani dynasty appeared much more established and entrenched. The grand struggles in the outer world between the rival Chinggisid houses had been reflected in a struggle within Kirman's ruling family which had at least temporarily been resolved during the 1250s. In Kirman the struggle had been between Baraq Hājib's successor and nephew, Qutb al-Dīn Tayanga, and his son, Rukn al-Dīn Khwāja Mobārak Jaq.⁵⁶³ Rukn al-Dīn had been on his way to Ögödei's court when his father's death had occurred and news of his cousin's accession to the sultanate reached him. Qutb al-Dīn's initial reign was short-lived. Rukn al-Dīn obtained a *yarligh* from Ögödei and was able to return to Kirman to reclaim the throne from his cousin who in turn was sent eastward to the Great Khan's *ordu*.⁵⁶⁴ Rukn al-Dīn held the throne for 15 years from 1236 to 1251 when, with a change in leadership in Qaraqorum, Qutb al-Dīn was able once again to press his claims for the sultanate. Rukn al-Dīn had managed to hold on to power due to the support he received from Chaghatai who had married his sister Sevinch, and from the minister and his former personal tutor Chinqai who had wielded some authority with Ögödei and even more under Güyük. During this time Qutb al-Dīn remained, on orders from Qaraqorum, in the service of the Minister Maḥmad Yalavach in Khitai.⁵⁶⁵ With Möngke's succession Qutb al-Dīn made representations to the Qa'an supported by the Minister Yalavach and these petitions were so successful that a *yarligh* was issued granting Qutb al-Dīn the sultanate of Kirman and the appointment of a Mongol *basqaq* to accompany him there. For his staff he was able to make use of the local bureaucrats and men of learning many of whom had previously been in his employ and, in addition, Qaraqorum added five *basqaqs* to safeguard their own interests.⁵⁶⁶ Rukn al-Dīn challenged his cousin's legitimacy and his claims were eventually heard before Möngke. The verdict was passed down in Qutb al-Dīn's favour and Rukn al-Dīn was handed over to his cousin to meet his fate. Qutb al-Dīn's severity was legendary, nearly one hundred victims of his punishment beatings reputedly dying under the

scourge.⁵⁶⁷ From his cousin Rukn al-Dīn received the stroke of the sword of annihilation. Rukn al-Dīn had not earned any great affection from his neighbours either. His marriage to Jahān Khātūn, daughter of Atabeg Abū Bakr of Shiraz, did not survive the first night and the humiliated bride was returned to Shiraz in disgrace, the sight of her awaking only disgust in her betrothed.⁵⁶⁸ However, it was rumours of intrigues between Rukn al-Dīn and the caliph in Baghdad which had ensured the manner in which the toppled Sultan met his fate.⁵⁶⁹

Rukn al-Dīn was survived by three daughters. One he had married to an atabeg of Yazd, one to an atabeg of Luristan and the youngest, Bibī Shāh Akaji was taken in charge by Terkān Khātūn and sent to Hülegü's *ordu* where eventually she became a concubine of Möngke Temür, son of Hülegü.⁵⁷⁰ As well as using marriage to cement ties with their neighbours, the ruling circles in Kirman did not forget the importance of maintaining firm links with the ultimate rulers of the land.

Now sedentary rulers, the Qutlugh Khans were only a couple of generations removed from their roots in the steppes of Central Asia. Although Baraq Hājib had converted his dynasty to Islam some twenty years before Quṭb al-Dīn's return to the throne, the legacy of the steppe was certainly very much alive in his successors. This was particularly noticeable in the role women were able to play in the running of the Qutlugh Khanate. Mention is made in the *Simt al-'Ula* of the position and the widely recognised influence that Qutlugh Terkān held over her husband Quṭb al-Dīn before and after he had regained the sultanate, 'The chiefs and amīrs of Transoxiana, many prosperous grandees and notables became envious [of her great management skills] at that time.'⁵⁷¹ It was she that was held responsible for the good fortune and prosperity that became the lot of Quṭb al-Dīn.⁵⁷² When Quṭb al-Dīn died⁵⁷³ in 1257 leaving two sons Hajjāj Sultan and Soyurghatmish,⁵⁷⁴ wide support was given to Qutlugh Terkān's appointment as regent for her son Hajjāj Sultan. Significantly, the notables of Kirman immediately sought confirmation and a *yarligh* from the Il-Khan Hülegü for their choice of appointment.⁵⁷⁵ However Hülegü who had been awaiting the arrival of Quṭb al-Dīn and his army in Hamadan, before the march on Baghdad, was taken aback by the news of the Sultan's death. Quṭb al-Dīn had ridden to Hülegü's aid earlier in his battle against the Ismā'īlis in Qohestan and had then been given leave to return on condition that he would return should Hülegü summon him again.⁵⁷⁶ Hülegü Khan hastily issued an edict giving Qutlugh Terkān control of the country and people through her young son Hajjāj while control of the army was to be given to her son-in-law Amīr Hajjī. The Amīr Āzad al-Dīn Hajjī had a reputation for cruelty, weak-mindedness, and a propensity

toward hedonism.⁵⁷⁷ His was not a popular appointment. In an early public display of her determination and influence Qutluḡh Terkān Khātūn set out herself for Hülegü's *ordu* taking with her the notables of Kirman and persuaded the Il-Khan to place all the affairs of the province, civil and military, under her authority.⁵⁷⁸ Her strict but benign rule was to earn her the approbation of the chroniclers and as a result the usual topoi concerning caring wolves and compassionate royal falcons have been duly recorded in their histories.⁵⁷⁹

Women had always played a leading role in Mongol society and the women from the steppe societies in general enjoyed a higher status than their cousins from the plateau lands to the south. Marriage alliances were often political in nature and remarriage was not uncommon.⁵⁸⁰ The Qutluḡh Khanids were able to adapt and merge their steppe traditions with those of the Islamic society of their adopted homeland of Kirman with apparent ease. They fitted into the patchwork of thirteenth-century Persian statelets without undue disruption and achieved a degree of harmony with both their neighbours and with the ruling Il-Khans. The period of their greatest prosperity was during the reign of Qutluḡh Terkān Khātūn (r.1257–83) that roughly coincided with the rule of the Juwaynī brothers who dominated the early Il-Khanate.

Qutluḡh Terkān Khātūn's life presents a remarkable fusion of steppe vigour and Islamic piety. If taken literally, then Qutluḡh Terkān Khātūn must have been a singly beautiful and charismatic woman. But even allowing for the filigree of the panegyrists, legend and myths which her longevity and obstinate survival would have ensured, she would have to have been an exceptionally clever and astute judge and manipulator of those around her. Her rise to the social and political heights of not just Kirman but the Il-Khanate itself and her maintenance of power and influence which belied her humble beginnings reflect not only her own personal and political savvy but that of her Mongol overlords who were able to recognise and reward rather than fear such ability in their vassals.

She was taken as a slave in early life and was eventually sold to an Isfahani merchant named Hajjī Salih. These early years have been recorded in the anonymous *Tārikh-i Shāhi*, which was written for Qutluḡh Terkān (Khātūn)'s daughter Pādshāh Khātūn. Though generally accurate in outline it must be assumed that a certain amount of embroidery and gloss went into the retelling of the formative years that this signal woman spent as a slave. She was born into a noble family of the Khitai and was called 'Halal Khātūn'. In the early thirteenth century the lands of Transoxiana and Turkestan were the scene of great upheaval and successive conflicts along with continuous raids for slaves and plunder. Terkān Khātūn fell victim to one such

raid and became a prisoner in the hands of Sultan Ala al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Tekish before being sold on as a slave. 'A great many sons and daughters of the families and tribes of the Turks, in the bloom of youth and the years of childhood, fell into the hands of traders.'⁵⁸¹ According to this royal history the aged Hajjī Salīḥ of Isfahan upon discovering the young Terkān Khātūn, was immediately struck by a compelling devotion to the girl and he spared no effort or expense in order to acquire her. He was quick to recognise the intelligence, beauty and modesty of his newly purchased slave and he hastened to give her all that she should need, even accepting her as one of his own children. The text is suitably extravagant in describing these events.⁵⁸² Unsurprisingly, fame of this exceptional creature spread rapidly until even the chief magistrate of Isfahan himself became aware of her and soon made known his own desire to be joined with the famed beauty. To this end he showered the ageing merchant with favours and all manner of kindness but to no avail and all his endeavours were repelled with no consent to the union forthcoming from Hajjī Salih. The *qāzī* then decided to use others means of persuasion. He 'wanted to extend the hand of injustice and embezzlement and to tread the path of violence',⁵⁸³ and so take Terkān Khātūn by force. Hajjī Salīḥ sought safety at the court of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Khwārazmshāh but the outcome was not quite as he would have wished. Much to the distress of the Isfahani trader, Ghiyāth al-Dīn himself fell in love with the girl.

*Although you snatched me from the clasp of the wolf, when I [could] finally see, [I saw] you yourself were a wolf.*⁵⁸⁴

After initial resistance to the Khwārazmian prince who insisted that the old man would find no better son-in-law than he, Hajjī Salih realised that there was no alternative but to submit and to comply with Ghiyāth al-Dīn's commands. But the nuptials were short lived for after a short time word of the prince's brother, Jalāl al-Dīn, reached Isfahan with news of the feared rival's imminent arrival from Fars. According to Waṣṣāf, Ghiyāth al-Dīn entrusted his new wife to the safekeeping of the *qāzī al-quṣāt* (chief *Sharia* judge) Rukn al-Dīn Saad, whereas the *Tārīkh-i Shāhī* claims that the prince placed his 'precious jewel', his 'pearl', 'hidden' in the home of Shaykh Yagana Muwaffaq Maamar who was famed and celebrated throughout Fars and Iraq for his piety and trustworthiness.⁵⁸⁵ With his mother, Ghiyāth al-Dīn then fled to Rey. Upon discovering that his brother had already fled, Jalāl al-Dīn did not tarry in Isfahan but immediately, without his retinue, troops nor any fanfare, left alone in pursuit of his sibling rival. Ghiyāth al-Dīn was never to reclaim his 'precious jewel' since four

years later in 1228 he was to die at the hands of the new ruler of Kirman, Baraq Hājib.

Even after having passed through so many hands Terkān Khātūn appears still to have been a highly sought after woman, an indication of the steppe heritage of the society in which she found herself. Next, the Atabeg of Yazd, Alā al-Dowla Maḥmad-shāh sent an army to Isfahan to seize her and carry her back to Yazd in order that he could marry her.⁵⁸⁶ Baraq Hājib was thunderstruck on hearing this news transmitted to him by his daughter Yāqat, and immediately sent troops to Yazd to demand what he considered to be rightfully his property, namely Terkān Khātūn. His justification was that since he had killed Ghiyāth al-Dīn on behalf of the Great Khan, Chinggis, all that had belonged to the enemy Khwārazmian prince, including women and children, now fell to him. When Baraq Hājib's demands failed to be met the two rulers set their armies against each other. The *qāzī al-quḏāt* agreed to act as an intermediary and eventually a compromise was struck. On the recommendation of the respected man of religion, the Atabeg of Yazd handed over Terkān Khātūn to the Qutlugh Sultan and Bariq Hājib in turn gave the ruler of Yazd his daughter in marriage.⁵⁸⁷ From this arrangement, Waṣṣāf records, friendship between Yazd and Kirman was established. Waṣṣāf claims that some time after their return to Kirman, Terkān Khātūn gave Baraq Hājib a daughter whom they named Maryam Khātūn.⁵⁸⁸ No mention is made of this nor of Terkān's relationship with Baraq Hājib in the *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*. On the Qutlugh Khan's death the sultanate initially passed smoothly to his nephew, Quṭb al-Dīn, and with the crown went a wife or sweetheart namely according to Natanzī, Terkān Khātūn, whom the prince married.⁵⁸⁹ It was after her marriage to Quṭb al-Dīn that she adopted the title Qutlugh Terkān.

When Quṭb al-Dīn acceded to the throne for the second time, he was well aware of his indebtedness to the lords of Qaraqorum. In order to forge even closer links with his Mongol overlords and in particular those with more influence over affairs nearer his homeland in Kirman he would visit 'the Court of Hülegü [where he was] distinguished by all manner of favours'.⁵⁹⁰ He sought to exploit his 'old friendship and camaraderie of long duration'⁵⁹¹ with the Mongol amīr Arghun Aqa. As early as 1252 he had proposed that a marriage take place between himself and Arghun Aqa's daughter Begī Khātūn and to this the amīr readily agreed. However, before the nuptials were able to take place, events overtook Quṭb al-Dīn and a *yarligh* arrived from Möngke Qa'an confirming his sovereignty over Kirman. The marriage was put on hold while he returned to Kirman to settle matters. He died before he was able to revive these wedding plans.⁵⁹²

His wife and effective-successor, Qutlugh Terkān (Khātūn), was

equally aware of the importance of marriage ties with the ruling Mongol élite and she was determined not to let these old wedding plans be forgotten. To this end c.1263, she dispatched ambassadors including the *basqaqs* Suvatu, Inaq Malik, Mongol functionaries obviously quite content to do her bidding, and the *Şāhib* Majd al-Malik, to the Il-Khan Hülegü's court in Azerbaijan. They were to plead on behalf of her son Mu'izz al-Dīn Hajjāj for the hand of Begī Khātūn. Hülegü gave his approval and the party was given leave to seek out Arghun Aqa in Georgia. The amīr was found with his entourage in Tiflis and in accordance with Qutlugh Terkān's instructions he was presented with rare and precious gifts, money was scattered to the populace and the streets were spread with carpets.⁵⁹³ Arghun Aqa accepted Qutlugh Terkān's proposal and undertook to send his daughter, Begī Khātūn, on to Kirman when he returned to Bākhār in Khorasan. This he did in 1264 and the wedding festivities were notably elaborate, the pomp extravagant, and the company among whom the Mongol élite were well represented, suitably illustrious.⁵⁹⁴

Pādshāh Khātūn, Qutlugh Terkān's favourite daughter, had been promised to the new Il-Khan Abaqa but it was not until 1271–2 that her mother overcame her misgivings about her beloved child becoming a minor wife in a Mongol harem and the marriage was able to take place. It was these fears rather than the fact that her Muslim daughter would be marrying an unbeliever that caused her disquiet. When a high ranking ambassador, Qarghai Ilchi,⁵⁹⁵ arrived in Kirman from Abaqa's *ordu*, Qutlugh Terkān realised that there was no alternative but to obey the marriage request. However she was most concerned as to how her 'delicate and sensitive', 'proud and well-bred', 'precious', 'illustrious', 'exalted', 'beloved' but 'hot-tempered' 'dainty coquette'⁵⁹⁶ would be able to deal with the rigours of harem life where she would have to adapt to the dictates of Mongol customs and rules. The princess Pādshāh would invariably have to join Abaqa Khan's close relatives and older more senior wives to whom she would be expected to defer. One of her duties would include presenting them with a vessel of wine and filling their drinking goblets. Her mother was fearful that due to her 'hot-temper' and 'great sensitivity' she might not be able to be suitably submissive and she wondered how such a fragile girl would manage to carry that demeaning and heavy wine flagon. However, Qutlugh Terkān's fears were allayed when her 'divine guardian angels brought forth words of comfort' and reminded her of when she had been in a similar situation in her own troubled past and had faced a comparable dilemma and stressed that eventually the circumstances had developed to the later benefit of both mother and daughter.⁵⁹⁷ In fact these qualms were unnecessary since the

death of Abaqa's mother, Yisunjin Khātūn, almost coincided with Princess Pādshāh's arrival at his court.⁵⁹⁸ After this venerated lady 'had been transferred from her throne in the House of Frailty to the great sepulchre of eternity' the problem of how to dispose of her considerable personal *ordu* comprising estates, provinces, servants, domestics, her throne and crown, still remained.⁵⁹⁹ The problem was answered when Abaqa met his new wife and according to the not unbiased *Tārīkh-i Shāhī* recognised in her qualities of intelligence, royalty, and leadership, and in her actions, he saw capability and suitability. A royal charter was therefore issued in Pādshāh's name and she was confirmed in office and the King's mother's crown was placed on her head. 'Day by day' and 'hour by hour' she gained acceptance from the other wives and the amīrs and the religious grandees who came to acknowledge her qualities.⁶⁰⁰ Munshī attests to Pādshāh's fifteen-year presence in Yisunjin's *ordu* but does not fully clarify her status therein.⁶⁰¹ Waṣṣāf felt that it was the special love that Abaqa felt for Pādshāh that caused him to promote her above all his other women, and that it was their inseparability which helped to account for her mother, Terkān Khātūn's thirty-year reign over Kirman.⁶⁰²

Other than an intriguing history, Pādshāh Khātūn has also left behind a small body of verse. The following are examples of translations of this verse:

*An apple that from your hand secretly reaches me,
 From that, the scent of eternal life reaches me.
 From your hand and palm a goblet reaches me
 At that, like a pomegranate, my heart smiles from joy.⁶⁰³
 That day in the infinite past that they formed him,
 They created him to soothe the souls of the love-sick,
 Candy laid claim to his sugar-like lips,
 In Egypt they put three skewers in his mouth.⁶⁰⁴
 Although I am the child of a mighty Sultān
 And the fruit of the garden that is the heart of the Turks,
 I laugh at fate and prosperity,
 But I cry at this endless exile.⁶⁰⁵
 Who has ever seen writing in musk on a ruby?
 When has perfume ever done injustice to wine?
 O my soul, the trace of a black mole on your lip,
 Is darkness and the water of life together.⁶⁰⁶
 Today, until my hand rests on your shoulder,
 How much grief must spring from your fountain of pleasure,
 In your ear I see seeds of pearl
 That surely my tears must water?⁶⁰⁷*

Qutlugh Terkān (Khātūn) spent much time throughout her reign in the *ordu* of the Il-Khan in Azerbaijan. This was especially true after the marriage of her daughter, Pādshāh Khātūn, to Abaqa. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, ‘she used to go to court every two or three years and to return loaded with honours’.⁶⁰⁸ This suggests not only the strength of her close relations with the rulers in Azerbaijan whose confidence and support she obviously enjoyed but the solidness and stability of her support at home in Kirman where initially she had left her son, Mu‘affar al-Dīn Hajjāj, to rule in her name. Echoing other writers of this period Rashīd al-Dīn summarises the woman and her rule succinctly: ‘Terkān Khātūn was extremely just, and the affairs of the kingdom of Kirman were kept in perfect order by her justice and equity.’⁶⁰⁹

But she was jealous of the power that she commanded and while sometimes indulgent she could be ruthless. When her son, Mu‘affar al-Dīn Hajjāj, showed signs of excessive ambition she was quick to act. Returning wounded from the wars on the Chaghatayid front, to his mother’s court in 1270 with full honours bestowed on him by Abaqa, Hajjāj in a state of drunkenness for which he was renowned,⁶¹⁰ persuaded his mother to dance for the company then present at her court. Against her wishes but indulgent of his intoxication she agreed to perform but was later outraged when her son’s followers began to chorus an insulting and seditious ditty:

*The sky and the stars are old. Your fortuitous lot is young.
It would be better if the old would give its turn to the young!*⁶¹¹

In her anguish Terkān Khātūn headed straight away for Abaqa Khan’s *ordu* in the north where she knew her daughter could prevail on her husband for assistance. The Il-Khan ruled in Terkān’s favour and she returned strengthened to Kirman from where Hajjāj had already fled. Mustawfī claims that Hajjāj had meanwhile contacted the sons of Ögödei in order to seek their support against Abaqa whom he now greatly feared. Munshī however reports that on the ill advice of his followers Hajjāj sent messengers to Abdullah Oghul, the grandson of Chaghatai Khan, to seek an alliance with, and a promise of aid from, him. News of these developments soon reached Terkān’s ears when the amīr Tāj al-Dīn Sāt’īlmesh and his sons defected from the rebel and reported the plot to their Queen. After six months wandering in Sistān,⁶¹² rumours reached Hajjāj of Abaqa’s presence in Badghis and as a result in 1279 he thought it expedient to flee further east. He reached the sultanate of Delhi and, relatively secure within his own palace, he was able to remain there for the next few years, later with the consent of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn Abū al-Mu‘affar

Khalaj.⁶¹³ In 1277 a Mongol emissary arrived in Kirman and escorted Beki Khātūn, Hajjāj's wife, and their children away to the Il-Khan's court where she had been betrothed to a Mongol minister.⁶¹⁴

At another earlier time when marriage preparations for their children had been under way between Arghun Aqa and Terkān Khātūn, the Qutluḡ Khanid regent had been able to call on her Mongol connections in order to stifle some would-be dissent. Arghun Aqa, as governor of Khorasan, would receive petitions and letters of complaint from the people of Kirman, often of a highly exaggerated and overly detailed nature, and he would send inspectors to ascertain the veracity of these reports. The investigators would then outline the cases to their governor who would review the contents of the petition and with his 'eye of insight' decide which petitions were the work of liars, scoundrels and legal manipulators and which were worthy of respect and should be granted further consideration. One such petition presented to Arghun Aqa had been drawn up by some notables of Kirman and was full of their previously secret invective against Terkān Khātūn. The governor's discerning eye concluded that the complaints were the work of envious and spiteful men whose lies could not be credited. Aware of his impending matrimonial ties with the Qutluḡ Khans he decided to refer the matter back to Terkān Khātūn herself and en-closed the petition of complaint along with his own letter which declared that Terkān's *Nā'ibs* (deputies) and the *basqaqs* (Mongol administrative overseers) of the province should summon the accusers and that those complainants should be interrogated before a *yarghu*.⁶¹⁵ Even though Terkān favoured mercy and compassion, the petitioners were taken to an open space of sandy gravel where it was decreed that in accordance with Mongol custom they spend some few days bound naked while undergoing interrogation until they confessed their sins and signed these confessions. Some of Terkān's accusers were executed immediately while others were told that as a warning to the people they would be taken to the Il-Khan's *ordu* where the *Yasa* would be carried out and they would face execution. At this juncture Khātūn Terkān intervened and showed her renowned mercy and compassion for her detractors by delivering them from the hands of the *yarghuchis* (the court functionaries/ executioners). Because she was going to 'Rum' and the *ordu* herself she would take these men with her and would personally plead their case. As a result none of them were executed and none molested or injured and this incident became another anecdote to illustrate the qualities of that 'most praiseworthy and eminent lady'.⁶¹⁶ Since this incident was reported in the partisan *Tārikh-i Shāhī* no real details of the complaints against Qutluḡ Terkān (Khātūn) were itemised and the assumption was that the accusations were of course totally groundless.

Other disputes concerning Terkān that were brought before the Mongol courts were dealt with in a more equitable manner with, in fact, the Mongol overseer applying local laws to resolve the cases. The town of Sīrjān with its own fortress had been claimed by both the rulers of Kirman and Shabānkāra. The Kirmanis laid historical claims on the district while the resident Shabānkārāns held very practical claims in that they had taken over the land after it had been abandoned by its unknown owners and had restored the ruined castle and brought water and prosperity back to the area. They claimed that they had occupied the castle for fifty years and that they had acquired so much furnishings that it would be impractical to try removing it all.⁶¹⁷ In 1265 Abaqa, after succeeding to the throne, issued a *yarligh* nominating a high ranking amīr, Iyaji Aqa, the *shaḥna* of Isfahan and Khwāja Shams al-Dīn Khorāsānī to go to Sīrjān with the purpose of overseeing the transfer of ‘the province of Sīrjān with its castle and all that belonged to it to the *nuwabs* (deputies) of Khodavand (Great Lady) Terkān’.⁶¹⁸ These officials were to set up a *yarghu-yi amlāk*, or a land-dispute court, to examine the evidence and title deeds of the opposing parties to the dispute. That land whose proprietary rights had been bought by the people of Shabānkāra would be duly handed over to them while the land to which water had been brought, though belonging to absentee landlords, would be subject to ‘the decree of former kings’.⁶¹⁹ Four and a half *dang* would go to the land revivers while one and a half *dang* would be awarded to the owners of the property. Sīrjān and the castle were to remain in Terkān Khātūn’s hands and she resisted all the pleadings and excuses of the Shabānkārāns to stay. When they pleaded a lack of pack animals for the transportation of their considerable effects she, in her beneficence, ordered the requisition of all available animals. All privately owned camels, mules and asses, from all *maliks*, amīrs, the great and the small were to be made ready and prepared by the following morning. Her command was obeyed and by sunrise the next day the animals were all set for the mass transportation. However though animals there were in plenty there was not one sign of the citizens and their belongings. After having being brought before the castle by the army, the citizens again pleaded their case insisting that they simply did not have sufficient time to evacuate the castle and that further delay was needed. They received their request but in addition Terkān Khātūn also ordered that the roofs of their houses be put to the torch and within a short time all were consumed by the fire though those Shabānkārāns that were able, attempted with pick and shovel to dig and bury the flames. Conceding defeat the castle was surrendered and the qāzī Emām al-Dīn Sīrjān, his son Tāj al-Dīn Salimān, Az al-Dīn Ḥāmed and his brother the qāzī Imād al-Dīn Moqabal again went

before the Mongols' land-court to plead their case. The minister Yaqab and his followers then tried to establish some form of security and basis of trust both for the Shabānkārāns and for Terkān Khātūn and the remaining Kirmanis. The Shabānkārāns were assured by the *yarghuchis* that those villages not specified in the *yarligh* would remain in their hands until such time as a formal request had been submitted and an order of surrender issued by the Mongol court.⁶²⁰ Terkān Khātūn might well have been able to manipulate the system to her own ends but that there was a legal system in place, generally recognised and one whose edicts were respected can be in little doubt. The Mongols introduced a basis for law into the lands they controlled. They incorporated local tradition, Islamic rulings, and elements of their own continuously evolving *Yasa*.

Another challenge to Terkān Khātūn's authority for which she again attempted to utilise her Il-Khanid connections came from her late husband's other son, Jalāl al-Dīn Suyurghatmish.⁶²¹ In May 1279 with her apparent permission and approval Suyurghatmish went to Khorasan where at that time Abaqa had established his *ordu*. While there Suyurghatmish obtained all that he had sought, with Abaqa granting him all the lands and estates that had been confiscated from his half-brother Hajjāj and subsequently made *inju* land. The position of Lord of the Hunt of Kirman and the commanders of some armies were assigned to him and he was honoured with a parasol for his homecoming.⁶²² On 19 September 1280 Suyurghatmish returned to Kirman and ordered that his name and *laqab* be read in the *khutba* along with his mother's name, Qutlugh Terkān (Khātūn) and that the notary Nezam al-Dīn should scatter celebratory coins in honour of his return. News of these events was received with incredulity by the people at Terkān Khātūn's court.⁶²³ Such Kirmani notables as Muiz al-Dīn Malekshāh 'who had always been a disciple of the policies of sedition and injustice',⁶²⁴ a prince notable for his 'malicious, sedition seeking, mischief-making ways',⁶²⁵ Shāl Malik, Taghmās Malik, Qyrach Malik, and Takān Malik left Terkān Khātūn's service and joined Suyurghatmish's entourage where they were 'regally' established as court secretaries (*bitikchi*) and deputies. According to Munshī, Suyurghatmish's stepmother appeared to accept this new situation with forbearance and tolerance. However she was also quick to quietly dispatch a full account of these changing circumstances along with a complaint against Jalāl al-Donya va al-Dīn Suyurghatmish to be delivered by Amīr Talāk (or Nakāl) the son of Palād Malik, to her daughter Pādeshāh Khātūn at Abaqa's *ordu*. The result was the issuance of a *yarligh* forbidding Suyurghatmish from meddling in the affairs of Kirman, and halting his takeover of the *inju*s of his half-brother Hajjāj and the position of Lord of the Hunt. The

yarligh further declared that those notables that had deserted Terkān Khātūn's court to serve Suyurghatmish were to be brought before the *Yasa* and face execution. However as was reputedly Terkān Khātūn's habit, after having the conspirators arrested she trod the path of mercy and conferred an amnesty on the culprits excusing her stepson's behaviour as a hereditary blemish on his character. Suyurghatmish followed by his disgraced entourage turned immediately for the Il-Khan's court and there after suitable supplications had been made, positions of rank were found for them unconnected with the affairs of Kirman.⁶²⁶

An incident a decade earlier in Terkān Khātūn's life suggests that her forgiveness and bounty may have been due to something other than humility and mercy. The *Tārīkh-i Shāhī* reports an encounter the queen had on one occasion with a soothsayer, a woman of indecent and demented appearance whose widely reputed gifts included the ability to see into the future.⁶²⁷ If the queen felt that she already had knowledge of that long and prosperous career stretching before her and believed that she already knew from where danger might be expected to arise she could certainly afford to be beneficent and compassionate to those she 'knew' to be relatively harmless.

The close ties that had been established with the Mongols and then with the Il-Khans from the inception of the Qutlugh Khanid dynasty were to prove advantageous not only to the current rulers but to other members of the ruling family as well. Terkān Khātūn had long exploited her connections with Abaqa through her daughter Pādeshāh but when the Il-Khan died to be succeeded by his half-brother Aḥmad Tegüdar it was Terkān's stepson Suyurghatmish who was then able to utilise his links with the new monarch to further his own ambitions. An enduring friendship had sprung up between Suyurghatmish and Aḥmad during the time of Abaqa when the two had formed a true bond of friendship from shared experiences on the battlefield. Now that Aḥmad Tegüdar had become Il-Khan he was in a position to re-forge those bonds of friendship. In addition to Aḥmad, Suyurghatmish had close ties with the amīr Suqunjaq Noyan nominal Mongol governor of Iraq-i Arab and Khuzistan under Abaqa,⁶²⁸ who was his father-in-law (*qā' in*),⁶²⁹ and to the Il-Khan's mother, Qutui, whose protégé he had been.⁶³⁰

Abaqa Khan died in 1281 after reputedly experiencing a hallucinatory attack of delirium tremens brought about by excessive drinking.⁶³¹ Terkān Khātūn spent only one day in the obligatory mourning before summoning all the nobles and people of her realm to a specially constructed encampment outside the city. There she enumerated all favours and kindness due to her from the great and the small, expressed the hope that all would be concluded righteously

and, proffering thanks to the whole community, she made her farewells and set out for Tegüdar's *ordu* in Tabriz.⁶³² She was aware of her stepson's intimacy with Aḥmad Tegüdar and his mother as well as with the amīr Suqunjaq Noyan and realised that delay would damage her case. However her stepson had already made his supplications and he had been granted governorship of all the regions of Kirman and a *yarligh* had been issued stripping Qutlugh Terkān (Khātūn) of her powers long before she arrived in Azerbaijan. The two adversaries met up with each other in Koh Siah in the vicinity of Hamadan en route to Tabriz and Kirman respectively. Suyurghatmish took great delight in reading out the contents of the *yarligh* to his stepmother and Pādes̄hāh Khātūn who was accompanying her. For Qutlugh Terkān this sudden reversal in her fortunes was so great a shock and her anger so intense that she fainted. Suyurghatmish ordered the notables who had been accompanying Terkān Khātūn to return to Kirman and his stepmother, he summarily dismissed.⁶³³

The battle for control of Kirman continued to be fought out mainly in the courts and *ordus* of the ruling Mongol élite, and the divisions among the Il-Khanid family were utilised by the rival protagonists of Kirman. In Kirman itself there was an ill-fated attempt by some notables connected with Qutlugh Terkān's military including the amīr Alī Sāt'īlmesh, Amīr Muḥammad Qutlugh Tāsh, Amīr Muḥammad Ayad Gaz, and Amīr Muḥammad Alamdār, to raise Bībī Khātūn's son, Soyokshāh, to the sultanate but the coup collapsed when Soyokshāh revealed the plot to Suyurghatmish. An investigation was ordered and the guilty acknowledged their sins. Judgement was passed in an open space in the plains, witnessed by the assembled *ulamā* ', notables, the lowly and the eminent and the conspirators were ordered to submit to the *Yasa* and so were put to the sword of vengeance.⁶³⁴ Meanwhile in Tabriz, Terkān Khātūn pleaded her case before Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*. She gained support for her petition from others at the court who were also able to prevail upon the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*. Her eldest daughter Bībī Khātūn was there with her son Naṣrat al-Dīn Yaluk-Shāh, along with Khwāja aahīr al-Dīn Yamīn al-Malik, the *Mustawfī* of Kirman, Tāj al-Dīn Sāt'īlmesh, who had withdrawn from Suyurghatmish and fled in order to join Terkān Khātūn's service, and Mawlānā Emād al-Dīn aāfer, one of Kirman's leading ministers of state and together they were able to convince the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* to approach Aḥmad Tegüdar on Qutlugh Terkān's behalf. The chief minister's prudence and the favourable picture he drew of the much respected deposed ruler of Kirman swayed the Il-Khan enough for him to issue a *yarligh* which stipulated that the kingdom of Kirman should be split between mother and stepson and that the province should be ruled over by both. Suyurghatmish's supporters, most notably Qutui Khātūn

and the amīr Suqunjaq Noyan, were unwilling to accept this arrangement and counselled the Il-Khan on the dangers of this course of action, claiming that such a compromise would surely antagonise Suyurghatmish whose resulting feelings of apprehension (*nafur*) might well drive him to an alliance with Tegüdar's rival, Prince Arghun in Khorasan. Their suggested solution to avert this undesirable situation developing was to have Terkān Khātūn remain at court for the winter and for her to establish her winter-quarters (*Qishlamishi*) in the province and so prevent any immediate conflict in Kirman. They further proposed that Suyurghatmish be summoned to the *ordu* in order that both parties might then argue their cases in the presence of the Il-Khan. Yet again a compromise was found between Persian viziers, Mongol Noyans, local power brokers, the provincial gentry, and Mongol royalty.

It was for this reason that Qutlugh Khātūn came to spend her last winter in Bardaa in the district of Arran, the building of her residence a gratuity covered through the authority and by the kindness of the *Şāhib Dīwān* Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī. That summer she made her way towards Tabriz and set up her residence in the suburb of Cherandāb where drinking deep from the cups of her grief she succumbed to palpitations of the heart and a fierce fever and died during Ramadan 681 (December 1282–Jan 1283) at a respectable age well into her seventies.⁶³⁵ Her daughter Bībī Khātūn who was present in Aḥmad Tegüdar's *ordu*, upon hearing the news of her mother's death, immediately entered into the intrigues of Terkān Khātūn's affairs which were so intimately bound up with events and personages in the *ordu* in Azerbaijan. She accompanied her mother's body to Kirman and arranged her burial under the cupola of the *madresseh* that she had had built in the city. Suyurghatmish and the notables of Kirman province were obliged to follow the customs of mourning and were required to welcome the coffin and accompany it to its final resting place.⁶³⁶ Before leaving Tabriz, Bībī Khātūn had also secured a number of decrees and appointments which she had publicised upon her arrival in the southern province. It had been agreed that Pādeshāh Khātūn would pass on to Bībī Khātūn control of Sīrjān and her personal estates there. After the funeral Bībī Khātūn, Naşrat al-Dīn Yulukshāh, and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Soyokshāh set out for Sīrjān while the humiliated Suyurghatmish resolved upon setting out for Aḥmad Tegüdar's *ordu* to once again plead his case and seek support, a journey abruptly interrupted when, on the borders of Kirman province, news reached Suyurghatmish that Arghun's operations against Aḥmad Tegüder were under way.⁶³⁷

The subsequent history of the Qarā Khitāi rulers follows a predictable and increasingly complicated pattern of intrigue and plot

closely interwoven with the fate and fortunes of their Mongol patrons. With Arghun established upon the Il-Khanid throne Bībī Khātūn's son Naṣrat al-Dīn Yulukshāh traded in his earlier support for the new Il-Khan's cause and accompanied his mother and brother, Soyokshāh, along with some Kirmani notables including the Mustawfī, Khwāja aahīr al-Dīn, and Tāj al-Dīn Sāt'īlmesh, to Arghun Khan's *ordu*. The result of this manoeuvring was the convening of a *Grand yarghu* to which Suyurghatmish and his supporters were also summoned. Despite the harsh treatment meted out to Suyurghatmish's party some of whom were tortured and beaten during their interrogation, Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn Suyurghatmish was saved from this fate through the support of the powerful *amīr ulus* (the leading military official of the Il-Khans) Buqa Chingsang who headed the *yarghu*. The Mongol court eventually gave down a verdict favouring both parties but satisfying neither and the government of Kirman was split between Pādeshāh Khātūn and her half brother Jalāl al-Dīn Suyurghatmish.

*Through his wise diplomacy and goodness, Buqa Chingsang thwarted the plots of those great adversaries against Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn, and ratified the equal division of the kingdom of Kirman between Pādeshāh Khātūn and Jalāl al-Dīn.*⁶³⁸

Just as rivalries and intrigue had now become a part of the Il-Khanate so, too, was the stability which had existed in Kirman under Qutlugh Terkān soon irretrievably lost with even raids by the Nigudārīs, rare during the time of Terkān Khātūn, increasing in frequency.⁶³⁹ Pādeshāh eventually brought about the downfall and death of her half brother, Suyurghatmish, and then she, too, met an unsavoury end when another change in the Il-Khanid leadership was reflected in their satellite states. Just as she had ordered the strangling of Suyurghatmish, so the new Il-Khan, Baidu, whose wives had included the strangled sultan's sister and daughter, ordered that Pādeshāh Khātūn should meet the same fate.⁶⁴⁰ It might have been this sudden descent into instability and confusion which created the climate for myth-making and inspired the *topoi* which began to form around the 'Golden Age' over which Qutlugh Khātūn presided.

Qutlugh Terkān Khātūn ruled over the province of Kirman for approximately the same period as the Juwaynīs held power over the Il-Khanate. This corresponded to, arguably, the period of the Mongols' greatest prestige in Persia under Hülegü and Abaqa Khan. Just as these two great Il-Khans were able to bring relative stability and a recognisable system of law and order to the lands under their direct control so, too, did Qutlugh Terkān give Kirman a sense of security and durability. This was not only reflected in the histories written

after her death but in the hard facts of economic truth. Land prices reflect economic health. Land and property are seen as sound, often long-term, investment when conditions are stable and therefore predictable. During Qutlugh Terkān Khātūn's reign the price of land in the province rose to record levels. The justice and security which prevailed during Khodavand Terkān's (Khātūn)'s reign allowed 'Turk and Tājik, town dweller and traveller, the small and the great' to turn their hands to commerce and investment in real estate.⁶⁴¹ 'The élite and the common man, the old and the young' all put their life's savings into acquiring land and would also mortgage their valuables to gain water rights and property.⁶⁴² Land and water prices reached unprecedented levels. The *Tārīkh-i Shāhī* cites the price of water shares in the environs of Bardsir and further claims that in no age including that of the Kirmani Saljuqs, had land prices been higher, the market more vibrant and trade brisker than now under the rule of Qutlugh Terkān.⁶⁴³

Security, open frontiers and secure highways despite the broader inter- Mongol rivalries became a hallmark of the early Il-Khanid years. Kirman's prosperity was linked to this general stability and access to wider markets but the boom was made keener through the endeavours of Khodavand Terkān. She took responsibility for the internal security of her province and to achieve this she imposed a special levy to help pay for her army. All land and estates were evaluated and a one per cent tax was levied on the landlords and lessors (*arbab*). The proceeds from this tax were used to provide wages and provisions, arms and horses for the soldiers who guarded the frontiers and passes of the province.⁶⁴⁴ This tax was not universally popular and there were those who found that 'the taste of this electuary on their palate was not agreeable and [that] the draft of this decree did not conform to the shape of their own advice'.⁶⁴⁵ However, it is interesting to observe that according to the *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, it was not the great queen who became the target for their discontent and complaint but rather one of her ageing 'lieutenants', the Ṣāḥib Yamīn al-Malik whose 'cup of oppression' was blamed as the source of their woes.

Qutlugh Terkān is widely credited with ruling wisely and fairly and her reign is often lauded as a time of justice.

*And during this time that was a festival of justice and a great cradle of equity, Khodavand Terkān spread the table of abundance for the guests in the abode of her country, and kept opened secure highways and routes for travellers over land and sea.*⁶⁴⁶

One story repeated by Pārīzī typifies her style during the years of her ascendancy. An old money changer one day approached the

Khātūn to complain that his wealth and his jewels had gone missing. Terkān Khātūn asked the old man if any strangers were living in his house. Upon his answering negatively she then inquired whether he had a young wife, to which he replied in the affirmative. Terkān Khātūn immediately instructed her chamberlain to bring her a quantity of some special perfume which she then gave to the petitioner. This special perfume, she told him, he was to present to his young wife. After the old man had been dispatched Terkān Khātūn issued orders to the night-watchmen and to her police officers that they were to search both the city and the bazaar and that whomsoever they found smelling of that unique perfume which the Queen herself had prepared, they were to be brought before her. A young man was duly discovered and when brought before the Queen and threatened with punishment he produced the old man's money and jewels. The old man was reunited with his wealth, the young wife was divorced and cast out, and the reputation of Qutlugh Terkān for shrewd wisdom was further enhanced.⁶⁴⁷

According to the *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, by the thirteenth century, the 'ulamā' had lost much of the respect that reputedly in former years they had once enjoyed and were widely perceived as being self-serving and corrupt. In the past, out of necessity, the 'ulamā' had to serve their worldly masters but they were able to avoid dishonour and disgrace. They remained untainted by the corruption of greed for possessions and position and their words and sermons were heeded. In contrast the 'ulamā' of Kirman in the latter half of the thirteenth century constructed a world of vanity and deception with their education and used their knowledge to acquire wealth and position and as a result no respect remained for their learning nor reverence for scholars: 'The souls of the learned ones have become stained with greed for dirhems'.⁶⁴⁸

This perceived corruption of the traditional upholders of justice can only have enhanced the reputation of Terkān Khātūn when she was recognised as being the source of justice and charity. She was a queen whose character was righteous, whose mystery was pure, whose outer garments were modesty, whose insignia was chastity, a high pillar and auspicious shadow whose rule was steadfast [*qawīm*], whose days were resolute. She was the jewelled knot and springtime of the kings of the Qarā Khitāi of Kirman.⁶⁴⁹ If these were the attributes with which she was credited it should not be forgotten that she herself was subject to the law and did not rule with impunity. Not only was a Mongol *basqaq* present in her court, though he would often act on her behalf, but her subjects and rivals also had access to the higher courts of the Il-Khans. Land disputes, complaints against ranking officials, financial fraud and cases involving Mongols often gave rise to the

convening of a *yarghu*, a Mongol court of interrogation.⁶⁵⁰ That these courts strove to achieve some degree of justice is evident from their inclusion and adaptation of local laws rather than rigorously applying the *Yasa* of Chinggis Khan. These courts were not automatic issuers of licences for the justification and legalisation of tyranny, murder and chicanery. Cases were lost and parties were cleared. Though the bastinado and other rather harsh tortures were an integral part of the justice system, verdicts were not a foregone conclusion. Arghun Aqa who, as has been mentioned above, set up *yarghus* in Kirman was himself a former defendant before such a court and one who obviously lived to tell his tale. He took over as administrator of Khorasan and 'Iraq when his predecessor, Kōrgüz was taken before a *yarghu*, a case detailed by Juwaynī.⁶⁵¹ A *yarghu* had been called at the request of Quṭb al-Dīn to decide on the claims of himself and his cousin Rukn al-Dīn. Arghun Aqa had summoned a *yarghu* to hear complaints against Terkān Khātūn and the court had found for the defendant. Terkān Khātūn's land dispute with the Shabānkārāns was also taken before the Mongol court and in this case the traditional laws and customs were invoked to settle the case. The aim of these courts was to settle the dispute to the satisfaction of all concerned. Where wrong-doing was involved the guilty party would often face execution at the hands of the *yarghuchis* or could be handed over to the other party to face whatever retribution that party thought suitable. Where possible compromise and reconciliation were striven for and the local *yarghu* was given great flexibility in its interpretation and implementation of the law. That so many freely chose to apply to the Mongol court system as is demonstrated by the cases cited in the *Tārīkh-i Shāhī* suggests that confidence in the *yarghus* existed with the Persian citizens and notables of the Il-Khanid satellite states. Though lip service has always been paid to the paramountcy of Islamic law and the *Sharī'a* invoked as justification for a kaleidoscope of edicts and judgements, common law has everywhere in the Islamic world in all ages been utilised for the practicalities of worldly disputes. In the Il-Khanate and in the province of Kirman, the *Yasa* of the Mongols, the rulings of traditional practices, with the added spice of Islamic teaching sat together comfortably with the judges and arbitrators of that time.

If Qutlugh Terkān's abilities as a shrewd and fair political ruler were widely acknowledged and her achievements in creating a climate of security and prosperity recognised, her charitable works were also greatly acclaimed and they did much to enhance her reputation. It is reported that after her death a quantity of fine clothes was discovered, still locked in the storehouse in her bedroom. They were removed for evaluation and upon inspection all were found to be garments of silk

and linen suitable for a variety of different occasions. Some were of the most excellent and finest quality, others were very delicate and some were very coarse. All kinds of underwear and over garments, clothes for inside and others for outside, for summer and for winter, for spring and autumn all had been put aside and stored. There were clothes for marriage festivals and for celebrations and banquets and even garments of mourning, all carefully arranged and classified. Terkān Khātūn had made it known to a close female confidante that these clothes were to be made available to poor but honest [*mastar*] women of good birth who had fallen on hard times and were now in a state of 'poverty and want' [*faqr u fāqa*'], and also to other well-born women who had remained unmarried. However she had not had the opportunity to fulfil this commitment herself. It was therefore ordered that the store of clothes should henceforth be made ready and arrangements completed so that when the necessity arose those deprived women should have their needs provided for.⁶⁵² Terkān Khātūn's other charitable works and donations were legion. Immediately upon being widowed she obtained her 'dowry' of 10,000 dinars and donated it for the construction of a *madresseh* and a domed tomb.⁶⁵³ She made numerous pious donations and bequests [*mauqafāt*] for the building and upkeep of gardens and palaces in thousands of small towns, had water and drainage installed in villages, provided cooking oil, wheat, corn, and ruknī gold to Qoran readers and other religious groups and made available regular funds for the support of respected members of the clergy including the son of the legendary Kubrāwī shaykh from Bokhara who is credited with converting Berke Khan to Islam,⁶⁵⁴ Shaykh al-Islam Burhān al-Dīn al-Bākhārzi, for whom she established a *waqf* when she had him brought to Kirman on his return from Mecca.⁶⁵⁵ The annual subsidies and provisions for each institution, pious person, building, *madresseh*, and group are itemised in various places in the *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*. This spirit of charitable generosity and patronage was fostered in her daughters, especially in Pādeshāh whose love of poetry led her to compose verse herself. Both the *Tārīkh-i Shāhī* and Munshī express high esteem for Pādeshāh Khātūn though the *Simt al-Ula* does admit that the throttling of her brother mars an otherwise exemplary character.⁶⁵⁶

Terkān Khātūn ruled Kirman through its heyday. Aware always of her status vis-à-vis her masters in Azerbaijan she nevertheless managed to maintain a degree of independence which eluded both her successors and those who ruled before her. She oversaw a prosperous and stable kingdom and through skilful marriage contracts, astute political manoeuvring, selective patronage, and the dispensation of justice, charity and social projects she acquired a loyal and enthusiastic following. She courted the leading '*ulamā*' and yet could

disregard Muslim law when it suited her interests as was the case when she gave her Muslim daughter, Pādeshāh, to the 'heathen' ruler, Abaqa, and when she consulted soothsayers. Her primary concern was the preservation and extension of her own family's power and yet her successes did not blind her to the potential precariousness of her own situation. The Qutlugh Khans' dynasty arose from the audacity of its founder, Baraq Hājib's opportunism. His clever political machinations saw the consolidation of his power and his courting of the Mongol Khans ensured his survival. With the stability which the ascendancy of Hülegü brought to the region the Qutlugh Khans were able to prosper and benefit from the skill of a wise and clever local ruler. However just as the Il-Khanate began a decline after the demise of Abaqa so too did the kingdom of Kirman falter after the death of Qutlugh Terkān (Khātūn). The Il-Khanate was able to revive with the arrival of Ghazan Khan. In Kirman no such leader of vision was forthcoming and the dynasty disappeared. The Kingdom of Kirman looked toward Azerbaijan for the protection and stability which would ensure their own durability. The Il-Khans provided a wider rule of law, securer borders, and a stronger continuity than might have existed in their absence. There can have been few who would have wished a return to the pre-Hülegüid uncertainty and the pre-Mongol anarchy.

Shiraz

Shiraz's most famous son, Shaykh Maṣālah al-Dīn Sa'dī returned to his now supposedly stable and secure birthplace in Shiraz around 1256. He had departed from Fars some decades earlier because of what he had perceived as the approach of danger and chaos in the form of the Mongol invasion.⁶⁵⁷ The advent of Hülegü Khan, the crushing of the Nizārīs, and the expectation of the establishment of a strong central government in Azerbaijan held out the promise of security and stability. God's mysterious purpose in unleashing the destructive hordes of Chinggis Khan was becoming clearer to many more people than only Aṭā Malik Juwaynī.⁶⁵⁸

Indeed in the preface to his celebrated work, *Golestan*, Sa'dī cites the reason for his return to his homeland after many years of wandering, as the return of stability to the region after the years of anarchy following the initial irruption of the Turanians in Iran. Though not explicitly stated, his return coincided with Hülegü's arrival and destruction of the Assassins in Alamūt. The *Golestan* was dedicated to Abū Bakr ibn Sa'd, the Atabeg and ruler of Shiraz, and also a loyal servant of the Mongols who had marched with them in 1258 to the conquest of Baghdad.

*Knowest thou not why I in foreign countries
Roamed about for a long time?
I went away from the distress of the Turks because I saw
The world entangled like the hair of Negroes;
They were all human beings, but
Like wolves sharp-clawed, for shedding blood.
When I returned I saw the country at rest,
The tigers having abandoned the nature of tigers.
Within a man of good disposition like an angel,
Without an army like bellicose lions.
Thus it happened that first I beheld
The world full of confusion, anxiety and distress;
Then it became as it is in the days of the just
SultanAtabek Abu Bekr Ben Sa'd Zanki.*⁶⁵⁹




Figure 5.2 The Salghurids.

Settling again in his favourite city, Sa'dī completed his most famous works, the *Golestan* and the *Bustan*. He dedicated his literary creations to his patrons and those eminent figures who were prominent in the affairs of his world which for many years remained Shiraz. The Salgharid (1148–1287) rulers including the Atabegs Abū Bakr b. Sa'd b. Zangī, his son Sa'd, Saljūqshāh, Muḥammad-Shāh, the young Muḥammad, Malike Terkān Khātūn, and her daughter Abish, have all been remembered in his lines. So too have the Juwaynī brothers to whom he was particularly close, the wazirs Shams al-Dīn Ḥussein Alkānī and Sayf al-Dīn, the Qāzī Rukn al-Dīn, the merchant-governor Malik Tāzīga, and also the Mongol governor of Shiraz, the amīr Angyānū, to whom the poet addressed at least three poems.⁶⁶⁰ This last, though by all accounts a fair and just administrator, fell victim to the partisan machinations and preponderance of self-serving greed which came to characterise the political climate of Shiraz in the early decades of Il-Khanid domination of the province.

It was the pervasiveness of this culture of corruption which spelt failure for successive Mongol attempts to instil order and the rule of law in this southern state and undermined their efforts to encourage prosperity and economic growth. Reliant on local people for the implementation of their policies the Il-Khans were first unable to find a single ruler after the death of Abū Bakr with the charisma or prestige to enforce discipline in Fars, and later when they dispatched their own powerful amīrs to take a more active role, these men too became entangled in the quagmire of local power politics, sycophancy, and deceit. In contrast to its neighbouring province, Kirman, under the benign but firm rule of Qutluḡh Terkān, the three

decades following Hülegü's assumption of power in Iran were generally marked in Shiraz and its hinterlands, by political turmoil and economic stagnation and failure. If Kirman were to be called an Il-Khanid success, then justifiably Shiraz would be labelled its failure.

However it might be more correct to view these two states from a different perspective. Seen from the ground rather than from the lofty heights of the Il-Khan capital of Maragheh, the rulers of Kirman might be deemed rather as having successfully taken full advantage of an Il-Khanid umbrella providing them security and expanded markets that they were able so successfully to utilise, while their neighbours in Shiraz by rejecting the opportunities offered by a potentially benign Mongol domination, through short-sighted venality and internecine bickering, themselves brought on the decline of their potentially prosperous state. Waṣṣāf, the principal source for the history of Fars and certainly no Mongol apologist, does not paint a negative picture of the individual Il-Khanid amirs. He apportions blame where he sees it lying and that is rarely with the Mongol officials. Indeed, for some, notably Suqunjaq and Angyānū, he is generous in his praise. It is through the detailed narrative of Shiraz during these years that a picture of the true role of the Mongol overlords begins to emerge and the conclusion that the lords of Shiraz brought about their own tragic fate is inescapable.

Mu'Uaffar al-Dīn Qutluḡ Khan Abū Bakr b. Sa'd b. Zangī had been the Salgharid ruler since 1226 and though he had established an accommodation with the Great Khans of Qaraqorum, his city had not been spared the indirect effects of the Mongol invasion. These effects took the form of attacks from such brigands as the Khwārazmians under Jalāl al-Dīn and the general instability which had been prevalent in much of the wider region. He was able to maintain good relations with Qaraqorum while at the same time he succeeded in earning a generally sound reputation at home. He sent his brother's son, Tahamtam, to reside at Ögödei's court and readily agreed to pay the annual tribute of what Waṣṣāf considered the paltry sum of 30,000 ruknī dinars, sweetened with pearls and other rarities, to his Mongol overlords. For this he received the Qa'an's favour and was awarded the title of Qutluḡ Khan just like his eastern neighbour Baraq of Kirman.⁶⁶¹ Waṣṣāf describes Abū Bakr as shrewd and strict while at the same time tolerant of the behaviour of others. He kept a close check on his officers and functionaries whom he made accountable for their actions and yet he was indulgent of some of their weaknesses. He would allow wine, music and revelry at his court for the entertainment of the amirs and notables of his realm even though he himself practised strict abstinence from alcohol.⁶⁶² He was, claims Waṣṣāf, the shining light of his family, a fosterer of religion and

benign government who adhered to the faith of Muḥammad in such a way that in his time no person dared to cultivate the doctrines of the philosophers or logicians. Learned and pious men prospered from his patronage⁶⁶³ and his reign was reputedly characterised by the rule of justice.⁶⁶⁴

Tough justice, it would appear from Waṣṣāf, who later relates the Sultan's arbitrary issuance of edicts concerning land ownership. These decrees forced the reverting to the state of all land and estates whose deed-holders could not prove a minimum fifty years' of documented possession, or could not produce the necessary seals, stamps and signatures to confirm their land's status. He had the *qāẓī al-quḏāt* Majd al-Dīn Ismā'il al-Fālī who replaced Izz al-Dīn Alevī, the last of a long line of a family of *qāẓī al-quḏāt*s, enforce this policy aimed at disinheriting and confiscating the estates of Shiraz's notables including its religious luminaries such as Alevī who forfeited all his lands and estates. This law was later repealed when in practice it proved to be unworkable.⁶⁶⁵

Abū Bakr, whose chief minister was Muqarrub al-Dīn Abū al-Mafākhir Masad, a man 'who fought the evil of enemies with righteousness'⁶⁶⁶ extended the territories originally under his control to include Kish, Bahrayn, Qatif and Lahsa and, according to Mustawfī writing around 1330, brought splendour and prosperity to his kingdom. He left as a memorial to his reign many fine buildings and charitable foundations such as the Ribāt-i Muẓaffarī of Abar-Qyḥ, and other such monuments in Baīzā, Fāraq, Banda Izadī, and Jāber on the Swāḥel road. He built the public fountain in the old Atabeg Qolī Mosque. He also bequeathed *waqfs* to the mausoleum of Shaykh Abī Abdullah Khafīf.⁶⁶⁷ Though on the order of the Mongols all fortresses had been dismantled and the castles of Shiraz laid to waste, Abū Bakr was able to preserve at least one fortified stronghold, the White Castle, *Qal a-ye Sefid*.⁶⁶⁸ Abū Bakr used to boast that his kingdom possessed two treasures the like of which no other king could claim. One was the White Castle and the other was the fabled *Shab Bavvān*, 'one of the most famous pleasantries in the world'⁶⁶⁹ which abounded in odiferous herbs, a multitude of varieties of flowers, an abundance of beautiful, sweet-throated birds, and pure and plentiful spring-water.⁶⁷⁰ Unfortunately Abū Bakr's happy legacy did not long survive his death, at the age of 70, that occurred in 1261 after 36 years of his rule.⁶⁷¹

The Atabeg Abū Bakr was immediately succeeded by his son Sa'd who at the beginning of the year of his father's death had gone to the court of the Il-Khan Hülegü as the customary surety. While on this journey north to Azerbaijan, Sa'd bin Abū Bakr fell ill.⁶⁷² The news of his father's death and of his own subsequent promotion to the throne

reached him in the town of Tabartu. Seals, and coins bearing his name were produced and presented to the new Atabeg as were encomia from the poet Sa'dī who had even dedicated the preface of his second great moral discourse, the *Gulistan*, to 'the mighty arm of the victorious empire, the lamp of the resplendent religion, the most splendid of mankind, the boast of Islam, Sa'd son of Atabek the Great, the majestic Shāhanshāh, owner of the necks of nations, lord of the kings of Arabia and Persia, the Sultān of the land and the sea, the heir of the kingdom of Solomon'.⁶⁷³ But within seventeen days, at the age of thirty-seven, Atabeg Sa'd II had also died⁶⁷⁴ and, shortly after, his coffin was taken to the *madresseh Azudī*, built for him by Terkān Khātūn, in Shiraz.⁶⁷⁵ These years which followed Abū Bakr's death were marked by confusion and chaos and this disorder continued right up to the time of Waṣṣāf's composition of his history as the historian himself reports before embarking on the subsequent tale of Abū Bakr's heirs.⁶⁷⁶

Upon Atabeg Sa'd's untimely death his young son Muḥammad was immediately declared Atabeg with the title Sultān Aūd al-Dīn, with Terkān, his mother, as regent.⁶⁷⁷ Terkān Khātūn, the sister of Alā al-Dowleh Atabeg of Yazd, assumed her royal duties by attempting to improve the lot of the peasants and spreading largesse from the treasuries of her late father-in-law. She also sent messengers bearing gifts to the court of Hülegü Il-Khan to offer her submission on behalf of her little son and on their return these envoys brought the Il-Khan's confirmation and recognition of the succession. The *Tārīkh-i Shāhī* initially speaks of the great hopes that the accession of the young Muḥammad engendered with the comparison with Kirman being made, both states having effective queens named Terkān Khātūn at their helms.⁶⁷⁸ Unlike her namesake in Kirman, Terkān Khātūn of Shiraz, the daughter of Quṭb al-Dīn Maḥmad-Shāh of Yazd, who as regent became effective ruler of Fars on her husband's death in 1261 did not receive the adulation and widespread support of either her peers or her countrymen. Waṣṣāf claims that the people of Shiraz rued the day that the Atabeg Abū Bakr bound her to his son Sa'd which he notes coincided with the change in fortunes of the House of Abbās. He further claims that it was commonly rumoured that she was having an adulterous affair with Shams al-Dīn Miyaq, a man of allegedly incomparable beauty, who was one of her husband's élite Turkish *ghulāms*.⁶⁷⁹

At the time of the succession Terkān was approached by Fakhr al-Dīn Abī Bakr, the son of Abū Bakr's wazīr, Abū Naṣīr Ḥwājī, who, hastening to her court, offered his services unconditionally and of his own volition, explaining his attachment to, and training in, kingship. He implored her to do with him as she wished. She did. Terkān had

him secretly executed and the story went abroad that as he was led away to his death he stuffed a paper carefully concealed in an arm bracelet into his mouth chewing it into little pieces. This paper was believed to have been the *Ganjnama* (treasure map) of the Atabegs, detailing the secret hiding places of the royal treasures.⁶⁸⁰ The twelve year old⁶⁸¹ Atabeg Muḥammad also met an early death and it is reported that he died following a fall from a rooftop in 1263 after a reign of two years and seven months. It was rumoured in certain quarters that it was his mother who had kicked him to his death.⁶⁸² He was buried by his father's side in the *madresseh Azudi*.⁶⁸³ His passing was not only greatly mourned in Shiraz but also in Kirman where it had been hoped that his reign would bring the two states closer together.⁶⁸⁴

After the appropriate period of mourning Terkān Khātūn summoned the notables of the country to deliberate on who should succeed to the throne. Their choice fell upon Muḥammad-Shāh, the son of Salghar-Shāh bin Abī Bakr, who was married to Terkān Khātūn's daughter, Salghum. Muḥammad-Shāh was renowned both for his bravery and for his learning and he was admired by the Il-Khan Hülegü for his boldness which the Atabeg had demonstrated when he accompanied the Mongol ruler on the Baghdad campaign of 1258. However such promise was not to raise the House of Salghar from the decline that had set in since the demise of Abū Bakr. Muḥammad-Shāh's accession and the breaking of Abū Bakr's bloodline was viewed by the chief *qāẓī* as God's retribution for unspecified transgressions visited upon Atabeg Abū Bakr and his heirs.⁶⁸⁵

Once on the throne Muḥammad-Shāh gave in to bad habits and reputedly led a life of idleness and debauchery, 'He spent the days of his sultanate in debauchery, epicurean indulgences and pleasure-seeking'.⁶⁸⁶ His was a short but bloody reign. To secure his position he had his brother Saljūqshāh imprisoned in the *Qala-ye Iṣṭakhr*, ignoring all pleas to rescind this decision and he no longer treated his mother-in-law's words and wishes with the respect that she felt they were due. This was to have unfortunate consequences for the new Atabeg. Heedless of the fact that he was married to her daughter Salghum, Terkān Khātūn was soon involved in plotting Atabeg Muḥammad-Shāh's downfall. In Shabānkāra it was widely believed that Terkān Khātūn had murdered her own son. These same sources suggest that she also poisoned Muḥammad-Shāh's son when she finally decided to move against the new Atabeg.⁶⁸⁷ Other sources agree that she conspired against her son-in-law naming some nobles from amongst the Shal and Turcomans. She arranged that her son-in-law should be seized while he was entering his private quarters. Once secured he was to be immediately taken away and presented at the Il-Khan's

court where charges could be brought against him. Hülegü accepted the petitions against Muḥammad- Shāh and he had the Atabeg imprisoned at his *ordu* bringing his eight-month reign to an end.⁶⁸⁸

Meanwhile in Shiraz Muḥammad-Shāh's brother, Saljūqshāh, whose mother was believed to be of noble Saljuqid blood, was released from prison and seated upon the throne of Fars. It was during these years that Spuler, citing later Egyptian sources, suggests that contacts had been made between the Mamluks and the ruling family of Fars.⁶⁸⁹ Reuven Amitai believes that the purpose of these contacts was to encourage resistance to the Mongol overlords and to collect intelligence. He cites Arabic sources which refer to a letter from Baybars to the ruler of Shiraz and the lords of the Lurs exhorting them to learn from the example of Berke.⁶⁹⁰ But what does appear certain is that the instability of the throne encouraged dissent, sedition and intrigue.

In the streets of Shiraz the news of Saljūqshāh's accession was greeted with great but premature glee and celebration. For Saljūqshāh, still wary of his precarious position, gathered about him a group of notables for support and then to further consolidate his position proceeded to take Terkān Khātūn in marriage. His intention was to lessen the chances of her inciting rebellion but the marriage also enabled him to appropriate her treasury. Saljūqshāh's reign soon proved to be as equally debauched and oppressive as his brother's had been.⁶⁹¹ This proved to be particularly true as far as Terkān Khātūn was concerned.

The story of Terkān Khātūn's bloody end and the beginning of Saljūqshāh's own endgame are widely reported.⁶⁹² In the middle of a drunken spree an image of Terkān Khātūn and her alleged lover Miyāq came to the Atabeg's mind. Seeing nearby a black slave of a particularly hideous aspect the king issued the command to this slave to bring him the head of Terkān Khātūn. No sooner said than done, the head was brought to the Atabeg on a platter and laid before him. In her ears there remained untouched a pair of precious royal pearl earrings. Atabeg Saljuqshāh with his own hands cut off Terkān Khātūn's ears and then threw them with the attached earrings to his minstrels. Waṣṣāf reports that he spent the remainder of the night in drinking and that he expressed his feeling for his late wife by emptying the dregs from his wine bowl over her mutilated face. Rashīd al-Dīn records that he also had Terkān Khātūn's two daughters, Abish and Bībī Salghum, imprisoned in the White Castle.⁶⁹³

At this same time Hülegü Khan had two representatives in Shiraz, Aghalbeg and Qutlugh Bitikchi, acting as *Basqaqs* on his behalf and they became very disturbed when news of the events surrounding Terkān Khātūn's death reached them. Attempting to make contact

with Saljūqshāh they soon learnt of plots against their own lives and, without first obtaining leave, the two made haste to flee. In response to their flight the Atabeg gave immediate chase. He reached Aghalbeg's residence first and killed the Mongol functionary with a blow to the head. When Aghalbeg's horsemen arrived Saljūqshāh gave vent to his fury and urged his own soldiers and the local people to rise up and to attack the enemy with stones, slings, and missiles of burning oil. In this way the Atabeg oversaw the killing of the second Mongol *basqaq*, Qutlugh Bitikchi, the destruction of both officials' houses, and the murder of their servants, retainers, wives and children. In the confusion of this mayhem the Soghdian lover of Terkān Khātūn, Miyāq, escaped and made his way to Hülegü's *ordu* where he was able to report on all that had passed in Fars. Hülegü responded by ordering the execution of Saljūqshāh's brother Muḥammad-Shāh whom he still held in prison, and the dispatching of the amīrs Altaju and Temūr with a Mongol army to Shiraz and a command that assistance should also be sent from Isfahan, the Lurs, Yazd, Kirman, and Eigg (Ig).⁶⁹⁴

Saljūqshāh is presented as an ambiguous figure. On the one hand he is derided for his cruelty and intemperance and on the other he is lauded for his heroic stand against the Mongols supposedly in defence of Fars. Before the final showdown Altaju, in accordance with the Mongol tradition of according heroic bravery respect, sent the Atabeg the offer of a pardon on condition that he surrender and confess his errors. But, reports Waṣṣāf, so drunk was he on the wine of his own pride that he chose defiance rather than the perceived humiliation of submission. Altaju moved against Saljūqshāh with backing armies from Kirman, Yazd and Eigg (Ig). From Kirman rode the great amīr Azad al-Dīn Amīr Haji, the brother-in-law of Qutlugh Khātūn, and Prince Malik along with their armies. From Yazd came Terkān Khātūn's brother (and stepfather), Atabeg Alā al-Dawleh, and from Eigg (Ig) there rode the Shabānkāran malik NiOām al-Dīn Ḥosavoyeh.⁶⁹⁵ The news of such a united force moving against him caused Saljūqshāh to gather around him his army and his treasury and to move to the town of Kharshif. A rumour was widely reported that while in the town, Saljūqshāh murdered the Mongol-appointed *shahna* and replaced him with one of his own men. Saljūqshāh hoped that if his forces became too weakened he would have the means of escape from Kharshif by water.⁶⁹⁶

In the event, when the armies of Altaju arrived to do battle, the representatives of Fars led by the amīr Muqarrub al-Dīn Masad, and including the province's judges, governors, and notables came out to meet the Mongols.⁶⁹⁷ They offered their submission and an appropriate welcome and Altaju gave them reassurances that though his army was poised and eager for plunder, Shiraz would be spared

and that he would restrain his men. Instead of their promised massacre his armies were sent along the coastline in search of the fugitive, Saljūqshāh. The fierce confrontation between the two armies eventually occurred in the vicinity of Kazirun. In the first onslaught the Malik of Eigg (Ig) was killed by Saljūqshāh himself.⁶⁹⁸ However the rebel forces suffered a severe setback when the Mongols, in a concerted rush, put the Shul and Lur rebel contingents to flight. In the growing mêlée, Saljūqshāh gathered together a select group of his own Turks and Mamluks and from them selected one *ghulām* in particular, Biklik, an Esfandiyyār of the day, as a bodyguard.⁶⁹⁹ With his chosen company and Biklik, the Shāh retreated to the city of Kazirun itself and sought sanctuary within the confines of the Tomb of the Shaykh Murshad Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm Kāziranī (d.1033).⁷⁰⁰ Shortly afterwards the Mongols had the Mosque containing the tomb surrounded. 'With an army like an iron mountain and a billowing sea in two days they had Kazirun's Friday Mosque besieged.'⁷⁰¹ This was universally considered such a sacrilegious act that a common voice arose from Muslims and pagans alike imploring justice and expressing shock. The Saint of Kazirun was a very widely venerated Shaykh and it was considered extremely profane by 'even Mongol standards' to assail such a holy site with military might. Saljūqshāh climbed atop the saintly tomb and smote the sepulchre with his hand with such force that it shattered, breaking into pieces. These fragments he then hurled into the distance. Addressing himself to his followers he assured them that assistance was at hand and that the spirit of the Shaykh would be their protector. He reminded them of the tradition which claimed that should calamity visit Kazirun at any time and that should the stone of the Saint's tomb be moved, then favour and power would find him who would strive against that catastrophe. But on that particular day, Waṣṣāf notes, the spirit of the Shaykh failed to move. Biklik suggested that they take provisions from the treasury and that they set their faces to escape. Saljūqshāh realised that his considerable girth and corpulence would prevent him from effecting any quick getaway so instead he urged his friend, Biklik, to take some of his relatives and funds from the treasury and if possible make good his own escape from the siege. Biklik followed this advice but was waylaid during the flight by Alā al-Dawleh, the Atabeg of Yazd, whom he was forced to strike with a poisoned arrow and 'dispatch to the region of non-existence'. Waṣṣāf claims that Biklik eventually made his way to Basra and from there on to Egypt, the haven for insurgents against the Il-Khans, where he is reported to have led a happy and prosperous life.⁷⁰² After Biklik had gone the Mongols stormed the mosque and a great number of Turks and inhabitants of Kazirun were massacred so much so that a well in the vicinity of the martyrs' graveyard was filled

to overflowing with bodies. Saljūqshāh was captured and then taken as far as Nobandijan to the foot of the *Qal a-ye Sefīd* where he was killed and buried. This occurred in 1264.⁷⁰³

For Waṣṣāf, Saljūqshāh's death marked the end of any semblance of independent rule for Shiraz and he laments that from that time forth the fate of Shiraz fell completely into the hands of foreigners and its internal affairs were reduced to chaos through the conflicting interests of local parties. He laments the inevitability of Mongol hegemony and the futility and dire consequences of resistance to Chinggis Khan and his heirs. Significantly he acknowledges that it was Muslim pride and dignity that suffered rather than any material torment from continued Il-Khanid domination but that for the sake of peace and security submission was an unavoidable requisite.⁷⁰⁴ A comparison with events in neighbouring Kirman where Qutlugh Khātūn ruled with minimal Il-Khanid intrusion suggests that the level of interference from the Mongols that occurred in Shiraz was self-induced by the leaders and notables of the province.

Immediately following Saljūqshāh's death, Altaju was advised by a close adviser that a massacre of the people of Shiraz would be in order to prevent any future uprising. This suggestion was rejected by Altaju who claimed that the ruination of Shiraz had been brought about through the absence of Il-Khanid rule and that the people of Shiraz had now expressed their readiness to serve. Altaju brought security to the city. He appointed a *shaḥna*, he committed the 'nefarious' Soghdian⁷⁰⁵ Miyāq to the *Yasa* (execution), the army was disbanded and he himself returned to Azerbaijan. Abish, the daughter of Sa'd and Terkān Khātūn, though only four or five years old,⁷⁰⁶ was declared Atabeg in 1264 with the *khutba* read and coins struck in her name. Abish and her sister Salghum were the only remaining heirs to the Salgharid throne and crown and in addition they had the support of the Shul and the Turcoman tribes.⁷⁰⁷ According to Rashīd al-Dīn, both Abish and her older sister Salghum, who had been married to the late Atabeg Muḥammad-Shāh, had been imprisoned by Saljūqshāh in the *Qala-ye Sefīd*. They were taken to the Il-Khan's court by their grandmother Yaghut Terkān bint Qutlugh Baraq Hājib, the recent widow of Atabeg Alā al-Dawleh Maḥmad-Shāh of Yazd.⁷⁰⁸ Abish was subsequently married to Prince Möngke Temür or Tash-Möngke, Hülegü's fourth son, to whom she had been betrothed earlier by her mother, presumably at the time Terkān Khātūn offered her allegiance to the Il-Khan in 1261.⁷⁰⁹ Her sister Bībī Salghum was given in marriage to Atabeg Yusef-Shāh of Yazd.

Without an effective ruler the province of Fars quickly degenerated into the anarchy and financial chaos summarised by Waṣṣāf by way of an introduction to Abish Khātūn's reign. This instability was not long

in finding manifestation in popular revolt. The chief *qāzī* of Fars, the *qāzī al-quṣāt* Sharaf al-Dīn Ibrāhīm, was hailed as a saviour and even as the promised *Mahdī Ākhar al-Zamān* (the Great Mahdī of the Age, when he returned to the province after a prolonged absence in Khorasan. He had long been admired for his asceticism, piety and self-discipline. A devoted group of followers had evolved and they narrated the stories of his greatness throughout the province so much so that on the holy man's return he began to attract disciples at every village and town through which he passed. The stories and legends surrounding Sharaf al-Dīn Ibrāhīm were exaggerated the more they were spread. It was said that a prayer whispered over a handful of gravel enabled him to scatter before him any mail-coated horseman though he be armed with sword and javelin. The stories told about this Shirazi saint bore a remarkable similarity to those tales woven around the Tārābī of Bokhara a generation earlier.⁷¹⁰

Advancing from the borders of Shabānkāra,⁷¹¹ the Sayyed moved toward Shiraz with the intention of taking over the city whose overseers at that time were the Mongol *Shahna*, Basatu, and the Atabeg's *Nā' ib-i Dīwān*, Kalijeh. After consultations with both Mongol and Muslim military units Basatu and Kalijeh moved their troops out of the city and confronted the approaching army of Sharaf al-Dīn Ibrāhīm by the Kavar Bridge. Rumour had it that as well as the army that could be seen massing before the city, the rebel army contained a throng of invisible Shaykhs and that whosoever should take up arms against this hallowed host would be immediately struck down with paralysis. This situation resulted in an initial stalemate as neither side seemed willing to strike the first blow. However, according to Waṣṣāf, with the greatest trepidation, two or three quaking soldiers fired their arrows into the rebel army to test the truth of these stories and when they were not turned to stone battle commenced. The Sayyed in the midst of his men cried out 'Allah al-Akbar' and led the attack. At the same time the Mongol army also moved forward with a group of Turcomans moving up to block any attempted flight. The rebel army was soon scattered and the rebels were slaughtered in great numbers and amongst the slain was the Shaykh Sharaf al-Dīn Ibrāhīm. The battle took place in May 1265.⁷¹²

When news of the Sayyed's revolt reached Hülegü he was greatly disturbed and he vented his anger on Altaju who, after the rebellion of Saljūqshāh, had ignored the advice of his own *noker* and had spared the people of Shiraz from massacre. Altaju received 17 lashes and an army of 10,000 was dispatched to Shiraz with orders to carry out destruction on the scale of Chinggis Khan's devastation of Transoxiana. However this order was never enforced since news of the death of Sharaf al-Dīn Ibrāhīm and of the loyalty of the people of

Shiraz reached the Il-Khan before his army had reached the city and an order cancelling the *yarligh*, hastily dispatched, saved the people of that southern state.⁷¹³

With no effective governor over the people of Shiraz and the city's affairs in ruinous disorder the *Bitikchi*, Shādi, and another Mongol official, Damur, were sent to the city around October 1266. Such was the disorder, they found themselves unable to carry out their duties and it was not until two years later when Abaqa Khan appointed Angyānū to Fars as governor that the province's finances and administration began to receive the attention they had for so long been lacking. According to Waṣṣāf, Angyānū was a formidable Turk noted for his shrewd intelligence who in a very short time became aware of the state of the country's affairs. He wisely selected and appointed tax-collectors throughout the region and awarded robes of honour to many officials, from the *shaḥnas*, to court secretaries. He ensured that their allowances were adequate, reasoning that discontented officials could not be trusted. However, he also demanded undertakings from these functionaries that they would follow the path of justice and honesty on the understanding that whosoever should offend against these pledges and stipulations would face severe retribution or even death.⁷¹⁴

As a result of these measures the state's tax coffers were again replenished, the country prospered, and security was established. Angyānū would appear to have been accepted into the cultural and social life of the city. Not totally, however, and from his own choosing, as one 'incident' related by Waṣṣāf would seem to suggest. Angyānū was one day attending an audience with the revered Shaykh of Shaykhs al-Maḥaqaqīn Kohef al-Wāṣelīn who was answering questions from his admirers. Suddenly the governor left the meeting without waiting for the conclusion to the Shaykh's talk. Later Angyānū sent a message of apology and explanation to the *pīr* for his behaviour. While realising that his abrupt departure from the Shaykh's presence was hardly in keeping with the accepted norms of politeness, the governor explained, he had felt himself forced to leave the meeting in such a manner because if he had remained any longer and continued to listen to the holy man's words he would surely have eventually been forced to renounce the religion of his forefathers and ancestors!⁷¹⁵

In her study of the Il-Khanids' fiscal policies Lambton suggests that 'Angyānū's vigorous administration . . . aroused opposition – perhaps because opportunities for illicit gains were becoming more limited.'⁷¹⁶ Certainly he aroused the wrath of Shiraz's élite and when he moved against the *nā'ib-i Dīwān-i Aṭābegī*, Kalijeh, the opposition became united and a conspiracy was fomented to topple Angyānū. After

Kalijeh's initial arrest *ghulāms* from Atabeg Abish's service and Kalijeh's own friends gathered together outside the arrested *nā'ib*'s home and then with their own armed elements they laid siege to the house. The Governor ordered the immediate beheading of the unfortunate Kalijeh and directed that his head should be flung from the roof. This timely act caused the dispersal and scattering of the militant crowds around the house. When Abish demanded that Angyānū be brought to account for her official's murder, the Governor was able to show her a decree from the late Hülegü himself ordering Kalijeh's death and so a major confrontation was averted.⁷¹⁷ The rule of law was upheld.

However, though open rebellion had been avoided, the notables of Shiraz were still very disgruntled with the situation and a number of them determined upon further action in order to undermine Angyānū. A deputation of notables fled Shiraz and sought an audience with the Il-Khan before whom they declared that Angyānū was a threat to them all. They variously claimed that he was busy in Fars destroying the country and embezzling the tax revenues, taking possession of title-deeds without payment, and that he held aspirations on the sultanate evinced by the coins struck during his rule with a 'sign' written in the Khitai script along the base under the Pādeshāh's name. The deputation had the desired effect and a *farmān* was issued for Angyānū's return in order that the matter might, with his interrogation, be resolved. This case again illustrates the Mongols' relatively equitable system of justice and their resolution of disputes through the courts and the fact that not only could non-Mongols appeal to these higher courts but that the legal decisions were in no way a foregone conclusion in favour of the ruling classes. In this particular case the court found against Angyānū though he escaped the usual death sentence, and he was removed from his position in Shiraz and sent back to Qaraqorum. No doubt the words of Shaykh Sa'dī, taken from one of three sympathetic verses he composed for the Mongol amīr,⁷¹⁸ comforted the 'Prince of the World, the Just Angyānū, commander of Iraq and the Turks'.⁷¹⁹

*Fortune has turned enough, and turns again:
The prudent man binds not his heart to the world. . . .
Throne, fortune, high command, dominion – all
These things are nothing, since they pass away:
Far better than some palace daubed in gold
Is the memorial of a goodly name?*⁷²⁰

According to Waṣṣāf, Angyānū was able to talk his way out of the death sentence by claiming that he was merely a small cog in the

wheel of the bureaucracy of that province and that he was just carrying out orders. Any charges of carelessness and negligence in the administration of such a large state could not be borne by him alone who was but one small slave. It was such words that saved Angyānū's life and resulted in his receiving the usual lot of Mongol amīrs who had raised the displeasure of their overlords. Their fate, again according to Waṣṣāf, was either to be sent on the long and often perilous journey to the court of the Qa'an where they could present their case. Or alternatively they could be dispatched to an area of insurrection to do battle with rebels.⁷²¹

Angyānū's replacement was Suqunjaq Noyan who arrived in the province in 1271.⁷²² He was sent at the suggestion of the *Ṣāhib Dīwān* Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī who also assigned Shams al-Dīn Ḥussein Alkānī as chief scribe and secretary to oversee the investigation of the accounts and to produce an increase in revenue.⁷²³ Hailing from the Suldus tribe, Suqunjaq was of the highest Mongol nobility and it was his grandfather who had been one of Chinggis Khan's 'four Paladins'. He had been a military chief and confidant of Hülegü at the time of Alamūt in 1256, and his residence in Maragheh revealed him to be a man of culture. He also had considerable business interests in which the *Ṣāhib Dīwān* Shams al-Dīn was a partner.⁷²⁴ After he had become familiar with the situation in Fars, Suqunjaq entrusted the governance and administration of the provincial districts of the state to his friends and associates, their contracts to commence from the beginning of the 671 (August 1272) tax year. Muḥammad Beg, Taniyāq, and Bulughan were appointed *basqaqs*, while the widely respected Sayyed Emād al-Dīn Abū Yalī Turāb placed locals in administrative posts. The terms and conditions under which personally selected governors operated were clearly defined and it was understood that they were to enjoy sovereignty over their domains and absolute independence of action, with the appointment of *shaḥnas* and tax-collectors to be left in their hands. However, responsibility for ensuring that the Khani taxes, set at a fixed rate, were paid promptly when they should fall due was also to lie solely with these provincial administrators.⁷²⁵ In the absence of an acting Atabeg, power was thus dispersed amongst several bases and suggests that Suqunjaq saw his own role as remedial rather than in any sense permanent. Since the Mongols were still reliant on local bureaucrats and notables to administer the provinces, a collection of mini-states would have perhaps appeared more controllable or manipulatory in the continued absence of a local figure of sufficient power and prestige to represent Il- Khanid interests.

Suqunjaq Noyan also moved swiftly to extinguish any suggestion of rebellion. A certain Maḥmad, ruler of the small island of Qulhāt which was one or two days by ship from the Persian Gulf port of Hormuz,

invaded and occupied the island of Kish. In response Suqunjaq sent messages to Bahrain, Kharashif, and other districts that they should arrange the collection of ships and have a navy readied in Kharashif while he himself mustered his Mongol and Muslim armies. By the spring of 1273 the two naval forces of Suqunjaq and the Qulhāti rebel, Maḥmad, proceeded to do battle. Unfortunately for Suqunjaq's forces a fierce storm arose in the middle of the battle and the resulting losses of ships and men forced the Mongol commander to sound a retreat. Unlike the rebel forces, the Mongol-led navy, through lack of experience, was unable to deal with the elements. The *Bitikchi* Shādī, the special *nā' īb* of the Atabeg, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Alī Lar and several amīrs were all drowned and the proud and mighty Suqunjaq Noyan was so humbled that according to Waṣṣāf he appealed reverentially in the court of God for help and an explanation for this apparent defeat. He could not understand how, if Chinggis Khan had bestowed the divine truth of his *Yasa* on his heirs, a person could now appear to have surpassed their own capabilities. His prayer was heeded and the armies of Fars were able to shower the rebel navy with a torrent of arrows and put their ships to flight. After the rout, the island of Kish was 'cleansed of foreigners' and once again returned to the sovereignty of Fars.⁷²⁶

To further stabilise the situation in Fars Suqunjaq in 1273–4, after collecting the outstanding two years' revenue, returned to Abaqa's *ordu* taking the fifteen-year-old Abish with him to finalise her marriage to Hülegü's brother, Möngke Temür, which had been arranged by her mother some time earlier. Neither mention nor rebuke is there made in the various sources that contrary to religious law, Abish, a Muslim girl was being wed to Möngke Temür, a non-Muslim man. Waṣṣāf details the camel loads of gifts, the lands in Shiraz, a generous marriage allowance plus the 100,000 dinars she had previously been granted by Hülegü, which Abish received on becoming Möngke Temür's wife. It is not explicitly stated that she received these dues on this visit to the *ordu* with Suqunjaq or whether they had been awarded earlier possibly on the occasion of her original betrothal.⁷²⁷

Back in Fars, Suqunjaq's reorganisation of the administration and the taxation system was failing to have the desired effect. Waṣṣāf seems to suggest that far from Mongol interference causing this failure it was more like a lack of sufficient interference and central control. Although surpluses were being produced by landowners and the peasants, the drain on these resources from excessive expenses and demands from greedy tax-gatherers led to a culture of widespread bribery and extravagant gift giving, with nobles and military commanders, in an atmosphere of envy and malice, receiving fabulous

gratuities and tax officials milking both Turk and Tājik further through usury. All became involved in these practices to insure their own security, and the people of Fars felt compelled to promote this spiral of bribery and corruption in order to survive. As debts began to grow so payments were deferred and eventually those drafts that had been issued in lieu of payment failed to be honoured. The result was ruin for the country and destitution for the peasants.⁷²⁸

By 1277–8 the situation had become critical and the previous policy of dividing the province into so many small autonomous tax districts was reversed and a *muqātaa* for the whole of Fars was granted to a rich merchant and local landowner, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad bin Malik Tāzīga, who was already the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*'s agent in Yazd. His commercial interests stretched from the east to the west though concerning how far to the west Waṣṣāf remains prudently vague with no mention of any possible Mamluk connections. Both Hülegü and his son, Abaqa, held traders in great esteem and did much to facilitate their business operations.⁷²⁹ Tāzīga had earlier even been offered the hand of Bībī Khātūn, sister of Pādeshāh Khātūn of Kirman, in marriage, having entered respectably mature years and his renown and popularity having reached the royal courts of the Il-Khans.⁷³⁰ Though the marriage contracts had been completed and Bībī Khātūn had set out for Yazd in October 1269 the age difference between the two and the reputed ill-tempered and irascible nature of the bride doomed the marriage to failure despite the efforts of her mother, the redoubtable Qutluḡ Khātūn, and eventually Bībī returned to her sister's royal *ordu* in Azerbaijan.⁷³¹

However Tāzīga's connections with the royal court and especially with Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī remained strong and his charitable work in Yazd as the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*'s vice-regent had not been forgotten. The local histories of Yazd recall with appreciation the buildings, such as the Mosque of Forty Mehrabs, that he had constructed and the *waqfs* he bestowed on this and other religious sites. A story concerning the rich merchant and his canny chief, Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, is also reported in the two fifteenth-century local histories of Yazd. Commanding Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Tāzīga, to construct a hospital in his name, the chief minister first complained that his *nā' ib*'s proposals were far too modest. They might have been suitable for one of Tāzīga's stature but not for someone of his own standing. When revised and greatly enlarged plans were consequently submitted envisaging elaborately decorated and tiled buildings including a *madresseh*, a lunatic asylum, a hospital, a 'pharmacy', water and ice storage facilities, mosques and a *Khānqāh* the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* wrote back that while the original plans might have been overly modest these latest plans were rather extravagant. In response his agent, Tāzīga

wrote back assuring the minister that any financial excesses would be met from his own pocket.⁷³² Such doubtfully sapient financial practices might explain the sorry straits he eventually found himself in after ten years as a *muqāta'a* in Shiraz. As a camel trader he might well have been successful, so much so that he had been able to absorb the loss of some 120,000 head from a herd of 360,000, driven off after a raid by the Nigudarīs even though eventually they were returned. This success was not repeated while he was acting governor of Shiraz.⁷³³

His wealth was certainly legendary and the stories surrounding him, related in the *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, concerning the return of his camels and by Sa'dī in his *Kulliyāt*, were considered representative of the man. Sa'dī describes an incident during Tāzīga's tenure in Shiraz in which he acted against the military commanders who had been shown to be price-fixing, and exploiting the 'people' and honest merchants including the brother of Shiraz's Shaykh Sa'dī.⁷³⁴ It was this picture of the successful merchant and just and benevolent ruler which clashed so dramatically with the impoverished man that Waṣṣāf's father encountered in 1299 living in penury and dependent on the good will of his former slaves' children. So extreme was his decline in the ten years he had been in Shiraz, worse than anything that Waṣṣāf's father had seen or read about in all his life, that he used the unfortunate man's fate as a cautionary tale for his son.⁷³⁵ Tāzīga had fallen victim to that same culture of greed, bribery and uncontrolled usury that had already become endemic when he accepted his *muqātaa*. Payments were not settled, loans were not honoured, advances were abused, deeds and titles were not paid for, and the revenue the local landowners were contracted to remit could not be collected. In addition Tāzīga 'squandered' far too much money on alms, charities, public commitments, spending in one case 100,000 *khalīfī* dinars on the place of public prayer in Fatahabad so that eventually he saw his savings 'given to the wind'.⁷³⁶

The amīr Suqunjaq was forced once again to return to Shiraz, on the orders of Abaqa, to examine the accounts and to attempt to collect the outstanding revenue with promises to all that they would receive justice and equal treatment from his investigation. Waṣṣāf adds that Suqunjaq was indeed a just and shrewd man and remarks upon his penetrating and clever questioning.⁷³⁷ He gives an example of Suqunjaq's astuteness in his dealing with two plaintiffs who came before him to plead their grievances against each other. The aggrieved party told Suqunjaq's hearing that some time previously he had found a ragged cloak on the public highway. In the mislaid cloak he had discovered a purse containing thirty-three gold dinars. Meanwhile the defendant whose cloak and gold it was that had been lost, had a

herald announce his willingness to present the finder of his lost property with a reward of six dinars. The finder of the cloak therefore sought out the owner, returned the gold and demanded his just reward. However, not only was his demand for the six dinar reward refused but the owner of the property then charged him with withholding a certain polished ruby which, he claimed, had been put in the purse with the gold and that this jewel, too, must be returned. After a few moments of reflection, Suqunjaq, demanded that each man should swear to the veracity of his statement to which both agreed and swore accordingly. It had been both men's insistence on the truth of their stories and their willingness to swear before God to that fact that had confounded others seeking to redress their complaints. The Mongol amīr then opined that it could well be that this purse with the thirty-three dinars merely bore a striking resemblance to that purse and gold which the original owner had lost. He continued that no doubt it had been God's intention to provide for the finder by causing him to discover this purse along the road. Therefore at least half the thirty-three dinars should go to the finder since fate had obviously willed his fortunate discovery, and the other half should go as partial recompense for the loss of the other. It then became obvious that it was the original owner who was lying though exactly how this was exposed Waṣṣāf does not elaborate. It can be assumed that it was the inappropriately modest sum of six dinars offered as reward which must have suggested that the original owner was lying since presumably he would have been willing to give considerably more than this had there been a valuable ruby within the purse. Upon hearing the amīr's words the people interceded and ensured that the contents of the purse were divided equally between the two parties. Suqunjaq's verdict was applauded by all and Waṣṣāf assures his readers that such a verdict was quite in keeping with the *Shari'a* and would have been quite acceptable to the *mujtahidīn*. It is worth noting that since Suqunjaq was soon to fall from favour and there would have been no retribution for anything detrimental Waṣṣāf might have said, the historian had been under no pressure either to award such compliments or to describe the heathen ruler in such appreciative terms.

The year of Suqunjaq's return, 1279, coincided with a time of drought according to Ibn Zarkab but the amīr's actual arrival was heralded by a break in the weather and much prayed for rainfall. This propitious return earned the Mongol commander a considerable swell of well-wishers and both Waṣṣāf and Ibn Zarkab report that he devoted his attentions to the plight of the peasants (*dehqānān*)⁷³⁸ acknowledging that for years they had suffered various calamities, many kinds of torments and undue burdens and impositions from

tyrants and oppressive overlords against whom they had had no voice or ability to resist. Suqunjaq 'laid the foundations of justice and rooted out all oppression and tyranny'.⁷³⁹ When he went to the various tax-collectors and landlords to settle their accounts and collect the long overdue arrears, their response was far from pleasing to him and he became so angry that he immediately annulled all *muqāta'as* and imprisoned all the defaulters.

To resolve this continuing chaos, in 1280, Suqunjaq appointed his wazir, Khwāja NiOām al-Dīn, to take charge of the whole of the province of Fars. Khwāja NiOām al-Dīn, who already had a proven record of clever and successful administration, was given sole authority for appointing officials for all the districts.⁷⁴⁰ However, this plan too, fell victim to the intrigues and rivalries of the local parties, and ultimately it also led to the demise of the fortunes of both Suqunjaq Noyan and Khwāja NiOām al-Dīn. Their first setback was in their choice for the dual position of *qāzi al-mamālik*, Nāser al-Dīn Abdullah, who though accepted by the assembly of '*ulamā*' was outranked by the learned and pious assembly's own choice, Rukn al-Dīn Khwāja. In addition NiOām al-Dīn's appointment had greatly upset another local notable and ranking administrator, Sayyed Emād al-Dīn Abū Yalī Turāb, who was so aggrieved by his rival's promotion that he absented himself from his district, without first notifying or seeking leave from Suqunjaq, and headed for the capital. An arrest warrant was issued and the Sayyed was subsequently detained and held in the house of his antagonist, NiOām al-Dīn. However, a close bond of friendship existed between Emād al-Dīn and another influential notable, Shams al-Dīn Malik, and their affinity was further cemented by their mutual opposition to Suqunjaq. They therefore conspired together to make all haste to the Il-Khan's *ordu* in order to speak ill, before Abaqa Khan, of Suqunjaq and his lieutenant, Khwāja NiOām al-Dīn. When Suqunjaq was informed of their machinations and intention of inciting the flames of insurrection against him he attempted to counter their schemes by transferring liability for payment of a considerable amount of money directly to them. He immediately had instructions forwarded to the two notables with orders that they should track down all tax defaulters and collect all outstanding dues, confiscating property and wealth, and imposing punishment on all who failed to comply, in order to raise the money they were now due to pay. In this way he hoped to keep them too busy to cause him any mischief.

But his efforts were to no avail and accusations against the Mongol governor of Fars and his lieutenant were brought by the Sayyed and Shams al-Dīn Malik to the Mongol inspector, Buqa, who at that time was carrying out an investigation into the chaotic accounts of the

province and an enumeration of the courtiers and treasury officials. Buqa knew that at that time Abaqa Khan was eager to hear of any reports of corruption and embezzlement by his agents and officials from those who were in a position to observe at first hand. As Waṣṣāf reminds his readers, it was at this same time that the informer Majd al-Mulk was causing such grief for the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*, Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, and stories of intrigue and corruption were making good currency in Azerbaijan.⁷⁴¹

Buqa arranged for Sayyed Emād al-Dīn and Shams al-Dīn Malik to be taken in secret to the court of the Il-Khan where they were received with favour and clemency. They repeated their stories of Suqunjaq's greed and excesses and of the negligence of his favoured lieutenant, the wazir NiOām al-Dīn and succeeded in convincing Abaqa of their story's veracity. The Il-Khan gratefully accepted their offer to replenish the treasury with an extra 2,000,000 dinar in addition to making good the shortfall caused reputedly by Suqunjaq's duplicity and failure to collect the taxes. Waṣṣāf further claims that the Il-Khan was so grateful for their vigilance and honesty in coming forward to offer their services that he personally poured out their wine for them and, showing them every kindness, awarded them both *paizas*. He immediately summoned Taqajar Noyan (son of Otchi Noyan)⁷⁴² and commanded him to proceed to Shiraz to collect the taxes, to give support to the two notables who had presented themselves at court, and to severely punish all those who might oppose them.⁷⁴³

Prior to his own departure Taqajar Noyan had already sent Boqadai *Elchī* to Shiraz and his agent had arrested Khwāja NiOām al-Dīn and imprisoned him in the house of Sayyed Emād al-Dīn. Taqajar arrived later accompanied by the *Ṣāḥib* Ṣadr al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Khāladi Zanjānī (made *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* with full powers by Geikhatu in 1293, d.1296).⁷⁴⁴ Sayyed Emād al-Dīn and Shams al-Dīn Malik, meanwhile, began their investigations into the tax arrears due from the province and commenced with NiOām al-Dīn, leaving others to sort out their own tax problems. However news of their generous offer to Abaqa to raise an extra 200 tomans had spread and those opposed to Sayyed Emād al-Dīn and Shams al-Dīn Malik, complained to the *basqaq*, Bulughan, appointed by Suqunjaq in 1272, that when the pair had finished with NiOām al-Dīn the excessive financial obligations they were under to the Il-Khan would mean that the two would be forced to extract taxes excessively from other sources and the result would be that the tax-collectors, *Shaḥnas*, and other Mongol officials would lose their own share of the 'cake'. According to Waṣṣāf, these disgruntled groups saw only two solutions to this problem. They would have to find a suitable intercessor who they would be able to ply with gifts and who would act on their behalf, or conversely they could sit searching for a remedy

that might result in the overthrow of their enemies. However, all such musings and manoeuvrings were futile since in 1281 in Hamadan, within a month of these events Abaqa in true Mongol fashion had succumbed to alcoholic excess, though some were to say he had been poisoned by the *Şāhib Dīwān*, and the scheming stage of Shiraz's political drama was once again reset.⁷⁴⁵

Upon receiving the news of Abaqa's death the *basqaq* Bulughan along with others from among the remaining amīrs gathered together an army and laid siege to the house of the recently installed Shams al-Dīn Malik until Khwāja NiOām al-Dīn's release was effected. Taqajar Noyan was forced to gather up all he had collected and along with Shams al-Dīn Malik and Khwāja NiOām al-Dīn set out on the journey northwards to Azerbaijan. The remainder of the nobles including Shams al-Dīn Hussain Alkānī, a ranking tax inspector appointed by the *Şāhib Dīwān* and Suqunjaq in 1271, and NiOām al-Dīn Abū Bakr who had been wazir under Terkān Khātūn, followed this party lest anyone should turn *sokhun-chīnī* (informer, turncoat) while in the presence of the new Il-Khan Aḥmad Tegüdar. At the royal court the various lords and notables of Shiraz jostled for position and competed against each other for favours until eventually Sayyed Emād al-Dīn was appointed as Wazir for Shiraz. This news did not please Bulughan who had also heard reports of his own dismissal from office. However, Bulughan heeded the advice of his two aides, Qovām al-Dīn Bokhārī and Sayf al-Dīn Yusef, to keep out of the political intrigues being played around them from the *ordus* of Azerbaijan, and to concentrate outwardly on 'good works' fostering the good-will of the people, until such a time should arrive when it would be more fortuitous to act. Likewise those amīrs still around him decided to await a more advantageous opportunity and, in concert with Bulughan, they withheld their formal submission and declaration of obedience from Sultān Aḥmad and for a year kept at bay his royal envoys and tax-collectors, sent to receive the province's dues and tributes. Even letters of apology and excuse, however false, failed to be dispatched to the Il-Khan's court.

Aware of the intrigues not only deciding the fate of Shiraz but also determining the future character and direction of the Mongol regime in Iran, Bulughan continued to waver and delay committing himself, along with those amīrs still loyal to him, to the new Il-Khan. Instead he sent envoys to Sultān Aḥmad's nephew and rival, Arghun son of Abaqa, whose *ordu* and power base was in Khorasan. In his dispatches Bulughan painted Fars in splendid colours and included faked letters purportedly from the people of the province, and he urged the prince to send an army to assist and protect them. Though Arghun with, according to Waṣṣāf, characteristic clarity of vision, declared his opposition to such a possibly provocative move he ensured that his

relations with Bulughan remained very cordial and he continued to show great favour to the rebel amīr, in a manner of which his great-great-grandfather would doubtless have strongly disapproved.

In response to Bulughan's perceived treachery the *Ṣāhib Dīwān* himself acted, and letters were sent to all the amīrs of the nomad tribes (*umarā-yi Hasham*)⁷⁴⁶ of Fars claiming that Bulughan and his minister Qovām al-Dīn Bokhārī were plotting to have a Mongol army invade the province and that such a move would invariably involve the shedding of Muslim blood and the enslaving of their children by the Mongols. When news of this planned insurrection spread the great amīrs of Kirman, Shabānkāra and of Lesser and Greater Luristan were quick to send emissaries to the Il-Khan requesting permission to ride on Fars to counter the rebellion. However Sultān Aḥmad would not countenance such a move and instead he issued a proclamation stating that he had sent Ibn Jamāl al-Dīn to tell the rebels of the concord reached with the esteemed NiOām al-Dīn and to invite Bulughan and his supporters to follow the path of righteousness and Islam. Even though these directives were now coming from the mouth of a Muslim sovereign rather than an infidel, the rebel lords of Fars chose to remain loyal to their heathen leader Bulughan and resistance and disobedience increased rather than diminished. When the level of insurrection exceeded the bounds of even Sultān Aḥmad's tolerance, the new Muslim sovereign acted and Tash-Möngke, the son of Hülegü and husband of the Atabeg Abish, was made governor of the whole of Shiraz with a remit to seize Bulughan and to confiscate all his property and wealth. If assistance should become necessary, the Atabeg Yusef-Shāh of Luristan would be ready to ride to his aid. Tash-Möngke immediately ordered Ḥisām al-Dīn, the son of Muḥammad Ali Lur, who was the chief *na' īb* in the Atabeg Abish's *Dīwān* to march on Shiraz as his advance guard, a move which triggered Bulughan's flight.

But Bulughan's flight was merely a ploy and he was soon to return to the city. With an army composed of common people and foot soldiers he laid siege to Ḥisām al-Dīn's house where they met fierce resistance. When eventually resistance faltered due to lack of arrows, the besiegers stormed the house and were amazed to find that the fierce defiance had been the work of only the one man and his *ghulām*. Brought before Bulughan, Ḥisām al-Dīn's beheading was swiftly decreed and executed and in response to this Tash-Möngke ordered the immediate deployment of Atabeg Yusef-Shāh's fully equipped and readied army. The sight of this formidable military machine struck terror into Bulughan's followers and the rebel leader himself soon realised that he had neither the power nor the ability to confront such an army. Taking up the contents of his treasury having already been

locked out of the city while on a morning tour of inspection, Bulughan along with his two aides, Qovām al-Dīn Bokhārī and Sayf al-Dīn Yusef, fled to Khorasan while his *Shahnas* and the amīrs of the nomad tribes made haste to welcome and to offer their services to Tash-Möngke. For this submission and promised service c.1282, they were excused their yearlong resistance.⁷⁴⁷ Meanwhile Bulughan and his aides were welcomed into Arghun's court and there they were shown every courtesy by the Prince.⁷⁴⁸

After Atabeg Yusef-Shāh's return to Luristan, Tash-Möngke arrived in Shiraz and busied himself with the province's chaotic administration. Waṣṣāf notes that in very un-Mongol fashion he headed his official documents for the new sovereign with the title 'Aḥmad Aqa', something which had never occurred in association with the name of a 'Khan' in the *Yasa* of the Mongols. On account of the greed of Bulughan's dependants and followers and his 'yes men' (*mawāfaqān*) Tash-Möngke subjected these one time supporters of the rebel Mongol amīr to severe scrutiny, seizing their property and imposing heavy fines and then publicly agreeing and receiving guarantees from them. For himself he amassed an abundance of wealth and property. In 1284 after a year in Shiraz, Tash-Möngke decreed that his wife Atabeg Abish should return to the city to take over as active governor while he would make his way back to the court of the Il-Khan taking his considerable fortune with him. At the frontier of the province Abish's path on her return journey to Shiraz crossed that of her husband's on his way north. Strangely Tash-Möngke did not greet nor seek out his wife on her arrival but rather he decamped and continued his journey by night. Waṣṣāf recounts this curious incident during the prince's departure from Fars and does not shy away from expressing his personal opinion of Tash-Möngke, surprisingly since the prince, though dead at the time of writing, remained one of the leading nobles of the Chinggisid royal family. Waṣṣāf puts the prince's odd behaviour down to stupidity, dotage, misplaced pride, a natural dishonesty, and a polluted nature. Such honesty in attacking men of considerable rank lends greater credence to Waṣṣāf's occasional compliments made to other Mongol officials such as Suqunjaq and Angyānū.⁷⁴⁹

The 'Home Coming' of the Atabeg Abish was seen as an occasion for revelry and celebration in Shiraz, with streets and squares and markets festooned with decorations, and musicians and entertainers kept busy travelling between the festive feasts. The rejoicing continued for the period of a whole month while Abish was being firmly established on the Salgharid throne of Fars. She appointed as her chief minister and deputy Jalāl al-Dīn Arqān b. Malik-Khan b. Muḥammad b. Zangī who was of the Salghar family, and as her wazir

she selected NiOām al-Dīn Abū Bakr who had previously served her mother, Terkān Khātūn. Prior to her arrival in Shiraz she had persuaded Sultān Aḥmad Tegüdar who, Waṣṣāf declares, did not excel in the arts of administration nor in the politics of Empire ruling, that the former crown lands of the Atabegs of Shiraz should be converted to *injū*⁷⁵⁰ land. Then in collaboration with the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* who was to share the proceeds, she set about usurping numerous villages, orchards, farmlands and estates from all the districts of the province, all recently converted to *injū* status following the Il-Khan's *yarligh* and from all of these she was also able to extract taxes. Her justification for her actions were her two daughters, Kurduchīn and Alghānchī, whose royal status and presence with her not only gave her entitlement to the land but, she presumed, placed her beyond the reach of any who might raise objections to her actions. If her greed was excessive her spending was well able to cope and the result was that very little revenue reached the central treasury.⁷⁵¹ Matters were not helped by the Atabeg's return coinciding with a severe drought and widespread starvation throughout the province. There was no rainfall for three years and during this time an ass-load (*Kharvār*) of wheat had risen in price from 100 Shirazi dinar to 1200 dinars if it could be found, with the transaction carried out only under cover of darkness. In spring people were forced to eat locusts while in the autumn they resorted to animals' blood to stave off hunger. The starving dropped in the streets and in the bazaars. In all more than 100,000 people died from starvation in Shiraz and the province of Fars.⁷⁵²

Sayyed Emād al-Dīn perceived the dire state of affairs in the province and so he again secretly made his way to the Il-Khan's *ordu* to report on matters. Meanwhile the 'dispute' between Sultān Aḥmad Tegüdar and his nephew Prince Arghun had reached a climax and it was to Arghun's henchmen that the Sayyed told his story. Buqā made Emād al-Dīn extremely welcome and introduced him in glowing terms to the new Il-Khan, Arghun, who subsequently warmly greeted the Shirazi noble and granted him administrative control of the whole of Fars with powers to dismiss and appoint the amīrs of Shiraz. In addition he honoured the *pīr* with a 'lion and wolf headed paiza'. Sayyed Emād al-Dīn's first task was to return to Fars bearing an edict for the Atabeg Abish, commanding her to return to the Il-Khan's *ordu* and forbidding her from continuing her 'duties' in Shiraz. He was also to install two new *Shaḥnas* for the capital, Cherik and Odamish. He demonstrated his clement nature and found a conditional posting for Qovām al-Dīn Bokhārī and Sayf al-Dīn Yasuf who after having served in Arghun's court for two years had then sought refuge with Aḥmad's army during the final confrontation between Sultan and prince

thereby forfeiting any claims on Aghun's mercy. But the Sayyed's clemency and sense of justice were not universally recognised or welcomed.

Back in Shiraz, Abish's associates and advisors had already heard details of the Sayyed's mandate from the new Il-Khan concerning Shiraz. Apprehensive of these developments these advisors derided the Sayyed in front of Abish and sought to turn her against him. However when the great man actually arrived at the frontiers of the province and immediately set about considering the affairs of state and looking into the financial practicalities still outstanding, he was met by a welcoming party of governors and *Shahnas*. The Sayyed was obviously little impressed and the leading *shahna*, NiOām al-Dīn Abū Bakr, was seized and put into a pillory where detail by detail the message to Atabeg Abish was spelled out to him. Her presence was demanded at the *ordu* of Arghun Khan. But the messages that were eventually returned from the young 'queen' were always the same and whatever the excuse the answer was her refusal to go.

On 1 December 1284 the Sayyed struck camp and set up a royal court and those amīrs, governors and nobles who only a year previously had considered themselves Emād al-Dīn's equals, to their shame were now mere footmen and when he rode out they, in deference and in the customary fashion, clung to his stirrups. When the new moon of Shawwāl marking the end of the fast of Ramadan was seen, the Sayyed ordered the start of the festivities of the Eid and indicated that the amīrs should begin preparation for a banquet while he arranged the construction of a pulpit in a corner of his camp. When prayers had been completed the Sayyed, with the consent of his messengers, proceeded to the capital and strolled casually to his own quarters, positioning the Mongol *shahna*, Cherk, in front of him as he walked. For the Atabeg Abish and her supporters, who had not been prepared for a feast at the end of Ramadan, the Sayyed's actions were a gross insult and deliberate snub. Her closest associates knew that to appease her anger they would have to devise a plan to eliminate this growing threat. To this end they composed a public letter accusing the Sayyed of disloyalty to the people and having a malicious disregard for their rights and that his deeds and acts had caused loss to the subjects of Fars. They then had the testament witnessed by the notables and the *ulamā* '. The plan proposed first securing and then killing Emād al-Dīn. Abish was assured that this plan held no danger since, as far as the Il-Khan was concerned, the Sayyed was merely one devotee among many and a king would never sacrifice a group for just one man. Abish who was well acquainted with the customs of the Mongols, having been brought up at court, and knew the fallacy of such arguments, nevertheless gave her assent to the project.⁷⁵³ Again

Waṣṣāf would appear to be acknowledging the strong sense of justice and the rule of law, however harsh, that underlined the Mongols' conduct and administration.

Events however overtook execution of this conspiracy. News had reached the Sayyed that a contingent of Negudārī horsemen had been seen approaching Kirman from Sistān. He at once wrote to the Atabeg advising her to seek shelter and security in the Castle of Istākhr. Abish in a fury interpreted this as a subterfuge to effect her arrest and imprisonment. Rather than reveal her anger or true intention she let it appear that she had accepted his proposal but that she was at present busy with her own preparations. Later some of her own people approached the Sayyed when in his usual grand style he was on his way to his own house accompanied by his train of courtiers. Abish's messengers gave the 'great man' the brusque communiqué that the Atabeg commanded that he attend the royal court immediately. The Sayyed was greatly insulted by this terse note and he answered the messenger in such coarse language that the man grappled with the mounted lord and in so doing unseated him and the two fell struggling to the ground. Although Sarāj al-Dīn Faḡlī Lar who that week had been presented with a robe of honour by the Sayyed, had seen the initial blows, the path had been very narrow and in the confusion it had been difficult to see what exactly was going on. Ibn Zarkab claims that it was Sarāj al-Dīn Faḡlī Lur who actually pulled the lord down from his horse. However the Sayyed's entourage soon either scattered or joined in the fracas attacking their lord along with his enemies. In the confusion someone from the Atabeg's following poniarded the venerable man and from ear to ear separated his head from his body.⁷⁵⁴ Later the attackers moved on to Emād al-Dīn Abū Tarāb's house to continue their pillaging until nothing remained of the Sayyed's possessions, while his head was paraded through the town and into Abish's court in triumph. It was proclaimed throughout the streets that the Sayyed had been chosen for this treatment because of the oppression and tyranny he had inflicted on the people. Waṣṣāf gives a short aside here to the effect that the 'people' should mind their own business and should keep their distance and stop meddling in the affairs of state. The 'vulgar rabble' continued their parade accompanied by drums and rejoicing, the participants congratulating each other while a member of the learned élite who 'continued to drown in the Sayyed's wealth' composed apt verses for the occasion. They wound their way to the court where this short verse was to be recited at the foot of their Atabeg Abish's throne.

*Oh Shāh, May your visage from joy be [glow] like rubies,
May your throne be above the highest heaven,*

*Every head that is not to your wish or in accordance with your desire,
May it be bodiless like the head of Emād Abū Yalī.*⁷⁵⁵

His death is recorded as occurring on the 30 December 1284.⁷⁵⁶

The Sayyed's death brought no reprieve for Abish however and in consultation with her advisors she sought out other sources of danger. The young nephew of the deceased was known at the royal court and was then in favour so when Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad was summoned to the Il-Khan's court he went without fear of harm. For Abish Khātūn this development sounded an alarm and could only mean that she would have to decide on whether the nephew should live or die. Her advisor pointed out that in the beginning when first he was established at his post, the Sayyed had had no riches and that there had been no enmity between the two of them. After he had been in the court of the Il-Khan the subsequent events and changes that had unfolded had already been seen. The Atabeg's advisor continued that Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad was not only wealthy and by implication powerful, but he was clever, heedful of threats, and would certainly be aware that logically and canonically the rights and duty of avenging his uncle lay with him. These words convinced the sovereign and so it followed that a group of her *mamluks* were soon dispatched and at the dead of night they murdered Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad and, carrying his remains out of the town, they buried him in a hollow so that the body would not be discovered. The story was put about that the victim had in fact fled the city and the two Mongol *Shahnas*, Cherik and Odamish, who had approved the dirty deed, were mollified and sweetened with a suitable bribe.⁷⁵⁷

Meanwhile the sons of the Sayyed, though they had not yet reached the age of maturity, had fled to the Il-Khan's *ordu* bearing offering from their supporters. There they sought out Buqa and to him they told their tale of woe and complaint.⁷⁵⁸ The news of the murder of the Sayyed, an appointee of the Il-Khan, had filled Arghun Khan with a great weariness and sense of ennui (*malal*). To ascertain the truth of the stories he was receiving Arghun appointed Ḥisām (al-Dīn) Qazvīnī to travel to Shiraz with an army and a *yarligh* demanding Abish's expulsion from Fars and her presence at the Il-Khan's court to face an inquiry.⁷⁵⁹ He also sent an angry message to Abish's powerful mother-in-law, Oljei Khātūn, accusing her of giving her daughter-in-law advice contrary to his own decrees which had resulted in the murder of his official and in rebellion in Shiraz. Oljei Khātūn was quick to respond with a suitably contrite and humble plea for forgiveness and an acceptance of any punishment the Il-Khan might deem due her but at the same time she secretly sent word to Abish reproaching her and insisting that she must now make all possible haste to attend the

yarghu that Arghun had called.

Upon receipt of Arghun's summons Abish immediately set about winning over the messenger, beguiling him with gifts and favours. Employing her most trustworthy agents, she also sent out more gifts to the lords and Mongol ladies at the royal court in the hope that they would be able to assist her in her present dilemma. It was Oljei Khātūn in particular among those ladies that Abish was relying on to save her from the death sentence in the forthcoming *yarghu*. But when Arghun received word of these additional and continuing machinations he became even more angry and ordered Ḥisām al-Dīn Qazvīnī, Tuladai Aqtaji who had the position of official investigator, and Chivarghutai to seize Abish, round up her associates and officials and begin collecting taxes. Various notables were duly seized, chained and placed in pillories but when it came to the Atabeg's turn Arghun's lieutenants hesitated and complained that they were reluctant to treat a royal princess, a daughter-in-law of Hülegü himself, with harshness or rudeness especially since she also carried the name of the sultanate. The Atabeg's men also pleaded that they needed time to prepare and present the complicated details of the country's accounts and finances for inspection and that they should be allowed to complete their task before Abish was taken before the Il-Khan. They backed up their case with gifts and sweeteners, and their arguments were accepted. However, these strategies were short lived and a special envoy arrived from Arghun himself, led by Qanān Aqtāchī, with orders that filled all with fear and alarm. Abish's mount was to be escorted by a certain Chilabur out of Shiraz and Qanān Aqtāchī refused to dismount from his own horse until he had received confirmation that she had arrived in Jihadābād.

The tearful preparations for the journey to Tabriz took a week and when finally Atabeg Abish departed she was accompanied by her chief minister Jalāl al-Dīn Arqān b. Malik-Khan b. Muḥammad b. Zangī, her amīrs, governors and the chief ambassadors. On arrival in the Il-Khan's capital, Jalāl al-Dīn Arqān and the governors of Shiraz were exposed to the contempt and scorn of the populace as they were paraded through the bazaars. Despite Oljei's intercession, Arghun refused to grant Abish an audience and instead she turned to Buqa, whom she approached under cover of darkness. Abish was spared the ignominy of appearing before the court along with her subjects after her mother-in-law again appealed to Arghun, citing her royal status. In her place her state officials, starting with Qovām al-Dīn Bokhārī, Sayf al-Dīn Yasuf and Shams al-Dīn Ḥussein Alkānī, were subjected to the bastinado, each receiving seventy strokes to the buttocks, with *mamluks* of the murdered Sayyed watching the proceedings to ensure that no mercy was shown. Despite the severe beating these veritable

Khwājas did not confess. Jalāl al-Dīn Arqān however, despite having been forewarned by Abish to remain resolute and to say nothing, broke down after only three strokes of the birch which he received with loud curses and insults. He poured forth his confession and described in great detail and with lengthy explanations how he and the Atabeg Abish had become accomplices and had conspired to seize the Sayyed Emād al-Dīn Alāwī but that he had always been acting in obedience to her commands. Everything he said was written down and, as Waṣṣāf notes, his accomplices' pleas that all he was saying was being extracted under duress and could not be believed, profited him little. For his troubles and past misdemeanours Jalāl al-Dīn Arqān, Abish's trusted minister, was publicly cut in two amongst the assembled worthies. The other ministers received more compassionate treatment mainly because of a promise they had made to pay back all the outstanding taxes and an additional undertaking that they would give guarantees for future increased tributes. This matter agreed, an edict was then issued concerning the other charges before the court. Abish and her lackeys were ordered to pay 500,000 dinar in compensation to the sons of Sayyed Emād al-Dīn, and 200,000 dinars to orphans of Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad, now also termed as Sayyed.

Abish herself remained in Tabriz where after a few months over a year she fell ill and within a couple of weeks she died. Even though she was a pious believer and just woman, claims Waṣṣāf, she was interred in Charandāb, Tabriz, in the Mongol fashion which involved being buried along with silver and gold vessels filled with wine. News of her death was greeted in Shiraz with great lamentation and public grief with people dressing in black and the mosques observing three days of mourning. Waṣṣāf himself was moved to verse upon receiving the tragic news of her early demise.

*If the throne brought fortune why would a monarch abandon it,
If the crown were an eye it would weep for Abish.*⁷⁶⁰

In her will she left a quarter share of her estate to each of her two daughters, Kurduchīn and Alghānchī, a quarter to be shared among her *mamluks* and freemen and the last quarter for Möngke Temür's son, Prince Tayaju. The hundred thousand-dinar allowance that Hülegü had bequeathed her, was to be distributed amongst her heirs. For Waṣṣāf her passing marked the final demise of the House of the Atabegs.⁷⁶¹ According to Rashīd al-Dīn the office of *malik* of Shiraz passed into the hands of *artāqs*⁷⁶² and merchants though drums continued to be beaten at the gates of the palace of the Atabegs, the building which continued to house the Great Dīwān.⁷⁶³ Those governors who had accompanied Abish to Tabriz spent a long time in

the *ordu* bickering amongst themselves until eventually after agreeing to pay all the various overdue payments, fines and additional taxes, they obtained *yarlights* granting them control again over the province. Qovām al-Dīn Bokhārī who had assumed precedence over the others, died on the borders of Fars. Sayf al-Dīn Yusef, Shams al-Dīn Ḥussein Alkānī, and NiOām al-Dīn Abū Bakr arrived in Shiraz and immediately placed their own supporters in administrative positions of power. However not long after Sa'd al-Dawleh assumed administrative control of the Arghun's kingdom as his *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*, sending Joshī, Izz al-Dīn Mu'Uaffar and Shams al-Dawleh to Fars as his agents, the three were accused of perdition and summarily executed.⁷⁶⁴

There are few who manage to emerge from this involved tale of convoluted decline with any glory. In the unfolding tale wazirs, *Shaḥnas*, *basqaqs* and lesser and higher officials many appear as faceless as shadows in a revolving Chinese lantern. Waṣṣāf singles out the once mighty Mongol General Suqunjaq for praise, admiring his shrewd judgement and his partial, if short-lived, success in imposing some kind of order on the land. His sympathy was also clearly felt for the other Mongol governor Angyānū who had also obviously aroused Sa'dī's compassion. Both officials fell victim to the intrigues of locals who were able to manipulate the Mongols' own system of rules and justice to suit their own ends. If in former times the nomads and the peoples of the sown had had a symbiotic relationship, the non-autarkic economy of the steppe people making them especially dependent on the sown for so many essentials, that relationship had become far closer and for the Mongols of Persia far more one-sided. The great *ordus* of the Mongol lords and ladies needed the prosperity of the sown and the urban centres to keep them in the style to which they were rapidly becoming more and more accustomed. Prosperity was the product of security, trade, and stability. The Mongols had long known the advantages of trade and the profits and taxes to be gained from traders. One of their primary concerns was free passage for their merchants and the stimulation of commercial life. Both private traders plying their wares independently, and the *urtāqs* in whom princes and lord had invested capital operated from Möngke's time. Juwaynī makes a distinction between 'those [*urtāqs*] who have received *balish* [ingots] from the treasury and have agreed to send in a certain amount to the treasury and those who recently have become *urtāqs*.'⁷⁶⁵ This possibly suggests the widening use of these merchants since as Juwaynī states, prior to this these *urtāqs* carried considerable clout and were awarded the greatest respect and honour, with many of the privileges of *Dīwān* officials and *ilchīs* allowed them. Möngke curtailed these rights recognising that all merchants whether *urtāqs* or one of the many subdivisions of merchant were ultimately working for

their own gain regardless of the services they performed for the empire. Immediately following the cessation of massacres and pillage in Baghdad in 1258, Hülegü ordered the new *shahna* of Baghdad, Ali Bahā'dur, to take direct control of the city's *urtāqs* and craftsmen.⁷⁶⁶ The city's return to commercial activity took priority.

Commerce was already a part of the life of the vast mobile cities that were the Mongol *ordus* and the security of the Empire's highways had long been recognised as a prerequisite for the successful pursuit of uninterrupted trade. It was because of the Mongols' deep involvement in trade, commercial activity in general and with wide travelling merchants that they fully realised the importance of the cities and the settled agricultural areas now firmly under their military control. Their problem was that though these areas might certainly be relatively easy to dominate militarily, this was in no way the same thing as exerting political and economical, let alone administrative control over the land and its people. The Mongols had the skill, expertise and manpower at their disposal, to confront any military challenge that might be raised against them, but they were woefully lacking in people skilled in civil administration, and experienced governors with political savvy, versed in the intricacies of Persian statecraft. There were some of course, like the Juwaynī brothers, who had been brought up in the Mongol *ordus* and who were comfortable in both camps but certainly in the early days of Il-Khanid rule such people were in short supply. The Qutlugh-Khanids were adapted to both the 'Persian' and the Mongol court as indeed were some of the Salgharids of Shiraz. The Mongol *basqaqs* who served in Kirman appeared perfectly content to represent their 'Queen', Terkān Khātūn's interests when they travelled back to Azerbaijan. But there were too few such people as these that the Il-Khans could rely on to run the numerous cities and provinces under their control and for that reason they were, out of necessity, overly reliant on the local notables who, even when overseen by such an awesome general as Suqunjaq, felt no compunction in manipulating the situation to their own ends. The Mongols were only able to enforce a workable system of administration and accountable control when their own leadership was recognised and accepted by all, but also only when those to whom they had devolved power, as was the case in Kirman, were also recognised and accepted by those under their local rule. In Shiraz, after the death of Abū Bakr, this last condition did not exist and the system began to break down. When the Il-Khanid leadership also began to fracture following the death of Abaqa in 1282 the structure completely collapsed.

The Mongol threat of annihilation was certainly kept alive and their fearful legacy was ruthlessly exploited, but the Il-Khans knew that it

would have been they who ultimately suffered if their threatened massacres had been carried out. The corrupt officials in Shiraz survived because there was no one to replace them and even the Mongol officials who were assigned to administrative duties or as overseers, were often equally prone to self interest. The destruction of the city was never carried out because the Mongol leadership knew that it would have been their loss that would ultimately result. The Il-Khans strove to rule their provinces through loyal and trusted subjects. Where these were lacking their system collapsed.

Herat

The Kart dynasty of Herat⁷⁶⁷ is remarkable for its longevity, surviving from 1245 to 1381, during a period of great turmoil and change in Iran. The Karts have long been considered the successors to the Ghūrīds and they themselves claimed connections if not descent from the Saljuqid, Sanjar.

*I am the light of Sanjar's eyes and the guardian of Alexander's kingdom,
Shams al-Dīn Kart.*⁷⁶⁸

Or from the pen of the later Karts' panegyrist, the poet Rabīi.

*The pride of Sanjar's family are you; a scion of Alexander's kingdom are
you. The House of Sanjar expects good news from you; Alexander's
kingdom has high hopes of you.*⁷⁶⁹

The Karts of Herat

643/1245
Muḥammad b.
Abī Bakr Rukn al-
Dīn b. Uthmān
Marghānī, Shams
al-Dīn I,
d.676/1278

676/1277 Rukn
al-Dīn or Shams
al-Dīn II b.
Moḥammad
Shams al-Dīn I,
d.705/1305

694/1295

Fakhr al-Dīn b.
Rukn al-Dīn or
Shams al-Dīn II.

707/1308

Ghiyāth al-Dīn I
b. Rukn al-Dīn or
Shams al-Dīn II.

729/1329

Shams al-Dīn III
b. Ghiyāth al-Dīn
I

730/1330 Ḥāfiẓ

b. Ghiyāth al-Dīn
I.

732/1332 Pīr

Ḥusayn

Moḥammad b.

Ghiyāth al-Dīn I,
Muizz al-Dīn

772–91/ Pīr Alī

b. Pīr Ḥusayn

Moḥammad

Muizz al-Dīn,

1370–89 Ghiyāth
al-Dīn II

791/1389

Timurid

conquests

The early genealogy of the Karts is still far from clear though Lawrence Potter has done much in resolving the confusion in his Ph.D. dissertation on the Karts.⁷⁷⁰ However, histories medieval and modern are agreed in recognising Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart (r.1245–78) as the founder of the dynasty which ruled the Herat region until 1381. Shams al-Dīn came to the throne with the blessing of his overlords the Mongols with whom he was intimately connected. Like his neighbouring rulers, the Qarā Khitāi of Kirman and their founder Baraq Ḥājib (d.1235), and the Atabeg Abū Bakr b. Sa’d b. Zangī of Shiraz (d.1261), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart came to a comfortable accommodation, first with Qaraqorum and later with Hülegü Khan. He was a local king who was later described by Rashīd al-Dīn as ‘a man of great sufficiency, cunning, and rashness’.⁷⁷¹ Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart was apparently revered by his subjects, admired by

his peers, praised by chroniclers and poets, befriended by the powerful and respected by his overlords. He became a player in the unfolding drama of the fractured consolidation of the Mongol Empire in the west and the chronicle of his political rise and fall is reflective of the emerging relationship between the Mongol rulers and their subject kings.

The accession of Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, as ruler of Herat was not without significance on the wider framework of inter-Mongol contention. The Golden Horde's influence in the region had been evident since the appointment of Eljigitai Noyan, 'the Curséd'⁷⁷² c.1221 as Jochi's representative for Khorasan.⁷⁷³ The intrigues of the local princes and warlords reflected the grander stage of fraternal rivalries in the Mongol royal family. Prior to Shams al-Dīn Kart's assumption of power, Sayfī records the bitter and bloody power struggles between local factions backed by their rival Mongol camps. The story of these rivalries puts the Karts' accession of the Herati throne in perspective and highlights the strategic and symbolic importance of Herat itself.

The conflict of interests between the two camps came to a head during the 1240s. Both Batu and Ögödei had sent their respective envoys to Herat in 1239–40, Teksinak from the Qa'an and Inawj Beg from the Golden Horde. The Uighur *shahna* of Herat, Kharlugh, who had been appointed by Ögödei, along with a certain Suku and his local governor, the Amīr Muḥammad Izz al-Dīn Moqaddam Haravī were initially greatly pleased at the arrival of these high dignitaries and awarded them sumptuous robes of honour to mark their reception.⁷⁷⁴ The province was then divided among these various nobles, Inawj Beg receiving the river Sabqar, another of Batu's men receiving the lands watered by the Mālān, while Teksinak was allotted the river Anjīr.⁷⁷⁵ However, a local ruler Malik Majīd al-Dīn Kālyanī was granted authority over the rest and it soon became apparent that this notable's sympathies and loyalty lay to the north-west rather than to the east. Sayfī is most generous in his portrayal of this presumptuous Malik, admiring his build, and praising his character. He also makes exaggerated claims for the scale of his learning, his knowledge of calligraphy and the Qoran, his competence 'without equal' in horse-riding and shooting, and finally he apologises to the readers that there is not room enough on the page to list all his other exceptional qualities.⁷⁷⁶ Majīd al-Dīn personally travelled to Batu's *ordu* to plead for, and to receive, a *yarligh* from the Khan of the Golden Horde himself. Batu cultivated his guest and gave him not only a *yarligh* but also a *paiza* with which to return and, seemingly, a confident arrogance with which to taunt Kharlugh and the representatives of Ögödei.

The antipathy between the two sides soon led to more overt friction. Majīd al-Dīn openly gave preferential treatment to the representatives from Batu over those on business from the Qa'an, and overtly insulted those from the Chaghataid prince, Yesü-Möngke. Yesü-Möngke's agent, Sharaf al-Dīn Bitakchī 'īā' al-Malik, had his royal *yarligh* forcibly taken from him and after eighteen days he was sent from the city, 'a failure and a loser'.⁷⁷⁷ In sharp contrast to the lavish treatment and attention afforded the envoys from Batu's court, the ambassadors from the Qa'an or from his governor of Khorasan, Arghun Aqa, were subject to long delays and postponements. The situation was such that, 'from dread of Malik Majīd, Kharlugh, Suku and the notables of Herat were unable to sleep soundly'.⁷⁷⁸ Much to the regret of the 'great and the good' of Herat this situation was resolved by the *shahna*, Kharlugh, who enticed Malik Majīd with lies and flowery deceit into visiting the Mongol General, Borangul, a subordinate of Arghun Aqa. The partisan king was seized during the journey, bound and brought before Borangul who then ordered his immediate execution. According to Sayfi the reaction of the 'nobles, lords, and notables of the province of Herat' was expressed in great grief and deep shock as all were cast into extreme gloom. Malik Majīd's personal retinue reputedly tore their clothes and raised lamentations which reached the very throne of the sun, and later in Herat they gathered before the murdered Malik's son, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, throwing themselves on the ground and shed tears of blood so copious they might have been welling up from a bottomless sea.⁷⁷⁹ Both Kharlugh and the Amīr Muḥammad Izz al-Dīn were blamed, hated and cursed for their part in the affair.

However, after Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kālyan had visited Batu and, like his father, received a *yarligh*, a *paiza*, and a sumptuous robe of honour and had returned to Herat confirmed as his father's successor, Kharlugh and the Amīr Muḥammad Iz al-Dīn feigned delight and respect for the new Malik and outwardly at least honoured and complied with his mandate from Batu. Within a month and a half Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad had deposed the Amīr Muḥammad Izz al-Dīn as governor of Herat and had begun cultivating friendship and an alliance with Kharlugh. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad sought to show as much respect to all the representatives of the princes of the royal family as was possible while at the same time practising within the framework of Islamic law. He used his inherited property for the benefit of the learned, the skilled, the ascetics, and the pious, and soon the great affection that had been his father's was rooted in the hearts of the people. He also doubled his efforts to placate Arghun Aqa and the embassies from Qaraqorum, treating the retinue of Körgüz⁷⁸⁰ with greater respect and bestowing the best of his gifts on all royal

representatives.

These efforts to secure his position on the throne of Herat were of little avail since it was from within Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad's own court that his demise blossomed. While away once more at his patron Batu's *ordu*, he heard rumours of the reputed machinations of his deputy, Shams al-Dīn Lāchīn. Shams al-Dīn Lāchīn had married Malik Majīd's chief wife during Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad's absence and Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad's interpretation of this deed was that it was treachery and an attempt at usurpation. His response was to order Shams al-Dīn Lāchīn's execution but before the order could be carried out word of these happenings reached Herat and the ears of the deputy governor, Lāchīn. Through various contacts Shams al-Dīn Lāchīn succeeded with 500 dinars in bribing a servant with intimate access to Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, to mix a drink for his master laced with poison. The plot was successful and after twenty-two days of great discomfort Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad died, his death provoking widespread lamentation, wailing and despair, lasting seven days.⁷⁸¹

If Malik Majīd had been openly partisan in favour of Batu, his son had at least attempted to make some superficial amends for his father's slights against the Qa'an's appointees even though his visits and sojourns at Batu's *ordu* strongly suggest where his true loyalties lay. With the assumption to the governorship of Herat of the Kart family the province came under the influence of the Qa'an and it was from the new Qa'an, Möngke that Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart received his *yarligh* to rule.⁷⁸² The Kart family had long been in the service of the Qa'ans, operating from their stronghold in Kheisār.⁷⁸³ They considered themselves, and were considered by their contemporaries, as successors if not a continuation of the Ghūrīd dynasty of 'Afghanistan'.⁷⁸⁴ Rukn al-Dīn Kheisārī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad's uncle and predecessor as leader of the Karts,⁷⁸⁵ originally received a *yarligh* for the administration of Ghar, from Chinggis Khan in recognition of his prompt submission and for services rendered.⁷⁸⁶ On his trips to the Mongol court he would often take the young Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart along with him and even allowed the prince to accompany him on campaigns, from which experiences the young prince gained a thorough knowledge of Mongol traditions, customs and law. This prince was also widely respected for his mastery of the civilities and rituals of Persian life. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart gained renown and widespread popularity for his exploits with the two Mongol commanders, Tayir Bahā'dur and Qara Noyan, with whom Rukn al-Dīn had earlier acquainted him.⁷⁸⁷ According to Sayfī's sources it was said that Shams al-Dīn came into the governorship of Herat in the same year that Shams al-Dīn

Muḥammad Kālyanī died from poisoning. This poisoning coincided with the death of Shams al-Dīn Kart's uncle Rukn al-Dīn (d.1245), and his entitlements and connections through marriage with the house of Ghar were cited as justification for his subsequent claims on the city.⁷⁸⁸ It was the Mongol commander Tayir Bahā'dur (d.1241)⁷⁸⁹ who urged Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart to cast aside the 'clothes of mourning' and 'dressed him in a special robe of honour' and affirmed the prince's excellent qualities and suitability to inherit the throne of Rukn al-Dīn. The commander invoked the original *yarligh* of Chinggis Khan and conferred its mandate on to Shams al-Dīn and consequently the various nobles, amīrs and *malīks* of Ghar and Ghaznin came to pledge their service to the new king.⁷⁹⁰

However, before taking up his official residence in the city, Shams al-Dīn was to spend some further years between 1245 and 1251 campaigning for his eastern masters. This was not a hostage prince bartered for services rendered but more a future ruler earning his spurs and undergoing grooming for his place in the emerging world empire. During the period of the interregnum and the reign of Güyük (1241–8) he was active in Hindustan on behalf of the Mongol forces. He initially went in the company of Sali Noyan⁷⁹¹ and his first assignment was involvement in the siege of the city of Multan. The siege was lifted peacefully after Shams al-Dīn, receiving the entreaties of the Shaykh al-Islam of Multan on the occasion of the Eid-i Qorbān, delivered by a certain *ghulām* of the sultan's named Jinkar Khan (Chinggis Khan?), arranged that 100,000 dinars be brought to Sali Noyan by the *ghulām* and in return the commander would withdraw his troops from Multan. In addition Shams al-Dīn had the *ghulām* Jinkar Khan present the Shaykh al-Islam with a royal gift from himself.⁷⁹²

This same situation was repeated when Sali Noyan advanced his army to Lahore and laid siege to the city and its defenders. On the thirteenth day the two armies clashed and the death toll was such that the governor of the city, Kart Khan, sent out a party of leading *ulamā* 'to plead their case with Shams al-Dīn. They appealed to his Muslim nature and begged him not to allow so many thousands of the Faithful to fall as prisoners into the hands of the unbelievers. They promised that whatever the 'Malik of Islam' should demand in payment they would willingly give. When Shams al-Dīn proposed to Sali Noyan that he should accept the sum of 30,000 dinars, thirty ass-loads of *narmīneh* (soft fabrics), one hundred slaves and payment of tribute being offered by the people of Lahore and their request that the city should be bestowed upon himself, Malik Shams al-Dīn, and that it should enjoy the great Amīr's grace and favour, Sali Noyan as always readily agreed. However, this readiness of Shams al-Dīn Kart to

intervene on behalf of the locals did not endear him to the main body of the troops and this dissatisfaction with the peaceful outcome of their campaigns led to mutinous talk in the ranks. Eventually the amīrs and commanders of Sali Noyan's troops became convinced that if Shams al-Dīn continued to campaign with them their troops would have no opportunity for gathering the usual rich pickings and booty, and that they might face a rebellion from below. When they eventually confronted Sali Noyan with their concerns they accused Shams al-Dīn of being in league with the Tājiks and of having accepted a 50,000-dinar bribe and pledges of loyalty from Kart Khan and Jinkar Khan. The commanders awaited Sali Noyan's order to immediately dispatch the traitorous *malik* to his death. Instead the Noyan urged caution and promised to carefully investigate the situation before any action should be taken.⁷⁹³

Shams al-Dīn's status as more than a would-be puppet king, or a royal yes-man, becomes more obvious with the continuing development of this story. News of the disgruntled officers and men was quick to reach the *malik*'s ear and he immediately made preparations for flight. What is revealing is that he left with an escort of only twenty mounted men and the remainder of his faithful following he commanded to remain at the camp and put themselves in the service of Sali Noyan who, he assured them, would treat them with great kindness and show them favour during his absence. With appropriate genuflection and kissing of the ground, Shams al-Dīn's officers assured their master of their undying loyalty and slave status and offered their obedience to his command. It is apparent that Sali Noyan was considered a trusted friend and that the danger Shams al-Dīn felt was from the Mongol commander's soldiers rather than from their commander himself. Having decided upon flight, it was not to the hills, or a mountain fortress, or to some hidden abode of some renegade freedom-loving Persians that the refugee king fled but to his old comrade in arms, the Mongol commander Taher Bahā'dur.

Another episode from this same saga throws further light on the relationship between the Mongol overlords and their supposed oppressed vassals. On his way to Taher Bahā'dur's camp Shams al-Dīn passed through the settlements of Panj Āb and Panbeh before reaching the town of Tekāneh where the townspeople came out to greet him. However when the *malik* informed them that he had pressing business with Taher Bahā'dur and that therefore they must make haste and gather together all their available horse, weaponry, and clothing to present to the great Amīr, the people of Tekāneh, 'low born and nobles, rich and poor'⁷⁹⁴ hesitated and began to express their doubts about the newcomer. They therefore approached their local headman Fakhr al-Dīn Kajvarān and informed him that this Shams al-Dīn Kart

had arrived in the town and was proceeding to muster all men with their arms and added that his aim was to seize Fakhr al-Dīn. Confused and alarmed at this news, at first light the following day, Fakhr al-Dīn ordered his brother Emād al-Dīn Kajvarān to arrest Malik Shams al-Dīn and to imprison him in the stockade of Tekāneh, which deed Emād al-Dīn quickly accomplished with a surprise attack backed by 150 men. Seven days later Emād al-Dīn travelled to Taher Bahā'dur's *ordu* to report the matter to the Mongol Amīr and to seek his advice as to what course of action to follow.

As was the case with Sali Noyan, Taher Bahā'dur did not rush to judgement when the local notable presented him with a case of apparent insurrection by a 'Persian' noble. Emād al-Dīn Kajvarān gave a somewhat embellished account of Malik Shams al-Dīn's arrival in town claiming that he had had the townspeople swear fealty to him before rounding up the militarily fit men and arming and mounting his troops with the intention of marching on the great Amīr himself in order to seize his lands before assailing the castle of the garrison at Kheisār. Emād al-Dīn then offered to personally execute the traitor and all his retinue so that they should be an example to others whose thoughts might turn to corruption and sedition. Unfortunately for Emād al-Dīn, the Noyan's reaction to this news was not what he had expected. Taher Bahā'dur explained that Rukn al-Dīn Kheisāri had been a friend of his and that this same Rukn al-Dīn had recommended and introduced Shams al-Dīn to him personally. Taher Bahā'dur ordered that Emād al-Dīn should bring his prisoner before a court of amīrs and that he would question the *malik* to ascertain if he still harboured thoughts of rebellion. If the evidence suggested that this was the case, Shams al-Dīn would be sent to the Qa'an to answer these charges of sedition. On the other hand, if these seditious thoughts were found to be absent then it followed that Emād al-Dīn could be judged guilty and blameworthy while Shams al-Dīn should be exonerated. Taher Bahā'dur sent the chastened and embarrassed Emād al-Dīn back to Tekāneh with an escort of forty men to collect his prisoner. When the party returned, the Mongol Amīr declared Shams al-Dīn to be the ruler of most of the province and that the majority of the inhabitants, including those in the districts belonging to Emād al-Dīn, would willingly serve this *malik* and would be unable to refuse him any goods or services that he might request of them. Laughing he pointed out that such a man in such a position would hardly be planning insurrection. Later that night a shamed Emād al-Dīn fled from Taher Bahā'dur's camp, where Shams al-Dīn was now being treated most regally. After two and a half months of such treatment in Taher Bahā'dur's camp, Shams al-Dīn left Hindustan along with his troops, all suitably weighed down with 'limitless and incalculable

[amounts of] booty'.⁷⁹⁵ He returned to Khorasan accompanied by great acclaim, and from the whole province 'great warriors and heroes', came to give him their allegiance and respect. The leaders of Tekāneh made haste to offer their services and everywhere the doors of the great houses were opened to him.⁷⁹⁶

What is interesting from this tale is first the fact that it was inconceivable to all concerned that one such as Shams al-Dīn Kart could possibly harbour any thoughts of enmity towards the Mongol rulers since he himself was considered one of that same ruling class. Later references to Sali Noyan suggest that Shams al-Dīn's flight from his camp was considered of no consequence.⁷⁹⁷ In addition it is strange that when a fellow Tājik and Muslim arrived at the town of Tekāneh calling on the people to take up arms, the instinctive reaction of those same people was one of great distrust and suspicion and their immediate reaction was to seek help, advice and justice from their nearest Mongol commander. Even at this early stage of the Mongol occupation of Iran the identification of the local leaders with the so-called occupiers is clearly evident.

Even though Sayfi is well regarded as a historian with ready access to contemporary archives, official records and documents, and he is credited with a sound knowledge of Persian and Arabic literature, as well as the Islamic sciences, he also knew, from past bitter experience, the safety value of current political correctness. Around 1305 he composed a *mathnavi*, the Sām-nāmeḥ, in praise of the then strongman of Herat, Jamāl al-Dīn Sām. When this ruler was overthrown and executed, his panegyrist, Sayfi, was accused of disloyalty to the Mongols and threatened with death. Fortunately part of his *mathnavi* contained a complimentary description of the power and resourcefulness of the Mongol army, and this coupled with the author's confession of guilt and pledges of future loyalty saved his life. He came back into the favour of the Kart court around 1317 and he was eventually commissioned to write a history of Herat from the invasion of Chinggis Khan to the present time by Malik Ghiyāth al-Dīn.⁷⁹⁸ Though he would have been anxious to portray the Kart dynasty in the best possible light as the repeated references to 'Malik-i Islam' etc. suggest it is difficult to imagine who might have pressured him into exaggerating the close relationship that existed between Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart and the Mongols. The Mongols were not ashamed of their bloodthirsty reputation and yet often Sayfi stresses their more compassionate side and the ease with which certainly Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart was able to appeal to this more humane side of their nature.

Such an occasion occurred not long after Shams al-Dīn's return from Hindustan. Taher Bahā'dur had died and his son Huleqatu had taken

his place as a military commander in Khorasan. News reached Shams al-Dīn that Huleqatu and Qara Noyan had been conducting raids into Afghanistan and on one such raid they had driven off five hundred head of camel, and captured two hundred prisoners. Shams al-Dīn complained that these people and this particular province were obedient, submissive and had always paid the required tribute. He observed that such disgraceful actions would never have been allowed to occur during the rule of Huleqatu's father, Taher Bahā'dur. When details of this affair became known to the princes and they realised the districts plundered were considered '*valāyāt-e 'il*' they fully accepted Shams al-Dīn's condemnation and claimed that they had not ordered the harming of any one from those particular districts. The camels were retrieved, the prisoners released and the Malik-i Islam himself fattened them up and clothed them all before sending men and animals home accompanied by his own footmen.⁷⁹⁹

However, the two princes were unhappy at the rebuke they had suffered at the hands of Shams al-Dīn and though they were apparently unable to take direct action against the *malik* they determined upon 'humiliating, squeezing and deposing'⁸⁰⁰ him by other means at their disposal. To these ends the two princes chose two orators, one a rhetorician from the army, the other a scholar of the realm. They were known as Sām Afghān and Shams Minjam. They were dispatched to Turkestan to the court of Prince Chaghatai and commanded to write reports on Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart as detrimental to him as was possible. After receiving their reports Chaghatai Khan sent messengers to have Shams al-Dīn brought before him. Once again Shams al-Dīn was able to pre-empt the machinations set in motion to entangle him having already received news of the departure of the two orators to the Chaghadaid *ordu*. Before the messengers from Chaghatai Khan could summon him he had made arrangements for his absence and had left for Turkestan with an escort of twenty horsemen. His first call was to the *Khanqāh* of the Shaykh al-Islam Khwāja Ghalveh to receive the holy man's blessing and by the time he reached the Chaghataid *ordu* Chaghatai Khan had died and had been succeeded by his son, Yesü Möngke. The Khan informed the *malik* that a complaint and some accusations had been received concerning him and that therefore it would be necessary to delay him until such time as a *yarghu* could be arranged. He was to be kept in custody but his jailer, Habesh Omīd, assured him that he would suffer no deprivations and that he would be housed in his jailer's palace and served on by Habesh Omīd personally. The *yarghu* was never convened and Shams al-Dīn, who had become almost a resident at Habesh Omīd's palace, so long was he there, was saved by the turn of imperial events in the world outside.⁸⁰¹

Shams al-Dīn was saved by events from that particular predicament and due to his prompt actions on gaining his freedom he was able to secure the future for himself and for the house of Kart. Following the death of the Qa'an Güyük of the house of Ögödei in 1248, the rivalry between the successor states of the royal sons had reached a pitch. It was the house of Tului, the youngest son of Chinggis Khan with the backing of Batu and the Jochids who finally prevailed and they took a bloody exacting, 'killing and killing and plunder and terror',⁸⁰² on the houses of Ögödei and Chaghatai. Yesü Möngke and his entourage fled and were scattered in the deserts and mountains of Central Asia. Shams al-Dīn turned his face towards the east and managed to arrive at Möngke Khan's *ordu* in time for preparations for the inauguration of the new Qa'an. It was a prerequisite for any would-be local rulers to appear in person before the Qa'an to prove their suitability and loyalty. It is interesting to note that the king of Armenia, Hetoum, was also in the east for Möngke's inauguration, and in Hetoum, the royal chronicler's, account (c.1307) of his journey to the new Qa'an's *ordu*, his King is very much centre-stage both as he lists his seven 'petitions and requests' which are made to sound almost like demands, to the great Emperor who, of course, agrees readily to everything including his own baptism, and later when the king returns to his homeland accompanied by his 'friend' Hülegü to effect these same 'demands'.⁸⁰³ This tendency of the local chroniclers to magnify and elevate the role and status of their particular lord or court is common and from Sayfi's account of Shams al-Dīn's reception at Möngke's court it could be supposed that the ruler of Herat's only rival in worldly importance and prestige would have been the King of Armenia.

While accepting that Sayfi's account must contain elements of hyperbole and that the reports of the events at the Qa'an's court might have been elaborated for local consumption, certain truths and points worthy of interest can certainly be gleaned amidst the literary filigree. Immediately upon his arrival, Shams al-Dīn was ushered by the gathered nobles and great ones waiting upon the Qa'an into the audience 'hall' of the Great Khan where the favourites of the court urged him forward. His introductory speech was so eloquent and flattering that the *Pādeshāh* of the World called for him to be brought before him so that the king could see close up this remarkable man. Shams al-Dīn made such a strong impression on the Great Khan, the World-Snatcher (*Jahān-Gīr*), that a command was issued throughout Turan and Iran that whatever city or town he should so wish to govern, that district should be bestowed upon him.⁸⁰⁴ It was while he was being thus honoured that the legends and rumours about the Kart dynasty's founder began to emerge. They said he was as strong as a lion and equally fierce and violent, and that he could repel armies

merely by sowing confusion and dismay amongst their ranks.

*His sword was pitiless; for his every stroke there was a death, for every sword wound, a lion had been brought down, and for every arrow (spent) there was an imprisoned prince.*⁸⁰⁵

The story of how he immediately left the court of Yesü Möngke upon hearing of the accession struggles and straight away presented himself before the new Qa'an was glossed and added to his repertoire. It was said by some that at the time of his initial arrival at the *ordu* he had encountered some of Güyük's troops and with his lion-like sword and twenty of his own men he had attacked and slain the enemy. Möngke, witnessing his battlefield heroics wondered aloud who this mighty warrior could be and for the first time was informed of Shams al-Dīn's impressive history.⁸⁰⁶ Sayfī also recounts how it was said that Shams al-Dīn, after a request from Möngke, vanquished the remaining armies of Güyük and for this he earned the 'favour and generosity beyond reckoning' of the princes and nobles of Möngke's court.⁸⁰⁷ What is significant about these pages devoted to Shams al-Dīn's reception at the Mongol court is not whether the details of some of the claims are true or not, nor that the time-frame appears somewhat confused and disjointed but that the picture that was created, was of the Kart King as one among, at the very least, equals and of a leading amīr as a valued and loyal servant of the accepted and rightful head of the empire. There is no question here of secret ambitions, or resentful service. Shams al-Dīn is portrayed as a hero only too pleased to fulfil his obligations not only to his people and the true believers but also to his king and legitimate ruler. And Sayfī adds, this same king and ruler, Möngke Qa'an, through his patronage and just treatment of Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart earned for himself the favour and blessing of God.⁸⁰⁸

Shams al-Dīn was, in 1255, early in Hülegü's career, allowed to show his influence and value to the new ruler. On Hülegü's leisurely march westward mopping up the Ismā'īlī outposts, Shams al-Dīn was summoned into his presence and ordered to approach the Muḥtashim of Quhestan, Naṣīr al-Dīn, and to demand his submission. The Muḥtashim was old and feeble and readily agreed to Shams al-Dīn's suggestion that he should accompany him back to Hülegü's *ordu*. Bearing various gifts the old man prostrated himself in front of Hülegü and kissed the ground, and Hülegü demonstrated his favour by accepting these gifts and awarded the old man with a *yarligh* and *paiza* and the governorship of Tun.⁸⁰⁹

In recognition of Shams al-Dīn's admirable qualities, his loyal service, the devotion of his forefathers and relatives to the World

Empire, and of the pleas and requests of the lords and nobles attendant on Möngke Qa'an, the World-Snatcher ordered the drawing up of a *yarligh* to detail Shams al-Dīn's governorships. Herat, Balkh, Sistān, Kheisar, Sijistan, Afghanistan unto the Shatt-i Sind and the border with Hindustan, Fāriyāb up until the Oxus, Jām, Morghāb, Kabul, Ghor, Ghorjistan and other districts were all placed under his authority.⁸¹⁰ Before a select assembly of exalted leaders (*ra'us al-nāss*), Möngke dressed Shams al-Dīn in a robe of honour, and presented him with three golden *paiza* and two weighty belts encrusted with gold and jewels. In addition he was given nine gold embroidered garments, 10,000 dinars in cash and various kinds of weaponry including an Indian sword, a straight spear, a golden mace, and a 'heart-piercing' dagger. The court poet of Fakhr al-Dīn Kart, Rabīī of Fashanj (d.1303),⁸¹¹ commemorated this lavish presentation in verse.

Exceeding all that was customary, he was indulged, with every kind of gift he was lavished,

A two-sided sword in a golden scabbard, golden hoofed, pedigree horses, Embroidered garments of Chinese brocade, radiant like the shining sun, A dazzling turban sash, a bezel, a gown, and a turban, were brought to the palace, and a pavilion and court were given him . . .

*Night and day in great joy he had his [every] wish.*⁸¹²

In addition to these sumptuous gifts the governor of Khorasan, Arghun Aqa, expressed his goodwill with the prompt payment of another⁸¹³ 50,000 dinars cash to one of Shams al-Dīn's lieutenants when the *malik*'s party stopped by in Tus after the Qa'an's investiture. Sayfī claims that Arghun Aqa entertained and honoured his guest for seven days and it was on the eighth day that he made the donation and dressed Shams al-Dīn in a robe of honour.⁸¹⁴ In Thomas Allsen's assessment of this unusually generous treatment, this was a case of the Mongols planting 'seed money' in order to assist their own creation, the Kart dynasty, in establishing firm roots.⁸¹⁵

Shams al-Dīn showed his independence of spirit in his attempts to consolidate his rule in his newly endowed regions. In November of 1255 Shams al-Dīn was the first, 'in advance of all his peers and equals'⁸¹⁶ of the nobles from Iran and the west to greet the new king, Hülegü Khan, 'in the meadows of Kān-i Gul (the Rose Mine) at the gates of Samarqand'⁸¹⁷ on the borders of the new king's domains where his loyalty 'was distinguished by all forms of favours.'⁸¹⁸ And yet a few years later, in 1260, Hülegü sent his commander, Taghur, with orders to skin Shams al-Dīn and stuff his body with straw. The confrontation occurred on the borders of Sistān and resulted in Shams al-Dīn's victory and the Mongol commander's death. When another Il-

Khanid army was sent to Herat to seize the ‘rebel’, Shams al-Dīn sued for peace, pledged his continuing loyalty and was welcomed back into the fold. Hülegü had been angered when reports had reached him that Shams al-Dīn, without authority, had killed ibn Masad, the *malik* of Nimruz and Sistān. When asked by the Il-Khan to explain his actions, Shams al-Dīn had replied that he had wanted the king to be asking this question of him and not of his enemy. This reply greatly pleased Hülegü.⁸¹⁹ The *malik* of Ghorjistan, Sayf al-Dīn, was no more successful in standing up to Shams al-Dīn than the *malik* of Sistān had been. Sayf al-Dīn’s comparison of his own status as *malik* and ruler with that of Shams al-Dīn’s had angered the Kart king when word of this had been brought to him. His reaction was to dispatch four hundred men to seize Sayf al-Dīn. However Sayf al-Dīn, on hearing news of these developments fled immediately for the protection of the Mongol governor of the region, Arghun Aqa, who unfortunately for the refugee, had already been contacted by Shams al-Dīn. Sayf al-Dīn was ignominiously returned to Herat for retribution. His body was flung to the crowds in the Khash Gateway where for three days it was trampled and abused until the ‘vulgar and the nobility’ had expended their zeal. Ghorjistan itself did not escape retribution for the arrogance of its former ruler, but Shams al-Dīn declined even to take a ‘holy book or sword’ of the booty which it offered up, and commanded that the spoils and plunder must be divided amongst his army and that 5,000 dinars be distributed as alms to the poor, the weak and the sick.⁸²⁰

Similar ruthlessness in establishing his dominion over the territories that had been assigned to him are recorded in detail by Sayfī, in summary by Zamchī Esfazārī, and briefly by others such as Khwāndamīr.⁸²¹ Around 1252,⁸²² in the district of Garmsīr, the *maliks* of that region, Shāhanshāh, Bahrāmshāh and Mirānshāh, along with 5,000 of their soldiers, were besieged in the fortress of Khāsek. The siege had lasted ten days when Mirānshāh, with a few men, managed to escape under cover of darkness. The next day the castle fell and the two other lords and ninety of their followers were executed.⁸²³ Mirānshāh met his end some time later in Zamīn Dāvar along with his son, Sālār.⁸²⁴ In 1255 Malik Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart laid siege to the supposedly impregnable Castle of Tīrī after the governor of the castle, Almār, refused to surrender or to pay tribute to his new overlord.

Even if all my relatives and fellow tribes were to offer their service and pay tribute I, Almār, will never do so as long as I have life, since before this time [I have] never [given] to traditional sultans, I refuse to serve Mongols and will never give tribute to pagans.

He further boasted that the Mongol commanders, Taher Bahā'dur, Sali Noyan and Qara Noyan had all tried and failed to dislodge and humble him. When Shams al-Dīn finally stormed Almār's stronghold after a siege of two months he sought his revenge in cruelty. Almār was chopped in two, fifty of his favourites were blinded, fifty lost feet and hands, another fifty had their ears cut off or their eyes gouged out, a further three hundred were bastinadoed, and the rest were taken as prisoners.⁸²⁵

If Shams al-Dīn's excesses had been what had riled Hülegü when he sent Taghur to skin and stuff the *malik* with straw, Shams al-Dīn was not intentionally angering his lord since he was well aware of his debt and dependency on the Il-Khan. On one occasion Shams al-Dīn was waylaid on his way to Hülegü's *ordu* by representatives of Batu. These messengers acting for the Jochid princes, Totar and Balagheh, insisted that the *malik* should come with them and present himself before the princes who were representing Batu. Shams al-Dīn angrily refused to comply and, when one of the Mongol soldiers grabbed at his horse's reigns, lashed out at them with his whip. The situation was resolved when envoys from Hülegü himself arrived and the whole party was escorted to the Il-Khan's *ordu* to explain themselves. The Jochid messengers' arrogance and infringement on what was now claimed to be Hülegü's domain, were rewarded with thirty-seven strokes of the bastinado while the impetuous but loyal Shams al-Dīn was heaped with honours, a golden *paiza* and a new *yarligh*.⁸²⁶

Sometimes Shams al-Dīn's crackdowns on his neighbours were beneficial to Hülegü in his wider familial struggles. In 1259 Tāj al-Dīn Kurd sought help from Berke Khan to retake the town of Mastung from where some years previously Shams al-Dīn had expelled Tāj al-Dīn Kurd's kinsmen, Shāhanshāh, Bahrāmshāh and Mirānshāh.⁸²⁷ Tāj al-Dīn had been alerted to Shams al-Dīn's admonishments to his military commander, Pahlavān Muḥammad Nehī, that the commander had unfinished business to complete and that he should not allow himself to become over fond of the life of peace and indulgence he was then widely boasting about and recommending to his men. Shams al-Dīn was referring to the fact that the relative of the three murdered nobles dispatched by Nehī's own hand, known as the 'Brave Lion of the Kurds', was now an adult and doubtless eager for retribution.⁸²⁸

Tāj al-Dīn Kurd was well received at Berke's *ordu* and the Khan bestowed a *yarligh*, a *paiza* and a robe of honour on him and pledged assistance to the rebel to take the town of Mastung. To this end Berke sent ten men to the local Jochid commander, Negüdar, with orders that the Noyan should assist and help finance Tāj al-Dīn Kurd's retaking of Mastung.⁸²⁹ Despite his pleas and promises to the notables of the town, there was resistance to Tāj al-Dīn Kurd's fierce attack

with 1,000 mounted and foot soldiers and consequently there was a general massacre of all the supporters of Mastung's Kartid military commander, Sepāhsālār Ghārī, after victory went to the rebels.⁸³⁰

This occurred not long before open conflict had begun to flare between Berke's troops and princes and the forces of the Il-Khanate further west so that when some of these refugee Jochid troops entered Khorasan in their attempt to regain friendly ground north of the Āmayeh, Negüdar immediately rode to their assistance summoning Tāj al-Dīn Kurd to aid him. After being dispatched from Azerbaijan in pursuit of the Jochid fugitives, Tübshin, a son of Hülegü, was welcomed to Herat by Shams al-Dīn and his amirs and *Shaḥnas* and in return the prince treated his host with due graciousness and ensured that all the *malik*'s men were fully equipped and dressed for battle. Tübshin ably supported by the Kart King with 1,500 horsemen chased Negüdar's forces from Andkhoy and forced them to retire to Bīnī-yi gāv. While Tübshin and Shams al-Dīn were dividing the considerable booty and 400 captives, Tāj al-Dīn Kurd with 1,000 mounted men rode out from Mastung to give his support to the routed Negüdar. The battle was fierce and losses were great on both sides and by nightfall the outcome was inconclusive. Tāj al-Dīn Kurd withdrew to Mastung. Pahlavān Muḥammad Nehī returned to Shams al-Dīn after this his eighteenth battle and was honoured by the *malik*.⁸³¹ Eventually Negüdar recovered and seized the lands 'from the mountains of Ghazna and Bīnī- yi Gāv to Multan and Lahore'.⁸³² Other neighbouring regions once under Jochid command still remained resistant to unquestioning Il-Khanid control. The Jochid Noyan, Junjudar, readily found shelter with a local warlord, Naṣīr al-Haqq va al-Dīn of Sīstān,⁸³³ who like many of the other amirs of the region remained sympathetic of the House of Jochi and wary of Hülegü and his local *malik*, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart.

Shams al-Dīn was not always successful in his courting of the Il-Khans and obtaining their support for his domination of his neighbours. Though he won Sīstān after killing ibn Masad in 1255, he was unable to retain control of the province. The year prior to his murder ibn Masad had been campaigning on behalf of his Mongol overlords. He had successfully brought the people of Neh around to accepting Mongol rule, so ending a siege by 3,000 horsemen. In addition he had marched his armies to Mastung and had seized the fortresses of Qoẓdār and Mashkī and subdued the surrounding area, before finally serving under Kitbuqa, at that time still answerable to the Jochid court. Though Shams al-Dīn Kart was apparently forgiven this indiscretion, the murder of ibn Masad was not forgotten by the victim's relatives, and a nephew, Naṣīr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Abū al-Faṭḥ ibn Masad, went to Maragheh to petition Hülegü for the return of

Sistān to his family's control. Other than one journey to attempt to retake Sistān, ibn Abū al-Fath remained in the service of Hülegü until 1260 when, armed with a *yarligh*, he was appointed governor of the province and by 1264 he succeeded in ridding Sistān of all Shams al-Dīn's representatives and killing those of the Kart's agents who had been involved with the murder of his uncle. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart made one attempt, in 1263, to retake Sistān, gathering substantial support from all parts of Ghar, Khorasan, Farah and Neh as well as from Sistāni factions unhappy with their new governor, but eventually the Kart *malik* was forced to withdraw from the city gates after a futile siege.⁸³⁴

Though Shams al-Dīn appeared to exercise a relatively free hand in relation to his treatment of his neighbouring nobles, his administrative affairs in general came under close scrutiny from Mongol-appointed officials. As was common throughout the empire, vassal rulers had *basqaqs* or *darughachis* or *Shahnas* or *tammās* or a combination who were usually of Mongol or Central Asian origin, appointed to their courts to ensure that the Qa'an's orders and wishes were faithfully carried out. Though their roles were fluid and often overlapped, the sources seem to suggest that the *Shahnas* (Persian) or *darughachis* (Mongol and Turkic) were civilian overseers while *tammās* (Mongol) or *basqaqs* (Persian and Turkic) were military.⁸³⁵ The relationship between these overseers and the local ruler was possibly deliberately ambiguous with the *basqaq* or *shahna* appointed to assist the *yarligh* holder to carry out his interpretation of the Qa'an's policies. The *basqaq* was a subordinate of the local ruler with his own direct link to the central Mongol court. Both parties had an interest in maintaining an amicable, working relationship.

When Shams al-Dīn first arrived in Herat various officials including the *shahna*, Kharlugh, who all pointedly welcomed him with honours and a great show of respect, complained to the *malik* of the corruption and tyranny of another administrator, Sharaf al-Dīn Bitakchī, and sought his ruling on the matter. The new *malik*'s prompt ruling was that the accused miscreant receive one hundred strokes of the cane to be delivered by ten persons.⁸³⁶ When he arrived in Herat from the audience with the Qa'an, Shams al-Dīn was accompanied by a *basqaq* appointed from the élite of Möngke's court, the *Amīr Kabīr basqaq Mu'ām Jahu*.⁸³⁷ While other *basqaqs*, with the agreement of military commander Huleqatu Noyan, were sent to the various regions of Afghanistan under Kart administration to proclaim the contents of the new *yarligh* issued by Möngke Khan, Shams al-Dīn and Jahu together visited the grander amīrs to read to them the new edicts. The copies of the *yarlighs* bore the royal seal of Arghun Aqa.⁸³⁸ Before leaving they first rid themselves of Kharlugh, the conniving *basqaq* from the

previous regimes, by intimidating him themselves and then by making a formal accusation to be brought before Möngke. They complained that Kharlugh was not only too old to carry out his duties but also that 'he drank so much wine day and night that he was unable to speak.'⁸³⁹ The Amir Jahu would read out transcripts of the *yarligh*⁸⁴⁰ himself and as has been seen in the case of such nobles as Mīrānshāh, Shāhanshāh, and Bahrāmshāh during the siege of Khāsek, such words were not always favourably received.

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart's greatest feat of loyalty and service to the Il-Khanid cause was in the wars between the Golden Horde and the new Hülegüid state. He had earlier assisted Prince Tübbshin in the battle against Negüdar and Tāj al-Dīn Kurd. In 1267 he set out for the new Il-Khan, Abaqa's *ordu*.⁸⁴¹ He remained there in waiting on Abaqa for fifty days before requesting permission to return home with a new *yarligh*. However at this same time news reached the Il-Khan's court that Prince Berke had moved a large army south across the Caucasus and had occupied Darband. According to Sayfī, Shams al-Dīn was issued a command to appear before the king and ordered to 'bind the girdle of self-sacrifice'⁸⁴² and along with his closest friends to help in repelling the invaders. With the edict there was also sent two hundred men, mounts, weapons, cuirasses, chain-mail, helmets, armour for man and beast, spears and javelins, and for the *malik* himself a few intricate and precious robes of honour. The command was further sweetened with the promise of rich rewards, favours and the greatest honours. Shams al-Dīn was reputedly full of joy and cheer at receiving such honour from the king and his words are recorded as being, 'The blood of the enemies of the Pādeshh Jahāngīr is wine to me . . . my ears are never happier than [when hearing] the drums of war.'⁸⁴³ There is no hint here that there was any coercion involved in Shams al-Dīn's participation in the upcoming battle. The honour to be gained from fighting for the great World-Snatcher is certainly real from the point of view of Sayfī and it must be presumed also from Shams al-Dīn's perspective.

Shams al-Dīn's bravery and victories earned him great rewards and honour from Abaqa. He reputedly rushed head-long into the thick of the battle first casting aside his helmet. He then shouted curses and challenges to the Muslim Berke's troops: 'Oh people of no religion, war mongers, fiery-natured devil-lovers, demon-eyed, Satan-statured [ones] who like Gog and Magog gather in this battlefield.'⁸⁴⁴ This resulted in his being wounded by a thrown rock and his mail-coat shredded by a stray arrow which had caused a hair-line tear. His attendants and followers rushed to his assistance but the *malik*, unperturbed, continued to fight and repel any attack launched against him, sending 'all who assailed him to hell'.⁸⁴⁵ Quoting the sons of eye-

witnesses from that battle, Sayfī recounts that despite extensive and serious wounds, Shams al-Dīn continued to display his customary fearlessness and ferocity so much so that his antics attracted the attention of Berke himself who inquired from a lieutenant, Taramatai, who the bareheaded valiant warrior might be, and was provided with the legendary details of the Ghūrid hero at the court of Möngke and on the battlefield against the Güyükids.⁸⁴⁶ As night fell both armies withdrew from the battlefield to assess the situation and count their losses. Around one hundred *maliks* and renowned amīrs had already been lost. Abaqa appointed five specialists from among his own doctors and surgeons to attend to Shams al-Dīn in the royal pavilion. The following day was just like the first, Sayfī continues in a suddenly perfunctory conclusion, with Abaqa achieving victory over Berke whose great army was then slaughtered, their ‘headgear, belts, horses, camels, tents, and the cash from their property falling into the hands of Pādeshāh Abaqa’s army’.⁸⁴⁷ After three months at the royal court, treated with the greatest of honours, Shams al-Dīn was given permission to return home to Herat. He departed in style after being awarded the usual *paiza* and a *yarligh*, and presented with some bejewelled mounts, some Egyptian weapons, and a drum and banner, the insignia of royalty.⁸⁴⁸

In Rashīd al-Dīn’s account of Shams al-Dīn’s visit to Abaqa’s *ordu* such detail as is elaborated by Sayfī is reduced to one line confirming the governorship of ‘Nimruz’ would be held by the Kart *malik*.⁸⁴⁹ In the short account of the battle, Shams al-Dīn is not mentioned.⁸⁵⁰ Though Khwāndamīr notes Shams al-Dīn’s glorious contributions to the Il-Khanid victory, it is likely that Sayfī was his source.⁸⁵¹

If in reality Shams al-Dīn was just one amongst many lords and amīrs vying for the eye and the favour of their king, rather than a living legend at the Mongol court close to the Il-Khan’s ear, then the ruler of Herat’s sudden fall from grace is not so surprising. Events turned against Shams al-Dīn when he became embroiled in the territorial ambitions of his northeastern neighbour, Baraq Khan. The Chaghataid Khan had crossed the Oxus and confronted Prince Tūbshin in 1270 and the prince had been forced into a tactical retreat, or a rout in Baraq’s eyes, sheltering in Mazanderan until his brother, Abaqa, arrived with reinforcements. Baraq had ordered and had carried out the devastation and plunder of Nishapur by Morghaval who reputedly killed 2,000 of the city’s Muslims, before turning his attention to Herat with the intention of a repeat performance there. The Khan appointed Amīr Satlamaysh with 10,000 horsemen to carry out the operation. He was dissuaded from such action however on the advice of Qutluq-Temūr, one of Baraq’s court intimates, who argued that if Shams al-Dīn could be persuaded to surrender and to offer his

services to the Khan, then his example would be willingly followed by all the other notables of the province such was the Kart's status and influence. If on the other hand there should be resistance and rebellion then their occupation of Khorasan would become a long and drawn out affair. The destruction of Herat, he added, could wait until after.⁸⁵²

Qutluq-Temür with fifty horsemen rode first to Herat where the city's notables re-directed him to the Kart stronghold of Kheisār and the situation was explained to Shams al-Dīn. Qutluq-Temür assured the Kart of his continued security and the esteem in which Baraq Khan held him since seeing him in Turkestan and of the Khan's desire to strengthen and increase his attachment and familiarity with the Kart king. After two days' deliberation Shams al-Dīn came to a decision with his advisors and ministers and with the words 'I hear and obey!' (*samān wa tā at*)⁸⁵³ left for Baraq's camp with the aide where he was greeted with great honour and kindness. In their first audience Baraq immediately informed the *malik* of his intention of launching a military expedition against Abaqa in order to seize Iraq and pressed the *malik* for his views and, with assurances of his freedom as his guest, urged him to speak without restraint. According to Sayfi, Shams al-Dīn pointed out that while Abaqa was busy collecting men and preparing for war, Baraq's troops were so busy rounding up cattle and donkeys and amassing booty and riches for themselves that come the morrow not one of them would be ready for war. Baraq readily agreed on the veracity of Shams al-Dīn's words and claimed that he had been thinking likewise but that he considered the situation acceptable until such time as Abaqa should actually reach the province and even then he doubted that the Il-Khan could muster even 80,000 men to meet his '150,000 famed warriors' every thousand of whom would show the resistance of ten thousand. In the eight days that Shams al-Dīn spent in Baraq's camp he became convinced that this was a fearless army with an interest only in plunder, booty and killing commanded by a king who was an oppressor and a liar. Baraq, he told his nobles back in Herat, came not as a ruler but as a destroyer.⁸⁵⁴

With the aim of lessening the burden and the plight of the people of his province, Shams al-Dīn received the permission of his notables to offer provisions and facilities to the invaders in such a way that Baraq would grow to trust the *malik* and presumably be more amenable to Herat's interests. Baraq readily accepted Shams al-Dīn's proposals and awarded him a special robe of honour. He also appointed three 'companions', Kebek (Köpek), Khaṣar, and Ḥussein the brother of Masad Beg, to accompany the *malik* back to Herat. However, not long after this party's departure, Baraq began to regret his decision realising that he had come to an agreement with Shams al-Dīn before

his army had been able to complete their pillaging of the province. He therefore dispatched a certain Alatimür to pursue Shams al-Dīn and to bring him back to camp. The wily Shams al-Dīn managed to talk his way out of this, persuading Alatimür, Kebek (Köpek) and Khaṣar that it would be better all round if he first returned to Herat to ensure that the nervous populace were not listening to those amīrs with pro-Abaqa sympathies and that the provisions, animals, fruit and wine that he had arranged to be sent to Baraq had indeed been dispatched. But Shams al-Dīn was unable to prevent Kebek (Köpek) and Khaṣar proclaiming on their arrival in Herat that the Pādishāh Baraq Khan had arrived in Bādghīs and that he would be proceeding from there to the conquest of the throne of Iraq and that all citizens must pray and recite incantations for the soul and long life of their new ruler. They further imposed new tax-collectors and inspectors over the markets, the mint and workshops with checkpoints at the gates to the city.⁸⁵⁵ Shams al-Dīn Kart had also been commanded to reveal to Baraq the names of all those of wealth in the province so that their details could be recorded in an official register and very soon ‘every person, lord and noble fell into despair’ (*Tamāmat az jān o Khan o māl nā-omīd shodand*).⁸⁵⁶

When such developments reached the ear of Abaqa it did not create a very favourable impression of Shams al-Dīn, an impression Sayfī clearly deems undeserved. Later when battle had commenced between the two Mongol princes, Masad Beg, finding the gates of Herat firmly closed, demanded that they be opened to him and the Chaghataid army. The town qāzī, Shams al-Dīn Bīārī, informed him that on the orders of Abaqa Khan the gates must be kept locked and despite Masad Beg’s threats and entreaties and even appeals to their shared faith in Islam and the to-be-expected wrath of Baraq, Herat remained closed to the unwelcome invaders.⁸⁵⁷ Even this did not fully placate Abaqa when it was revealed to him after Baraq’s rout, and his mistrust of Shams al-Dīn dates from these events.

Abaqa’s immediate thought after achieving victory over Baraq was the destruction of the city of Herat and the dispersal of its people. His own Mongol advisors argued that Herat’s prosperity had brought little benefit either to the Il-Khan or to them, other than disgrace and loss to his armies, until such time as the present when he himself had been forced to come to the rescue. They remonstrated that if Herat had not been so affluent Baraq would never have invaded and the losses that had been engendered would never have had to be suffered. Their solution was the evacuation of the population to the rest of Khorasan and the destruction of every ‘narrow alley and tower’ so that no king or ruler could ever build their dwelling there again.⁸⁵⁸ The order was given and a proclamation was then announced throughout the city

that the citizens, nobles and the masses, had three days to evacuate Herat. Five hundred Mongol horsemen were deployed to enforce the ruling with wooden cudgels. They emphasised their seriousness by indulging in violent plunder and rampant looting. Among their number was the eldest son of the generally esteemed chief governor of Khorasan, Arghun Aqa. He had come to Herat with 1,000 riders especially for the plunder and set about the fleeing crowds and their abandoned property with relish.⁸⁵⁹

But again the dual nature of the Mongol ‘hordes’ is brought to the fore by Sayfī. Armed elements unleashed, and certain individuals such as Baraq and his ‘mob’ and now Arghun Aqa’s son, might represent the Mongols at their barbarous worst but they are often contrasted with the new face of the Mongols, open to reason, sympathy, and even apparent altruism. On hearing of the widespread pillage taking place in Herat both Prince Tübshin and Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*, shocked and dismayed, sought an immediate audience with Abaqa Khan to protest and to dissuade him from this destructive course of action. They appealed to his sense of honour, they reminded him of the effects his actions would have on his future legacy and the glory of his name, and they invoked the old legends, oral and written, which spoke of the misfortune that would overtake those who should harm the country of Herat and exile its people. The two also evoked the reality of Herat, the city of Islam and saints, home to sultans of Sufism, and to shrines and holy tombs. He that would destroy this city ‘would exchange glory for contempt and would end his life in reproach and infamy’. As if to underline their case news arrived at this time that the plunderer, the son of Arghun Aqa, had just taken a fall from his horse and had been killed.⁸⁶⁰

Tübshin and the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*, proposed that a trap should be set for Shams al-Dīn Kart who had fled to his stronghold in Kheisar, and that meanwhile another *malik* should be chosen from amongst the loyal notables of the city to rule Herat. Such a *malik* was one Malik Bolabān, whom Abaqa accepted and awarded a *yarligh* on being assured that the candidate was most suitable, intelligent, far-sighted, and right-hearted. Abaqa informed Bolabān that it had been his wish to destroy the city and exile its inhabitants but that his brother Tübshin, the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*, and the lords from his chief *ordu* had dissuaded him from such action. He therefore commanded Bolabān to gather together all the scattered people of Herat and urge them to rebuild their farms and homes so that they might again find contentment and an easy life. The next day with the Il-Khan’s permission Bolabān left for Herat accompanied by two *Shahnas*, Avirad (Oirad?) and Toghai, selected from the élite of Abaqa’s court. Though the party was given a warm welcome from the notables of the

city when they arrived, they were never able to feel particularly safe in Herat since the populace were continually expecting and talking about the imminent arrival of Shams al-Dīn Kart. Bolabān's rule lasted only one year.⁸⁶¹

Shams al-Dīn remained in Kheisār until 1275 from where he still managed to exert much control over Ghar, Ghaznin, and Afghanistan. In 1272 he sought advice over whether to invade Herat and with the proceeds continue to Tübshin's court and offer the booty in supplication and to further his request that the accusations of treason against him be reconsidered. Eventually he was persuaded to send his son, Malik Tark, accompanied by 'Pahlavān' Jamāl Kaynānī, and Hazhbar al-Dīn Gharī bearing suitably rare gifts to petition Prince Tübshin. This embassy was so successful that Malik Tark was appointed the representative *malik* of Herat in the absence of Shams al-Dīn. When he left Tübshin's *ordu* after twenty days he went with the customary robe of honour and a *yarligh*.⁸⁶²

Malik Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart once again became the effective ruler of Herat with the tacit knowledge of Tübshin though he remained firmly ensconced in Kheisār. He received copies of all correspondence and met with and advised and directed all the functionaries and notables of the city. According to Sayfī, Herat entered a period of great prosperity and the roads were once again free of bandits and cut-throats, and the people were allowed to enjoy government free from oppression and tyranny. Prince Tübshin continued to tempt Shams al-Dīn back to the city, aware that as long as the *malik* remained in the impregnable castle of Kheisār he would be untouchable. Letters of mutual admiration, trust and loyalty were exchanged between the two but Shams al-Dīn was still not prepared to move.⁸⁶³ Further pressure to entice the elusive *malik* into the open involved the infamous son of the *Ṣāḥib Diwān*, Bahā' al-Dīn Juwaynī (1253–79), governor of Persian Iraq, being sent to Herat along with Aq Buqa and Najīb Naāl, to conduct a census. After Bahā' al-Dīn's departure to report to Abaqa, Mawlānā Fakhr al-Dīn, Qāzī of Herat, and Shihāb al-Dīn Zareh were left in the city as representatives of the Juwaynis, father and son respectively, and they were able to witness a year (1273) of exceptional abundance and comfort for the people of the province, a situation which continued into the next year, assuring Tübshin and the Il-Khan wealth and trouble-free sleep.⁸⁶⁴

However, Abaqa remained unimpressed and suspicious of the 'cunning and impetuous' *malik* of Herat, still safe in his family fortress, and was already determined on an endgame for Shams al-Dīn. To this end Abaqa composed a warm letter to Shams al-Dīn to which he added a precious robe of honour, a jewel-studded belt, and a legendary sword and a generous *yarligh*. Abaqa was effusive in his

praise and insistent that he had never listened to the lies and stories of Shams al-Dīn's enemies. He implored him to leave Kheisār which was 'an abode of tigers and lions and a nest of vultures and eagles'⁸⁶⁵ and to once again take up residence in Herat, strengthen his frontier provinces from Afghanistan, to Shiburghan and the Ama Daryā ridding his lands of oppression and tyranny. Shams al-Dīn sent messages of continued loyalty and obedience in reply and entrusted rich and rare gifts to the envoys for delivery to Abaqa and Tübshin and to the nobles of their courts. In fact Abaqa had wanted to invade first Herat and then storm Kheisār in order to capture the errant *malik* but the entreaties of his top ministers had once again dissuaded him from devastating the Khorasani capital. Shams al-Dīn wrote to Shams al-Dīn Juwayni the *Şāhib Dīwān* expressing his misgivings but the minister persisted in his advice that the *malik* should come and pay homage to Abaqa in person. The *Şāhib Dīwān* was sympathetic and wrote verses expressing his feeling to the exile but his advice did not waver.⁸⁶⁶ Shams al-Dīn Kart insisted that it had been his dream and the answer to his prayers that he should one day be able to meet the great *Şāhib* and to tell him of his troubles and woes, 'new and old'⁸⁶⁷ but he added:

*When my beloved sits often with my enemies,
It is not fitting for me to sit again with my beloved.
Abstain from that honey that is mixed with poison,
And flee from the fly that sits on the snake.*⁸⁶⁸

His wish was to remain peacefully in his ancestral home in Kheisār until such time as events outside had calmed down:

*It is better for a wise man to retire
Or to withdraw into the corner of a strong fortress
And to drink wine and kiss the ruby lips of beauties,
Until the world in turmoil calms down.*⁸⁶⁹

Once in Herat, the two Juwaynīs, father and son, composed a letter inviting the suspicious *malik* to visit them in Iraq and assuring him of their support and of Abaqa's favourable opinion of him. Bahā' al-Dīn sent him robes of honour to further encourage his departure.⁸⁷⁰ Shams al-Dīn accepted the invitation and set out for Isfahan immediately. The journey took him a month and on his arrival he was greeted by Khwāja Bahā' al-Dīn, all the great and the noble, and the 'pillars of state' (*arakān*) of the province of Persian Iraq.

Shams al-Dīn was to learn the reality of his situation within a few

days of his arrival in Isfahan. Bahā' al-Dīn sent a delegation of his chief ministers to petition Abaqa on Shams al-Dīn's behalf. Abaqa was however implacable, 'his heart reflecting the colour of hatred'.⁸⁷¹ He refused to grant the delegation any favours, and ordered them not to allow the *malik* to enter the royal *ordu*, nor to let him leave their safe-keeping. 'I do not trust him.'⁸⁷² While Shams al-Dīn was detained in Isfahan, his sons Rukn al-Dīn and his brother, were sent north to serve in the Il-Khanid armies in Darband.⁸⁷³ The *Ṣāhib Dīwān* and the army commanders also attempted to sway Abaqa with accounts of the Kart *malik*'s faithful service and exploits and those of his family in the service of the Mongols. Abaqa remained steadfast and answered that he would instead keep Shams al-Dīn in his own *ordu* and that he would not be sending him back to Herat and further that he should not be approached again on the subject of the Kart *malik*. That Shams al-Dīn was an influential person with friends in high places is demonstrated by the fact that further representations were continued on his behalf. In the year 1278, an amīr of notable standing at Abaqa's court, Amīr Tikneh, attempted to advance Shams al-Dīn's case with the Il-Khan. He was in debt to Shams al-Dīn for the *malik*'s treatment and cure of his animals which were prized specimens and particularly precious to the amīr. Their successful cure had defied all the doctors and specialists of Khorasan and Iraq but Shams al-Dīn had been able to prescribe some drugs which had somehow been totally efficacious. In recognition of this great service this amīr went on more than one occasion to Abaqa to plead Shams al-Dīn's cause. According to Sayfī, Shams al-Dīn's residence in Tabriz was regularly visited by the notables of the realm who all assured him that they were doing, and would do, everything in their power to prevail on Abaqa to release him and allow his return to Herat. They all concluded that Abaqa was not to be swayed.

The end came swiftly and all sources agree on the cause of death being poison. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, when Shams al-Dīn fell to contemplating his fate and the inevitable plundering of his estates he determined upon suicide. His attendants reported that he had poison secreted under the stone of a ring and that at a suitable time he had mixed this into some pasta and eaten it.⁸⁷⁴ Khwāfī states that it was said that he died from poison.⁸⁷⁵ Khwāndamīr repeats the story found in Sayfī which claims that Shams al-Dīn was killed by poison injected into a watermelon sent to him while in his bath on the orders of Abaqa.⁸⁷⁶

One story repeated in Sayfī and Rashīd al-Dīn is the claim that Abaqa was so distrustful of Shams al-Dīn, even in death, that he dispatched the amīr Huleqatu to Tabriz to ensure that the *malik* was demonstrably dead. Huleqatu ordered that Shams al-Dīn be placed in

a wooden coffin and that the lid be secured with iron nails or chains. He was then buried in the ground. Zamchī Esfazārī adds that his body was taken to Jām in Ghar for burial.⁸⁷⁷ He died in January 1278 and his death was widely eulogised by poets from as far afield as Delhi.⁸⁷⁸

*In the year six hundred seventy-six in the month of Shabān,
When destiny took an augury from the Koran,
In the name of the warrior of Iranians, Muḥammad Kurt,
Came the reading : wa'sh-shamsu kuwwirāt
(when the sun shall be folded up).⁸⁷⁹*

In the vacuum caused by Shams al-Dīn's detention, Herat had once again fallen into anarchy. Visiting the city later in the year 1278 Prince Tübs̄hin found Herat 'without head or foot and ungovernable'.⁸⁸⁰ There seemed to be numerous governors, people were their own *wālīs*, and everyone was busy 'feathering their own nests' (*khalghī be-rīshān*) and everybody appeared to be a leader of some sect with their own band of followers. The people of Herat explained this anarchy saying that there was no one person who was capable of replacing Shams al-Dīn Kart. When pressed to elect any one of the deceased *malik*'s 'sons, brothers or relatives' they unanimously declared, 'his son, Rukn al-Dīn Muḥammad [who] is residing in the grand *ordu* of Pādeshāh Abaqa'.⁸⁸¹ Prince Tübs̄hin prevailed upon the Il-Khan and eventually Rukn al-Dīn, who had already gained great merit on the battlefields of the Caucasus in the service of Abaqa, was awarded a robe of honour, a *yarligh*, a *paiza*, and a drum and standard, symbols of royalty, and allowed to return to Herat with a *shahna* called Qutjaq, where he was received with great jubilation. He was to be called by his father's *loqab*, 'Shams al-Dīn' with 'Kohīn' (the smaller, younger) added to differentiate the two.⁸⁸²

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart was one of a new generation of Iranian notables who rose to positions of power and influence under the Mongols. Many of this generation whether they achieved greatness as courtiers like the Juwaynīs, as poets and Sufis like Semnānī, or as actual rulers like Shams al-Dīn Kart, spent much of their formative years in the service of the Mongol Khans and close to the royal *Dīwāns*. Their contemporaries were the princes, lords and courtiers of these royal courts and their heroes would often have been those figures eulogised and lionised by their cosmopolitan companions. Shams al-Dīn might have earned the hostility of Abaqa, a ruler who despite a reputation for justice and wisdom suffered fearsome attacks of alcohol-induced paranoia, but his support was such that even one as supposedly omnipotent as the Il-Khan had to be circumspect in carrying out his vassal's murder. Mongol and Persian lords together

made representations on his behalf. When Shams al-Din angered and crossed junior Mongol princes, they were unable to take unilateral action against the *malik* and their machinations were thwarted when Shams al-Din was able to call upon his friends, high in the Mongol hierarchy, to protect his interests. Nor was this position of intimacy with the 'oppressors' considered in any way treacherous, blasphemous or anything other than highly commendable and appropriate by the chroniclers and poets of his day or indeed by subsequent historians. No censure was invoked when Shams al-Din raised his flag in support of the pagan Il-Khans in order to repel the invading forces of the Muslim Berke and his armies, among whom were many believers. That justice and righteousness were represented by Prince Tübshin and Abaqa, both unbelievers, and that evil and destruction came in the guise of the soldiers of the believing Berke did not seem anomalous to the chroniclers of the Karts. For the Karts and others of the Iranian rulers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Mongol umbrella represented security and a relative predictability, with the potential for prosperity through trade that the open borders of the Empire had created. The *ordus* of the rulers were not the alien and hostile habitations of invading oppressors but rather they were the landscapes of Iranian nobles' childhood and home to fond and formative memories. The environment of the Il-Khanid *ordu* had metamorphosed into a different world from the *ordu* of the high steppes and the Mongols of two generations earlier. Sedentary city dwellers though they might have become and as they were so often portrayed, many of the Iranian notables contemporaneous with Shams al-Din Kart were sufficiently familiar with life in the saddle not to be fazed by the vicinity of the great Mongol encampments.

6

THE JUWAYNĪS

As one of the major sources for the history of Central Asia and the Mongol conquests of Persia during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Alā al-Dīn Aṭā Malik Juwaynī has come under intense scrutiny from critics not always sympathetic to his apparently accommodating attitude to the ‘scourge from the East’ and suspicious of his less than reprehensive posture towards the Mongols. The greatly respected historian, David Ayalon’s dismissal of Juwaynī as a ‘partisan panegyrist’⁸⁸³ of the Tuluīd Chinggisites and his nauseous reaction to the formalised politeness of medieval Persian are vastly overstated and imbue literary filigree with undeserved gravitas. Ayalon rightly recognised Juwaynī’s pivotal position as the source of much of the knowledge of the *Yasa* of the Mongols for the Mamluks and later commentators yet he retained the reservations that other modern informed observers of the Mongols in Iran, such as both Boyle and Morgan,⁸⁸⁴ still hold. That Aṭā Malik Juwaynī was not an embittered exile such as Jūzjānī nor a normally shrewd and reliable historian such as Ibn al-Athīr, dependent on the often second-hand accounts of fugitives for his harrowing conclusions, nor a ‘mystic’ such as Najm al-Dīn Rāzī who watched his home town, Ray, fall to the Mongol hordes and later sanctimoniously abandoned his own family and children to the invaders,⁸⁸⁵ should not detract from his illuminating histories and first-hand accounts of the Tatar courts and conquests gleaned from his years as a powerful Mongol functionary. Unlike these three figures, Juwaynī lived and worked under Mongol rule rather than under Tatar invasion and his experience did not produce clichéd knowledge. Though Aṭā Malik now possesses the more well-known name it was his elder brother, Shams al-Dīn⁸⁸⁶ who, over seven centuries ago, wielded greater authority at the Il-Khanid court in his capacity as *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*, and his brother’s son, Bahā’ al-Dīn, who exercised considerable power in the administration of Isfahan. The Juwaynī family had served the kings and princes of Persia over centuries and whatever the legacy of their masters, this faithful family of talented administrative officials, on their demise, invariably attracted a wealth of apparently sincere eulogies and great approbation for their lifetime’s work.

*‘Ala’u’d-Din and his brother were endowed with nobility, lordly qualities and experience in affairs, and were moreover just, kind to the people and active in promoting the prosperity of the country. ‘Ala’u’d-Din was made superintendent of Iraq in the year [six hundred and] sixty and odd [of the hijra], after Imadud-Din al- Qazwini, and thereupon betook himself to promoting the welfare of the villages, and freed the peasantry from many taxes, until the revenues of Iraq were doubled . . . Some say without exaggeration that the Şāhib Dīwān restored Baghdad so that it became even more prosperous than it was in the days of the Caliphate, and through him the people of Baghdad attained comfort.*⁸⁸⁷

The Juwaynī brothers were faithful servants of their own particular calling and they worked within their own moral and spiritual parameters. Their struggle toward a more just and equitable world was conducted not through the medium of swords and resistance but through the agency of the pen and the power of influence and diplomatic persuasion. If Aṭā Malik’s great historical work betrays a certain bias toward the parties under whom he operated it may only be indicative of the purely human tendency to self-justification rather than evidence of a conspiratorial attempt to pervert the recorded course of history or of any irresistible pressure to follow a particular party line. Such distinctions in themselves may be anachronistic. Juwaynī’s masters were powerful, mighty and successful. The court historian’s job was to record this irrefutable fact and to explain and reflect the circumstances of that success. The Juwaynīs, just as generations of their family before them, were constant and committed to their office and it was in recognition of such loyal and devoted attachment to their profession that they earned the approbation of their contemporaries and the recognition and praise of later generations of statesmen, chroniclers, poets, artists and functionaries not only from their own homelands but from those neighbouring them.

That the Juwaynīs were valuable and essentially non-partisan functionaries was a fact immediately recognised not only by their current rulers but by their ruler’s would-be enemies as well. Bahā’ al-Dīn Muhammad, the father of Aṭā Malik Juwaynī, slipped easily from his service within the circles of the dashing Jalāl al-Dīn Mīnkubirni Khwārazmshāh to the position of Şāhib Dīwān of Khorasan and Mazanderun for the Mongol conquerors. The Juwaynīs’ long and illustrious pedigree stretches back to the time of the Abbāsids when their ancestors, Faḡl bin al-Rabī, both father and son, served the caliphs al-Manṣar, al-Mahdī, al-Hādī, Hāran al-Rashīd and al-Amīn as ministers and chamberlains. This ancestor al-Rabī is alternatively claimed to be of indeterminate parentage or twelfth in line from the

mawla, Abū (bābī) Farwa Kaysān, who was attached to the third caliph, Uthmān.⁸⁸⁸ The family held high office under both the Great Saljuqs and the Khwārazmshāhs so much so that the title *Şāhib Dīwān* became almost a family epithet and indeed Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, born in the Khorasani village of Āzādvār,⁸⁸⁹ was universally known simply as ‘*Şāhib Dīwān*’ after he became the Grand Wazir of first Hülegü and then Abaqa Khan. Aṭā Malik also adopted this title in his capacity as governor of Baghdad. After Arghun’s defeat of his uncle and rival, Aḥmad Tegüdar, Shams al-Dīn approached the new Il-Khan’s *ordu* hoping for a ‘pardon’ and presumed that if granted he would be able to assume his former position of *Şāhib Dīwān*. The Juwaynīs served the office rather than the man.

‘Aṭā Malik was not alone in his family with his literary skills since an aptitude for words as well as administration and diplomacy evidently coursed through the Juwaynī genes. It is reported that in 1192 ‘Aṭā Malik’s great grandfather, Bahā’ al-Dīn Muhammad, eulogised his way into the court of the Sultan Tukush Khwārazmshāh with the following quatrain:

*Your favour detracts from the nobility of the hidden jewel,
The munificence of your palm is beyond the splendour of the Jayhun
(ĀmūĀyeh, oxus),
Your judgment, in an instant, if you so wish,
Can remove any fatuous fancies from the head of heaven.*⁸⁹⁰

Muntajab al-Dīn Badī’ al-Kātib al-Juwaynī, a maternal uncle of this great grandfather, was secretary to and head of the *Dīwān-i Inshā’* for Sultan Sanjar as well as a noted writer whose work has appeared in Awfī⁸⁹¹ and received recognition in Dawlatshāh.⁸⁹² His book on Sanjar’s administration, ‘*Kitāb-i Atabat’ al-Kataba*’⁸⁹³ is a unique compilation of official documents from the Saljuqid Sultan’s reign (1117–57). It was his timely humour that saved the life of the poet Rashīd al-Dīn Watwāt from the wrath of Sanjar who had wished to slice the wayward wordsmith into seven parts. On the grounds that a swallow (*watwāt*) was such a tiny, weak creature, would it not be more prudent to merely slice him in two, Muntajab hazarded. The king laughed so much that he spared the poet’s life.⁸⁹⁴ A propensity for literary expression was present with Aṭā Malik’s father whose work was reproduced in a variety of medieval sources, while a son of the *Şāhib Dīwān*, Sharaf al-Dīn Hārān,⁸⁹⁵ was also a famed poet, and a noted patron of poets while a governor in Rum.⁸⁹⁶ A few verses attributed to Shams al-Dīn himself have also appeared.

But the principal propensity of this remarkable family was for diplomacy and administration like the influential family of ministers

in Abbāsīd times, the Barmakids, to whom they have often been compared. Shams al- Dīn Moḥammad Bozorg va May-i Dirāz (long-haired), the brothers' grandfather was the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* for the last ruling Khwārazmshāh, and accompanied the ill-fated sultan on his desperate flight from the advancing Mongols in 1220–1 from Balkh to Nishapur, and after his King's lonely death on an island near the Caspian port Ābaskan,⁸⁹⁷ he served, in the same capacity, his reckless son Jalāl al-Dīn Mīnkubirnī, who 'was at that time leaping all over the countries of Khorasan like a stag'.⁸⁹⁸ Bahā' al- Dīn, the brothers' father, entered Mongol service after first fleeing Nishapur from where Jalāl al-Dīn's two amīrs, Qarajar and Yaghan-Sonqur, had been launching raids on the Mongols and their collaborators. He initially sought refuge with Tāj al-Dīn Farīzanī of Tus who, Aṭā Malik claims, 'outdid all the unbelievers in massacring and treachery'⁸⁹⁹ but eventually found a haven with the very people he had been escaping from, namely Chin Temūr and the Mongol forces. Chin Temūr had originally been made *basqaq* of Khwārazm by Jochi and he was at this time involved in mopping up operations further south against renegade bands of 'scum and rabble'⁹⁰⁰ usually led or inspired by remnants of the Khwārazmians. After the treacherous Farīzanī had handed over Bahā' al-Dīn Juwaynī and the other notables of Nishapur and fellow fugitives from the Mongols, to Kol Bolat, the Qa'an's representative with Chin Temūr, these eminent captives were surprised at their respectful treatment and the honour shown them by their captors.

This personal history is related by Aṭā Malik Juwaynī in his story of the fortunes of Chin Temūr, the Qarā Khitāi ⁹⁰¹ governor of Khorasan and Mazanderan, a man whom the historian obviously admired. In Juwaynī's narrative the ultimately successful efforts of this amīr to save the provinces from yet more death and destruction are carefully emphasised. Juwaynī relates how Chin Temūr sought the peaceful submission of the *maliks* of Khorasan and after receiving such, sent these nobles with Kol Bolat as a delegation to petition the Qa'an. In sending such a delegation of notables, he hoped that the emperor, suitably impressed, might counter the previous imperial command to Tayir Bahā'dur to lay waste the province in such a way that:

*such as had [hitherto] escaped the sword were to be cast upon the wind of annihilation, no one was to be left alive in the lands of Khorasan and their dwellings and habitations were to be flooded with water so that no remains or trace thereof might survive.*⁹⁰²

The Qa'an was so pleased with this 'royal' delegation that he immediately confirmed Chin Temūr as governor of Khorasan and

Mazanderan with Kol Bolat as his partner. Juwaynī's father was then made Chin Temür's *Şāhib Dīwān* and was later sent to the Qa'an along with Chin Temür's deputy, Körgüz, where he received a *paiza* and a *yarligh* with an *tamgha*,⁹⁰³ had his office confirmed and was shown the favour of the World Emperor. The Juwaynī family's initiation into the service of the Great Khans is thus presented in a justifiable light, as the brothers' father's initial Mongol appointment was to a Qarā Khitāyān noble whose first act in the country was the prevention of any further loss or sorrow for its people and the introduction of a period of stability and security.⁹⁰⁴ Juwaynī cites a contemporary proverb to express the precarious situation that Chin Temür found himself in after the order had gone out from Qaraqorum for Tayir Bahā'dur to subdue Khorasan using more traditional Mongol methods. ' "The wolf must be taught to sew, but he can tear very well already" and in this fashion the [Mongol] army was to seek slaughter and rapine [even] in the earth.'⁹⁰⁵ The proverb might also be indicative of the role that the Juwaynīs saw themselves playing in this emerging new world order.

Bahā' al-Dīn Juwaynī continued in office after Chin Temür's peaceful though early death in 1235 and became *Şāhib Dīwān* and a confidant of the ambitious Uighur, Körgüz,⁹⁰⁶ another dependant of the House of Jochi.⁹⁰⁷ Surviving the intrigues which were later to sweep away Körgüz, Bahā' al-Dīn continued in the service of the Amīr Arghun Aqa accompanying him on his journeys to Qaraqorum and ensuring that his son, the young Aṭā Malik, was noticed and given a place in the amīr's retinue. On the accession of Möngke Qa'an the young Juwaynī received a *yarligh* and a *paiza* on behalf of his father confirming the office of *Şāhib Dīwān*.⁹⁰⁸ The office had become a burden to Bahā' al-Dīn, now sixty years old, and it was with reluctance that he again took up the responsibilities of the wazi-rate wishing rather that he be permitted to spend his last years in the more worthwhile and serious business of scholarship.

*He was wearied and disgusted with service in the Divan, and repenting [in time] before falling into the whirlpool of regret he had decided to himself to withdraw his feet beneath the skirt of contentment and make up for the days he had passed in frivolity and idleness.*⁹⁰⁹

He died in 1254 at the age of sixty upon reaching his appointed destination, Isfahan, a disgruntled man if the words of his bilingual *qita*, quoted by his son in the *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā*,⁹¹⁰ were indicative of his hopes and wishes for the future. However the regrets that he expressed in these heavy lines might well have stemmed from the traditionally felt contrition experienced by those who have not spent

their rich and splendid lives under a self-imposed yoke of scholarly asceticism and epicurean deprivation. 'And be not deceived by singing women, for sweet praises are worse than the teeth of torture.'⁹¹¹ The conceit was a commonly valued solace for a troubled conscience, a form of which is recounted in Sa'dī's story of the dismissed wazīr now a dervish, who was later unsuccessfully recalled to his former office by a repentant Pādešāh. The story ends thus:

*The king said: 'Verily we stand in need of a man of sufficient intelligence who is able to carry on the administration of the government.' He [the former wazīr] replied: 'It is a sign of sufficient intelligence not to engage in such matters.'*⁹¹²

Bahā'al-Dīn was recognised by his contemporaries and by later men of note not only as an able administrator but as a competent scholar and poet. Not only his son quotes his verses but also Aṭā Malik's self-styled continuator, Waṣṣāf, and the Qāzī of Isfahan, NiOām al-Dīn, in *Shuraf Aywān al-Bayān fī Sharaf Bayt Šāhibad-Dīwān*, a book dedicated to the Juwaynīs, father and two illustrious sons and containing examples of their verse.⁹¹³

'Aṭā Malik had been in continuous service with the Mongols for about ten years when his father died and was already exceptionally well travelled. During this time he had earned great esteem at the Mongol court particularly with Möngke, a fact recorded by subsequent Persian chroniclers. "Aṭā Malik was held in the greatest possible esteem in Möngke Qa'an's court."⁹¹⁴ He was born in 1226 and spent the years from 1243 until 1256 in the court of the amīr Arghun Aqa. Juwaynī gives an account of the state of his world at the time of his commencing the *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā*, and the reasons behind his starting this ambitious literary project. He, like his father, saw the time spent at the *Dīwān* as somehow wasted and frivolous.

*In the flower of my youth, which should be the season for laying the foundation of virtues and accomplishments, I complied with the words of my contemporaries and coevals, who were the brethren of devils and before I was twenty years of age I was employed on the work of the Divan, and in the management of affairs and the transaction of business neglected the acquisition of knowledge and heeded not the advice of my father. . . . It is idle to regret and lament the waste of the days of study just as it is profitless to bemoan and bewail the days of idleness.*⁹¹⁵

Now at the desperate age of thirty with life apparently holding little magic for the future, 'What pleasure is there now? And if there be

pleasure, a hundred goblets for a loaf when the wedding feast is over!'.⁹¹⁶ Juwaynī ruminates and decides that in fact all is not yet lost since at least he has travelled extensively during these wasted years and has seen 'the confines of Machin and farthest China'⁹¹⁷ and has heard and observed so much he must now comply with the command-like wishes of his friends and 'reduce(d) to writing all that was confirmed and verified and call(ed) the whole of these narrations *Juwaynī's History of the World-Conqueror*'.⁹¹⁸

In his introduction to his history Juwaynī dwells at length on the dire state of his homeland at the time of writing and attempts to see the divine purpose behind the irruption and subsequent ascendancy of the gentile Mongols in the lands of Islam. Juwaynī was not an eye-witness to the initial wave of destruction that followed the Mongols' invasion of Khwārazm but he was unequivocal in his testament to the extent of the devastation caused by their brutal arrival. While conceding that the prospects for Transoxiana were relatively favourable and for cities like Bokhara positively rosy, his prognosis for Khorasan, the land he knew best, was gloomy.

*Every town and every village has been several times subjected to pillage and massacre and has suffered this confusion for years, so that even though there be generation and increase until the Resurrection the population will not attain to a tenth part of what it was before.*⁹¹⁹

If Juwaynī had been wary of upsetting the sensibilities of his Mongol masters he fully knew that he was on safe grounds in describing the horrors perpetrated by their disciplined armies and the awful fate that would await those foolish enough to resist the 'punishment of God'⁹²⁰ since it was this very dread of their coming which had accounted for much of the Mongols' initial spectacular success. Juwaynī's account of the dreadful fate that befell Khorasan at the hands of Tolui's armies in no way tries to excuse or lessen the horror and brutality of the massacres and plunder. However he also notes that the Muslim levies working with the Mongols were hardly unwilling participants in these bloody events.

*The people of Sarakhs (as levies) in avenging their cadī exceeded [the ferocity of] such as had no knowledge of Islam or religion and passed all bounds in the abasement and humiliation [of their fellow Muslims].*⁹²¹

It is in Juwaynī's opening passages to his history that he also makes it plain that his real ire and venom are directed not so much against the Tatars 'since the Mongols were aided by Fortune and assisted by

Fate'⁹²² but against those of his fellow Muslims who had taken advantage of the terrible events of those transitional times and were currently in positions of power and influence. In a bitter tirade in the introduction to his history Juwaynī makes plain his contempt for the legions of opportunists who now appeared to have replaced the worthies of yore. 'All learning must now be sought beneath the earth, because all the learned are in the belly of the earth.'⁹²³ He derides these *arrivistes* who unlike his own family are without pedigree, background or learning and whose ancestry has appeared in the same manner as wild grass.

*They regard lying and deception as exhortation and admonishment and all profligacy and slander bravery and courage. . . . They consider the Uighur language and script to be the height of knowledge and learning. Every market loungee in the garb of iniquity has become an emir; every hireling has become a minister, every knave a vizier and every unfortunate a secretary; every ['mustadfi' shivering wretch] a Mustawfi and every spendthrift an inspector; every rogue a deputy treasurer and every boor a minister of state; . . . [etc., etc.,] they consider the breaking of wind and the boxing of ears to proceed from the kindness of their nature . . . and they deem vituperation and sottishness to be the consequences of a scatheless mind. In such an age, which is the famine year of generosity and chivalry and the market day of error and ignorance, the good are sorely tried and the wicked and evil firmly established.*⁹²⁴

Such sentiments declaiming the present and inviting contrast with the golden age of the past were hardly an innovation of the young Aṭā Malik.⁹²⁵ They have been, and no doubt will continue to be, a constant throughout history.

However if Juwaynī is predictable in his condemnation of his times and of many of his contemporaries, his words do prove very revealing of the man and the future governor of Baghdad. In his later chapters he is specific in his attacks and his upbraiding is brought against named officials such as the 'nefarious' Sharaf al-Dīn, Arghun Aqa's widely condemned *basqaq*, and since he was about to take up a very powerful and influential government position, he must have felt it to be in his capabilities to put an end to this deplorable situation which he had been describing at some length.

Since the 1220s when the Mongol hordes had first been unleashed upon the lands of Iran in waves of often vengeful conquest, the countries of the Persian plateau had been suspended in a state of what was often mere anarchy as rival armies clashed and, centreless, the eastern Islamic world fell apart. Hülegü Khan's advent had been widely welcomed by the Karts, the Armenians and Georgians among

others and his westward triumphant march was seen by many as the return of a king, government and stability. Hülegü Khan had come to fill the dreadful political vacuum that had existed since the collapse of the Khwārazmshāh's oppressive and predatory empire. In his entourage were the Juwaynis and their ilk, and it was partly to these able administrators that he was to give responsibility for the rebuilding of his new kingdom. Juwaynī had a profound faith in the ultimate justice of God's mysterious ways and he saw Möngke's accession to the throne, Hülegü's establishment over the chaos of Persia, and his own appointment in a position of power as harbingers of good:

*when such events occur as the devastation of countries and the scattering of peoples through the adversity of the good and the triumph of the evil there are wise saws [maxim, ḥekmathā] rolled up inside them.*⁹²⁶

Belief that kingship was divinely bestowed was a widely held and rarely questioned assumption of the times. The Kubrawī⁹²⁷ Sufi Najm al-Dīn Rāzī (d.1256) saw the king as an instrument of divine pleasure or displeasure:

*Those who are kings of the world [as opposed to kings of religion] are the form for God's attributes of favour and wrath, but they are imprisoned within their forms and unable to recognise their attributes. God's attributes of favour and wrath are manifest through them, but not of them.*⁹²⁸

It was after the destruction of the despised heretics of Alamūt that Juwaynī claims finally to have seen clearly God's divine purpose, 'the truth of God's secret intent by the rise of Chinggis Khan has become clear'.⁹²⁹ He was even able to see the hand of God at work in the Mongols' all powerful *Yasa* and noted the features it possessed in common with Islam's divine edicts: 'There are many of these ordinances which are in accordance with the *Shariāt*'⁹³⁰ If Chinggis Khan had been God's wrath and divine punishment now was the time for God's bounty and just as their Mongol kings were carrying out his mysterious designs so too were the Juwaynīs fulfilling his wishes in their appointed positions which enabled them to represent and safeguard the interests of the Muslim subjects of the World Emperor. That they received such warm and widespread praise during and after their reigns from so many Muslim notables confirms that this was indeed the view that the majority held of their government positions. It was Sa'dī of Shiraz, a friend and great admirer of both Juwaynīs, whose patronage and largesse he enjoyed, who declared the following

in one of his many eulogies to the ministers: ‘God has given East and West to the Il-Khan [thus] you are responsible for the safety and the protection of the treasures of the world’.⁹³¹ Sa’dī saw the Juwaynīs as saviours of Islam.

*It is a continuous and sweet hand that could not be said to be wavering
It looks like the hand of the Ṣāḥib Dīwān of the Il-Khan
Trustee [amin] of East and West, high dignitary of government and religion
Whose elevated court resembles the sky.
God wished that Islam, under your protection,
Should remain secure from the arrows of events.
Otherwise insurrection would have sharpened its teeth so
that in this land not a tower nor one homely retreat [nest] would remain.
It is fitting that he who was able to distinguish, should perform
commendable deeds
For it is only a person’s righteousness or maleficence that survives in
history.*⁹³²

Sa’dī saw their rule as a present golden age and the past as the time of strife and corruption and though many of the flood of pages addressed to the rich and powerful brothers can be dismissed as the hyperbolic panegyrics so popular and typical of the court poetry of the time, evidence exists of genuine affection and mutual regard between poet and ministers.⁹³³ Another short verse expresses Sa’dī’s view of the land under their charge.

*Iraq is cool in the shadow of your protection
Not your protection, rather God’s favour.
Under your guardianship it is not strange that in the land of Persians and
Arabs
The wolf is unable to show enmity toward the flock.*⁹³⁴

Included in Sa’dī’s *Kulliyāt*, a collection completed some fifty years after his death, is some correspondence between the Ṣāḥib Dīwān and the poet wherein the minister seeks the poet’s advice on some curiously juvenile questions such as ‘Is a man better, or a devil?’, ‘Is a noble better, or a common man?’, ‘Is a Ḥājji better, or one who has not performed the Ḥājji?’⁹³⁵ though at least one authority, Arthur Arberry, doubts the authenticity of this particular material.⁹³⁶ There is also recorded an encounter between the venerated Sheikh Sa’dī and the Il-Khan Abaqa which took place after the Mongol king had witnessed his two most highly ranked Persian wazirs, Aṭā Malik and Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, greeting the esteemed and already famed poet

of Shiraz with extravagant deference. ‘Both of them dismounted and turned toward me [Sa’dī] and when they reached me they kissed my hands and feet. . . . When Sultan Abaqa saw this situation he said, “How many years has this Shams al-Dīn been with me and has known that I am the Pādeshāh of the Earth, and yet never has he shown me such humility or kindness as he has just this moment shown this man.”’⁹³⁷ Qazvīnī, in his introduction to the *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā*, expresses grave misgivings about the authenticity of this tale citing as his reason for doubt the extremely obsequious tone of other of Sa’dī’s compositions addressed to the brothers and finding it unlikely that the recipients of such panegyrics could then show equal servility towards the author of such verses. He quotes a typical verse of Sa’dī’s though more extravagant examples abound: ‘You [Aṭā Malik] are a mountain of generosity and I am drowning in the sea of poverty unless the favourable wind of your good fortune blows me to the shore’.⁹³⁸ Arthur Arberry is not so dismissive of the likelihood of Sa’dī’s authorship of this episode nor of its veracity and points out that

*the story reflects faithfully the popular picture, in the Persia of those centuries, of the poet’s role in society. It is true to say that in no other age, and among no other people, has the man of creative genius, the scholar, the scientist, the artist, the writer, enjoyed so great esteem or found open to his proved merit such inviting doors to advancement.*⁹³⁹

‘Aṭā Malik Juwaynī sometimes revealed himself in his writing to be a humble man and was well able to view the foibles and conceits of his fellow humans with a dispassionate and knowing eye. It seems most unlikely that he would have taken the words penned by his beneficiaries too much to heart or in any literal sense. Such excesses as, ‘Whosoever sees your face, compares the sun with your face and supposes it [your face] to be the sun!’,⁹⁴⁰ were the literary sport of the time, verbal gymnastics and erudite acrobatics whose parameters and conventions would have been known to both parties. Sa’dī was quite open about the real debt he felt he owed his illustrious patron: ‘Your approval of me has spread my name around the world, because of the Ṣāḥib Dīwān my Dīwān has become cherished.’⁹⁴¹ For Sa’dī, the Juwaynīs were of course benefactors but they also provided him a haven when for unknown reasons he was forced to flee his beloved Shiraz while his verses also point to a deep friendship. In one eulogy Sa’dī berates his ‘lover’, the Ṣāḥib Dīwān, for not visiting him frequently enough. Hidden amongst the absurdly hyperbolic imagery and wildly exaggerated encomia is one most revealing *bayt* in which the poet complains of the unjust and tortuous treatment the Ṣāḥib Dīwān’s absence constitutes and reminds him that such treatment is

not permitted in the *Yasa* of which he is the upholder. 'I complain to the honoured *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* of the Il-Khan, that in his *Yasa* such oppression of the weak is not [permitted].'⁹⁴² Aṭā Malik Juwaynī was clearly not alone in his view that the Mongols' legal system was not wholly bad and bereft of merit.

While Juwaynī was scathing in his attacks on the shortcomings of his contemporaries and bitterly rued the decline in the status of the old educated and cultured élite of which he obviously considered himself one of the few surviving members, many qualities in the manner, behaviour and government of the new masters of the world impressed him greatly. His views are owed respect and serious consideration since, from an early age, Juwaynī had travelled extensively within the Mongol empire and he was intimately knowledgeable about its inner workings. He knew his Mongol masters well and though he obviously regretted their actions in their role as agents of God's wrath he admired much in their administration and saw divine providence in the unfolding drama of the house of Chinggis's rise.

*I beheld the effects of that justice whereby all creation hath recovered and bloomed again [after Möngke's assumption of power] . . . wherein I fulfilled the commandments of the Lord – 'Look to the effects of God's mercy, how He maketh the earth to live after its death.'*⁹⁴³

Juwaynī noted also the dramatic change in the habits of the Mongols themselves that had accompanied their evolving status along with the rise of their Great Khan. Where once their clothes were of the skins of mice and dogs, their food the meat of those animals, their fruit the edible pine cone and their sign of royalty an iron stirrup today Juwaynī proclaimed those 'uncooked' primitives had

*issued forth from the straits of hardship into the amplitude of well-being, from the prison into a garden, from the desert of poverty into a place of delight and from abiding torment into reposeful pleasancess; their raiment being of silk and brocade. . . . Moreover, everyone of them has laid out fields and everywhere appointed husbandmen; their victuals, too, are abundant, and their beverages flow like the River Oxus.*⁹⁴⁴

Chinggis Khan's sons had matured with opulence and power. His grandsons grew up surrounded by both in an environment of increasing sophistication. It was no accident of fate that raised the Great Mongol Khan to this new affluence and splendour.

*God Almighty in wisdom and intelligence distinguished Chinggis Khan from all his coevals and in alertness of mind and absoluteness of power exalted him above all the kings of the world.*⁹⁴⁵

Juwaynī's immediate audience would have been his Persian fellow notables, and ranking administrators. But like Juwaynī himself there was a growing class of young Persian nobles who would have grown up within the *ordus* of the Mongol ruling classes and Turks, Mongols, Uighurs, Armenians and Kurds would have been numbered among their intimates.⁹⁴⁶ Though appropriate respect for their masters might have been expected and direct criticism of Mongol individuals would have been unwise, Juwaynī's praise for many of the qualities of the new rulers would appear to have gone beyond the usual extravagant plaudits and panegyrical flattery which were the norm in the courts of the times. Generally the Mongols were not impressed with ostentation and hyperbolic flattery though this contempt might well have been weakening from prolonged exposure to the lure of the eloquence of Persian court life. Juwaynī quotes 'a tradition of the traditions of God'⁹⁴⁷ to 'prove' his claim that the Tatars were indeed the instruments of divine and mysterious providence.

*'Those are my horsemen; through them shall I avenge me on those that rebelled against me' nor is there a shadow of doubt that these words are a reference to the horsemen of Chinggis Khan and to his people.*⁹⁴⁸

Though not the *Shari āt*, the *Yasa* of Chinggis Khan was strict, clear and was designed to curtail and punish sinful and reprehensible behaviour; in many of its strictures the laws were in accordance with Islamic rulings and 'were praiseworthy from the point of view of reason'.⁹⁴⁹ Unlike other tyrant kings, Juwaynī gushes, Chinggis Khan never had need of recourse to the threat of violence or to menaces; his command to the kings he encountered was to submit or to place themselves in the hands of God who alone knew the consequences of all actions: 'And if ye do otherwise, what know we? God knoweth.'⁹⁵⁰ Such wry humour would no doubt have brought a smile to both Tatar and Tajik lips. Though not Muslims the Tatar lords were laudably free of the curse of bigotry and intolerance and 'honoured and respected the learned and pious of every sect, recognising such conduct as the way to the Court of God.'⁹⁵¹ Juwaynī noted objectively that the Great Khan's children and grandchildren had in many cases followed their own inclinations and had often adopted the religions of their new territories, be it Islam or Christianity, but was quick to emphasise the tolerance that they still maintained for all faiths: 'They still for the

most part avoid all show of fanaticism and do not swerve from the *yasa* of Chinggis Khan, namely, to consider all sects as one and not to distinguish them from one another.⁹⁵² In Juwaynī's view it was this tolerance and religious liberality which had enabled the regeneration of Islam. Added to this was the opening of borders and the encouragement of trade. Even the Mongols' practice of abduction and transportation to the East of the flowers of Islam's greatest cities, the artisans, artists and thinkers, contributed to this rejuvenation and spread of the true faith.

*For this reason the Banner of Islam is raised higher and the candle of the Faith lit brighter; and the sun of the creed of Muḥammad casts its shadow over countries whose nostrils had not been perfumed by the scent of Islam.*⁹⁵³

For a wanderer and in some respects an adventurer like Aṭā Malik it is possible that the pain and disorientation associated with such social dislocation and forcible uprooting did not appear so cruel and damaging as they might to others.

Like many others, including their enemies,⁹⁵⁴ Juwaynī was suitably impressed with the Mongols' military machine and the iron discipline displayed by the Mongol troops.

*It can be read in no history and is recorded in no book that any of the kings that were lords of the nations ever attained an army like the army of the Tatars, so patient of hardship, so grateful for comforts, so obedient to its commanders both in prosperity and adversity; and this not in hope of wages and fiefs nor in expectation of income or promotion.*⁹⁵⁵

Juwaynī's account of the army, its training and organisation, its regular deployment for the *nerge*, and its discipline is no idle exercise in obsequious panegyric. His admiration appears genuine and the contrast he draws with the armies of other rulers and their management of their own troops is censorious: 'How different it is with other kings who must speak cautiously to their own slave.'⁹⁵⁶

Juwaynī also has fulsome praise for the Tatar rulers' lack of ostentation.

*It is one of their laudable customs that they have closed the doors of ceremony, and preoccupation with titles, and excessive aloofness and inaccessibility; which things are customary with the fortunate and the mighty.*⁹⁵⁷

Considering the excessive pomp and ceremony and the sometimes suffocating panegyrics which typify the image of the Medieval Persian court such a sentiment is surprising coming from such an exalted courtier and surely reveal a significant truth lying behind the writing of Juwaynī's history. His audience was primarily his fellow Persians, 'faithful friends and pure-hearted brethren',⁹⁵⁸ although it could be expected that his words would of course be made known to, and would be read, directly or indirectly, by his Mongol masters and colleagues and that therefore prudence would have to be observed in his narration and description of matters directly related to the Lords of the Age, the overbearing eulogies and immoderate exaggeration, requisites for material addressed to a Persian ruler, could certainly be tempered and the language used in his histories made more truly reflective of the views and emotions the writer actually held. Juwaynī stressed more than once that his words were carefully chosen and that his aim was accuracy and his wish was to express himself 'with conciseness and brevity so that those that honour this book with their perusal may not reproach the author of these lines with garrulity'.⁹⁵⁹ Indeed in Juwaynī's exuberant praise of the Qa'an Ögödei, his words are not dissimilar from those of one who could never have been accused of toeing a Tatar line, the historian of the Ghurids, Minhāj Sirāj Jūzjānī, writing around the same time from the relative safety of Delhi.

*By nature, Uktae [Ögödei] was exceedingly beneficent and of excellent disposition and a great friend of the Musalmans. During his reign the Muhammadans in his dominions were tranquil and prosperous in condition and were treated with respect.*⁹⁶⁰

Where praise was due, Juwaynī too, was quite willing to administer it. Unlike Rashīd al-Dīn, his renowned successor, Hülegü's eloquent historian had not been commissioned by his sovereign to write a history of the age. His was more a labour of love and he himself is ready to admit that the time allocated for the writing of his histories had to be snatched from the demands of his other duties.

*[Juwaynī] despite his inclination thereto, has not a single moment for study, save when in the course of distant journeying he snatches a hour or so when the caravan halts and writes down these histories.*⁹⁶¹

Juwaynī interpreted events as manifestations of a wider and greater divine plan. God was 'the Avenger, and the glittering sword of the Tatar was the instrument of his severity'. But this God was also

merciful and beneficent and Juwaynī sought for signs of this munificence in the events that were unfolding around him and in which he thought himself graced to have been cast a role to play. The widely regarded Ögödei whose generous nature and strong sense of justice were acknowledged by friends and foes alike was succeeded by Möngke Khan whose accession, for Juwaynī, was again evidence of blossoming providence and the continuing unfurling of the Muslims' brightening fortunes. He even awarded Möngke the honorific title *ghāzī*, Fighter for the Faith, for his terminal punishment of some Uighur nobles on the complaint of the Muslims of Besh-Baligh.⁹⁶² Möngke's dispatching of his brother Hülegü to take charge of the destabilised affairs of Persia and this prince's initial act of confronting the cancer at the heart of Islam, the curse of the Heretics of Alamūt, was the final proof of God's beneficence and his secret purpose.

It was with Hülegü's appointment to lead the Mongol armies west in order to stabilise Persia and bring the lands under the sway of the Caliph of Baghdad to heel, that the Juwaynī brothers began their rise to the peak of what was becoming their considerable power. It was the then-governor of Persia, Arghun Aqa, who actually appointed Aṭā Malik Juwaynī along with Aḥmad Bitikchi under his son Kerei Malik, to administer the affairs of Khorasan and Iraq for the new king, while he returned to Möngke's court in Qaraqorum.⁹⁶³ That Aṭā Malik was, at this stage, already favourably well-known to Hülegü was evident from an incident which occurred at this juncture when a certain Jamāl al-Dīn Khaṣṣ-Ḥājib, intriguing against the Amīr Arghun presented Hülegü with a list of allegedly corrupt and questionable officials in which the name of the historian had been included. Hülegü demanded that the charges against Aṭā Malik be presented immediately and the matter be dealt with forthwith, whereupon the allegations were promptly withdrawn and Juwaynī's position secured.⁹⁶⁴ Not long after this incident Juwaynī, through the narration of a further anecdote, hints not only at his ready access to the king but to the influence he was able to exert on him. Passing through Khabashān (Quchan) in Khorasan where Juwaynī had previously purchased a quarter of the town, the newly appointed minister prevailed upon Hülegü to take an interest in this particular site and to bestow his royal largesse.

*Having observed the King's interest and pleasure in restoring ruins I brought the case of Khabashān to his attention. He listened to my words and issued a yarligh for the repairing of the qanāts, the erection of buildings, the establishment of a bazaar, the alleviation of the people's lot and their reassembly in the town. All the expense of re-building he met with cash from the treasury so that no charge fell upon the people.*⁹⁶⁵

Juwaynī's elevation in Hülegü's court became particularly evident as the grinding siege of the Ismā'īlī strongholds came to a climax and the minister who had been a party in the negotiations with Rukn al-Dīn, the lord and Imam of the 'Heretics', was commanded to draw up the *yarligh* which would grant the young king safe conduct in return for the submission of his scattered kingdom. Juwaynī celebrated this glorious victory with the composition of the *Fath-nameh of Alamūt* which he dedicated to the world as proof of God's justice and the ultimate righteousness of his chosen human tools.

[Juwaynī] wishes to send these good tidings to all the climes of the world, far and near, and to utter the cry which the tongue of the Faith has caused to reach the souls of all orthodox believers:

The Truth has appeared with firm pillars, with a rising star and a lofty structure,

*While the wrongdoers and the wicked, the aberrant and the rebellious, have stretched out their hands after evil.*⁹⁶⁶

His Mongol masters come in for the usual panegyrics though Juwaynī's language is so insistently and unnecessarily commendatory that the impression of sincerity is irresistible. Just as the Armenian subjects of 'the benevolent and kind-tempered great Hulawū'⁹⁶⁷ were convinced that their new king was especially sympathetic to their faith if he were not actually himself a baptised Christian like his principal wife, Dokuz Khātūn, Juwaynī saw the Mongols' recognition of One God as not incompatible with his own faith in the One God and he conceivably felt that this great mystery would also in time be resolved. For Juwaynī, Hülegü remained 'the Blessed King and Just Monarch – He whose sword is kept strong by religion has the pomp and manner of an Emperor'.⁹⁶⁸ For Juwaynī, the destruction of the Ismā'ilīs was accomplished by 'the swordsmen of Islam'.⁹⁶⁹ With the Assassins' destruction Juwaynī saw that a curse had been lifted from the Muslim world and for the bringer of that 'balm of Muslim wounds' and curer of the 'disorders of the Faith' he called on the faithful to 'pray for the fortune of the happy King who uprooted their [Assassins'] foundations and left no trace of any of them.'⁹⁷⁰

Great though Juwaynī's hatred of the accursed Assassins was, this antipathy did not blind him to the intellectual value of the fabled library of Alamūt and he was able to prevail upon Hülegü to be permitted to retrieve what he would from that priceless depository. In his History the 'pious' writer claims to have saved only copies of the Qoran and other such books along with certain astrological instruments and to have destroyed by fire the books 'which related to their heresy and error and were neither founded on tradition nor

supported by reason.⁹⁷¹ However such claims can be treated with considerable scepticism if only for the reason that Juwaynī proceeded to reproduce Ḥasan-i Šabbāḥ's autobiography⁹⁷² and a detailed history of the Ismā'īlīs and their 'horrible' beliefs and teachings in his own book after his supposed destruction of all such material. It is highly unlikely that a man of Aṭā Malik's intellectual stature and erudition whose deep respect for learning and academic inquiry is unequivocally stated in his own passionate words, would commit such a blasphemy and intellectually repugnant crime as the consignment of a unique and laboriously built library to the flames. That the library survived in a fuller form than as a collection of Qorans and related books is also suggested by the existence of Naṣīr al-Dīn ẓasī's legendary library at Maragheh established shortly after the destruction of Alamūt, and by the works of Rashīd al-Dīn in particular and other historians such as Qāshānī and Mustawfī, whose knowledge suggests access to additional material on the Ismā'īlīs not found in the *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā*. Juwaynī also demonstrates that his intellectual curiosity was far greater than his religious intolerance in his undisguised glee at being let loose not only in the Heretics great library but also in the bowels of their fabled stronghold where he delighted in exploring and marvelling at the ingenuity of the builders.⁹⁷³ That so much material from the library is no longer extant should not be blamed on Juwaynī but rather on the subsequent turbulent history of Iran where, unlike Egypt, longevity was not the fate of its capitals and intellectual storehouses of history. The sorry conclusion to all Rashīd al-Dīn's elaborate but for the most part futile precautions to ensure the survival of his own monumental history, the *Jāmi al-Tavārikh*,⁹⁷⁴ demonstrates the odds against the survival of a body of literature such as was stored in the Assassins' castle, and much of which would have been anathema to its readership. It was with the demise of the Assassins that Juwaynī closes his History of Chinggis Khan and the Mongol people satisfied that:

*In that breeding-ground of heresy in the Radbār of Alamūt the home of the wicked adherents of Ḥasan-i Šabbāḥ and the evil followers of the practice of ibāḥa ['deeming the unlawful lawful'] there remains not one stone of the foundation upon another.*⁹⁷⁵

For Juwaynī this represented the end of an era. The turmoil of Persia and the cancer at the heart of its society were finally at an end. A king had returned to the helm, evil had been expurgated, and a brighter future now beckoned. It was from this point on that Juwaynī's official duties increased dramatically and those moments during his years of wide travel after camp had been struck when he

was able to recollect his thoughts and commit them to paper, were no longer so readily available. He ceased writing at this point and left his colleague, Naṣīr al-Dīn ẓasī to add the final chapter on the fall of Baghdad.

‘Ala al-Dīn ‘Aṭā Malik Juwaynī was appointed governor of Baghdad in 1259, one year after that city’s fall to the Mongols, a date explicitly stated in the historian’s biographical tract, the *Tasliyat al-Ikhwān*.

*When the Ruler of the Empire of ‘Thou givest dominion to whom Thou wilt and wrestest dominion from whom Thou wilt’ had wrested the provinces of ‘Iraq, Baghdad and Khuzistan from the grasp of the control and possession of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphs, and had transferred and consigned them from their hands to the hands of Hülegü, the lord of the world, in the year A.H. 657, one year after the date of that great event, he entrusted the management of the affairs and concerns of that kingdom to the writer of these occurrences, giving him a free hand in the control of affairs and the direction of public policy.*⁹⁷⁶

According to al-Ṣahabī’s *Tārīkh al-Islām*, Juwaynī succeeded Imād al-Dīn Qazvīnī as governor⁹⁷⁷ while the chronicler Ibn al-Fawatī [al-Ghatī] claimed that the appointment followed Qazvīnī’s execution.⁹⁷⁸ Juwaynī had accompanied Hülegü on the siege and conquest of Baghdad though whether his role was as active as it had been in the destruction of the Assassins is not stated in the sources. Whereas Juwaynī was quite explicit in his opinions on, and attitude to, other matters such as the destruction of Khorasan, the crushing of the Ismā‘īlīs, the coming of Hülegü Khan and the reign of Möngke Khan, he remained mute on the subject of Baghdad and the execution of the caliph. It is doubtful whether the actual event had the impact on the society and people of the time as it assumed with the hindsight of history. The political as well as religious enormity now surrounding the fall of Baghdad is the creation of later Islamic and non-Islamic commentators. The caliphs had hardly been instrumental in curbing the influence of the Heretics and had done little to promote justice and stability in the lands under their nominal influence. During the prolonged negotiations with Hülegü, in which it could be assumed Aṭā Malik and more likely his elder brother took an active part, the caliph failed to present himself in either an honourable or sympathetic light. Bar Hebraeus’ judgement of the Caliph al-Mustaṣim reflects the opinions of many of his time: ‘[al-Mustaṣim] was devoted to entertainment and pleasure, passionately addicted to playing with birds, and dominated by women. He was a man of poor judgment, irresolute, and neglectful of what is needful for the conduct of government.’⁹⁷⁹ Though the caliph had been used as a source of

legitimacy for Islamic potentates, the Khwārazmshāh Alā al-Dīn Moḥammad had demonstrated how easily respect could transform into contempt once this caliphal recognition was withheld.

Waṣṣāf records that Ala al-Dīn [Aṭā Malik?], the Persian [*al-ajam*] was sent as a *Shaḥna* to the Shi'ites of Ḥilla during the siege after Hülegü was approached by a delegation of Alids from within the stricken city. These divines claimed that Alī ibn Abī zālīb himself had prophesied the coming of the Mongols, 'the sons of Kantura', to deliver God's judgement on the wicked city of Baghdad.⁹⁸⁰ At the time of the siege, Hülegü had appointed Fakhr al-Dīn Damghānī⁹⁸¹ as *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* of Baghdad and this official along with the new court favourite Naṣīr al-Dīn žasī had taken charge of most of the negotiations that had been going on with the caliph and his agents. Rashīd al-Dīn however confirms that Aṭā Malik was a member of Hülegü's party when it began its final assault on the 'City of Peace'.⁹⁸² If the Alā al-Dīn Ajamī, mentioned in Waṣṣāf's and Banākātī's accounts of the events of this time, was indeed the historian Juwaynī, this might explain the absence of Juwaynī's own description of such an historic episode and the inclusion of Naṣīr al-Dīn žasī's simple but detailed narrative in many of the extant manuscripts of Juwaynī's. Though with the interpretative eyes of hindsight the fall of the Abbāsīd caliphate seems a defining moment in Islamic history those who were actual witnesses of these 'calamitous' events presented a more pragmatic and human view of the drama. According to Rashīd al-Dīn's sources, the defiant Malik Kāmil of Mayāfāriqīn made a rallying speech to his subjects, urging them to resist the Tatar onslaught and promising them his bounty: 'Thank God, I am not like Mustāṣīm a worshipper of dirhems and dinars, who because of his miserliness and parsimony lost both his head and the kingdom of Baghdad.'⁹⁸³

It was for his work as governor of those lands which had been under the direct control of the late caliph, namely Baghdad, Lower Mesopotamia and Khuzistan, that Ala al-Dīn Aṭā Malik Juwaynī earned the approbation echoed by most subsequent Muslim officials, chroniclers, writers, poets and notables. It is in reference to this period also that the name of his brother Shams al-Dīn in his position as *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* and Grand Wazir to first Hülegü and then to Abaqa Khan, becomes commonplace in the sources.

[Hülegü] selected the *Ṣāḥib Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Juvainī* and conferred upon him the office of *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* of the countries, making his hand strong and absolute in the loosing and binding, the organisation and control of the affairs of the kingdom. The kingdom of Baghdad he bestowed upon his brother the *Ṣāḥib Alā al-Dīn, Aṭā Malik* and so reorganised the

There was none of the censure so predominant in the anachronistic criticisms of later European and modern historians in the eulogies and chronicles which were written closer to the Juwaynīs' time and place. In Qazvīnī's scholarly introduction to the *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā* the eminent editor of so many classical Persian texts quotes from a selection of later Arabic writers all fulsome in their praise of the brothers.⁹⁸⁵ These writers would appear in the main to have shared Aṭā Malik Juwaynī's interpretation of the irruption of the Mongols on the world and on Islam in particular, and also to have accepted the brothers' position in the divine scheme of events. Apart from the usual panegyrics some specifics are recounted. In al-Ṣahabī's (d.1348) *Tārīkh al-Islām*, the brothers are praised for the kindness they showed to the people and their promotion of the prosperity of the lands under their charge. al-Ṣahabī claims that Aṭā Malik freed the peasantry from many taxes, concentrated his concerns on the welfare of the villages and also succeeded in doubling the revenues of Iraq. It was claimed that he ensured that this prosperity spread throughout the towns and villages while through his construction of a canal from the Euphrates, beginning in al-Anbar and stretching to the Tomb of Alī in Najaf, along which were built 150 villages, enough wealth was generated to enable the restoration of Baghdad to something like its former splendour. Mirza Muḥammad Qazvīnī, Juwaynī's modern editor, credits Aṭā Malik, though nominally subordinate to the Mongol General, Sunjaq Aqa, with spending more than 100,000 dinars of red gold on the canal project and the associated reclamation and construction work, all of which resulted in 'converting the hitherto desert land lying between these two places [al- Anbar, ten *parsangs* from Baghdad, and Najaf] into verdant and smiling groves and pastures'.⁹⁸⁶ In the holy city of Najaf Juwaynī constructed a *ribat*, the Mashad 'Ali, for theological students, the best known of the many endowments which are alluded to everywhere.

Shams al-Dīn who was made Hülegü's *Ṣāhib Dīwān* in 1262 following the execution of Sayf al-Dīn Bitikchi,⁹⁸⁷ was, like his brother, credited with bringing justice and prosperity to the lands which fell under his jurisdiction and 'lavishing his virtuous efforts'⁹⁸⁸ together with his great wealth, derived from an income estimated at equalling 10,000 dinars a day,⁹⁸⁹ on good works for the benefit of all. Shams al-Dīn held a higher position than that of his brother. As well as the two Iraqs, Anatolia, stretches of Syria and even parts of India came under his control, and according to a later Timurid source, Sayf al-Dīn Ḥājji b. NeOām Aq'īlī, both the army and the peasantry were grateful to, and well satisfied with, his reign.⁹⁹⁰ Mustawfī credited the

Chief Wazir with the construction of a thirty-two-arched bridge near Miyānij in Azerbaijan⁹⁹¹ and in the region of Āvah and Sāvah the building of a dam upon which the whole area depended for its irrigation.⁹⁹² An interesting example of the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*'s pragmatic philanthropy is cited in both of the fifteenth-century local histories of Yazd. Commanding his local representative, a wealthy, respected merchant named Shams al-Dīn Moḥammad Tāzīga,⁹⁹³ to construct a hospital in his name, the chief minister first complained that his *na'ib*'s proposals were far too modest, suitable for one of Tāzīga's stature maybe but not for someone of his own standing. When revised and greatly enlarged plans were consequently submitted envisaging elaborately decorated and tiled buildings including a *madresseh*, a lunatic asylum, a hospital, a 'pharmacy', water and ice storage facilities, mosques and a *khanqah* the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* wrote back that while the original plans might have been overly modest these latest plans were rather extravagant. In response his agent, Tāzīga, wrote back assuring the minister that any financial excesses would be met from his own pocket. Though Juwaynī was suitably eulogised for this particular charity by the Herati poet Emāmī, 'Every breath, a hundred Ḥātims, every glance, a hundred Nashīrwāns, Khwāja of the *dīwān* of the seven climes, Sun (Shams) of the angels and religion', he never actually visited Yazd to see his completed works.⁹⁹⁴ Shams al-Dīn's abilities were recognised by Hülegü's son and heir Abaqa and not only did the wazir retain his prominent post on the new Il-Khan's succession but his son, the infamously 'pious' Bahā' al-Dīn, was made governor of the province of Isfahan.

Bahā' al-Dīn Juwaynī's severe interpretation and implementation of the *Shari āt* has given rise to a number of legendary accounts of his harshness. While revelling in the horror of many of these anecdotes these accounts would sometimes fall short of censure since it was duly noted that his extreme behaviour was practised for supposedly pious reasons and the dividends of his rule, security, law and order, would always be stressed. Waṣṣāf narrated the oft repeated story of the fearsome man of God's ordering the execution of his favourite son for the sin of playfully grasping his young father's beard.⁹⁹⁵ Another story tells of his becoming annoyed from the persistent stares of one of the street rabble. Called to account for his insolence, the poor man's tongue was struck dumb from fear and in anger Bahā' al-Dīn gouged out the 'sinner's' eyes. His uncompromising demand for perfection at all times is illustrated by the punishment meted out to three night guards he had sent his *ghulām* and confidant, Nīkpaī, to spy upon. All three received seventy lashes even though one of the guards had not been found sleeping or neglecting his duties. However in Bahā' al-Dīn's eyes the fact that this night-watchman had failed to realise that

he was being spied upon was reason enough for reproach and chastisement.⁹⁹⁶ His own brother, Hāran, of whose literary and artistic merits Bahā' al-Dīn was most envious, did not escape his zealous and pious captiousness. At a drinking feast the stern Bahā' al-Dīn was outraged to overhear his drunken brother address the eminent and widely revered sheikh, Mawlānā Ṣafī al-Dīn Abd al-mumin as simply Ṣafī al-Dīn. His quick-witted brother replied that since he held so much in common with the Abbāsīd Caliph Hāran al-Rashīd, citing his official position, the family connections through his Abbāsīd wife,⁹⁹⁷ his own name and that of his son, Māman, why then should it be considered strange for him to address those at the court in the manner of a caliph?⁹⁹⁸

Shocked by such incidents, the Ṣāḥib Dīwān wrote warning his son of the dire consequences of such killings and tortures but, according to Waṣṣāf,⁹⁹⁹ to no avail. It was fate that brought his brutal regime to an end in 1279 with his early death at the age of thirty. It is interesting to speculate on the causes of his death since Bahā' al-Dīn shared a surprising trait other than premature expiration in common with his heathen masters, namely, a liking for drink.

*[Bahā' al-Dīn would] seek relaxation with his learned boon-companions sipping from bowls of wine . . . to drive off tiredness he requested goblets of deep red wine from the maīdān of epicurean pleasure.*¹⁰⁰⁰

Waṣṣāf defended the harshness of his rule by relating reports he had heard that following the Ṣāḥib's death, crime and killing had again returned to the streets of Isfahan and that the number of victims of crime far exceeded the number executed on Bahā' al-Dīn's orders. It is only right opines Waṣṣāf that the disobedient and the seditious should be given punishment.¹⁰⁰¹

In addition to killing and drinking it is widely reported that Bahā' al-Dīn also did his share of 'good works' more in keeping with his family's traditions. He built palaces, gardens and parks and devoted some of his time to the arts and to learned discourse. Despite his harsh exterior and apparent callousness, Isfahan's governor, Waṣṣāf would have his readers believe, was possessed of generosity and munificence and was a man particularly attentive to the needs of the learned and the 'ulamā'.¹⁰⁰² Khwāndamīr, writing with hindsight, was able to summarise his period in office as positive since the governor of Isfahan 'maintained such wise policies that the area was protected and flourished'. The celebrated poet Majd al-Dīn Hamgar was a pro-tégé of this governor although his better known compositions were written for the Ṣāḥib Dīwān, while a student of this master, Badr al-Dīn Jājaramī, actually addressed *ghazals* and *qaṣīdehs* to Bahā' al-Dīn.¹⁰⁰³

Shams al-Dīn Kāshī famed for his versification of the *Tārīkh-i Ghazānī* of Rashīd al-Dīn, is said to have addressed his best work and most elaborate *qaṣīdas* to the honour of Bahā' al-Dīn.¹⁰⁰⁴ Bahā' al-Dīn's father, the *Ṣāhib Dīwān*, Shams al-Dīn, composed a couplet to mourn his youthful death. Waṣṣāf claims that Bahā' al-Dīn was his favourite son on whom he relied for support and encouragement and wished this, so often decried, son to inherit his high office after his own death.¹⁰⁰⁵ Even the modern literary historian, E. G. Browne is not without a good word for Bahā' al-Dīn, commending his patronage of scholars, poets and artists and expressing admiration for the law and order prevailing in Isfahan and its province during Bahā' al-Dīn's reign.¹⁰⁰⁶ Though they defended and justified this prodigal son, the fact that the writers of this time felt under no compulsion to conceal or to minimise the brutality or depravity of the reign and behaviour of so high-born and well connected an official is a testament to the sincerity, relative honesty and comparative reliability of their work and another indication of the relatively liberal intellectual climate of those tumultuous times.

Though their names would have been ensured a place in history merely by their longevity as chief ministers, a notoriously unhealthy job with a high fatality rate, both Juwaynī brothers were enthusiastic and overly generous patrons of the arts and especially of poets and this beneficence secured for them immortality through an abundance of grateful words and a plethora of eulogies and extravagant anecdotes attesting to their piety and charities. Sa'dī's *Kulliyāt* abounds with near idolatrous tribute to both brothers: 'If a thousand Sa'dīs sang your praise continuously, you would deserve a thousand times more',¹⁰⁰⁷ 'So long as God kneads into shape the flowers of Adam and embroiders into being his creatures, never again shall he create from clay such as you, . . . such an idol has never existed [even] in the temples of China.'¹⁰⁰⁸ But this panegyric excess was neither universal nor demanded. The satirist Pūr-i Bahā' was quite unafraid to address long poems of extravagant complaint to his exalted patrons. His praise is spiked with impudence when in a poem deriding the severity and unfairness of Il-Khanid taxation he notes that his patron is, 'The Lord of the viziers, Alā al-Daula wal-Dīn, Whose justice (has) levied *qopčur* on the whole world'. Later he also notes that it is not only the Persians who suffer from such tax burdens but that Mongol lords are also required to pay their dues. 'In thy time the kingdom has become such that, on the order of the sheep, The shepherd's dog collects *qopčur* from the wolf.'¹⁰⁰⁹ That Pūr-i Bahā' felt confident enough to write such hard-hitting verse lacking in the usual panegyric filigree says as much about the poet's audaciousness as about his patrons' liberality and tolerance.

In the two brothers' case their record on patronage is not marred by any suggestion that their regimes were characterised by oppression or terror of the kind associated with the infamous Bahā' al-Dīn Juwaynī. The Qazvīnī poet, Jamāl al-Dīn Rustuq al-Qutnī, was another poet who benefited from the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*'s patronage and though usually composed in the Pahlavi dialect, one verse of his in Persian perhaps captures the mood of the times. This short verse may explain why the general prosperity and broadened commercial horizons which accompanied the establishment of the Il-Khanate and characterised the rule of the Juwaynīs seemed to justify acquiescence to heathen rule and acceptance of the demise of the House of Abbās.

*O Gold, thou art that which compasseth all pleasures: thou art the Beloved of mankind at all times:
Without doubt thou art not God, yet, like God, thou art the Concealer of Faults and the Fulfiller of Needs.*¹⁰¹⁰

Better known was the poet Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn Kāshī whose often flippant and satirical poems targeted among others the venerated Sa'dī of Shiraz, again suggesting that in an age when ostentatious panegyrics were so often a prerequisite for patronage the Il-Khan's chief ministers did not take this seductive and corrupting flattery too much to heart. The Malik Razī al-Dīn Bābā Qazvīnī and governor of Diyar Bakr under Abaqa Khan, when he was dismissed from his post, felt no compunction in complaining, in verse of course, to the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* about the injustice of this act and the unsuitability of his replacement, the eunuch Amīr Jalāl al-Dīn. The message was plain, the wording clever, and the personal laudation minimal.¹⁰¹¹ The cheeky exchange between the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* and the poet Imād al-Dīn Faḡulavī the Lar is well known and is again demonstrative of the Juwaynīs' accessibility and lack of pretension. In reply to the minister's provocative comment during a game of chess, concerning the size of the poet's wife's arse, Imād the Lar is said to have answered:

*Although thou utterest words [precious] as pearls, be careful! for thou talkest with Imād the Lar: Thy fault is this, that at chess thou sayest too often, 'Ay, your wife's arsehole is wide'.*¹⁰¹²

Majd al-Dīn Hamgar's invective was legendary but he too received the chief minister's patronage. Al-Ḥababī has been cited for the information that every author who dedicated a book to the Juwaynīs received from them a thousand dinar in gold and that this was one of

the reasons that the number of poets, scholars and writers seeking their patronage and largesse was so great.¹⁰¹³ Even the celebrated *Qalandar* and writer of erotic and mystical verse, Fakhr al-Dīn ‘Irāqī, penned a work in exaltation of the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*: ‘Lord and Master of time and place, leader of Islam, great Ṣāḥib, glory of the Arabs, great regulator of the Persians, Āṣaf of the Age, ruler of the world’.¹⁰¹⁴ It is said that the dedication of ‘Irāqī’s mathnawī, *Eshaqnameh*, to the ‘Lord of lords of the Earth, Khwaja of the days Shams al-Dīn¹⁰¹⁵ is in memory of the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*, his friend and patron to whom it is related he owed his life. Qonqurtai, Hülegü’s ninth son, whose troops were securing the borders of the Parvānū’s kingdom of Rum had demanded the presence of the poet at his court after hearing stories that the treasures of Rum had been transferred into his hands. Shams al-Dīn, realising that the treasures that ‘Irāqī possessed were not those desired by the Mongol lord, forewarned the poet and sent him away to Egypt with 1,000 dinars.¹⁰¹⁶

A poet in the more traditional mode was Humām al-Dīn Tabrizī, the panegyrist of both the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* and his son Sharif al-Dīn Hāran, whose verses exalted his powerful patrons in the usual extravagant style typified by the following:

*[My] house is Paradise today for Rażwān (the Gardener of Heaven) is here, [it is] the time to nourish the soul for the beloved is here, . . . So what of the grief from the inspectors, the Shahna and the clamour without, for today Khwāja Hāran the son of the Ṣāḥib Dīwān is here.*¹⁰¹⁷

This poet who was close to both father and son wrote a long and endearing eulogy following Shams al-Dīn’s death, and included this poem in his *Dīwān*, dedicated to Rashīd al-Dīn under whom he served during the later part of his life.¹⁰¹⁸ He accompanied Shams al-Dīn to Rum when the vizier was sent to look into the affairs of the Parvānū.¹⁰¹⁹ His mathnawī, *Ṣoḥbat-nāmeḥ* was dedicated to the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* and indeed his devotion to the whole Juwaynī family was widely recognised.¹⁰²⁰ In recognition of this bond, Shams al-Dīn granted Humām al-Dīn an annual grant of 1,000 dinar for the upkeep of his *khānūqāḥ*, recorded in an eloquent and extremely laudatory letter, the *idrār-nāmeḥ*, presented by the chief minister to the poet whom he termed, ‘a man unique in his age, the most perfect of men among the Human species’.¹⁰²¹

After a period as governor of Rum where he had been appointed by his father in 1277,¹⁰²² Hāran eventually succeeded his uncle as governor of Baghdad¹⁰²³ (1283) but in contrast to his brother, Bahā’ al-Dīn, he has generally been celebrated for his artistic and scholarly achievements; he was considered one of the most accomplished men

of his age and was known as a poet himself. He was a pupil of the famed musician, the Master Şafī al-Dīn Abd al-Mamin, who had escaped the massacres during the sacking of Baghdad through the breadth of his reputation. Though Hülegü had no fine ear for music he was so impressed by the Master's renown that he ordered the musician to be paid a huge sum of money and to be enlisted in his retinue where he continued to serve into Abaqa's reign. His treatise the *Sharifiyya* was composed in honour of his star pupil, Sharaf al-Dīn Hāran.¹⁰²⁴ Hāran was married to *Sayyida-i Nabawiyya* Rābia, the daughter of Abdul Abbās Aḥmad, the son of the last Caliph al-Mustaşim, and it was said that they named their children after the most illustrious of the caliphs.¹⁰²⁵ Hāran like his father, was executed (1286) in the reign of Arghun following malicious accusations brought against him by the cousin of the historian and geographer Mustawfi, Fakhr al-Dīn Qazvīnī.¹⁰²⁶

It was inevitable that a family occupying so powerful and influential a position in the Il-Khanid Empire would have attracted the jealousy and invective of the enviously ambitious in these boom years of the emerging kingdom. Though the literality of the following incident cannot remain unquestioned since it is an unattributed story recorded by the Safavid historian Khwāndamīr the anecdote perhaps demonstrates the fragility of any official position however exalted during this age. At a banquet it was said that Abaqa Khan after refusing the *Şāḥib Dīwān*'s repeated offer of a goblet of wine, instead, offered his wazir a piece of pork skewered on the point of a knife which Shams al-Dīn then gratefully accepted. Abaqa is reported to have exclaimed, 'This Tajik is certainly bold. I refused the goblet several times but he kept offering it. I had in mind, if he refused the morsel, to pluck his eye out with this knife.'¹⁰²⁷ Another unauthenticated story cited in Ibn Shākir al-Kutubī's [d.1362-3] *Supplement to Ibn Khallikān* describes how Alā al-Dīn Juwaynī was saved from Hülegü's murderous wrath by the cunning and connivance of Naşir al-Dīn žasī¹⁰²⁸ demonstrating that even court favourites were not immune from the capriciousness of their Mongol masters. The mercurial disposition of their kings so often pickled with excessive alcohol was a tempting target for the intriguing opportunist and the scheming courtier and both brothers became, more than once, the objects of courtly manoeuvring. Sodden minds made for easy swaying and negative kneading.

In 1268, Aṭā Malik brought on the wrath of some of the faithful of Baghdad when he intervened in a dispute between them and the Nestorian Catholicus. The Catholicus had seized one of his 'flock' who some years earlier had converted to Islam, with the intention that the apostate should be 'baptised', or by some interpretations 'drowned', in

the Tigris. When the outraged mobs of Baghdad stormed the doors of the Christian sanctuary demanding the Catholicus' head, Aṭā Malik ordered the rescue of the patriarch from his palace, an act which did not endear him to the pious rabble.¹⁰²⁹ It was believed that when two or three years later the wazir was attacked by a band of Assassins while out riding, this was a result of the earlier action of the governor in saving the Catholicus.

Another early attempt to discredit and remove the governor of Iraq al- Arab from office was made by Qarabuqa, the Mongol magistrate of Baghdad, and his deputy, Iṣḥāq the Armenian. The claim was made that Aṭā Malik had been conspiring to escape to the court of the Mamluk sultans in Egypt and to this end had enlisted the help of a bedouin Arab, now ready to testify, to guide him across the desert. However nothing came of this since the Arab soon broke down under interrogation at Abaqa's court and implicated Ishaq the Armenian in his confession. Both men were executed and Juwaynī was set free.¹⁰³⁰ The modern Mamluk historian Reuven Amitai has concluded that the Mamluk sources contain no indications that either of the Juwaynī brothers 'had actually had any kind of contact with the Mamluks'.¹⁰³¹ The author of the *Kitāb al-Fakhri*, Ibn al- ḏiqtaqā, was one of the Juwaynis' most consistent critics, never failing to condemn and find fault, including even casting doubts on the ancestry of the family. The hatred that he felt toward Aṭā Malik followed the treatment his father and his estates had received at the instigation of the wazir. His father had been assassinated and all his possessions and properties had been confiscated. To cover himself Aṭā Malik is claimed to have had the assassins put to the sword.¹⁰³²

But it was the intrigues of the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*'s one time protégé and later rival, Majd al-Mulk of Yazd,¹⁰³³ which were ultimately to cause ruination and indirectly the death of the two brothers. Majd al-Mulk, a noble from a powerful family,¹⁰³⁴ entered Bahā' al-Dīn Juwaynī's service after having acted as wazir for the Atabegs of Yazd and eventually came to the notice of the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* himself who promoted him and appointed him to, among other positions, superintendent of the census in Georgia. The jealous and ambitious Majd al-Mulk sought to discredit his patrons and when he heard Majd al-Dīn ibn al-Athīr, a close advisor to Aṭā Malik, discussing the merits of the Mamluk Sultan's army and its commendable discipline during the course of a conversation, he felt able to misrepresent these words as indicative of treachery and report them to Yisu Buqa Kurgan¹⁰³⁵ knowing that the story would eventually reach the ears of Abaqa Khan. However, more than a hundred blows from the baton failed to make the servant implicate his master and no charges were brought against the Juwaynis. Rather than risk moving directly against one he

perceived as dangerously powerful and influential the *Şāhib Dīwān* thought it more expedient to attempt to co-opt his foe and induce his acquiescence with the granting of the governorship of the Rumi province of Sivas and a sweetener of a *balish* of gold, a ruby and a sum of 10,000 dinar payable on the local exchequer.¹⁰³⁶ This generosity did not have the desired effect and rather than producing gratitude and loyalty from Majd al-Mulk it merely supplied this schemer with 'evidence' of the *Şāhib Dīwān*'s attempts to buy his loyalty and silence. With this 'evidence' Majd al-Mulk gained admission to Prince Arghun's court and it was to Abaqa's son that he presented his accusations against the Juwaynī brothers. When the *Şāhib Dīwān* heard that matters had again reached the Il-Khan's ears and that Abaqa had in anger ordered an immediate enquiry and inspection of the books, he threw himself on Uljay Khātūn's protection.¹⁰³⁷ Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī with the royal lady's assistance was eventually able to extricate himself from this web of deceit thrown down by his enemy but unfortunately for him, his renewed ascendancy was not matched by his foe's fall. Rather than cast Majd al-Mulk on Juwaynī's mercy Abaqa declared that although he had again shown favour to the *Şāhib Dīwān*, he did not hold Majd al-Mulk to be culpable. Abaqa further declared that he wished him to remain in attendance at his court.¹⁰³⁸ Eventually Majd al-Mulk was again promoted and this time was actually appointed to oversee all the lands from 'the Oxus to Egypt' and to govern them in partnership with the *Şāhib Dīwān*. An explanation for Abaqa's motives for such a move must remain pure conjecture.

It was in this position of stalemate that the two verses attributed to the warring wazirs were written: Majd al-Mulk wrote first to Juwaynī;

*Into the Ocean of thy grief I'll dive,
And either drown, or pearls to gather strive,
'Tis hard to fight with thee, yet fight I will,
And die red-throated, or red-cheeked survive.*

and the *Şāhib Dīwān* replied:

*Since to the King complaints thou canst not bear
Much anguish to consume shall be thy share.
Through this design on which thou hast embarked
Thy face and neck alike shall crimson wear.*¹⁰³⁹

But it was not Shams al-Dīn who suffered initially as a result of Majd al-Mulk's intrigues but rather, once again it was his apparently

more vulnerable brother, Aṭā Malik, who became the first target.

It was concerning this very vexing period near the end of his life that Aṭā Malik Juwaynī chose once again to commit himself to manuscript. The painful episode is described in his *Tasliyat al-Ikhwān* and in another, untitled complementary manuscript. Accused of corruption and gross misappropriation of state funds Aṭā Malik deemed it worth paying up just to keep his tormentors at bay.

*Although it was known to all that these charges were baseless, and that the existence of the above mentioned balance was entirely false and fictitious, I nevertheless agreed to pay this sum, simply in order to save myself and many of my friends from shameful and degrading squabbles with these wretches.*¹⁰⁴⁰

Since he had money already owed him from the treasury he would simply offset one amount with the other he continued. This was not enough to satisfy Majd al-Mulk who had succeeded in convincing Abaqa that the extent of Aṭā Malik's embezzlement was truly on a grand scale and that only a thorough search of his private estates would reveal the hidden wealth. Even the intercession of his brother, the *Ṣāhib Dīwān*, who had donated his own and the donations of others' wealth to help pay off the alleged debt, could not dissuade the Il-Khan from giving leave to Majd al-Mulk to continue the humiliation and ruination of the once respected and loved wazir. The graves of his children and kinsfolk were dug up, his servants were tortured and finding no hidden treasures the looters made off with the actual contents of Aṭā Malik's house. These indignities finally ceased after the intercession of a number of Mongol princes and princesses on Juwaynī's behalf, most notably Abaqa's brother Qunquratay and Abaqa's favourite wife, Princess Bulughun Khatun. Aṭā Malik was released from prison on 17 December 1281.

This was not the end of the Juwaynīs' tribulations, however, and Majd al-Mulk seeing his efforts to destroy his rivals once more thwarted, revived the rumours and the accusations of treachery and collaboration with the Mamluk enemy in Egypt.¹⁰⁴¹ In fact the contacts that Aṭā Malik had had with the Egyptians had been with a group of rebel Baḥriya Turks who had been fleeing the Mamluk armies of Qaluwun al-Alfī and were now seeking aid from the Il-Khanate in Baghdad in order to establish their own principality in Syria. Aṭā Malik had sent representatives of the defectors led by Sunqur al-Ashqar from his base at Sahyun, ahead to Abaqa in the royal camp and when the party arrived it was duly favoured and Aṭā Malik's role in the affair acknowledged.¹⁰⁴² When the governor of Baghdad became aware of the slanderous allegations that had been

put about by his foe and realised that these same accusations were being presented to Abaqa Khan he immediately determined on travelling in person to the royal *ordu* which was then in the environs of Hamadan. On 1 April 1282 he was met half way by some courtiers from the Il-Khan's court and informed that Abaqa had been convinced of his innocence on all charges and had commanded that all the wazir's confiscated property should henceforth be restored to him. Before he could arrive to receive the Il-Khan's favour in person Abaqa had died, apparently from delirium tremens and pending the election of the new Il-Khan, Aṭā Malik was again thrown into jail. The announcement of Aḥmad Tegüdar's accession to the throne was accompanied by the release and demonstrations of Aṭā Malik's return to favour all of which the historian records in considerable detail.¹⁰⁴³

Majd al-Mulk was seized and, following a search of his possessions, he was charged with witchcraft, a crime particularly fearsome to the Mongols, and he was ordered to be put into the hands of his enemies. To atone for his crimes his end was fittingly blood-thirsty and horrible as the loosed soldiers 'like the thirsty [seeking] water, the sick [seeking] well-being, thirsted for his blood, every one with swords raised and fire raging'.¹⁰⁴⁴ As the bloody orgy commenced Juwaynī admits to having had pangs of conscience: 'The face of compassion and consideration were continually overcoming [my] nature and I had made a firm resolve that I should not seek more compensation than his crime deserved but the Commanding Soul spoke to [my] heart'.¹⁰⁴⁵ Mongols and Muslims fought to savage Majd al-Mulk whose body they pulled limb from limb while at the same time roasting its parts and devouring them.¹⁰⁴⁶ To meet their victim's wish to occupy the whole kingdom the populace sent his shredded body parts to the far reaches of the Il-Khan's lands, a hand to Iraq, a foot to Fars, his head to Baghdad while his tongue, sold to a bidder for 100 dinars, was sent to Tabriz. To celebrate this gruesome climax to Majd al-Mulk's career the following verses were composed.

*For some brief days thy guile did mischief wreak;
Position, wealth and increase thou didst seek:
Now every limb of thine a land hath taen:
Thou'st overrun the kingdom in a week.*¹⁰⁴⁷

and these punning lines from Bahā' al-Dīn Jāmī (Pūr-i Bahā'):

*He wanted to stretch his hands as far as Iraq,
His grasp never reached that far; his hand, however, did arrive there.*¹⁰⁴⁸

Majd al-Mulk's followers and dependants many of whom, according to Juwaynī, were Christians were rounded up in Alā-zāq where their master had met his fate and were dispatched toward Baghdad. However they were unable to make it through the gates of that city. An angry mob waylaid the party and stoned and stabbed the prisoners and then burnt the bodies. But this was not the end of Majd al-Dīn and his legacy lived on in the memory of Prince Arghun.

‘Alā al-Dīn ‘Aṭā Malik Juwaynī died 5 March 1283 some eight months after his rival, foe and accuser. Great enmity had sprung up between Aḥmad Tegüdar and his nephew Arghun and the two Juwaynī brothers had fallen victims to machinations outside their control. Before his death Majd al-Mulk had informed Arghun that Abaqa, his father, had died from poisoning at the hands of Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī¹⁰⁴⁹ and that he feared for his life because the *Şāhib Dīwān* was aware that this secret was known to him. To Arghun the Juwaynis now appeared as agents of his usurping uncle and the murderers of not only his father but of his faithful servant Majd al-Mulk. Though Arghun was not actually able to seize either ‘Aṭā Malik or the *Şāhib Dīwān* when he moved south from Khorasan to winter in the environs of Baghdad he was able to harass and torment their servants and again revived the old charges of embezzlement against ‘Aṭā Malik. He went so far as to dig up the grave of a recently deceased close friend of ‘Aṭā Malik, Najm al-Dīn Aşfar, and then ordered the corpse to be flung into the road. Upon hearing this distressing news ‘Aṭā Malik was said to be so aggrieved that death was not long in taking him; he died shortly afterwards in Arrān¹⁰⁵⁰ and was later buried in the Charandāb cemetery in Tabriz. His brother the *Şāhib Dīwān* wrote the following verse on hearing of his death: ‘He and I, thou wouldst say, were two lamps which in unison shone; one lamp burneth still, but alas! for the other is gone.’¹⁰⁵¹ An anonymous writer recorded his death for posterity thus:

*‘Aṭā Malik whose equal in this Age does not exist,
Has passed away, alas, a hundred thousand times alas,
Wazir of East and West, benevolent ruler of both worlds.* ¹⁰⁵²

The career of Shams al-Dīn rose again to a peak after the death of Majd al-Mulk during the short reign of Sultan Aḥmad but when Arghun succeeded the Il-Khanid throne he knew that this heralded an eclipse. After he had parted from Aḥmad in Jarjān the news of Arghun's victory reached him as he was nearing Isfahan. He considered continuing his journey to Hormuz and hence to India but the thought of abandoning his children to the prisons of the Mongols held him back. It was the arrival of Malik Imām al-Dīn Qazvīnī

accompanied by Amir Qamārī and the Aṭābeg Yusefshāh Lar that persuaded him to throw himself on the mercy of the new king. The three notables had with them a letter from Arghun upon which were penned guarantees for the Ṣāḥib Dīwān's safety.

*Because the Eternal God has shown me his beneficence, and has bestowed on me the crown and the throne of my good father, I have forgiven the sins of every miscreant. And if the Ṣāḥib Dīwān should make haste to offer his services to me, we shall treat him with favour.*¹⁰⁵³

With this assurance Shams al-Dīn proceeded to Arghun's *ordu* which he reached on 22 September 1284. He was received affectionately by the Il-Khan and his hopes of regaining his old position were rekindled. Whether this initial greeting and the expressions of goodwill were genuine cannot be known for there were enough other voices and interests abroad in Arghun's camp to ensure that a Juwaynī would not again gain a position of such favour and power as he had previously held. The advisors around the Il-Khan, including Fakhr al-Dīn Mustawfī of the Qazvīnī family, reminded the king of the charges of poisoning and embezzlement that had been levied against their captive and insisted on a trial. Qara Buqa prevailed upon the king that Shams al-Dīn should not be left alive. In answer to his accusers the Ṣāḥib Dīwān is recorded as saying:

*I confess a hundred times over to those of my shortcomings that have been reported by these self-interested people, but I have no knowledge whatsoever of any thought of treachery toward my benefactor.*¹⁰⁵⁴

Shams al-Dīn was given leave to make his farewells to his family and to compose a lengthy *Waṣīyat-nāmeḥ* (last will and testament) to the 'ulamā' of Tabriz which both Rashīd al-Dīn and Waṣṣāf record¹⁰⁵⁵ and he was finally executed on Monday 16 October 1284 at noon after prayers by the side of the river in Ahar. A short time later his son Yahya was also executed in the *maidān* of Tabriz¹⁰⁵⁶ and then his other sons.

Waṣṣāf records that the grief at the Ṣāḥib Dīwān's death was widespread and heartfelt. The people of Shiraz who had never actually seen the wazir but knew of him only through his charities and good works were, Waṣṣāf records, broken hearted.¹⁰⁵⁷

With his departure the Sun dripped blood from the red of the western sky, the Moon scratched his face, and Venus cut her locks.

*Night clad itself in black in mourning, and
morning gave a sigh of grief.*¹⁰⁵⁸

If grief was a common emotion expressed by many, other verses acknowledged the loss of a great man and a just ruler¹⁰⁵⁹ and hinted at the injustice of his slaying. In one example his demise was described as having occurred ‘Unjustly, and not by free will, [after he had] Quaffed a portion of wrath’.¹⁰⁶⁰ Another literati essayed this verse:

*That minister whose head oertopped the skies
Hath earned in truth, of martyrdom the prize;
The Ṣāḥib Dīwān, who for thirty years
Hath kept the world secure from hurts and fears.
O cruel heavens such a life to ban!
O cruel earth, to slay so great a man!*¹⁰⁶¹

But praise for Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī was not universal and the Qazvīnī family had not forgotten the sorry end that Majd al-Mulk had been forced to meet. In Mustawfī’s *Tārīkh-i Guzīda* it is this role in the Ṣāḥib Dīwān’s life which the historian, whose family were closer to the fortunes of Arghun Khan and who regarded the Juwaynīs as rivals, decided to record for posterity.

*Since Majdul-Mulk, by God sent destiny,
A martyr in Naw Shahr’s plain did die,
By the Ṣāḥib Dīwān Muḥammad’s spite,
Who ruled the land with unrestricted might,
Two years, two months, two weeks went by, and lo!
Fate bade him drain in turn the cup of woe.
Beware how in this world thou workest harm;
Fate’s scales hold equal weight of bane and balm!*¹⁰⁶²

Another aspect of Aṭā Malik’s character which might also be illuminating as regards his brother considering their closeness, is the historian’s attitude to, and descriptions of, the ‘leaping’ Jalāl al-Dīn Mīnkubirnī, the last and exiled Khwārazmshāh to whom he devotes considerable space in the *Jahān Gushā*. Even before the fall of their empire the Khwārazmian army had earned an apparently fully justified reputation for savagery and banditry but in the years following the collapse of the Khwārazmshāh’s kingdom, before the onslaught of Chinggis Khan and the scattering of his armies into exile or servitude, that reputation was reinforced many times over and the

horror stories of Khwārazmian atrocities have been recorded in many different sources. These mercenary bands initially under the command of the exiled Khwārazmshāh, Jalāl al-Dīn Mīnkubirni, spread fear and destruction throughout Persia and the Caucasus until the coming of Hülegü Khan after which they fled west to continue their wanton ways in Syria and the Levant. Juwaynī would of course have been well acquainted with the history and reality of this rogue army as well as with the details of the less than majestic machinations at the court of the former Khwārazmshāhs. It might therefore initially appear strange that given his knowledge and insight into the actuality of Khwārazmian ‘rule’, Aṭā Malik Juwaynī proceeded, over 65 or so pages, to paint a heroic and laudatory portrait of the exiled young king and his struggles against the mighty Mongols: ‘No one has seen the like of this man in the world nor heard of his like from the worthies of yore’.¹⁰⁶³

Whether Juwaynī intended his portrait of the Sultan to be an icon for the spiritually disaffected, a glorification of the dormant Iranian spirit, or a veiled celebration of brave resistance to the uncouth invaders, or whether his vivid portrayal of the ‘leaping’ prince was a mere self-indulgent whim, the fact that he chose such a politically insignificant figure as the ignominiously murdered Jalāl al-Dīn, who was also the leader, however personally glamorous, of such a discredited ragtag army as the Khwārazmian soldiery suggests that too much significance should not be read into these colourful chapters dealing with the young sultan, and the fancies recorded therein should be regarded as just that. Certainly the deliberately drawn parallels with the *Shahnama* and the illustrative evidence cited by Teresa Fitzgerald suggesting an anti-Mongol trait in the loyal servant cannot easily be dismissed¹⁰⁶⁴ and would constitute an area of legitimate research. But this is one chapter, an aside and very possibly a private joke for his educated friends.

What these chapters do reveal is the basic reliability of Juwaynī’s narrative for factual information. He might have embellished his record of the sultan with heroic verse and prose but the chronology of events is borne out by other sources, including those hostile to the sultan and the Mongols.¹⁰⁶⁵ This reliability has already been remarked on and is evident in his records of other areas which can be verified even by comparison with the anti-Mongol contemporary historian, Jūzjānī (d.1260). Juwaynī admits to being uncertain of the final fate of Jalāl al-Dīn and is content to repeat the most popular account which has some Kurdish bandits casually murdering and robbing the legendary shāh in order to steal his clothes. He repeats the rumours then current that Jalāl al-Dīn had in fact not died but had rather forsaken the bloody world of medieval politics and sought anonymity

as a wandering Sufi. Admittedly without much enthusiasm, Juwaynī also reiterates the stories of the sultan's reappearance at different times though he in no way suggests this in any eschatological sense.¹⁰⁶⁶ Juwaynī was a scribe and pen-pusher. Jalāl al-Dīn was his antithesis; the man of action, the reckless and fearless knight errant, the archetypal adventurer. Busy with his papers, Juwaynī can hardly be judged amiss nor his dreams and admiration misplaced.

Both Juwaynīs lived in the real world of political actuality and each day they would have been forced to make uncomfortable choices and decisions which would affect the lives of their many subjects. They had been brought up and schooled within the confines of the Mongol *ordus* and their contemporaries would have been noble princes from across the Mongol empire. They worked with, and in close proximity to, powerful men from a multitude of backgrounds vying to promote a profusion of causes and interests. Their interaction with these persons would necessitate varying degrees of mutual sympathy and empathy and the cultural stereotypes and ideological clichés prevalent in the rest of society and existing in more hermetic communities would have held little currency in the catholic court of the Il-Khans. They could dream but in their waking hours the intimacy of their intercourse with their fellow lords and nobles precluded the intrusion of ideologies or the interference of dogmatic bigotries. Both Möngke Khan and Hülegü Khan had been God-fearing men whose harsh strictures had been tempered with the eye of a strict morality, and this was a trait admirable and wholly acceptable to both the introspective Juwaynīs.

In most accounts of the Juwaynīs excepting those written by more recent historians with a European or American background there are few if any points of censure raised, Ibn al-ẓiqtaqā being a notable exception. That they were men of culture, education, and sensitivity is beyond dispute and Juwaynī's *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā* is a fine testament to so many of at least Aṭā Malik's admirable qualities. Bahā' al-Dīn Juwaynī, the brutal governor of Isfahan, has been remembered and so often commented upon not so much for his cruelty and lack of compassion, which were hardly unknown traits in the Middle Ages, but the fact that he stood in such stark contrast to his noble, well loved relatives. However questions concerning the family do arise and the sources are not fully revealing on all matters. Saints do not run dictatorships and tyrants however benign and appreciative of life's fineries do not employ angels to organise their affairs. Where dirty tricks were needed the Juwaynīs could be more adept than their opponents at utilising them. The father of Ibn al-ẓiqtaqā learnt this to his cost as did the hired assassins who were paid to murder him. To counter the accusations and intrigues of Majd al-Mulk the *Ṣāhib Dīwān* was not above manipulating potential perceptions of events. The *Ṣāhib*

Dīwān 'incited the people to make accusations against Majd al-Mulk and they reported [Majd al-Mulk's] words, some truthfully others fabricated'.¹⁰⁶⁷ Rashīd al- Dīn claims that Shams al-Dīn attempted to block his old enemy's execution but at Aṭā Malik and Hāran's insistence the culprit was dragged away to his singularly nasty fate.¹⁰⁶⁸ In his own account Aṭā Malik claims that he was locked in inner debate about the justice of seeking retribution and had almost decided that compassion rather than anger and reproach should prevail when the arrival of Mongols and various tribesmen interrupted his reverie and sped Majd al-Mulk to his final meal.¹⁰⁶⁹ Majd al-Mulk has had few apologists and unfortunately for him those that he did have were not such prolific writers on political matters as were the Juwaynīs and their admirers. The Juwaynīs spent their resources wisely in that their heavy investment in the literary arts has ensured that their names have survived the upheavals of a very turbulent history and that those who effected their immortality were most grateful for their patronage and were very much in their debt.

The Juwaynīs saw the Il-Khanate during some of its most glorious and confident years despite the setbacks against the Mamluks. If Ghazan is credited with the reform of Hülegü's kingdom its decline coincided with the waning years and fall of the Juwaynī brothers. They were able men and they were judged on their results. Admittedly conditions could hardly have got worse after over three decades of anarchy and constant warfare and the stability which Hülegü delivered in the later 1250s would, in itself, have brought prosperity. The Juwaynīs were able to introduce to this period of relative stability a recognisable continuity and a revival of faith and hope for the future. The enormous literary and artistic output which began in this period and continued throughout the Il-Khanid years owes a great deal to their encouragement both financial and social. They created the court conditions under which patronage of the arts thrived while their overlords provided the economic and commercial infrastructure and security under which trade boomed and wealth was generated. Wealth and a rich cultural and religious revival were the sweeteners which made the serving of infidel masters acceptable, if not very palatable. The influx of new blood and recent converts coinciding with the death and discrediting of the Abbāsids brought on a religious reawakening and it is to this period that many of the great Sufi lodges owe their origins. The Juwaynīs were alive and receptive to all these new trends and they sought to encourage the flowering of these new ideas and artistic creativity within their realm. Compared with the religious and social bigotry which prevailed in the Mamluk capital, Maragheh and Tabriz were cosmopolitan centres of learning and sophistication with such towers of erudition and seekers after

knowledge as Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī playing host to diverse scholars from east and west.¹⁰⁷⁰ Aṭā Malik was aware that he was living through a momentous period of historical change and he had not only an enduring faith that it was all as God had ordained and that therefore all was for the general good and for the betterment of mankind, but that he too had a key role to play in these unfurling events and that ultimately history would judge him through the acts and decisions that he performed in his role as a major Il-Khanid administrator. The Juwaynīs should not only be remembered for their longevity, for the many laudations they have earned and for the worthy and invaluable product of one of their members, namely Aṭā Malik's *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā*, but for the literary and artistic revival which they helped spawn. Few of the great names of classical Persian poetry who lived during the early Il-Khanid years would still be having their works read and appreciated today if it had not been for the generous patronage they so gratefully received from the Juwaynī family. The Juwaynīs were the heralds of a new age and of a Persia reborn, refreshed and reformed.

KHWĀJA NAṢĪR AL-DĪN ṬŪSĪ

‘One of Hülegü Khan’s greatest distinctions was that he was a contemporary of, and knew, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-ḡasī.’¹⁰⁷¹ A towering contemporary of the Juwaynīs, revered more for his intellectual prowess than for his considerable political influence, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī (1201–74 CE) slid, seemingly without difficulty, from being a student in Nishapur under the rule of the Khwārazmshāh to service with the Ismā‘īlī warlords of Qohestan, through elevation to the court of the Nizārī Imam, Alā al-Dīn Moḥammad III, in his fortified eyries of Alamūt and Maymandiz and lastly to an honoured and very influential position in the inner sanctum of Hülegü Khan’s *dīwān*. According to Khwāndamīr it was this most distinguished thinker, that others have since branded a ‘double-dyed traitor’,¹⁰⁷² who prevailed upon the Mongol Prince to crush the Sunni caliph of Baghdad: ‘Since Mustaṣīm’s great sectarian fanaticism was known to Khwāja Naṣīr, he persuaded Hülegü Khan to take his army to Baghdad.’¹⁰⁷³ This was the same man that Khwāndamīr then eulogised as, ‘Victorious in the nation and in religion, emperor of the realm of learning, Unique, to the likes of whom mother time never gave birth.’¹⁰⁷⁴ ḡasī completed many of his most creative writings during his time with the Ismā‘īlīs whereas under his patron, Hülegü Khan, who ordered the construction of an observatory at Maragheh for his use, and also under the Khan’s successor Abaqa, he became their ‘court philosopher/vizier/physician/astronomer/ chronographer’.¹⁰⁷⁵ Some thirty years after his death, the Mongol court’s chief wazīr and official historian, Rashīd al-Dīn, was describing ‘the late Mawlānā Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī’ as ‘the most perfect and wisest man in the world.’¹⁰⁷⁶ Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī’s renowned intellectual and academic gifts would seem to have more than compensated for any errors of judgement of which he might have been guilty in his political and temporal life.

Bar Hebraeus describes ḡasī as ‘a man of vast learning in all branches of philosophy. . . . Under [whose] control were all the religious endowments in all the lands under Mongol rule.’¹⁰⁷⁷ The Syrian Divine’s Chronography devotes a warmly laudatory paragraph to Khwāja Naṣīr and his words suggest a personal acquaintance.

*He constructed instruments for the observations of stars, and the great brass spheres which were more wonderful than those which Ptolemy set up in Alexandria, and he observed and defined the courses of the stars. And there were gathered together about him in Maragheh . . . a numerous company of wise men from various countries. And since the councils of all the mosques and the houses of instruction (i.e. colleges) of Baghdad and Assyria were under his direction he used to allot stipends to the teachers and to the pupils who were with him.*¹⁰⁷⁸

Unlike Bar Hebraeus whose career as a leading Jacobite cleric, a historian and prolific intellectual writer and thinker was secondary to his lonely mystical quest for enlightenment and union with the ‘Beloved’,¹⁰⁷⁹ Khwāja Naṣīr was foremost a seeker after intellectual and academic truth and he would apparently serve any master who could provide him the facilities to indulge his passion and his art. Whereas from an early age Bar Hebraeus had seen the futility of debate and had ‘forsook disputation with anyone concerning confession.’¹⁰⁸⁰ Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī had always relished scholarly confrontation ‘for he held fast to the opinions of the early philosophers, and he combated vigorously in his writings those who contradicted them.’¹⁰⁸¹

It has been a continuing source of fierce contention whether ḡasī served the Ismā‘īlīs under duress, taking advantage of *taqiyya* or whether he was a true convert, an almost universally damning accusation. What is surprising is that his faithful service to the Il-Khanate is not questioned by his contemporaries and is not a source of rebuke nor considered a stain upon the eminent theologian’s reputation by later Persian chroniclers. Though service under the infidel Mongols was seldom seen as a crime, association with the Ismā‘īlīs has commonly been considered as particularly profane, so much so that Juwaynī was even able to see the justice of the irruption of the Mongols into the *Dār al-Islām* as expressed in the destruction of the nefarious Nizārī Isma‘īlīs.¹⁰⁸²

His contemporaries, the Juwaynīs, grandfather, father and sons, had also started their illustrious lives in the camp of the Khwārazmshāhs and had found their ultimate fruition in the *dīwān* of the pagan Il-Khans. Like ḡasī, this family of Persian administrators who could trace their genealogy through generations of renowned bureaucrats to Faḡl b. Rabī’, wazir to the Abbāsīd caliph Hāran al-Rashīd, knew their strengths and saw their destiny as the practice of those gifts they perceived themselves to have been endowed with. Both ḡasī and the Juwaynīs aligned themselves with the ‘regal tools’ which could best complement those abilities. If the older Juwaynī had had little choice in joining the Mongol court, neither had Naṣīr al-Dīn. ‘[Hülegü]

brought [me] forth from that place [Alamūt] and ordered me to observe the stars.’¹⁰⁸³ Neither the Juwaynīs nor Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn would have regretted their decision to cooperate. One anecdote recorded by Ibn Shākir b. Aḥmad al-Kutubī claims that Naṣīr al-Dīn through cunning and contrivance once saved Aṭā Malik Juwaynī from the wrath of Hülegü and certain death. Even if, as E. G. Browne suggests, this story ‘bears every sign of being apocryphal [and] is not mentioned in any authoritative history’¹⁰⁸⁴ it indicates the closeness and mutual respect of the two men. Naṣīr al-Dīn’s three sons went on to serve the later Il-Khans after their father’s death, Ṣadr al-Dīn Alī taking over the Khwāja’s positions, and Aṣ‘il al-Dīn Ḥassan initially going with Ghazan Khan to Syria where he was given the governorship of Damascus, though another son, Fakhr al-Dīn Ahmad, eventually met his death at the hands of Ghazan Khan.¹⁰⁸⁵

Work at the court at Maragheh and service with ‘the powerful, valiant, and victorious Hulawu.’¹⁰⁸⁶ offered unprecedented potential for *żasī* when compared to his previous cloistered and paranoid existence. Khwāja Naṣīr was very quick to recognise the nascent possibilities when in the 1250s the World-Conqueror began his leisurely march westward toward the Persian heartland. *żasī* along with other so-called ‘outside scholars’ at the Ismā‘īlī court had been instrumental in persuading the young Kharshāh to surrender to Hülegü¹⁰⁸⁷ and after his submission *żasī* had wasted no time in distancing himself from his former patron and embracing the opportunities presented by the new.

Khwāja of the World, Naṣīr al-Dīn żasī . . . composed a chrono-gram to mark the occasion: ‘When the year of the Arabs was 654, On Sunday 19 November 1256 in the morning, Kharshāh, the King of the Ismā‘īlis, from his throne, Rose up and stood before the throne of Hülegü. ¹⁰⁸⁸

His ploy succeeded and the advancing Mongol court recognised and gladly welcomed such an eminent prize.

And [having recognised] the probity and sincerity of Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn żasī and the sons of Rais al-Daula and Muvaḥḥaq al-Daula [relatives of Rashīd al-Dīn], who were great and celebrated physicians . . . he [Hülegü] showed them all manner of kindness and favours and gave them post horses in order that they might remove from thence all their family, dependants and kinsfolk together with all their retinue and followers. He admitted them to his presence and to this day they and their sons have been and are in attendance upon the person of Hülegü Khan and his illustrious seed. ¹⁰⁸⁹

Even though his years with the Ismā'īlīs had been very creative and his literary output prolific the 'Khwāja of the World' was quick to disown any indebtedness or acknowledgement to his former benefactors. He claimed it had been 'the hand of destiny [which had] shackled him to residence in the territory of Qohestan'¹⁰⁹⁰ and while there he had been bound by the spirit of the verse, 'And humour them while you remain in their house; And placate them while you are in their land.'¹⁰⁹¹ After such an admission it is hard to see how he could have expected his new patron to have been moved by his grateful claim that, 'the solicitude of the monarch of the age (may his justice become general), vouchsafed this grateful servant an egress from that discreditable residence.'¹⁰⁹² However his actions during the assault on the Sunni caliphate holed up in the 'City of Peace' following the crushing of Alamūt and the subsequent murder of the 'Divine family' would have made it plain where his loyalties lay and his line was given credence in later histories.

*The philosopher Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī, whom Kiya Moḥammad b. al-Ḥasan had forcibly detained and compelled to act as his wazīr, while professing friendship for the Heretics, was inwardly eager to compass their destruction, and when Rukn al-Dīn Kharshāh asked his advice as to how he should answer Hülegü Khan, he counselled him not to give battle, for which the stars were not propitious, but to surrender Alamūt, which he accordingly did.*¹⁰⁹³

Whereas Juwaynī, an eye-witness to the events, gives only one very vague reference¹⁰⁹⁴ to any role ḡasī might have had in influencing the Kharshāh, both Mustawfī¹⁰⁹⁵ and Rashīd al-Dīn devote considerable space to his seemingly pivotal role.

*[ḡasī], and a group of eminent physicians Ra'īs al-Daula and Ma'affaq al-Daula¹⁰⁹⁶ and their sons, who had been brought against their will into that country, had observed that the deeds and actions of the Kharshāh were devoid of reason, that tyranny and oppression were implanted in his nature and that the indications of insanity were apparent in his circumstances. In consequence their minds were filled with disgust and abhorrence for the society of the Heretics and they were strongly inclined in favour of Hülegü Khan, as indeed they had been previously; and they were constantly consulting with one another in secret as to the best and easiest method of his conquering that country. Many exiles and Muslims had attached themselves to them and they were all agreed in this matter. For that reason they were constantly exerting themselves and urging Kharshāh by encouragement and intimidation to submit and surrender.*¹⁰⁹⁷

Even a minor financial administrator, Āqsarā ī, writing in 1323 for the Mongol governor of Rum, Timurtas ibn Chuban, makes reference to žasī's role in the downfall of Alamūt.¹⁰⁹⁸

As well as being a prolific writer with 150 treatises and letters attributed to him, Naṣīr al-Dīn was one of the greatest scientists, philosophers, mathematicians, astronomers, theologians and physicians of the time. He wrote mostly in Arabic though his most famous works are in Persian. A treatise on geomancy was composed in Arabic, Persian and Turkish demonstrating his proficiency in all three languages.¹⁰⁹⁹ He made significant contributions to many academic fields and he wrote several treatises on different sciences and subjects including those on geometry, algebra, arithmetic, trigonometry, medicine, metaphysics, logic, ethics and theology. Five major works on logic have survived with his *Asās al-iqtibās* considered one of the most important, while his treatise on Shi'ite theology, the *Tajrid*, has attracted over 400 commentaries and glosses.¹¹⁰⁰ He is also credited with the composition of poetic verses, mostly in Persian, and chronograms also in Persian. Many of these were recorded by al-Jārjarmī in his *Manis al-Ahrār* including last words for the final Abbāsīd caliph, Hülegü, Abaqa, and Arghun.¹¹⁰¹

His major contribution in mathematics¹¹⁰² is said to be in trigonometry, which for the first time was compiled by him as a new discipline in its own right. Spherical trigonometry also owes its development to his efforts, and this includes the concept of the six fundamental formulae for the solution of spherical right-angled triangles. His mathematical training is very evident in the order and system he brought to his classification and breakdown of the Il-Khan's revenue, compiled when he was appointed as a financial overseer but prior to his later appointment as inspector of *waqfs*.¹¹⁰³

As the chief scientist at the observatory established under his supervision at Maragheh, he has been remembered for his significant contributions to astronomy. The observatory had been ordered by Möngke Khan who had originally wanted it built nearer his own court. Dissatisfied with the efforts of his own astronomers, Jamāl al-Dīn Moḥammad zāher bin al-Zaidī Bukhārī, he had instructed Hülegü to find and dispatch žasī to him.

*Now the fame of the Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn's accomplishments had traversed the world like the wind, and accordingly Menggu Qa'an, when bidding farewell to his brother, had said: 'When the castles of the Heretics have been captured send the Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn here.'*¹¹⁰⁴

Since his brother was otherwise disposed at the time, Hülegü instructed 'the Supreme Mawlānā, the Teacher of Mankind, the Sultan

of Philosophers, the Most Excellent of the Moderns, the Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī (may God envelop him in his mercy)¹¹⁰⁵ to carry out construction in the local area rather than to travel back east, and the location chosen was the site of the first Il-Khanate capital, Maragheh. ‘Hülegü Khan commanded him to construct the observatory here in this country, for he had become aware of the goodness of his character and the sincerity of his heart and wished him to be in attendance on him.’¹¹⁰⁶

The observatory, the *Raṣadkhāneh* of Maragheh was to prove a theatre not only for ḡasī’s many gifts but for a wide multicultural audience and cast of ethnically diverse players. The observatory was equipped with the best possible technical instruments, including those collected by the Mongol armies from Baghdad, Khorasan, Syria and other Islamic centres of learning. The instruments included astrolabes, representations of constellations, epicycles, shapes of spheres, and one ḡasī himself had invented called the *turquet* that contained two planes. The new astronomical tables which he named *Al-Zij al-Ilkhānī* and dedicated to the Il-Khan (Hülegü Khan) were the result of twelve years of considerable work by himself and a dedicated gathering of notable scholars and scientists. Although ḡasī had contemplated completing the tables in thirty years, the time required for the completion of planetary cycles, he had had to finish them in twelve years on orders from Hülegü Khan. The tables were for the most part based on original observations, but they also drew upon the wide amount of existing astrological knowledge. Naṣīr al-Dīn pointed out several serious shortcomings in Ptolemy’s astronomy and foreshadowed the later dissatisfaction with the system that culminated in the Copernican reforms. The *Zij al-Ilkhānī* retained its position as most popular astrological table for at least two hundred years. That its use was not confined to a closed circle of Persian and Muslim scholars is demonstrated by ḡasī’s original introduction to his treatise. In this introduction the extant manuscript of which is believed to have been made three years after ḡasī’s death in 1277–8, various details suggest that the expected audience was not local. The language of the text was of a more straightforward Persian, the *lingua franca* of the Empire, than Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī’s usual scholarly writing. He also made extensive use of Chinese technical jargon in for example, describing the three cycles of the sexagenary system and using the Chinese names for the ten celestial stems and twelve earthly branches of the sexagenary cycle.¹¹⁰⁷ He translated the date 1203, the year of the Pig, to not only the Muslim calendar, but to the calendar of the Zoroastrians, the Eastern Christians and the Chinese. He also saw it appropriate to provide his readers with a brief outline of the rise of Islam and felt it necessary to explain to his audience that Muḥammad,

the Prophet, was a native of Mecca.¹¹⁰⁸ Such explanations would not have been necessary for anyone with any meaningful contact with the Muslim world. In the environment he now found himself, Naṣīr al-Dīn was able to cast off the sectarian parochialism which plagued so many of his contemporaries and cast his aspirations towards wider horizons. ʿazāsi adapted comfortably into this new intellectual milieu, with the rich and nourishing intellectual climate he helped create, reflected in his work.

In philosophy his contribution to logic and metaphysics has been recognised, particularly his treatise on logic, *Asās al-iqtibās*, but it was his work on ethics entitled *Akhlāq-i-Nāṣiri* and the earlier *Akhlāq-i Muḥtashamī*, that became the most well known books on the subject, and remained popular for centuries. Both works were originally dedicated to his Ismāʿīlī patrons though he rescinded these dedications later. However, they remain arguably Ismāʿīlī inspired books. In the thirteenth-century Islamic world the distinction between philosophy, still sometimes a suspect field of study, and *kalām* was not always clear and was indeed often very blurred. During the thirty-year period he spent as ‘captive’ of the Ismāʿīlī, he also produced another major work, the *Raw. at al-taslīm* (Meadow of Submission) in addition to a number of shorter treatises which unequivocally reflect Ismāʿīlī ideology.¹¹⁰⁹

The list of his known treatises is exhaustive; Brockelmann lists 56 and Sarton 64. About a quarter of his listed works are concerned with mathematics, a quarter astronomy, another quarter philosophy and religion, and the remainder a variety of other subjects including his detailed explanation of the tax system under the Il-Khans.¹¹¹⁰ Not so well known are some minor works ʿazāsi undertook, presumably at the behest of his Mongol masters. The *Fālnāma*, the *Risāla-i raml*, and the *Risāla-i istikhrāj-i khabāyā* deal with divination and the esoteric. Many of his books, originally written in both Arabic and Persian, were translated into Latin and other European languages in medieval times.

In more modern times this ‘Teacher of the World’ has had his once glorious reputation attacked from many circles and he has often been dismissed as ‘a self-seeking and hypocritical traitor who, with all his gifts, would have been denied membership of any respectable club, regiment or university of [the critic’s] own day.’¹¹¹¹ From a twentieth-century point of view where judgements can so readily be delivered from the comfort and security of a complacent nanny state such worthy abstracts as ‘honour’, a gentleman’s word, the integrity of proffered principles, and tenacious and suicidal loyalty might appear timeless and universal truths, the dictates of a ‘higher’ man. In medieval Persia where the slings and arrows of outrageous warlords, petty tyrants, divine punishers and godly armies of wrath dictated the

irrational march of progressive barbarity, the seeker of moral certitude had only one loyalty. That constant would be loyalty to the communication and expression of those higher truths in which the scholar was immersed. It was the lot of mankind to suffer, therefore it mattered little who would deliver that suffering. The scholar's duty was to his work. In the rewritten exordium to his *Akhlāq-i-Nāṣirī*, a book composed under and dedicated to the Ismā'īlī governor of Qohestan, ẓasī wasted little time justifying himself and explaining his new circumstances, before he embarked on his main theme and preoccupation. Indeed the most productive period of his life was during the nearly three decades he spent with the Ismā'īlīs. It should be added that the Ismā'īlīs at this time were in a period of *ṣatr* when the Nizārī laws were in suspension, and intellectual activity was encouraged in the Ismā'īlī strongholds, a practice which attracted a number of scholars to the generous patronage offered by the Nizārīs in their castles. In contrast to his behaviour at the Ismā'īlī court, ẓasī maintained a politically high profile at Hülegü's court and though his existence was hardly remarked upon by Juwaynī his career eventually earned effusive approbation from the Il-Khan court historians, Waṣṣāf and Rashīd al-Dīn.

Khwāja Naṣir al-Dīn's role in the destruction of Baghdad is underlined by both Waṣṣāf and Rashīd al-Dīn. Rashīd al-Dīn reports that though his military advisers and ministers were urging Hülegü to continue with his campaign against Baghdad, the Qa'an-appointed astrologers were warning of the consequences of such a portentous act. To break the impasse, the Khwāja was asked for his judgement: 'He replied that none of those judgments would occur. "What then," asked Hülegü, "will happen?" "Hülegü," he replied, "will reign in place of the Caliph."¹¹¹² Waṣṣāf claims that Hülegü went to Naṣir al-Dīn while in Hamadan to ask him to consult the stars for reassurance and that the astronomer was able to assure him that the signs were favourable and that the operation would be possible and painless for the invaders.¹¹¹³ It would appear that this was an astute move on the part of the one time exponent of the Nizārī heresy and his admittance to the inner sanctum of the Mongol court was assured. Not only his gifts in star reading found employment but his penmanship was also put to the service of Hülegü's continued progress westward deeper into the *Dār al-Islām*. It was the Mawlānā's mastery of both Arabic and Persian that found expression in many of the fearsome letters dispatched to those Sultans and rulers still unconvinced of the advantages of Il-Khan authority.

When the wealth of the world had been amassed and enemies overthrown, and towns and villages burned, Hülegü commanded that the Great

Mawlānā Naṣīr al-Dīn the Spirit of God write a Faṭḥnāmeḥ and to send it to 'Syria' that it might cause the kings and rulers of that region to fear. ¹¹¹⁴

During the final stages of the siege of Baghdad, ḡasī was entrusted with delivering personal messages to the caliph and, stationed at the Halba Gate, with receiving and checking those that would surrender. For Naṣīr al-Dīn the caliphate and indeed the Sunni Mamluks and their feuding Syrian warlords were the deviators from the true path and the 'parsimonious caliph' ¹¹¹⁵ a 'sectarian and fanatical' ¹¹¹⁶ blasphemer. If this was indeed his true view of the caliph, it was obviously not allowed to intrude on his task of establishing an intermediary's role of trust between Hūlegū and the doomed Mustāṣim. It was the caliph's possession of a complimentary *qasīda* from ḡasī, according to Waṣṣāf, ¹¹¹⁷ which was the cause of the Khwāja's being brought initially to prison in Alamūt from his intellectual haven in Qohestan, the better for his masters to watch over him. That the Shi'ites welcomed the toppling of the House of Abbās is well attested to from the 'treachery' of the caliph's minister Ibn al-Alqamī ¹¹¹⁸ to the sparing of the lives of the Shi'a clergy in Baghdad and the readiness of the mainly Shi'ite inhabitants of Ḥilla and Najaf to welcome the Mongol armies. ¹¹¹⁹ It has been suggested that this could have been due to rumours circulating that Naṣīr al-Dīn had succeeded in converting Hūlegū Khan to Shiism and to *hadīths* which predicted that the final victory of the expected Mahdi would be achieved with the help of the armies from Turan. ¹¹²⁰

When the bond, the indissoluble comes, you will in truth be destroyed, O mother of cruelty and home of injustice, . . . O Baghdad ! . . . There will come the sons of Kantura [Turks, descendants of Abrūham's second wife, Ketura], and their leader of mighty voice; they have faces like leather-covered shields and noses like the trunks of elephants; they will not enter a land without conquering it, and approach no flag without overturning it. ¹¹²¹

However it is Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī's role as a servant of the Ismā'īlīs that has stirred up most controversy. Twelver Shi'ite writers insist that he wrote his seemingly Ismā'īlī works under the greatest of duress while a prisoner of the 'Heretics', while contemporary and later Persian officials and historians, as has been noted above, have been effusive in their praise and wholly supportive of his claims of coercion. At the same time, Ismā'īlīs, past and present, have embraced the philosopher as one of their own. As well as his almost perfunctory explanation for his laudatory remarks addressed to the governor of

Qohestan, Nāṣir al-Dīn Abd al-Raḥīm, in the revised preamble to the *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*, other sources are cited as evidence of the hardship he experienced in the three decades he spent with the Ismā'īlis.

*I wrote most of it [Sharḥ al-ishārāt] under most difficult circumstances . . . a time every portion of which was a container for unbearable sadness, suffering, remorse, and sorrow . . . 'So far as I can see all around me Calamity is a ring and I am a bezel in it.' . . . [God] rescue me from the injuries of the waves of calamities, the surges of hostilities*¹¹²²

Whether these tribulations were due directly to his treatment at the hands of the Ismā'īlis or whether he was commenting on the air of general malaise and tension which existed throughout the region in the power vacuum created with the collapse of the Khwārazmshāh and the irruption of the Mongols is open for dispute. That the Ismā'īlis would have kept such a prominent figure and allowed him relative physical freedom and liberal access to their intellectual treasures if he were in reality an unreformed adversary is unlikely. The modern scholar Daftary surmises that ḡasī was a one time convert to the Nizārīs and was initially attracted to their courts for their intellectual reputation, seeing them as a refuge from the anarchy of the Persian urban centres where anti-Shi'ite feelings were rife. The evidence suggesting ḡasī's adoption of Ismā'īlism comes from his writings some of which, such as the *Raw. at al-Taslīm*, have been used to the present time as standard Ismā'īlī doctrinal texts. In the *Sayr va sulak*, his spiritual autobiography, ḡasī claims that it was his dissatisfaction with *kalām* (scholastic theology) and *ḥikmat* (philosophy) that led him to the belief in the necessity of an infallible leader and the Ismā'īlī doctrine of *Ta'līm*. It is not unreasonable to assume that actual contact with this infallible Imam might have eventually caused him to revert to his more conservative Imami beliefs before the approach of Hülegü who, like his original patron Abd al-Raḥīm, had a reputation for religious tolerance and respect for scholars. ḡasī's major contribution to the Ismā'īlī doctrines of his time was his explanation¹¹²³ of the alternating periods of *satr* (concealment), when the faithful were obliged to hide their true beliefs in *taqiyya* and the *Sharī'a* was to be observed, and periods of *qiyāma* (resurrection), no longer a finality but a transitory episode initiated at the discretion of the Imam when the veil of *taqiyya* could be lifted, the hidden would be revealed and the *Sharī'a* would no longer be binding on mankind. In his cyclical view of history the era of Moḥammad, the sixth of seven 1,000-year cycles, was characterised by these alternating periods of *satr* and *qiyāma* proclaimed by the Imams as they deemed appropriate. Whatever way Naṣir al-Dīn's personal theological beliefs had

developed during his time with the Ismā'īlīs, the Kharshāh obviously retained his belief in ẓasī and against the wishes of many of his followers he eventually accepted the advice of the Khwāja and surrendered to Hülegü.

In his spiritual autobiography, the *Sayr wa Sulak*, ẓasī clearly elucidates his reasons for adopting Ismā'īlism, addressing his work to the 'chief of the dā īs and chief of the ministers [Mu'jaffar b. Moḥammad]'.¹¹²⁴ He explains his frustration with his early teachers, 'my heart was not satisfied with what they said . . . while my desire to attain the truth was not diminished'¹¹²⁵ but proclaims by the end of his 'letter':

Now that I have come to know that unique person who is the man of the epoch, the Imam of the age . . . and now that I have surrendered to the fact that he is the [real] instructor . . . utterly abandoned my own will . . . my recognition and knowledge are to be that which my teacher says are [true] recognition and knowledge etc.

This Imam of the age was the young Kharshāh. ẓasī, not renowned for his humility despite his gushing words, could well have changed his opinion upon meeting the Imam in person. ẓasī undoubtedly had long been seeking God and his Imam. It is hardly surprising that when he finally met this emissary of God, he was not fully satisfied.

A revealing anecdote concerning ẓasī is reported by the Arab court official Ibn Fuwatī who served the Il-Khans in Baghdad. Asked by Hülegü, c.1260, to explain a group of *Qalandars* that the Il-Khan had encountered on the plain of Ḥarrān, ẓasī had answered that they were 'the uncounted (surplus) of the world' leading Hülegü to immediately order the unfortunate dervishes' execution. Elaborating, presumably after the slaughter, ẓasī expounded to his master that mankind was divided into four categories; rulers, traders, craftsmen and agriculturalists. Those who did not fall within these categories 'were a burden [on the people]'.¹¹²⁶ Obviously, ẓasī viewed his fellow citizens with a dangerous degree of arrogance and it cannot be thought surprising if his encounter with the Imam of the Age, the young Kharshāh, left him disappointed.

Another Nizārī personage to undergo an apparent change of heart at this time was ẓasī's one time patron, Naṣīr al-Dīn Abd al-Raḥīm, the Muḥtashim of Qohestan, who had been very willing to surrender to Hülegü when called upon to do so. When he presented himself kissing the ground before the World Conqueror his explanation for not bringing with him his garrison was that, 'Kharshāh is their ruler and it is his command that they obey.'¹¹²⁷ It would appear that he was no longer constrained by the edicts of his Imam. He was able to retire

with a *yarligh* and a *paiza* as governor of the town of Tun.

The debate about whether Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī was an Imami Shi'ite or an Ismā'īlī has tended to obscure his true role in the courts he served. ḡasī had served and gained acclaim in the courts of an Ismā'īlī prince, two Ismā'īlī Imams and two non-Muslim Mongol kings and had retained the trust and respect of them all. He had also, reputedly, been in correspondence with the Sunni House of Abbās presumably in order to sound out Baghdad as a potential haven. He was a thinker and a searcher after truth and he did not confine his associates or his sources of knowledge to the narrow limits of sectarian dictates or even of Islam. His own role in the court, as Hülegü's 'meanest slave', is clearly elucidated in a short essay quoted in the *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, in which he explains the historical role of the king, the men of the Sword and the men of the Pen in Iran and the advantages for each if these roles and duties are observed. He includes the '*ulamā*' as one of the four categories of men of the Pen but specifies that by '*ulamā*' he means only philosophers, astronomers and doctors of medicine.¹¹²⁸

At his observatory at Maragheh he was able to associate indiscriminately with scholars from throughout the Mongol Empire: 'His friends and colleagues included Chinese, Turkish, Arab and Persian jurists, philosophers, theologians, mystics, mathematicians, astronomers, etc., with diverse religious persuasions.'¹¹²⁹ His works, often written in non-canonical Persian rather than Arabic, abound in non-Islamic discourse, Greek philosophy and pre-Islamic Persian traditions and follow the ethical themes standardised in the non-clerical 'mirror for princes', essential texts of the Persian court. His style and content is suited to his audience. He could adopt the parlance of the times and mix in Mongol and Turkish terms with his plain Persian or he could filigree his rhetoric in the best Persian manner and at the same time espouse his thoughts on *kalām* and philosophy in high Persian and classical Arabic. His audience was diverse and he knew he was not preaching to the converted. ḡasī was a seeker, but he was a seeker who expected to be followed, and it was his words and intellect with which he enmeshed and led people.

Like his masters he sought power but, unlike those masters, he sought power through command of knowledge rather than control of the sword. His mastery of the sciences and Islamic disciplines raised his position above sectarian quibbling and his introduction to the *Zij al-Ilkhānī* demonstrated that the audience and fraternity he sought transcended the limits of his immediate world. Naṣīr al-Dīn was a theologian with a wide audience and a wider ear but he was not a theologian of the hue of the Jacobite Maphrian, Bar Hebraeus' with whom he would have been acquainted through his Maragheh circles. Whereas Bar Hebraeus was a self-effacing mystic¹¹³⁰ who felt himself

forced into his prominent political and clerical role, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn saw his role as what Dabashi calls the ‘philosopher/ vizier’ and his attempts at humility ring with the pride of voluntary self-debasement: ‘The writer of this discourse and author of this epistle, the meanest of mankind, Moḥammad b. Ḥasan al-ḡasī, known as al-Naṣīr al-ḡasī, says thus:’.¹¹³¹

As philosopher/vizier, Naṣīr al-Dīn would have seen his role as crucial to the management of the state. The king might provide the military might but it was his presence which would provide the moral authority and legitimise the sovereign’s rule. Dabashi sees a continuous tradition of the vizier/philosopher and the *pādishāh* throughout Persian history. In classical times there was Anashīrwān and Buzurgmihr, later there was Alā al-Dawla Moḥammad b. Dushmanziyār (1008–41) and Avicenna, in Saljuq times Malik Shāh and NiOām al-Mulk and fulfilling a similar task there was NiOāmī ‘Ara.ī writing his *Chahār Maqāla* for the Ghurid prince and the *Qābasnāma* of Qābas b. Vushmgīr. Naṣīr al-Dīn had attained an enviable position for the dissemination of knowledge and had mastered all its disciplines, theological and scientific, and was able to produce seminal texts in all of them. If kings sought out their greatest thinkers in order that they might legitimise and add a spiritual dimension to their rule those thinkers also needed the material might and military prowess of their kings to enable them to legitimise themselves through the furtherance and promotion of their sciences. The caliph no longer existed as a source of legitimacy but the traditions of the Persian court stretched far back into pre-Islamic times. Naṣīr al-Dīn paid homage to his calling and he remained faithful throughout his life to the intellectual endeavours of the men of science and the ascendancy of the men of knowledge and the pen. He remained the essential Ḥakīm, possessing an exceptional, analytical mind whose horizons he had broadened from a grounding in mathematics, astrology and logic to encompass philosophy, theology and mysticism. It was the recognition of his role as Ḥakīm that saved him from the contamination associated with accusations of sectarianism.

8

POETS, SUFIS AND QALANDARS¹¹³²

The period of Il-Khanid rule, indeed much of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was a time of great literary and spiritual activity. Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī, Sa'dī, the Safavid order's founder, Ṣafī al-Dīn, the historians Rashīd al-Dīn and Juwaynī are merely among the most widely renowned of this tumultuous period's luminaries. The *Dīwān* and the retinues of the great and the good became centres of the arts and learning and ministers of state became the patrons of poets and preachers. One of Hülegü's first acts upon setting up his capital in Maragheh was the construction of an observatory and centre of international learning for his court favourite, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn ṣāsī.¹¹³³ Both Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī¹¹³⁴ and his brother Aṭā Malik, were keen benefactors of the arts and actively encouraged and financially supported a number of poets and literary figures during their long years in power at the centre of the early Il-Khanid court. Their children, notably Bahā' al-Dīn, governor of Isfahan, and Hārān in Anatolia continued this patronage of the arts in the provinces. The establishment of a powerful state centred in Azerbaijan ruled by an essentially benign and supportive administration created a climate of stability which after so many decades of chaos proved very conducive to cultural growth.

That the Il-Khanid administration became a sponsor and indeed a seat of literary wealth should have come as no surprise. A literary tradition had long existed within the *Dīwān* of most medieval Muslim states and the *Dīwān al-inshā'* (Chancellery) in particular attracted the most gifted of the country's writers to compose the state's domestic and foreign correspondence. These secretaries of state were commonly schooled in the Islamic sciences, and erudite in Persian and Arabic literature. As a consequence of this, many of the documents, letters and official proclamations of these medieval courts tended to reflect the academic and literary background of their authors. The Il-Khans continued this tradition when they established their state in the 1250s through their appointment of the Juwaynīs to preside over the administration. The Juwaynī family was able to trace its ancestry back through centuries of service to the Persian court. Their ancestors, Faḏl

bin al-Rabī , both father and son, had reportedly served the caliphs al-Manṣar, al-Mahdī, al-Hādī, Hāran al-Rashīd and al-Amīn as ministers and chamberlain.

The historical value of the work of such administrators is of obvious significance but the Il-Khanid period is also marked by a profusion of other literary works and these can also be of great historical importance. A writer such as Sa'dī lived during the politically turbulent years of the Salgharids of Shiraz and the vagaries of this dynasty can be found reflected in the dedications of the poet's work. The Sufi poet Semnānī was born into a family of top administrators and was brought up at the Il-Khanid court and yet, against the wishes of his Mongol masters, he was eventually allowed to abandon the life of the *Dīwān* in order to follow his true calling. The satirist Pūr-i Bahā', a friend and a beneficiary of the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān*, wrote biting and often obscene social and political commentaries and his work reveals another side of Mongol Iran not always reflected in the flowery words of the panegyrists or in the airy verses of the Sufis. Some of these writers were themselves members of the *Dīwān* and they were dependent on the goodwill of their powerful patrons for their livelihood and this must be considered when judging their work.¹¹³⁵ Others such as Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī were not under such obvious constraints and their contact with their Mongol overlords was not so direct. This again is reflected in their writing. A survey of these poets, various Sufis whose orders flourished throughout this period and of the occasional *Qalandar*¹¹³⁶ can shed important light on the social conditions prevalent during the first decades of Mongol rule. In his study of the poet/mystic Shabistārī [d.c.1339], Leonard Lewisohn has concluded that:

*If political consciousness can be defined in the first degree as sympathy with the social woes of one's fellow man, all poetry, even the most seemingly metaphysical, is also unavoidably political.*¹¹³⁷

Grudging acceptance that the period of Il-Khanid rule was accompanied by a remarkable resurgence in cultural and spiritual expression is widely acknowledged. Even E. G. Browne admits that though

*those scourges of mankind [Chinggis and Hülegü] . . . did more to compass the ruin of Islamic civilisation, especially in Persia, than any other human beings . . . it says much for the tenacity of the Persian character that it should have been so much less affected by these barbarians than most other people with whom they came in contact.*¹¹³⁸

Later he adds:

*Considering what Persia suffered at the hands of the Tartars, it is wonderful how much good literature was produced during this period. . . . the period of Mongol ascendancy . . . was wonderfully rich in literary achievements.*¹¹³⁹

D. O. Morgan concedes that ‘intellectual horizons were broadened’¹¹⁴⁰ and with some reservations endorses the view that the time of the Il-Khans was ‘the best period of Persian historical writing’ and adds that, significantly written in Persian rather than Arabic, these histories reflected the ‘wide ranging interests of some of the writers’.¹¹⁴¹ Hodgson regarded this period as one of the most brilliant and diversified in Persian cultural history¹¹⁴² a view upheld by the Oxford scholar Julie Scott Meisami.¹¹⁴³ Bertold Spuler also opines that:

*However slight an interest the Il-Khans may have taken in learning for its own sake, they were far sighted enough to make use of Perso-Arab science for their own ends and encourage it so far as they could, or at least not to place obstacles in its way.*¹¹⁴⁴

The greatly respected Russian orientalist V. V. Barthold, writing in 1917, held a far more balanced view than most of his successors:

*In reality, the results of the Mongol invasion were less annihilating than is supposed. . . . Besides a not numerous military contingent, the Mongol Khans brought with them their cultural councillors [sic] who helped them to establish their rule and to apply to the new country that harmonious and well-constructed governmental and military organisation which had been elaborated at the time of Chenghiz Khan himself.*¹¹⁴⁵

Bernard Lewis in a revision of current judgement on the Mongol period has justly noted that, ‘The Mongols, then, though they ravaged some of the lands of Islam and abolished the Baghdad Caliphate, did not destroy Islamic civilisation’.¹¹⁴⁶ At least one modern scholar views this whole period in a very positive light. Discussing the Sufi poet ‘Irāqī, Seyyed Hossein Nasr narrates that the poet

*lived during the 7th/13th century at the peak of Islamic spirituality . . . [‘Irāqī] himself was a leading light in a period so luminous that its brilliance still dazzles the eye some seven centuries later.*¹¹⁴⁷

This period of excellence is also noteworthy in that it was Persian rather than Arabic which reached such peaks and has survived the centuries: 'In those days of gloom and cold the torch-bearers of learning, literature, verse and prose were Persian'.¹¹⁴⁸ The fact that few of the recipients of Il-Khanid largesse nor of those who lived under the Mongols' shadow, saw fit to complain too loudly is too easily explained away by the glib answer that terror, self-interest and weary resignation are wonderful curbers of tongues. Voices of dissent were heard, and dissatisfaction with Mongol domination was openly expressed.¹¹⁴⁹ But what does appear most strikingly however is that judging from the content of much of the literature of the time the 'oppressive' presence of the Mongols was not foremost in people's minds.

The picture that emerges of life under Tatar domination as expressed by those who were subject to Il-Khanid rule is at variance with impressions given by hostile commentators whether contemporary or later. Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī consoled the Parvānū¹¹⁵⁰ who was aggrieved at the amount of work he was obliged to do on behalf of his Mongol masters. Rather than rebuking the ruler for his loyal service to the unbelievers Ramī assured him that his work was worthwhile and of value to God.

*These works too are work done for God, since they are the means of procuring peace and security for Muslimdom. . . . God has inclined you toward such good work, and your exceeding ardour is a proof of Divine favour.*¹¹⁵¹

However, in another discourse, Ramī indicated that he had also in fact urged his patron to join forces with the Syrians and with the Mamluks of Egypt in the name of Islam and to resist the rule of the infidels. His message was that whatever state of sin the Amīr Parvānū had fallen into through his service to the Tatars, he could still make amends and seek God's help and guidance: 'turn your face to Almighty God, for things are in a parlous state. Bestow alms, to the end that God may deliver you out of this evil state of fear [of displeasing the Mongols]'.¹¹⁵² The ambivalence of feeling is not perhaps so surprising since it is reflective of the reality; relative peace, security and prosperity and yet rule by infidels, a situation which would surely tax the keenest preacher of didactic sermons.

An explanation for the remarkable creativity of this period especially in the development of Sufi thought and the creation of mystical poetry has been that it was a reaction to the widespread social and political instability caused by the Mongol invasions and the prevalence of unprecedented violence causing the collapse of so many

of the pillars of people's lives, which these irruptions engendered. According to Lewisohn many have concluded that 'the only consolation for the ordinary man faced with such barbarity lay in the cultivation of Sufism' and he cites Arberry and Manachihir Murta'awī in particular.¹¹⁵³ Ḥamid Algar also linked the rise of Sufism to the apparent anarchy of the times.

*This flourishing of Sufism took place against a sombre background of barbarian invasion – the Crusaders descended on the Islamic world from the West, and the Mongols from the East – and it may almost be regarded as a kind of compensation for the political disasters of the period.*¹¹⁵⁴

Arberry suggests that it was the embracing comfort of mysticism that helped formal Islam to survive this 'terrible' period of catastrophe.¹¹⁵⁵ A modern Islamic scholar has suggested that, 'Fear of the Mongols and the difficulties of life subsequent to the Mongol invasions may have directed people towards hope in the next world and not in this world.'¹¹⁵⁶ Flowered by stereotypes of not only 'marauding Mongols and plundering Turks' but of cultivated, nationalistic and long-suffering Persians, a modern Persian writer, cited by Lewisohn, typifies this view of the origins of the creative genius of the time when he states:

*Yet, in the midst of this pessimism, anxiety, despair, apathy, political corruption and psychological terror, Sufism seemed to be the sole force capable of saving the soul of the Iranian populace, casting a ray of hope and courage into the traumatized hearts of the inhabitants of medieval Persia.*¹¹⁵⁷

However, though Sufism might indeed have flowered under the rule of the Il-Khans, it was already well entrenched in the lands of Iran and Turan and in the Islamic west well before the Mongols arrived. In Shiraz the Sufi/poet Razbihān Baqlī (d.1209) produced a wide range of writing covering the whole spectrum of Sufi thought and metaphysics.¹¹⁵⁸ The thoughts of the great Andalusian theosophist Ibn al-Arābī (d.1240) were widely known throughout the Islamic world and his work and theories had a profound influence on the Sufis and poets of 'Persia' in particular, and yet there is no evidence that Ibn al-Arābī suffered any great hardship or was unduly affected by the upheavals in the east. Najm al-Dīn Kobrā, the founder of the Kobravī order of Sufis that was to play a major role in the development of Persian mysticism, was born in Khwārazm though his interest in Sufism was kindled in Egypt where he had become an adherent of

Shaykh Razbehān al-Wazzān al-Mes. r ī of the Sohravard ī order. Najm al-D ī n Kobr ā was sent back to Khwārazm in 1145 when his spiritual development was considered mature enough for him to initiate and train his own *morīds* and he quickly attracted a wide following of devotees, earning himself the title *valī-tarāsh* (manufacturer of saints). And this was at a time when the name of Chinggis Khan had yet to be coined. The divine careers of Najm al-Dīn Kobrā's disciples some of whom were later credited with influencing the conversion of some of the Mongol notables and khans,¹¹⁵⁹ all began before the Mongol invasions and their refuge in mysticism was not a reaction to any horrors occasioned by the approaching 'Storm from the East'. Perhaps Persia's greatest poet/Sufi prior to Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī, Farid al-Dīn Attār (d.c.1220)¹¹⁶⁰ also lived at this time and like so many of his fellow Sufis, travelled extensively throughout the Muslim world before settling in his native city, Nishapur. His masterpiece of the Sufi journey, the *mathnawī*, *Mantiq al-tayr*,¹¹⁶¹ was composed at the turn of the century and much of his time in Nishapur was spent compiling the verses and sayings of Sufi saints. Awfī's *Lubāb al-Albāb*, composed around 1221–2,¹¹⁶² lists other contemporary figures whose careers were blossoming before and at the time of the irruption of the Mongols even if in some cases the Tatar arrival put an end to their flowering careers. Recognising that there were those that would correlate 'the displacement of a cultural élite from political power and its withdrawal into inward compensations' and the 'rise of mysticism with the collapse of great Empires' Marshall Hodgson has noted that Muslim mystics were not necessarily descendants of former members of the élite and were indeed often from a 'craftsman background'. He interprets the rising interest in mysticism as connected with the increasing cultural sophistication and social complexity of the community in general.¹¹⁶³

Najm al-Dīn Kobrā was one such figure who was martyred during the initial Mongol assaults. However his death illustrates a less publicised characteristic of the invading hordes. Chinggis Khan had heard of and obviously valued the name of this 'Pole-Star of Saints' and before unleashing his armies against Khwārazm where he had been informed Najm al-Dīn Kobrā was residing, he sent word pleading with the Sufi divine to leave the city and to join him in his camp before the deluge of death and destruction overtook his city. Najm al-Dīn Kobrā declined the offer explaining that he had been bound to the people of Khwārazm for seventy years through times of bitterness and sweetness and that if he were now to flee it would be in breach of any concept of generosity of spirit and compassion. His body was later found after a thorough search amongst the piled dead.¹¹⁶⁴ According to Khwāndamīr, before the commencement of the actual battle Najm

al-Dīn Kobrā gave permission for sixty of his disciples including the later renowned Shaykh Sayf al-Dīn Bākhārī (d.1261), to take advantage of the Mongols' offer of safe conduct which would presumably have been extended to his followers.¹¹⁶⁵ Even in these opening raids, launched in a spirit of vengeance, the Mongols were well aware of the spiritual as well as the material wealth of the lands they were conquering and made attempts to preserve that which they obviously deemed precious.

Though indeed the assault of the Mongol armies was devastating and fear of the irruption swept the eastern Islamic world, the chaos caused by the irruptions to individual areas was hardly unique. The wide-scale and wanton destruction of the Khwārazmian armies and later by Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn, the fear and chaos engendered by the Ismā'īlīs, the endless struggles between the Kurdish warlords and their neighbours, all had for many decades become part of the anarchy that had defined the region. Though the effects of the Crusades can in no way be compared with the devastation caused by the Mongols, the Frankish atrocities combined with the wars of the local Ayyabid, Armenian, and Mamluk soldiery were hardly conducive to an atmosphere of peace, tranquillity and security. The scale and speed of the Mongol invasion was unprecedented, as was the apparent, or perhaps more correctly, the rumoured invincibility of the invaders. The ruthlessness, the thoroughness and the inevitable result of resistance to the Mongol advance were all tactics planned and executed with one aim in mind, that of swift and total subjugation. Terror was a tool used by the Mongol tacticians with overwhelming success and, as is demonstrated by the accounts of their servants such as Juwaynī, they made no attempt to gloss over the horrors of their methods. The result of this was that the first reaction to the invasion was fear and doom and in some of the writers who lived through this first period, these negative feelings towards their new masters were never completely abandoned.

If the chroniclers were recording events in all their horror and glory, other writers of great prestige and influence made no attempt to balance their own traumatised views. Najm al-Dīn Rāzī, Dāya,¹¹⁶⁶ one of Najm al-Dīn Kobrā's most revered disciples, wrote scathingly of the Mongol invasions from his refuge in Anatolia. Born in Rayy in 1173 he left his native city not because of the instability and chaos caused by the Tatar hordes but because of localised turmoil. It was the incessant territorial and internecine warring between hostile Saljuqid princes and rival militant religious factions representing the Hanafī, Shāfī and Shī'ite persuasions which finally led to his departure from Rayy around 1202–3, fleeing 'the blight of heresy, deviation, and fanaticism'.¹¹⁶⁷ He felt that his 'region were the homeland of

disaster'.¹¹⁶⁸ It was later in 1221 after extensive travel both to the east and west while residing in Hamadan that he fled the approaching danger of the Mongols. The Mongol danger was the final calamity which decided him to flee for ever his troubled homeland. The danger was such that in the process he saw fit to abandon his

*kith and kin; profiting from the adage that 'he who has saved his head has truly profited', and conforming to the principle that 'flight from the unendurable is a custom of the prophets,' [and] had to depart and entrust [his] dear ones to calamity.*¹¹⁶⁹

Such behaviour, in stark contrast to the heroic stance of his Sufi master, Najm al-Dīn Kobrā, did not escape Sa'dī's censorious eye:

*Witness that one, devoid of compassion who never
Will see the face of good fortune
For he chooses ease and comfort for himself,
Abandoning his wife and children to hardship.*¹¹⁷⁰

However, Dāya's subsequent fame has rested more with his mystical writings and his lurid accounts of Mongol atrocities than with this disgraceful episode so readily defended with Qoranic injunctions. For his denouncement and depiction of the Tatar hordes he rounded up the usual clichés, 'godforsaken army', 'accursed creatures never before witnessed in any age', 'the catastrophes that shall ensure the end of time', 'accursed infidels', 'killing, killing abundant,' and then pleaded his divine right to desert his loved ones, to flee Hamadan in the direction of Erbil and from hence to make good his escape to Rum, the only country he could conceivably consider safe for Muslims.

*A land adorned with security and justice, where goods were cheap and the means of livelihood were abundant, and a pious, learned, just, equitable, and discerning monarch ruled, who might appreciate the true value of men of religion and grant the accomplished their due.*¹¹⁷¹

Dāya was soon disabused of his bright expectations of Anatolia and he obviously did not receive the appropriate respect and esteem he evidently considered his due. In disgust, he relates in 1226,

I found no one in that realm able to tell musk from dung, or the sincere from the swindler. However much I tested both the high and the low, I saw that the whole garden was planted with celery. When I thus discovered

there was no host in the house, I fully detached my heart from the realm . . . and gladly, without any regret, turned my back on the whole herd. ¹¹⁷²

Najm al-Dīn Rāzī died in Baghdad in 1256, two years before the conquest of that city where his tomb still stands. He is believed to have continued working for the caliphate from the time he left Rum in disillusionment, some time before 1225, until his death so it is unlikely his ill feelings toward the Mongols would have changed to any degree in this period. He was also rather incongruously associated with the bandit chief Jalāl al-Dīn Khwārazmshāh during this period. His fame and popularity spread swiftly throughout the immediate region of Rum and Azerbaijan as well as to both Iraqs, Transoxiana and as far as the Indus and India itself. It was this wide readership and respectful fame so rapidly acquired that has coloured successive generations in their assessment of the Mongols' impact on Persia.

From this same period another fugitive Sufi of immense fame not only among his contemporaries but certainly internationally today is Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī, also known as Mevlavi and the Mawlānā (1207–73). Like Rāzī, Bahā' al-Dīn Balkhī, Ramī's father, fled turmoil and political persecution in his native land and was able to find sanctuary in Anatolia, though unlike the judgemental Dāya he found peace and a home in the cultural and spiritual heterogeneity of Rum and soon established a base, initially in Larinda and then in Konya, the Saljuqid capital of Rum. Ramī would only have been young when he was uprooted but he retained some memories and emotional as well as family connections to Transoxiana and would have shared in his family's grief at the tragedy which overtook his homeland. Though hardly an apologist for the Mongols, Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī was in no way so damning of the visitors from the east as was his older contemporary Rāzī even though his native city, Balkh, suffered the same treatment as did Rāzī's Rayy. Unlike the Rāzī family, Ramī's family was not abandoned to their fate when circumstances forced their migration. His father, Bahā' al-Dīn, an eminent theologian, took his family with him in 1213 when he sought a new home which eventually he found in the west. It was the political intrigues and instability of the Khwārazmian regime which prompted his original hasty departure and not the murmuring of trouble filtering in from the east, though this no doubt prompted his second flight in 1218 and influenced his final choice of Rum as a destination.¹¹⁷³ Having already seen the horrors perpetrated by supposedly friendly fellow Muslims when the Khwārazmians besieged Samarqand, it is doubtful that the already exiled family would wish to chance their luck with an infidel invasion.¹¹⁷⁴ Aflākī relates a revealing tale concerning the Saljuqid Shāh, Alā al-Dīn,

Aflākī relates a revealing tale concerning the Saljuqid Shāh, Alā al-Dīn, and the approaching Khwārazmians which perhaps puts the reality of invaders in perspective away from political and religious considerations. In order to see at first hand the nature of this exiled prince, Jalāl al-Dīn, the Saljuqid Shāh with some retainers went in disguise to the Khwārazmian camp claiming to be disaffected nomad Turks. The supposed rebels were well received and courted and were provided with tents and rations. However, in a dream, the spirit of the recently deceased Bahā' al-Dīn Valad appeared in order to warn the Shāh that his cover was about to be discovered and that his life would be in dire danger. When the king did not respond immediately the spirit of the saint appeared yet again and insisted that the Saljuq Shāh depart at once under cover of darkness. The Shāh obeyed and when later the armies of the Saljuqids and the Khwārazmians clashed, victory went to the Ramīs.¹¹⁷⁵ The people of the time had a realistic assessment of the dangers surrounding them, and were quite able to read through political rhetoric from wherever it came.

Unlike Rāzī, Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī lived to see another side to the Mongols and though not living under their direct rule he was close enough to his friend and patron, the Parvānū, to be well acquainted with their ways and foibles as well as with their strengths and laudatory characteristics. His financial independence from the central Il-Khanid *Dīwān* and his elevated social status in Konya enabled him to speak more freely than many others of the great literary and spiritual figures of this time. What then is revealing is that he is not more condemnatory in his work, as he would surely have been at liberty to be, and surely would have been, if the Mongols had been the curse so many have, since then, believed them to have been. Though Nicholson has suggested that certain verses in Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī's magisterial *Mathnawī* are references to Abaqa or his father and the war with the Mamluks, there is no evidence that he is not in fact talking in the most general of terms of 'madmen', 'Holy War', and 'the ignorant'.¹¹⁷⁶ Nicholson hazards the possibility that Ramī is referring to Naṣīr al-Dīn ẓasī, the renowned theologian, philosopher, wazīr in another *bayt*, 'for, [moved] by necessity, that [renowned] philosopher paid honour to [one vile as] the tail of an ass, and gave him the title of "noble"' but again there is no evidence other than the broadest kind of conjecture based on the stereotypical characterisations of the personages of the day that the philosopher could be Naṣīr al-Dīn ẓasī and the ass's tail, Abaqa or his father.¹¹⁷⁷

In his discourses Ramī does make direct references to the Mongols and to those who are forced to have dealings with them. His relationship with the Parvānū was close and the chief minister in turn was devoted to Ramī, a relationship with which not all were

happy.¹¹⁷⁸ The closeness of the relationship is obvious not only from Ramī's collected discourses but from Aflākī's fourteenth-century (wr. 1318–53) collection of anecdotes recounting the origins and early history of the Mevlevi Sufi order.¹¹⁷⁹ Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī felt intimate enough with the Saljuq chief minister to admonish him for siding with the Mongols against the forces of Islam explaining that the Parvānū's arrogance in trusting in his own judgement while losing sight of God's will has resulted in his efforts to preserve Islam being turned into the instrument of Islam's destruction. 'Hence that means for [ensuring] Islam's durability created the means for its diminishing.'¹¹⁸⁰ The editor of the Tehran, 1362/1983 edition of the *Kitāb Fiyeḥ Māfiyeḥ*, has suggested that this conversation took place during the Mamluk invasions around 1275 but this is unlikely since the Mongols were defeated by Baybars, the Sultan of Egypt at the battle of Abulustayn and the sermon contains references to the destruction of the Syrians and Egyptians.¹¹⁸¹ It is in a later discourse in the book that Mawlānā reassures the Parvānū that he is doing right by serving the Mongols' interests insofar as he is providing the stability and prosperity in which Islam and Muslims might flourish.¹¹⁸² In a later chapter still, the Mawlānā answers a question posed by one who was troubled at accepting 'property' from the hands of the Mongols who had originally seized it from them. Employing clever logic and analogy the master's answer is that it is lawful to accept *mālḥā* from the Mongols and so apparently he could be seen to be re-enforcing the message of cooperation he had used to reassure the Parvānū. In this same chapter Ramī explains that the Mongols owed their own rise and triumph to God who answered their prayers at a time when they were weak and were being abused by those in power. He recounts that after the calamity that befell their merchants at the hands of the Khwārazmshāh, the Mongols appealed to their king to guide them as to what action they should take. Their king went into retreat and sought God's guidance. 'A proclamation came from God most High: "I have accepted your supplication. Come forth: wherever you go, you shall be victorious."' ¹¹⁸³

Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī may not be the most enthusiastic apologist for the Mongols but it is doubtful whether he himself would have provided any actual inspiration for a tradition which was circulating when Aflākī amassed his collection of anecdotes. In the story it is said that Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī was miraculously transported to the battlefield of Aīn Jālat and that it was his presence that ensured victory for the forces of Islam and defeat for Kitbuqa and the Mongol army. Witnesses came forward to swear they had seen the Mawlānā seated on his steed, and when news reached Konya and the master was asked to respond to these tales, Ramī is said to have replied, 'Yes, yes! Jalāl al-

Dīn was the horseman who obtained a victory over the enemy, and who showed himself a sultan in the eyes of the people of Islam.’¹¹⁸⁴ The Il-Khans were not the hordes that had razed Transoxiana and in the cosmopolitan and culturally dynamic city of Konya there did not exist the expectation of imminent annihilation. The Saljuqs of Rum maintained their semi-autonomy through most of Ramī’s life and therefore for the divine himself there would have been little personal contact with any Mongols. Therefore it is hardly surprising that little if any sympathy, affection or understanding of the Il-Khanid regime was fostered in the Mawlānā’s heart. But equally it can be seen that the relatively benign and non-interfering nature of the Maragheh government did not engender nor excite any of the latent hatred or animosity that would surely have been residual in Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī’s memory. His natural ill-feelings and resentment towards the Mongols which could have so easily been excited to stronger antipathy were never expressed in more than general terms and his usual message was one of acquiescence and cooperation.¹¹⁸⁵

The experience and the expressions of that experience of those under more direct Mongol rule or with more intimate contact with the central *Dīwān* contrasts with that of Ramī. Due to the example set by the Juwaynī brothers, patronage of the arts, and poets in particular, flourished under the early Il-Khans. Even revered Mongol military commanders such as Suqunjaq¹¹⁸⁶ became known for their appreciation and support of the arts. The constraints and philistinism once present throughout much of Mongol Persia that famously led the historian Juwaynī to sniffily remark, ‘[The establishment] consider the Uighur language and script to be the height of knowledge and learning’¹¹⁸⁷ were disappearing and the Persian language was undergoing another remarkable revival. Descendants of Turanian wazirs now ruled Persian courts and encouraged and supported Persian poets. Both Kirman and Shiraz produced a clutch of prolific wordsmiths and euphuists.

However even at the heart of the *Dīwān* dissent could still be expressed. Though many of the more noteworthy names associated with the literary scene, other than the chroniclers, were Sufi poets and court panegyrists a tradition of parody seems to have emerged at this time which reached maturation the following century in the biting satire of Zākānī (d.1371).¹¹⁸⁸ Pūr-i Bahā’ was one such poet very closely associated with the *Dīwān* and with the Juwaynī brothers in particular.¹¹⁸⁹ His present fame rests in many ways on his diatribes against the harsh taxation system imposed on the country by the ruling Il-Khanid regime. Minorsky published a translation of one of his poems, *Qopchur*, in 1956 and suggested that this work validated the criticisms that the *Ṣāḥib Dīwān* Rashīd al-Dīn was later to make

concerning the pre-Ghazan Khan administration.

*This poem is a vivid and unexpected confirmation of the picture which the great historian Rashīd al-Dīn drew of the confusion reigning in Mongol financial administration, before some improvements were introduced into it by Ghazan-khan.*¹¹⁹⁰

Pūr-i Bahā' like many others of his countrymen, resented paying taxes and no doubt found it a great strain on his resources. However he appears to have been quite unafraid to address long poems of extravagant complaint to his exalted patrons. His praise is spiked with impudence when in this poem deriding the severity and unfairness of Il-Khanid taxation he notes that his patron is, 'The Lord of the viziers, Alā ad-Daula wa al-Dīn, Whose justice [has] levied *qopchur* on the whole world'. Whereas Rashīd al-Dīn could be accused of self-interest and ulterior motives in his stinging criticism, the poet Pūr-i Bahā's only motive would appear to be to ease the sting in his own pocket. Later he also notes that it is not only the Persians who suffer from such tax burdens but that Mongol lords are also required to pay their dues. 'In thy time the kingdom has become such that, on the order of the sheep, The shepherd's dog collects *qopchur* from the wolf.'¹¹⁹¹ That Pūr-i Bahā' felt confident enough to write such hard-hitting verse lacking in the usual panegyric filigree says as much about the poet's audaciousness as about his patrons' liberality and tolerance. Even irreverent references to Mongol rule as an 'interregnum'¹¹⁹² appear to have gone unchallenged. Pūr-i Bahā' for all his poems of complaint and woe recognised providence when he encountered it. He ends a poem, written in 1271 in praise of the 'just Abaqa' for his restorative work on the city of Nishapur, with the following lines:

*Three things, I pray, may last for aye, while earth doth roll along:
The Khwāja's life, the city's luck, and Pūr-i Bahā's song.*¹¹⁹³

Pūr-i Bahā' of Jam was a contemporary of the Juwaynī brothers and Abaqa Khan. His chief patrons were the Ṣāḥib Khwāja Izz al-Dīn zāhir Faryumadi who was appointed wazir of Khorasan by Abaqa, the two Juwaynī brothers, Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī, and various other high court officials.¹¹⁹⁴ When Majd al-Mulk, the Juwaynī brothers' rival and enemy finally lost the fight against his hated foes and met a particularly gruesome fate, Pūr-i Bahā' was there, ready with a clever ditty. 'He wanted his hand to reach as far as Iraq; His grasp couldn't reach but his hand did arrive.'¹¹⁹⁵ He has also been linked with the Sufi poet and boon companion of the Ṣāḥib Diwān, Humām al-Dīn

whom he met while visiting Tabriz with Vajih al-Dīn, the son of his chief patron, the Persian governor of Khorasan, *zāhir* Faryumadī.¹¹⁹⁶ What is particularly noteworthy in Pūr-i Bahā's work, which is often of a strongly satirical bent, is his use of Mongolian and Turkish idioms not found so plentifully in other literary works of the time.¹¹⁹⁷ Though this use is highly stylised in works such as the so-called *Mongol Ode* his widespread usage of Mongolian and Turkish terms suggest that such language was in much more common employment than has generally been credited despite the existence of other such texts. Naṣir al-Dīn *zāsī*'s 'On Finance' is just such a text using numerous Mongolian and Turkish terms which do not appear in later Persian writing.¹¹⁹⁸

Whereas in poems such as his account of the earthquake in Nishapur where he refers to the good works of Abaqa Khan whom he describes as the 'Nushirvan of our time, Abaqa, the Lord of the World, the Sovereign of the Earth, the World Conqueror, foe-binder',¹¹⁹⁹ Pūr-i Bahā' is suitably respectful of his superiors, he is elsewhere not afraid to launch into a vicious tirade against the government taxation policies of the time and to address such words to the highest officials. In the *mathnawī*, *Kār-nāmeḥ-ye Awqāf*, ostensibly in praise of Izz al-Dīn *zāhir* al-Faryamadī¹²⁰⁰ he lampoons the administrators of *waqfs* and cruelly satirises the hypocrisy of Mullas. In an address to his patron Aṭā Malik Juwaynī, governor of Baghdad, he makes an impassioned and vitriolic attack on the excessive taxes paid to the Il-Khanate state.¹²⁰¹ He complains that 'the census, that in thirty years was taken once, Now [the government] imposes *qopchur* twice at a time'.¹²⁰² Such is the zeal of the tax-collectors that 'A chick has not yet put its head out of the shell, When *qopchur* has been fixed both on the cock and the hen.'¹²⁰³ So great is the distress and lamentations of the victims of the Arghun Aqa's tax regime that the *qopchur* itself feels the affliction of the people. 'Because of the burning prayer of the oppressed, *Qopchur* itself is raising its sighs and cries to the [throne] of the Almighty.'¹²⁰⁴ Pūr-i Bahā' was obviously very unhappy at having to pay these taxes not least because the taxes applied equally to Muslim and Christian alike, but it is rare that eulogies and fulsome praises are composed about tax-collectors or about the pleasures of filling the state's coffers with the pecuniary sweat of one's own labour. It is perfectly natural to resent parting with hard-earned wages and to dislike an efficient and thorough system which evidently did not allow or encourage shirking or evasion of payments due. That Pūr-i Bahā' was allowed, and felt confident enough, to compose such satirical ditties and then to present them to such high government officials who were responsible for the collection and spending of much of those monies, says much for the indulgence and tolerance of the regime that

he lived under.

Doubtless there was room and reason for complaint but Pūr-i Bahā's words cannot be taken as a serious assessment of the financial health of his times. Whether Pūr-i Bahā' is describing the absence of his patron who in the *Mongol Ode* is addressed as if he were a beauty surrounded by *huris* and *peris* while luxuriating in confectionery,¹²⁰⁵ indulging and improvising in the use of new and foreign terms, eulogising his masters,¹²⁰⁶ complaining of his harsh and unjust lot in life, attacking his enemies,¹²⁰⁷ or even composing panegyrics to his own penis and elaborating the advantages of young boys over women,¹²⁰⁸ Pūr-i Bahā' is invariably wildly extravagant and cannot be taken at face value. His diatribe against the *qopchur* was addressed to Aṭā Malik Juwaynī and his main aim must have been to amuse and humour his rich and powerful patron and possibly at the same time to convey the message that the taxes were not exactly popular. Disgruntled tax payers are as old as rapacious tax-collectors but it is not always that those malcontents are allowed the luxury of giving public voice to their chagrin.

Other poets of this time, though not satirists or critics of the regime, were not necessarily panegyrists of their rich patrons either. Born in Hamadan in 1213, Fakhr al-Dīn 'Irāqī was from a long line of religious scholars and he, from an early age, was steeped in Islamic learning and literary disciplines.¹²⁰⁹ According to a biography believed to have been composed shortly after his death in 1289, he achieved early fame for his melodious and captivating recitations of the *Qoran*. The topos of the infidels becoming instant converts to Islam after hearing his voice is included in this version.¹²¹⁰ At seventeen according to this same biography having 'acquired an understanding of all the sciences, having studied all things well, and being himself already an instructor to others' he chanced upon a group of *Qalandars* amongst whom was a boy of 'matchless beauty'. Such was the power of this encounter that not long afterwards 'Irāqī abandoned everything in order to follow this roving band and the beauty who had captured his heart. 'Seizing the cup of drunkards, filling and swilling it' 'Irāqī set out on his wandering which took him throughout Persia and eventually to India where he was to meet his master, Bahā' al-Dīn Zakariyā Multānī (1170–1267), a Suhrawardī and Chishtī saint. His departure from Hamadan, it has been noted, was not connected with the Mongol irruptions which though they had certainly reached Hamadan and must surely have left a profound impression on his young seven-year-old mind, were having little effect on life in Hamadan around 1229, the invaders being more concerned with the cornering of the elusive Jalāl al-Dīn Mīnkubirnī to the west of the city.¹²¹¹

'Irāqī wrote much of his greatest poetry during his years based in

Anatolia, mostly in Konya. Like his contemporary Sa'dī of Shiraz, 'Irāqī returned to Iran around the decade that the Il-Khanate was being established in Persia and Azerbaijan. However in spite of being named Shaykh Bahā' al-Dīn Zakariyā Multānī's successor he had left Multan under a cloud of acrimony and scandal amidst accusations of spending his time 'reciting poetry in the company of young boys'.¹²¹² After travelling to Oman and the Hijaz, 'Irāqī, now in his fifties, made his way to Konya, already a famed and welcoming centre for poets and Sufis, arriving in the city around 1266. In Konya, a city where Persian, Greek, Turkish and Arabic were all commonly spoken, 'Irāqī came under the patronage of the good and the great, and the renowned *Qalandar* antinomianist and writer of sublimely erotic mystical verse began dedicating his work to such luminaries of the Persio- Mongol world as the Juwaynī brothers and the Parvānū of Rum, Muīn al-Dīn. Under the guidance of Sa'dr al-Dīn Qunawī, the stepson and spiritual successor of Ibn al-Arabī,¹²¹³ 'Irāqī thrived in the Saljuqid capital where he was also befriended by Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī. He made his base in the city of Tokat, just north of Sivas. His biography abounds in stories of his eccentricities, wisdom and divine insight.¹²¹⁴

The high esteem in which Sufi poets were held during this period is reflected in the events leading up to 'Irāqī's abrupt departure from Rum. His patron, the Parvānū Muīn al-Dīn, had probably unjustly aroused the suspicions of the central *Dīwān* for compliance in the abortive but very damaging irruptions of Baybars and his Mamluk armies into northern Syria and Anatolia. At the battle of Abulustayn in 1277 the Mongol forces, including a contingent of Saljuqid troops, had been routed by the Mamluks and the Parvānū's son had been taken prisoner and transported to Egypt. Baybars had entered Kayseri and had had himself crowned king of Rum, employing traditional Saljuqid rituals for the ceremony. However fearing a Mongol counter-attack he had withdrawn to Egypt before any outbreak of renewed hostilities. The Parvānū, in anticipation of the wrath of Abaqa, stole to 'Irāqī's retreat in Tokat one night and pressed upon him a bag of jewels which he claimed were the fruit of all his years in office. He pleaded with the divine that 'Irāqī should make his way to Egypt in order to find his son. If his son were found then he must at all costs be dissuaded from following the secular path of politics and the pursuit of power and he should be enjoined to embrace the simple life of the dervish. If he were not found then 'Irāqī was free to spend the money as he saw fit.¹²¹⁵ Shortly afterwards the Parvānū met his fate and was executed on Abaqa's orders. According to the Armenian historian, Hetoum, who dismissed Muīn al- Dīn as a traitor, Abaqa Khan made a meal of the alleged tergiversator and then he and some of his lords feasted on the

flesh of the Parvānū.¹²¹⁶

But it was not only the ranking officials of the Sultanate of Rum who held the poet and Sufi in high regard and before 'Irāqī was able to depart Anatolia he was approached by the *Ṣāhib Dīwān* of Abaqa himself. Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī had been dispatched to the area to restore order and authority and to consolidate direct central rule after the chaos caused by the Mamluk invasion of Rum. He had invited the Shaykh to his camp while he was visiting Tokat and had provided a donkey and an escort for the divine. In his audience with his exalted host, Shaykh Fakhr al-Dīn 'Irāqī was true to form and his warming eloquence soon brought tears to the great minister's eyes. When Juwaynī returned to his headquarters he was informed by the Mongol representative, Prince Qonquratai, that acting upon intelligence received he had dispatched his agents to seize 'Irāqī into whose safe keeping, he had been informed, the Parvānū had given the whole of the treasuries of Rum. Juwaynī acted immediately and sent his own agents to warn the Sufi of his approaching doom. With the warning he sent a sack of 1,000 dinars and the urgent advice to flee Tokat and the country without delay. His advice was heeded and 'Irāqī left forthwith for Sinope with two companions and from there made his way to Egypt.¹²¹⁷ In recognition of his debt to the Il-Khanid minister, 'Irāqī dedicated his *mathnawī*, *The Song of Lovers*, to Shams al-Dīn, 'Lord and Master of time and place, leader of Islam, great *Ṣāhib*, glory of the Arabs, great regulator of the Persians, Āṣaf¹²¹⁸ of the Age, ruler of the world'.¹²¹⁹

In the *Ṣāhib Dīwān*'s retinue on this trip to Anatolia was another celebrated poet, Humām al-Dīn Tabrīzī (d.1314),¹²²⁰ described by his patron in an official document allotting him 1,000 dinars annually as the 'jewel of the age' and the 'perfection of the human species'.¹²²¹ Though also a Sufi and a director of a reputed *Khanqāh* for which the above annual stipend had been allocated, Humām al-Dīn was more obviously a panegyrist and consort of the mighty than others of his colleagues. He did not have the glamour of a *Qalandari* past nor the history of suitable eccentricities like his contemporary 'Irāqī and he could not claim the theological stature nor exalted pedigree of Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī. Though it has been claimed that he had been a disciple of the Tabrīzī Sufi, Ḥasan Bulghārī,¹²²² his fame rested more on his skill as a spinner of fine verse and he was considered to be a worthy contemporary of Sa'dī of Shiraz, thirty years his senior. Only one incident of the two poets meeting has been recorded and though the event is narrated by Dawlatshāh, not the most scrupulous of chroniclers as regards historical facts, the story is considered reliable.¹²²³ According to this tale Sa'dī entered a *hammam* where Humām al-Dīn was already ensconced in all his glory. The Shaykh

served the apparently conceited poet with a basin of water and the two struck up a conversation. On hearing that the old man hailed from Shiraz, Humām informed him that there were more Shirāzīs in Tabriz than dogs. Sa’dī countered that in Shiraz indeed there were fewer Tabrizīs than dogs. As the great poet flounced out after this short gambit, a young man of exceptional beauty mimicked his rather vain behaviour for Sa’dī’s amusement. Irritated by such a display of disrespect Humām al-Dīn turned back and, standing between the young man and the Shaykh, demanded of Sa’dī whether the name of Humām al-Dīn and his poetry were not known in Shiraz. The old man replied that indeed they were and then produced a verse suggesting that, standing as he was between the old man and the young beauty, Humām al-Dīn was a veil between him and his beloved. His great desire was that that veil should be cast aside. Humām al-Dīn realised to whom he was talking and fell at the great Shaykh’s feet before carrying him home as his honoured guest. Humām was ready to recognise Shaykh Sa’dī as his master and wrote much verse in praise of him. He acknowledged that the older man ‘had carried off the ball of fame’ when he wrote:

*Humām has an utterance sweet and charming;
But what doth it avail, for the poor fellow is not a Shirāzī.*¹²²⁴

Humām al-Dīn Tabrizī is of interest for two main reasons. First, he was a poet at the very heart of the Il-Khanid *Diwān* where he had early been a student of Naṣīr al-Dīn ẓaṣī¹²²⁵ and was counted one of Shams al-Dīn’s boon-companions and an intimate of his son Hāran al-Dīn.¹²²⁶ Shams al-Dīn had singled Humām al-Dīn out for praise in his last letter before his execution in 1284 addressed to the ‘*ulamā*’ of Tabriz.¹²²⁷ However such closeness to that fated family did not harm the poet’s career and he successfully attached himself to the Ṣāḥib *Diwān*, Sa’d al-Dīn Mustawfī Sāvajī, and then to this amīr’s partner and successor, the great Rashīd al-Dīn to whom he dedicated so much of his work,¹²²⁸ and he also continued to find favour with, and to write flowery verses for, the Sultans Aḥmad, Ghazan and Öljeitü.¹²²⁹ The other reason that this Sufi poet is of interest is that, in addition to being well regarded by the rich and powerful, Humām al-Dīn Tabrizī was a respected member of the Sufi poet fraternity and had connections with the Kubrāwiya order through Ṣadr al-Dīn Hamaya¹²³⁰ and his *Khanqāh*, initially financed by the Juwayni family, was a popular centre for the spiritually minded.

It was in the latter half of the thirteenth century that the institution of the *Khanqāh* became particularly widespread and central to the lives of the Islamic community. These spiritual social centres had long

been recorded in Transoxiana and had been steadily growing in popularity and influence since the end of the eighth century. In the mid-twelfth century the *Khanqāh* was defined as the ‘house of the aware and of becoming aware’.¹²³¹ It was the Persian Sufis and their *Khanqāhs* that were to become inextricably linked to the Il-Khans and their wazirs.¹²³² The *Khanqāh* had over the centuries come to be seen as an alternative to the mosque which was often associated with the state or the ruling authority of the time. Though the mosque never lost its role as a centre for prayers, it retained its associations with political dominance whereas the *Khanqāh*, even when it later became more institutionalised, maintained an air of relative independence, exclusivity and privacy.¹²³³ ‘The tavern of annihilation is the nest of the bird of the spirit – the tavern of ruin is the threshold of the space beyond place.’¹²³⁴ So said Shabistārī (d.1339) who though associated with no specific *Khanqāh* clearly reflected his links with these institutions through his poetry.¹²³⁵ Most Sufi poetry shows the influence of the *Khanqāh* (Arabic: *zāwīya*; Turkish: *tekke*) and Dawlatshāh evinces how many poets especially of the Mongol period in Persia were frequenters if not masters of these ‘houses of awareness’. Dawlatshāh has recorded how Fakhr al-Dīn ‘Irāqī, Awḥādī of Maragheh, and Sayed Ḥusseinī all claim to have written their finest mystical poetry during a retreat at a *Khanqāh* founded by the Sufi poet Awḥād al-Dīn of Kirman (d.1238).¹²³⁶ The *Khanqāh* of Humām al-Dīn Tabrizī to which Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī allocated an annuity of 1,000 dinars illustrates the scope of the activities of these dervish retreats. When Khwāja Hāran, the son of Shams al-Dīn, visited Humām al-Dīn at his lodge the Sufi poet laid on a sumptuous feast which, according to Dawlatshāh, consisted of four hundred platters of Chinese delicacies and he also composed a *ghazal* in celebration of the occasion. This particular *Khanqāh* in Tabriz survived its founder and was still active at the time Dawlatshāh was writing his *Memoirs of the Poets* c.1485.¹²³⁷

The *Khanqāhs* were not the exclusive domain of Sufis but served as inns for travellers, providing board and lodging. ‘The servant [of the *Khanqāh*] is charged with making others comfortable’.¹²³⁸ Their open forums allowed a wide public without restrictions on class, or indeed religion to participate in the Sufi assemblies and to listen to the sermons, musical and poetry recitals and the dance and *samā* (mystical chanting sometimes accompanied by ‘whirling’)¹²³⁹ displays. Ibn Battuta was well served by these Sufi hospices as he travelled across Persia. ‘At the end of each stage [of his journey across SW Iran] there was a hospice, at which every traveller was supplied with bread, meat, and sweetmeats.’¹²⁴⁰ He claims that a third of the state’s revenue went to the upkeep of the *madressehs* and these hospices.¹²⁴¹

As well as these public functions the *Khanqāh* also functioned as more conventional spiritual centres allowing space for private meditation, fasting and prayer and intimate spiritual discourse between Sufi initiates. Hodgson concluded that these Sufi institutions ‘succeeded in combining a spiritual élitism with a social populism’ while Sufism ‘provided a wide field of free development for the exceptional individual.’¹²⁴²

Perhaps it was inevitable that such ubiquitousness and such worldly support as the *Khanqāhs* began to enjoy would result in these establishments losing some of their reputation for saintliness and becoming associated with less salutary practices. Throughout the Il-Khan period and beyond, the Sufi ‘retreats’ enjoyed unprecedented popularity. Mustawfī Qazwīnī devotes nine pages of his history to listing the Shaykhs, many of whom were Sufis associated with *Khanqāh*, who flourished under Mongol rule.¹²⁴³ Lewisohn has expressed this ‘vulgar socialisation of Sufism during the Mongol period’ as the development and crystallisation of esoteric Sufi ideals into an exoteric format, ‘a collective socialisation of Divine Love, a ritualisation of the heart’s original self-sacrificing service.’¹²⁴⁴ Even such a figure as Jalāl al-Dīn Rāmī, who had himself founded an order based around music and dancing much to the disapproval of the establishment of Konya, expressed his own abhorrence toward some of the *Khanqāhs* and even named offenders such as Shaykh Nāṣer al-Dīn of Konya.¹²⁴⁵ He recounts the tale of a ‘beardless youth’ who enters a *Khanqāh* in the vain hope of finding respite from the snares of the lecherous. However, after being woken in the night by his devout companions ‘with eyes full of sperm and testicle-squeezing hands’, the youth despairs. If even the *Khanqāh* is not safe from the corrupt, what hope could there be for the secular world of the bazaar?¹²⁴⁶ Elsewhere the Mawlānā tells the tale of the wandering Sufi so blinded by greed for the music, dance and spiritual comforts of the *Khanqāh* that he does not recognise that same over-powering greed in his hosts, though for more blatantly worldly comforts, which leads them to steal his donkey to pay for the entertainments.¹²⁴⁷ Jalāl al-Dīn Rāmī comments that among the many thousands of so-called Sufis few deserved that adopted title: ‘(But) of these Sufis there are [only] a few among thousands; the rest are living in [under the protection of] his [the perfect Sufi’s spiritual] Empire.’¹²⁴⁸

Shabistārī (d.1337) expressed his own doubts as regards the denizens of the *Khanqāhs* in his work, *The Secret Garden*, when he contrasted the true mystic with the habitués of the Sufi sanctuaries: ‘He goes at dusk, drunk, into the *Khanqāh* [and] reveals the Sufis’ wonders to be but tricks’.¹²⁴⁹ A contemporary of Shabistārī, Izz al-Dīn Maḥmad Kāshānī, unequivocally states his opinion that the once

admirable institution of the *Khanqāh* had suffered ‘degeneration which has arisen in the present day – caused mainly by the deteriorating state of the sciences and disappearance of the traditions of the Sufis’.¹²⁵⁰ Mustawfī Qazwīnī concludes his section of the saints of the Mongol era with a bitter denunciation of the Sufis and Shaykhs of his own time c.1330 accusing them of fraud and hypocrisy.¹²⁵¹

However, though many of the more illustrious names might have taken a cynical view of the popularisation of their retreats, there is much evidence that the true nature of Sufism and its strict ideals had not been forgotten and that though often not practised, the preaching remained true to more traditional values.

Though he achieved his greatest fame during and after the reign of Ghazan Khan, the Shaykh of Ardabil, Ṣafī al-Dīn Iṣḥāq (d.1334), was possibly already known before this time as a pious and powerful local dignitary and for his association with his illustrious mentor, Shaykh Zāhid of Gilan. His life 1252–1334 indeed spanned the rule of the Il-Khans in Iran. Ṣafī al-Dīn’s hagiographer, Ibn Bazzāz, who compiled his collection of stories and anecdotes about the Shaykh around 1358, was a disciple of the ‘saint’s’ son and successor Ṣadr al-Dīn Ardab‘ilī.¹²⁵² Regardless of whether the stories he relates are historically accurate, the fact that they were believed and acted as paradigms for the Shaykh’s wide following indicates the ideal behaviour and values expected of Sufis and religious figures at that time. Ibn Bazzāz clearly states that the Shaykh would never accept largesse from any Sultan or notable. Even on those of his own lands on which he had been exempted from paying tax and which were forbidden to any kind of interference or inspection from state officials, he eschewed his right to collect the taxes from the peasants and went so far as to ban the voicing of the words ‘*idrār-e Diwān*’ (government allowance) in his presence.¹²⁵³ Exactly how he acquired and maintained such large estates as he and his family possessed is not satisfactorily explained. Examples of his practising what he preached are scattered about the book. He famously ignored and left behind him in Tabriz, the gift of seventy robes of honour presented to him by the son of the great Rashīd al-Dīn, explaining to a travelling companion that his aspirations did not include even awareness of such things. His love was for the people not for that which he could solicit from them.¹²⁵⁴ Another story relates how the Shaykh was troubled by a terrible stench emanating from his private oratory. He requested ‘Abdelmalek Sarāwī to search for the source of the smell and to clear it out. ‘Abdelmalek did as requested but the only possible source of the stench was a privy which he then proceeded to fill in with earth. However the good Shaykh continued to complain of a terrible stink and ‘Abdelmalek returned to empty the room of anything else he

could find. When he returned again to the Master, he insisted that he could find nothing from which the smell could have been emanating but that he had cleared out the room anyway even removing a gold dish which had been presented to the Great Man by the princess Qutlugh Malik, daughter of the Sultan Gaykhatu, and placed under a cushion. Şafī al-Dīn pointed out that the stench had now disappeared and that indeed it had been emanating from that gold dish, a gift from the Sultan's daughter, which was something which greatly troubled him.¹²⁵⁵ 'When I am indebted to the name of Turks, princes and amīrs, my heart is restless.'¹²⁵⁶

However he was reputedly also a very humble man and he even claimed that he was unsure of which house of God, Heaven or Hell, he was worthy and whether his deeds would make him fit for heaven.¹²⁵⁷ Humble and honest he might have been but he was also credited with a rounded education and a knowledge of Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Mongolian as well as his native Gilani dialect.¹²⁵⁸

The Shaykh's implied distance from the *Qalandars* who were one of the causes for the disrepute of some of the *Khanqāhs* is illustrated in an interesting story concerning Şafī al-Dīn's mentor, Shaykh Zāhid of Gilan. Şadr al-Dīn related to Ibn Bazzāz that a certain Ḥassan Mangolī, the leader of the Yaqabīāns, had relatives who were close to Sultan Aḥmad. Whether this relative was Kamāl Abd al-Raḥman, the Sultan's Shaykh al-Islam is not specified. This Ḥassan Mangolī advocated a Sufi order which permitted and encouraged indulgence in hashish and Sultan Aḥmad was much taken by his company. Together they became involved in 'blasphemy and corruption' and the Sultan began to mix with the society of *Qalandars* and other such 'unclean' persons that Ḥassan Mangolī collected about him. Pūr-i Bahā' paints a vivid picture of the Ḥaydarī *Qalandars* at this time, dressed in torn wraps of coarse goat hair, their beards singed, with rings both in their ears and their pierced penes which they clutched as they wandered the land often in groups as large as a hundred.¹²⁵⁹ Ibn Bazzāz's story goes on to relate how Ḥassan Mangolī, out of burning jealousy for Shaykh Zāhid's influence at court, poisoned the Sultan's mind with lies and fabrications against the Shaykh and his son Jamāl al-Dīn Alī. Before the Sultan could act on his new friend's duplicity, his fate overtook him and after being wrapped in felt, he was kicked to death on the orders of his nephew, Arghun Khan. And Ḥassan Mangolī who had been inflamed by so much of the fire of envy was most suitably thrown in a cauldron and boiled alive.¹²⁶⁰ Though not verified elsewhere the story seems to support the impression that Sultan Aḥmad's brand of Islam was somewhat suspect and that he turned from the path of righteousness as represented by Shaykh Zāhid to consort with the likes of Shaykh Ḥassan Mangolī¹²⁶¹ with his

Qalandars, and Kamāl Abd al-Raḥman. Shaykh Kamāl Abd al-Raḥman, according to Bar Hebraeus, had escaped the massacres in Baghdad where he had been a Greek slave of the caliph and had taken up the trade of carpentry in Mosel. By claiming contacts with the spirit world and magical powers he eventually came to the notice of the royal court and was invited to meet Abaqa, who enjoyed the company of such people, and with trickery he was able to convince the Il-Khan of his supernatural powers. It was in this way that he gained access to, and was able to exert such influence over, the future Sultan.¹²⁶²

It is *Qalandars*¹²⁶³ and their strange practices, the use of hashish figuring prominently in these, which have been the source of many of the associations wrongly made between Sufism and the use of drugs. The Sufis believed in the quest for mystical experience and of the possibility of personal knowledge of God through a spirituality independent of the traditional religious schools (*maḥab*). However, for the most part, the Sufi lodges and the leading Sufi Shaykhs were upholders of the establishment and supporters of traditional Islamic teachings and practices. They as much as the most conservative of the traditional '*ulamā*' disapproved strongly of the activities and the reputation of the *Qalandars*.

The *Qalandars* were a very distinctive group seen on the medieval landscape and they became particularly prominent in the later thirteenth century in the Il-Khanate. They affected a characteristic coiffure, the so-called 'four blows' (*chahār żarb*), by shaving head, beard, moustache and eyebrows, though such groups as the Ḥaydarīs grew their moustaches excessively long. Their dress was sometimes completely absent, sometimes restricted to a simple loincloth, though often they dressed in more traditional Sufi garb, the woollen or felt cloak, though coloured black or white rather than the usual Sufi colour, blue. Others wore simple sacks. When they wore headgear it was invariably distinctive. Almost universally these *Qalandars* went barefoot. Apart from their strange appearance *Qalandars* could also be recognised as such by the paraphernalia they carried with them. The traditional black begging bowl and wooden club were ever present but also other equipment such as iron rings, collars, bracelets, belts, anklets, chains, hatchets, ankle-bones, leather pouches and large wooden spoons distinguished these wandering *Qalandars*. Most noticeable, maybe, were the rings, which were sometimes pierced through the penis to enforce sexual abstinence. This deliberately provocative external appearance was further exaggerated by their eccentric and scandalous behaviour which itself was encouraged by their well-attested use of intoxicants and hallucinogenic drugs, cannabis in particular.¹²⁶⁴

The *Qalandars* justified their outrageous behaviour with clever, no

doubt hashish-strengthened, logic for they defiantly maintained their adherence to Islam and the teachings of the Prophet. They were, they would earnestly insist, engaged on the quest for God and enlightenment and this of course entailed the suppression of 'self' and 'selfishness'. Too many, they claimed, were the Sufis who trod the path of self-denial and asceticism and yet who were ultimately defeated and seduced by the demon of self-aggrandisement. Too often these same ascetics took secret satisfaction and pleasure from the acclaim and admiration they elicited from their disciples and admirers and relished the fame that their hardship engendered. Their egos increased in proportion to the miseries they endured, and their public acclaim defeated the worldly self-denial they cultivated. The *Qalandars* rejected such courting of public esteem and considered false this publicly paraded saintliness and piety. For them, such public honour would undermine their attempts at self-abasement and true denial. It was, therefore, to avoid the pitfalls of public respect that they sought the opposite, namely, public contempt and disgrace. They actively sought disapproval not only from the establishment but also from the public in general, and in this way they considered themselves freer to follow their spiritual path towards truth.

It was with this aim that the *Qalandars* adopted their distinctive dress and practices and it was with this as their justification that they took up with relish the consumption of, in particular, hashish, though it should be mentioned that alcohol, music and various forms of less common sexual practices were also indulged in for the same pure reasons as mentioned above. Therefore the *Qalandars* were indulging in these excesses of sex, drugs and trance-inducing music merely to throw people of their trail, and to avoid the sin of vanity. They were not really hedonistic libertines but closet ascetics willing to endure public scorn and disgrace in the service of true humility.

For many in the more conservative Arab heartlands of the Islamic world all sin came from the east and from Persia in particular. Not only did the *Qalandars* appear from Persia but also, it was commonly believed, hashish and indeed, hashish use, was first introduced by the Persians, some said at the same time as the Mongols appeared, in the thirteenth century. 'They say: The secret of poverty [Şafism] is eating a herb [cannabis]. This secret has been brought to us by some Persians.'¹²⁶⁵ The legends of the advent of hashish centre around Ḥaydar al-Zāwah of Nishapur in Khurasan, founder of the infamous Ḥaydarī *Qalandars* who is said to have discovered hashish in 1211.¹²⁶⁶

The story of Ḥaydar's discovery of hashish and its magical properties is related in various sources. The fourteenth-century historian, al-Zarkashī, relates simply and clearly a story which had previously been circulated by a proponent of hashish, Imād al-Dīn al-

Ukbarī (d.1291), a source found only in later citations. In this story, Shaykh Ḥaydar is said to have left his monastery in a state of depression and to have wandered away from his companions into the countryside. It was a hot day and the air was unusually still with no wind detectable in the foliage of the trees or plants. Quite suddenly the Shaykh chanced upon a small tree. This *ḥashishah*, for that was what it was called, was in a state of agitation, shaking its branches and leaves excitedly even though there was no trace of wind in the air. The Shaykh surmised that this strange behaviour must be due to some secret contained within the plant and he therefore proceeded to pick and to eat the leaves of this tree. When he returned to his companions he instructed them to do likewise for he now knew that the plant indeed contained a secret.

Aḥmad al-Maqrīzī (d.1442), a major and reliable medieval source, embellishes this story with some interesting details. He recounts that the Shaykh's companions immediately noticed on his return the change in their master's appearance, 'his face radiated energy and joy, quite a contrast to his usual appearance.'¹²⁶⁷ When confronted, the Shaykh acknowledges that after eating the leaves he was indeed 'filled with this restless joy [they] had observed in [him].'¹²⁶⁸ After the Shaykh's disciples had also partaken of the leaves they too experienced 'irrepressible joy and gladness' and were then bound under oath not to reveal the secret of this plant to anyone other than fellow Sufis. 'God has granted you the privilege of knowing the secret of these leaves. Thus when you eat it, your dense worries may disappear and your exalted minds may become polished'.¹²⁶⁹ Al-Maqrīzī credits the appearance and growing popularity of hashish in Khurasan, Fars and later, in the ruling circles of Hormuz, and Bahrain to the spreading influence of the Ḥaydarī *Qalandars*. Verses by al-Maqrīzī and other poets often refer to cannabis as 'the Wine of Ḥaydar'.

But it was not solely the pernicious Ḥaydarīs who were responsible for the spread of cannabis use westward into the lands of the Arabs. The heyday of such groups as the Ḥaydarīs and other *Qalandars* coincided with the ascendancy of the Mongols in the Islamic world. The first Il-Khan, Hülegü Khan, destroyed the Abbāsīd caliphate in 1258 and loosened the doctrinal restrictions on the Islamic community. One of the results was the upsurge in Sufi orders and the growth in the number of *Qalandars*. The Mongols and the Persians, who administered their kingdom, became the obvious targets of blame for the moral and material ills which beset the Islamic world in the second half of the thirteenth century, a decline exemplified by these wandering, hashish-partaking 'foreign' *Qalandars*. Ibn Timiyah (d.1328) is in no doubt that it was the Mongols who were responsible

for introducing the evils of cannabis to the Islamic World: 'It was with the Tatars that it [hashish] originated among the people', 'about the time of the appearance of the Tatars; hashish went forth, and with it, there went forth the sword of the Tatars.' His intention was to suggest not only that the Mongols introduced this vice to the people but that they did so with the intention of using it as a weapon to weaken resistance to their conquest. This belief was put forward by subsequent chroniclers such as al-Dhahabī and al-Zarkashī. Al-Zarkashī quotes an unnamed source when he claims that the use of cannabis 'was an evil restricted to Persia, until the Tatars gained control over its inhabitants. Then it moved on to Baghdad when the evil effect it had upon its people was already known.' The thirteenth-century Spanish historian Ibn Saïd remarked disapprovingly on the use of hashish in Egypt which he claimed was unknown in his native Islamic Spain. However his remarks are significant when considered beside the verses, written in 1360, of Lisān al-Dīn ibn al-Khatīb who drew attention to the appearance of widespread hashish use among both the low and upper classes of Granada in the fourteenth century.¹²⁷⁰ Other than Sultan Aḥmad, hashish use among the Mongols has not been recorded. They were heavy drinking men and as the poets of the time were fond of saying the two drugs did not mix well.

*Their hashish covers the respectable person with ignominy
So that you meet him like a killer acting with premeditation
It produces upon his cheeks something like its own greenish colour . . .
Our own wine covers the lowly person with respectability
And dignity so that you find every master beneath him . . .
It appears – and his secret appears and gladdens him.
He resembles its colour with a rosy cheek.*¹²⁷¹

The situation and status of religion at this time is particularly confusing, if indeed a time has, or will ever, exist when the state of religion is not confounding. In the early years of the Il-Khanate, the *Qalandars* and the Sufi lodges held sway. In his study of Islam in Anatolia, the Turkish scholar Köprülü convincingly claims that:

*The vigorous religious coalescence that took place in Anatolia and western Iran in the 11th/17th century and the various groups and tariqas that came into existence there beginning in the 7th/13th century are closely bound to the history of the Qalandariyya.*¹²⁷²

With the Turkish and Mongol population movements, there came

westward a large influx of religious figures from Khorasan and Central Asia among whom were many dervishes loosely associated with the *Qalandars* and their associated groups such as the Ḥaydariya.¹²⁷³ These groups were in no way ‘Shamans in turbans’ and any similarities between the behaviour and outward appearance of the Sufis and shamans was superficial. Shamanism was not generally practised as a transcendental religion and did not include such practices as *fanā* (annihilation in God), and Gnosticism.¹²⁷⁴ However a distinction should be made between the many wandering, often antinomian dervishes, the larger ‘establishment’ *Khanqāhs*, and other more select centres where more ascetic, less flamboyant Sufis might gather. Sultan Aḥmad’s Mangolī must surely represent one of the first class of Sufi, the wandering antinomian dervishes, though it should be remembered that this is a very unsatisfactory generalisation since the *Qalandars* were hardly uniform in their practices, their social, religious, or educational backgrounds, nor indeed in the depth of their spiritual integrity. The *Khanqāh* of Humām al-Dīn Tabrizī would likely typify one of the second groupings of Sufi, whereas the third type of Sufi practitioner might be exemplified by such figures as Khwāja Ṣāim al-Dīn Yaḥyā (d.1284), Abd al-Raḥīm Tabrizī (1257) and Muḥammad Kujujānī (d.1279).¹²⁷⁵

These last mentioned Sufis were all natives of Tabriz which, particularly during the early Mongol period, was a thriving centre of Sufism. The traditions of erudition and scholarly pursuits did not die with the last caliph. With the collapse of the caliphate and the demise of the traditional centres of what has been termed ‘High Islam’,¹²⁷⁶ urban centres such as Tabriz and Konya became the focal points of the educated élite and many of the leading religious scholars of the age. After the conversion of Ghazan to Islam the Il-Khanid *Dīwān* itself became a centre for religious learning and debate with such giants of the age as the early exponent of Shiism Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hillī addressing their theological works to the Sultan Öljeitü himself. In the earlier period, the individual *Khanqāhs* still maintained their autonomy and a certain distance from the central court and their practices and reputations were diverse and distinctive. The distinctions however between those Sufi masters extolling folk Islam and those advocating ‘High Islam’ was not always so obvious as might be supposed. Abd al-Raḥīm Tabrizī was celebrated by his contemporaries and by the next generation of Tabrizī Sufis including the formidable Shabistarī for his vision and the depths of his thoughts and yet the sixteenth-century chronicler of the Persian Sufis, Ibn al-Karbālā ī (d.1590), claims amidst profound praise for the great man that he was in fact illiterate and had received no training from any instructors nor studied any books. But Ibn al-Karbālā’ī insists that the

greatest scholars and clerics of the time found Abd al-Raḥīm Tabrizī's conversation and speeches in Arabic delightful and yet so recondite that they had the greatest difficulty in understanding them.¹²⁷⁷

When this conflict between the face of respectable Sufism and the reality of the Sufi drunkard intoxicated with inner turmoil became too apparent, often drastic steps were taken to resolve the incongruity. Whereas Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī and the Sufi order which his son, Sultan Valad, inherited and institutionalised must belong to what is called 'High Islam',¹²⁷⁸ Shams-i Tabrizī¹²⁷⁹ has been portrayed as a figure very much in the tradition of the *Qalandar* and the heterodox *babas* common throughout eastern Anatolia at the time and certainly more associated with the folk Islam of the people than with the religion of the sophisticated and cultured urban élite.¹²⁸⁰ The establishment circles of Konya could not countenance such a disreputable figure on such intimate terms with their leading theologian and spiritual guide and it is widely believed that Shams al-Dīn was murdered c.1247 on their orders. Shams al-Dīn Tabrizī certainly challenged the establishment with his unorthodox behaviour and controversial teachings, but his own writing and words reveal him to have been 'a man of learning and wisdom and eloquence'¹²⁸¹ without equal in his knowledge of the sciences, theology and philosophy.¹²⁸² He even defended the Mongols long before the advent of the enlightened Il-Khans. In reply to a scholar who complained that the Tatars had killed his brother, he admonished the man with the following: 'If you have knowledge then you should know that with that sword stroke, the Tatar bestowed eternal life on [your brother]'.¹²⁸³

Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī is on record as having some sympathy with the *Qalandars* if only for their habit of being clean shaven as Aflākī has recorded.¹²⁸⁴ In the *Mathnawī* Ramī cautions against hasty judgement of these 'unruly friends of God'. 'Do not measure the actions of holy men by (the analogy of) yourself'.¹²⁸⁵ Elsewhere Aflākī has recounted contacts and mutual respect exchanged between Ramī and Hajjī Mubārak Ḥaydarī, a direct disciple of the eponymous Shaykh Ḥaydarī.¹²⁸⁶ That the Konya élite and Sultan Valad in particular felt a strong aversion to *Qalandars* and the Turkoman rebels and consistently favoured those political leaders with strong links with the Mongols is borne out by the sources when Sultan Valad in his *Dīwān* rejoices that the ascension of the Sultan of Rum to the throne caused the 'Turks' to flee for their lives into the mountain caves where he suggested they be hunted out and killed.¹²⁸⁷ Köprülü emphasises that this hatred and aversion was for the wild and nomadic Turks and not for those in the employ or service of the Il-Khanid state. Sult. an Valad and other Anatolian poets of the time distinguished between the urbanised and culturally sophisticated 'Turks' and the unregulated

nomadic bands, referring to the former as *Ramīs*.¹²⁸⁸

It should be remembered that some years earlier in 1259–60, during the reign of Hülegü, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī had expressed his own unequivocal opinion to his Mongol master concerning the wandering dervish bands. Encountering a band of *Qalandars* in Harrān, northeast of Aleppo, Hülegü asked his trusted advisor, Naṣīr al-Dīn, to explain such people. In response to ḡasī's description of the dervishes as 'excess' Hülegü reputedly had them all immediately executed.¹²⁸⁹ Ubayd Zākānī (d.1371) recounts a similar anecdote in which Hülegü condemns not only the *Qalandars* to death by drowning in the Tigris but also Shaykhs, Hajjīs, Sufis, beggars, mystics and even poets and story-tellers in order 'to purify the face of the earth from their villainy'.¹²⁹⁰ Though not to be taken literally, these anecdotes are of interest for the sentiments and attitudes they betray.

But this blurring between folk and 'High' Islam was not always the case. Khwāja Ṣāīn al-Dīn Yaḥyā (d.1284) whose 'attainment of nobility and perfection was greater than that of all the pole-stars of the age, all the great shaykhs, all the celebrated of the world and of all the elders of the era'¹²⁹¹ founded a *Khanqāh* which in his day attracted 'all the great saints particularly all the saints who resided in the sweet lands of Tabriz'.¹²⁹² According to al-Karbalāī he was considered a leading authority on both the esoteric and exoteric sciences and the leading authority on the chains of veracity associated with the *Hadith*. 'He was celebrated in the exoteric sciences and famous amongst the adepts of esoteric knowledge, and in his time none were superior to him [in knowledge] of the *sanad hadith*.'¹²⁹³ At the time of writing, in the mid-sixteenth century, Ṣāīn al-Dīn's *Khanqāh* was still attracting the faithful. One other Tabrizī Sufi master of lasting fame and an adherent of Ibn 'Arabī was Muḥammad Kujujānī another 'very greatest who all the saints of his day accepted as their "king"'.¹²⁹⁴ Kujujānī was famed not only for his sophisticated erudition and Islamic scholarship but for his tolerance, humility and mild, understanding temperament.¹²⁹⁵ The venerated Kubrāwiya Shaykh, Sa'd al-Dīn b. Hamaya (d.1252), the spiritual master of 'Azīz Nasafī (d.1300) was also associated with Tabriz for a short period.¹²⁹⁶ His son, Ṣadr al-Dīn (d.1322), credited with the conversion of Ghazan to Islam,¹²⁹⁷ maintained very close ties with the Il-Khanid court and was married to the daughter of Aṭā Malik Juwaynī. He was also a leading Sufi of the Kubrāwiya movement closely associated with Shaykh Ḥasan Bulghārī,¹²⁹⁸ and showed a preoccupation with numerology and esoteric subjects, and a veneration of Ibn Arabī. Shaykh Ḥasan Bulghārī who died in 1298/9¹²⁹⁹ was himself closely connected to the central *Dīwān*. During this period as the 'Persian' *Dīwān* became stronger so the links between the *Khanqāhs* and the

ruling élite became increasingly more entangled.¹³⁰⁰

This trend towards closer links between the world of the Sufis and their *Khanqāhs*, and the Il-Khanid *Dīwān* did not irrevocably falter when Arghun, whose sympathies were notably not directed towards the Muslims though this supposed animosity has been overstated, took over the reins of power.¹³⁰¹ Alā al-Dawla al-Semnānī (1261–1336) was born into a powerful, land-owning family with obvious parallels to the Juwaynīs.¹³⁰² However, where the Juwaynīs served in the central *Dīwān*, the Simnānīs remained initially in Khorasan serving the governors there and were well placed in Arghun's court when he eventually came to the west, reigning from 1284–91. The young Semnānī entered the court in 1275–6, when he was fifteen years old, at the encouragement of his paternal uncle and it was his wont to engage in religious disputes with the Buddhists who were favoured by Arghun. What is interesting in Semnānī's case is his relationship with his master, the supposed scourge of the Muslims,¹³⁰³ Arghun Khan. In 1284 during a battle between the forces of Arghun and Sultan Aḥmad's son-in-law Alīnāq, Semnānī had a vision which was to redirect his life. Much against the wishes of Arghun he eventually determined to leave the *Dīwān* and to devote himself to asceticism and the Sufi path. Though he was discouraged from doing so by his family, friends and Arghun himself, his will prevailed and his new status as a Sufi in place of army commander and fiscal administrator was grudgingly accepted. He was allowed to return to Semnan in 1286.¹³⁰⁴ Though many Muslims fell from their pivotal positions of power during Arghun's reign the fact that a court favourite such as Semnānī was permitted to follow the path that he chose possibly suggests that many of the dramatic changes in the Il-Khanid *Dīwāns* were to some degree cosmetic.

The opening years of the Il-Khanid state saw a widespread cultural blossoming of a knot of trends which had been slowly emerging from the early thirteenth century. The reasons for this renaissance are many but it was the relative stability, the economic revival through trade and a sudden re-awoken confidence that surfaced after it became clear that the masters in Maragheh were there to stay and it was this that provided the basis on which that trend would grow. The anarchy and disruption which grew and intensified after the irruption of the Mongols in the first quarter of the thirteenth century added to the already growing numbers of refugees heading westward. The Sultanate of Rum offered an early haven and the influx of poets, Sufis and *Qalandars* along with merchants, exiled notables and refugees was welcomed and many of these diverse people were soon assimilated into the multi-ethnic, pluralistic and religiously and culturally tolerant Ramī state. The Saljuq sultanate in Rum stood in contrast to the

chaotic and anarchic lands to the east. After Hülegü's triumphant march across northern Iran to establish his capital in Maragheh in the 1250s this situation changed. It was awareness of the change that Hülegü's advent promised that prompted Sa'di's return to his beloved Shiraz as the poet himself informs his readers.¹³⁰⁵ The remnants of the Khwārazmians had fled into Syria, the Ismā'īlīs had been conquered and dispersed, the caliphate had been neutralised, the Persian mini-states had pledged allegiance and once again the roads of Iran were made safe for business and travel, and quite suddenly Azerbaijan became the western hub of a vast land empire and the centre of a transcontinental trading network. For those first two decades the new Il-Khanid state was able to enjoy the fruits of strong central government, relative internal political stability and unfettered trade and cultural links. The demise of the caliphate freed a blossoming of spirituality from previous constraints and the new, effectively secular, authorities did not interfere with these emancipated schools. The bureaucrats of the Il-Khanid *Dīwān* were Persians who had grown up in Mongol *ordus* and their early companions and childhood friends had been Mongols as well as Turks, Persians, Uighurs, and Khwārazmians. They were a new generation just as their Mongol overlords were a new generation at least one step removed from the harsh austerity and brutality of the steppe. If the unity and stability of the new regime began to unravel after Abaqa's death and the political rivalries between princes and bureaucratic clans began to destroy what order and discipline Hülegü and his son had succeeded in implementing, this should not detract from the accomplishments of the new order nor obscure the aims and aspirations on which the new order was based. If there was a return to partial anarchy and confusion in the last two decades of the thirteenth century it should not be forgotten that the first three decades of the fourteenth century were to become a golden age for some.¹³⁰⁶

RETURN OF A KING

Hülegü's establishment of a state in Iran toward the end of the 1250s marked an end to an enduring period of anarchy which had prevailed in the region since the early twelfth century. As he began his leisurely journey westward he was waylaid by well-wishers and greeted by the dignitaries and rulers from throughout the west.

*There came willingly to his service a large number of the princes and generals. People came from every house and from by roads to praise him. At every halting place where they stopped, they received praise from those along the way.*¹³⁰⁷

Even the Ismā'īlī Kharshāh sent representatives to earn his goodwill and pledge allegiance. Rulers such as Shams al-Dīn Kart had already proved their loyalty on the battlefield and local kings and royals such as those from Cilician Armenia, Kirman, Yazd, Shiraz and other Iranian, Caucasian, and Anatolian provinces had previously established their allegiance and 'devotion' to the Mongols. Hülegü had little to fear from the country he was entering and the opposition he expected, namely from the Ismā'īlīs, he was well prepared to greet. Even his later treatment of Kharshāh was merciful and it was not at Hülegü's hand or command that the Nizārī Imam met his fate. This was not a man seeking vengeance and destruction. Hülegü Khan came westward to further Mongol overall hegemony over the Islamic lands and to establish his own power-base in Iran and Irāq.

That Hülegü had higher ambitions than the destruction and oppressive subjugation of a sedentary society is made obvious by his treatment of those who fell under his power and judgement. He was aware that he could not blindly trust even his own relatives and that the 'locals' had to be cultivated at all levels and in all institutions.¹³⁰⁸ The Muḥtasham of Qohestan, Naṣīr al-Dīn, whose erudition was widely known, was quickly pardoned and honoured despite his history with the hated Ismā'īlīs as was the renowned Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī whose denunciation of his former masters was instantly accepted. Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī was almost immediately installed in a place of honour and power in Hülegü's court and yet his only prowess was his

remarkable intellectual dexterity and scholarly reputation. One of this legendary thinker's first tasks was the establishment of his seat of learning in Maragheh containing his famous library and observatory, a centre for an international cast of academics, clerics and scholars. Bar Hebraeus found sanctuary and peace in that haven of learning. Arguably it is traces of this church that can still be seen today in Maragheh on the western face of a hill overlooking the city only thirty or forty metres beneath the observatory, the Raṣad-Khāneh.¹³⁰⁹ Bar Hebraeus' *Chronicum Ecclesiasticum* makes reference to a new monastery and church.¹³¹⁰ Along with ẓasī, Rashīd al-Dīn makes it clear that his own relatives were recognised for their own abilities and were given refuge after the fall of Alamūt. The thinker and Shi'a divine, Ibn zāwas, together with other clergy and scholars were all spared the massacres of Baghdad and like the Caucasus's leading clerics and academics, were soon co-opted into Hülegü's circle of apparent admirers. This was not the sparing of possible magic-makers or spiritual interlocutors by the superstitious, the ignorant and the naive but the deliberate policy of a ruler with aspirations beyond his origins, a conclusion alluded to in Rashīd al-Dīn's closing pages on Hülegü Khan. Though the vizier makes some disparaging remarks about Hülegü's trust and belief in the deceits and trickery of alchemists on whom he squandered his resources, Rashīd al-Dīn readily acknowledges Hülegü's keen interest in science and the disputations and discussions of philosophers and scholars and his generous allocation of pensions and stipends to these learned 'hangers-on'.¹³¹¹

Mustawfī Qazvīnī, writing in the 1330s, has abundant praise for Hülegü and his achievements which cannot be considered as 'servile flattery'¹³¹² since he was unlikely to have been under any particular pressure to defend the early Il-Khans.

*Hülegü achieved the majesty of kingship through fortune's wheel, and became prince of the world through the destiny of the bands of the stars. In wisdom was his guide, and in state matters, his wisdom became a guide for mankind. . . . That victorious and fortunate shāh treated hearts under his hand with justice and kindness. . . . Everywhere, he cut off the heads of the evildoer, but he never cut open the breast of a man with greatness of soul.*¹³¹³

Mustawfī even measures others against how well they served Hülegü as was the case in his assessment of Naṣīr al-Dīn ẓasī.

In the reign of the famous Hülegü, [ẓasī] served him until his end. In

straightforwardness, his intentions before the Khan's throne were always good. His heart bound him to every service, and his tongue spoke the truth of his heart. . . . He sought nothing but good for the Khan, he said nothing except that which was wise and pointed to the path; his soul was happy at the prospect of heaven.¹³¹⁴

He notes that Hülegü was quick to recognise the value of men of learning and that his desire was to have them in his court serving his interests. Accepting their submissions Hülegü treated his 'guests' with 'inestimable kindness'. For their part these scholarly recipients of the Il-Khan's largesse were duly appreciative of this turn in fortune.

*Daily their [those now in the Il-Khan's service] estimation of the wisdom of the freedom loving Khan grew. . . . Every prince was rewarded by the liberality of the court, and delighted by the Khan's nature.*¹³¹⁵

Though Mustawfi's principal source for this period was Rashīd al-Dīn whose narrative he closely follows, these asides and reflections were obviously his own personal assessment based on current opinion and attitudes. His praise extends to Abaqa, who, he claims, 'was a fortunate shāh, ruling happily and royally in that pleasant world, which found security in his justice, and the door of the works of the devil was locked'¹³¹⁶ but not necessarily to other of the early Il-Khans. Aḥmad was allowed to be dismissed as worthless,¹³¹⁷ and Gaykhatu was condemned as a drunkard and debauchee of the kingdom's youth.¹³¹⁸ Mustawfi's conclusions and appraisal cannot be lightly dismissed since he was aware of his responsibilities as an historian. He ends his epic prose work, the *aafarnāmah*, with these sentiments, 'Since I reached the age of 40 years, knowledge has become the ruler of the kingdom of my heart.'¹³¹⁹ Continuing he explains the care which went into his history.

*I sought out an abundance of diverse stories and many came to me from all kinds of people. I questioned wise men, wise in the history of Iran about events in this history, and sought anecdotes of Arab and Mongol in every part.*¹³²⁰

If these are the considered reflections of the Muslim administrative élite at the end of the Il-Khanid years, the earlier histories provide the historical data which fed those impressions. Before embarking on his famous tirade against corruption in the early Il-Khanate, Rashīd al-Dīn is quick to note that:

First in the time of Abaqa Khan, who as everyone knows, was a just emperor during whose reign the people rested secure and the administration of the Yasaq and criminal justice system of his father Hülegü Khan, who was the truly star-blessed monarch of the age, was maintained. ¹³²¹

Hülegü's reputation was certainly still intact over three hundred years later when the Safavid chronicler, Majd al-Dīn Moḥammad al-Ḥosseini, was able to describe the founder of the Il-Khans as 'Great Hülegü, a sage, and wisdom-lover (*ḥakīm dast*)' whose debates among the philosophers were attended by the '*ulamā*' and learned and whose love of alchemy led him to spend legendary sums on the science. ¹³²²

Both the provinces of Fars and Kirman initially prospered under Mongol domination. Their subsequent development was divergent and the cause of this divergence was reflective of the conditions which prevailed during the second half of the thirteenth century. Both Abū Bakr, the Salgharid leader of Shiraz, and Baraq Ḥājib of Kirman, early realised the necessity and value of allying themselves with the Mongol invaders. They made their accommodation and were rewarded with the title Qutlugh Khan. Baraq Ḥājib's alliance with the Mongols did not prevent him at the same time establishing cordial relations with Baghdad and accepting caliphal recognition and the title Qutlugh Sultan. The Kirmani royal family had achieved distinction on the battlefield fighting for the Mongol cause. Quṭb al-Dīn had fought with Hülegü in Qohestan against the Ismā'īlīs and would have taken part in the battle for Baghdad if death had not prematurely overtaken him. Mu'ẓaffar al-Dīn Hajjāj had been awarded full honours by Abaqa for his part in the war on the eastern front. Suyurghatmish had formed a bond of friendship with Aḥmad Tegüdar through their shared experiences on the battlefield and had married a daughter of Möngke-Temür. The ruling family of Shiraz was likewise closely associated with the Mongol military with Abū Bakr actually being permitted to retain the fortifications of the fortress, the *Qala-ye Sefid* and Muḥammad-Shāh b. Salghar-Shāh greatly impressing Hülegü with his daring at the battle for Baghdad. The other ruling families of the Iranian plateau were also quite willing to be closely associated with the Il-Khans when the occasion demanded it as the incident involving Saljūqshāh's rebellion demonstrated. From Kirman, on the Il-Khan's command, rode the great amīr Azad al-Dīn Amīr Hajī, the brother-in-law of Qutlugh Khātūn, and Prince Malik along with their armies. From Yazd came Terkān Khātūn Shīrāzī's brother (and stepfather), Atabeg Alā al-Dawleh, and from Eigg (Ig) there rode the Shabānkāran malik NiOām al-Dīn Ḥosavoyeh. ¹³²³ Of course it was not only the Muslim subjects of the Mongols who readily took up arms in their defence. The Caucasian Christians and the Armenians of Lesser

Armenia willingly swelled the ranks of the conquering army and were energetic in proving themselves brave and worthy allies, notably so the Orbelian family.

The Karts of Herat were militarily much more closely involved with the Mongols than were their more westerly neighbours. Shams al-Dīn Muḥam-mad Kart had, as a young boy, accompanied his uncle to Qaraqorum and had early begun to ride with the Mongol horsemen. He had earned widespread renown for his exploits and skills and in particular the admiration of two Mongol nobles, Taher Bahā'dur and Qara Noyan. He was respected by Mongol, Turk and Tājik for both his command of those skills associated with Mongol tradition and also for his mastery of the elaborate court rituals and civilities of Persian life. Despite his intimacy with the Mongol military élite and Il-Khanid government circles, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart never became a puppet-king and generally his close association with the Mongols and his furtherance of their cause was also perceived to be conducive to his own interests. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart is perhaps a prime example of the integration of the Persian élite with the second and third generation of Mongol conquerors, an integration which was present to varying degrees with the other ruling families and élite of Iran.

It was not solely in the realm of the military that cooperation and mutual links were established. Marriages between Muslim daughters and infidel princes and vice versa were not uncommon with the marriage of Abish Khātūn with Tash-Möngke (Möngke-Temür), Hülegü's fourth son, merely being a noteworthy example. The voluntary marriage of the Georgian princess Khoshak Khātūn, daughter of Atabeg Ivane to Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī in the 1260s,¹³²⁴ and the lord of Xachen, Ḥasan Jalāl's daughter Rhuzukan's marriage to Charmaghun's son, Bora-Noyan¹³²⁵ indicates that whatever the professed faith, religious scruples did not interfere in the serious business of political manoeuvring and the cementation of alliances.

In the realm of law the Great *Yasa* seems to have expanded and matured since 1206 and among its edicts and provisions, common law, *Shari'ah* law, customary law and local law all seem to have been provided for. *Yarghus* were called for not solely by the ruling élite but by the provincial notables when they felt the bite of injustice from above. The verdicts of this Mongol institution were not necessarily a foregone conclusion and high Mongol officials and their representatives often owed their fall from grace to the decisions of the *yarghuchis*. The *basqaqs* and *Shaḥnas* sent to 'help' administer the provinces were not necessarily seen as agents of the central authority there to impose that power's will though that would certainly have often been their allotted task. It is plain in the example of Terkān

Khātūn of Kirman that the *basqaqs* which she sent back and forth to Maragheh were representing her interests and putting her case before the Il-Khan's court rather than making some kind of progress report on the situation in Kirman. In Shiraz the break-down of authority at a local level had repercussions for local officials and notables as well as the *basqaqs* and even the centrally appointed governors as the fate of the great Suqunjaq well illustrates. The Mongol-appointed governors tried first to form and foster a cordial and working relationship with the local notables and in such a manner hoped to establish a stable and prosperous tax-generating regime. Though governors such as Angyānū and Suqunjaq were initially successful and were even popular with the local notables and had often made attempts at cultural assimilation, ultimately they failed to curb either the apparently endemic corruption or the political in-fighting and petty rivalries and were unable to create a viable tax-generating system. Waṣṣāf suggests the failure lay not in Il-Khanid interference but rather in the opposite, a lack of interference and of centrally imposed authority. Even though massacres, pillaging, rapine and other such soldierly pursuits were often threatened on the populace of Shiraz these extreme measures were never carried out. The eventual take over by direct Mongol control was reluctantly adopted and only after all other attempts at administration had failed. Hülegü had himself early been aware of the limitations of his own kinsmen.¹³²⁶

If in these early years of Mongol rule the countries and provinces enjoying Il-Khanid rule generally prospered and experienced a long absent period of relative peace and security, the resurgence of patronage, the regeneration of an enriched spirituality, and the establishment of a cultural identity that has persisted until the present day, were all the fruits garnered as a result of that development. The period of Il-Khanid rule is widely recognised as having been a period of great cultural creativity, and often even a golden age of artistic and spiritual expression though the explanations for this renaissance differ greatly. Often portrayed as symptomatic of the spiritual malaise of a desperate people overwhelmed by the horror and hopelessness wrought by the Mongol invasions, the popularity and interest in Sufism had in fact begun well before the Mongols appeared in the west. No longer so restricted by a legalistic and ritualistic Sunni 'ulamā' Sufi lodges sprang up throughout Hülegü's domains and enjoyed the patronage of the ruling élite and the following of the masses. With travel relatively safe and unrestricted, wandering bands of *Qalandars* became a familiar sight, while more traditionally minded Sufi *Khanqāhs* offered lodging to more conventional travellers. In urban centres and in the royal *Diwāns*, Sufi masters of a more moderate bent than the wandering antinomian *Qalandars* or some of

the patrons and organisers of the *Khanqāhs*, offered their services to the ruling circles, Mongol, Turk and Tājik and in return received, often lavish, patronage.

Mongol involvement in the cultural life of this new kingdom was expressed at different levels. From Hülegü's commissioning of Khwāja Našir al-Dīn ẓasī's observatory at Maragheh and his support of philosophers and thinkers, to the great Suqunjaq's collaboration with Rashīd al-Dīn in sponsorship of learning and the arts, through local Mongol agents immersing themselves in the spiritual life of their provinces even when they perceived such contacts as a challenge to their own beliefs, as was the case with Angyānū in Shiraz,¹³²⁷ to Arghun's tolerance of his boyhood friend's desertion of the life of the *Dīwān* for that of the Sufi, the Mongol ruling élite cannot be seen as a separate entity divorced from the land they ruled. Since first they had migrated across the Oxus, the *Dīwāns* of the Mongols had increasingly harboured the young, the influential, and the powerful from among the 'conquered' people within their folds. The sons and daughters of the local élites had been reared in, or with access to, these increasingly sumptuous *ordus*. The children of the progressively sophisticated Mongol nobles were reared alongside the progeny of their Persian, Turkish, Armenian, Khwārazmian or Georgian administrators and commanders. The nearly two generations and three long decades separating the initial Mongol invasion over the Oxus with the generally welcomed conquest of the hosts of Hülegü in the 1250s saw great changes in the nature of the conquerors and their retinue. The acculturation was gentle and the cultural borrowing mutual. The adoption of the trappings of majesty so dear to the Persians, with its ceremonial and robes of gold and brocade fell naturally onto the shoulders of Mongol tradition.¹³²⁸ The old guard was still there but the face of the new regime was not the visage of alien terror that had so troubled the world in the second decade of the century. If Chinggis Khan had been the punishment of God, his grandson Hülegü was God's secret intent revealed.

APPENDIX: MAPS



Figure A1 Irāq Arab and Irāq Ajam. Azerbaijan and the southern Caucasus.



Figure A2 Khorasan, Turkestan, Sind and Sistan.



Figure A3 Hülegü's campaigns.



Figure A4 The Mongol Empire, post-Hülegü.

GLOSSARY

Aiqaq Informer.

Al-tamgha A vermilion seal attached by the Mongols to their documents, c.f. *tamgha*.

Anda 'Brother by oath', the relationship that existed between Chinggis Khan's father and Ong-Khan and Chinggis Khan himself and his later rival, Jamuqa.

Aqa In Mongol, 'elder brother' used in the sense of 'senior prince' as compared with *ini* (q.v.).

Atabeg A Turkish title, originally given to the guardians of Saljuq princes, borne by the rulers of Fars and Azerbaijan.

Bahā'dur Hero; brave warrior.

Bakhshi Buddhist priest.

Balish The Persian word for 'pillow' applied to an ingot of gold or silver.

Basqaq Mongol governor of a conquered territory.

Ba'urehi Cook; steward.

Bilig Maxim; wise saying.

Bitikchi Secretary.

Büke'ül Taster; officer responsible for commissariat.

Cherig Auxiliary troops.

Dānishmand Muslim divine.

Darughachi Military overseer. *Dīw ā n*

Dīwān Government department; secretariat; chancery.

El (il) Subject territory.

Elchis Ambassadors; envoys.

Ev-Oghlan Page.

Fidā' i Ismaili assassin.

Hazāra Military unit of one thousand men.

Ini Younger brother. The *aqā* and *ini*, that is, the senior and junior Mongol princes.

Inju Crown land(s).

Ispahbad Title of local rulers in the Caspian region.

Kezik, Kezikten Guard.

Khan In Mongol times the ruler of an *ulus* (q.v.).

Khaqān An old Turkish title of sovereignty, applied by Rashīd al-Dīn to the Emperors of China.

Kharvār 'Donkey load' equal to Tabriz maunds, under Ghazan equivalent to 83.3 kg.

Khātan Title applied to Turkish and Mongol princesses.

Khutha Friday sermon in the mosque.

Madressah A school for Muslim learning.

Malik Title of Muslim local rulers, inferior to Sultan.

Muqāt.aa Farming of the revenue of a district for a fixed sum.

Nasīj A kind of brocade.

Na'ur Lake.

Nerge Ring of hunters in a battle; similar formation in battle.

Noker Follower; assistant.

Noyan Commander.

Oghul The Turkish for 'son' applied as a title to Mongol princes of the

blood.

Ordu Camp of a Mongol prince.

Pahlavān Wrestler; hero.

Paiza Chinese *p'ai tza*, a kind of laissez-passer; Marco Polo's 'tablet of authority'.

Qa'an A variant of *khaqan* (q.v.), always applied by Rashīd al-Dīn to the Mongol Emperor, Ögödei, the Great Khan.

Qalan Tax collected by the Mongols from the sedentary population.

Qalandar Wandering dervish.

Qam Shaman; witch-doctor.

Qarachū Man of the people; commoner.

Qarshī Palace.

Qiyāma Resurrection.

Qopchur Tax on herds which transformed into general poll tax.

Qorchī Bodyguard.

Quriltai Assembly or diet of the Mongol princes.

Qashchī Falconer. *Rib ā t*

Ribāt Blockhouse on the frontiers of Islam.

Şāhib Diwān Minister, especially minister of finance.

Satr Period of concealment.

ḥna The Arabo-Persian equivalent of *basqaq* (q.v.); see p. 166. *Sha*

Tamgha Seal; octroi at the gates of a town.

Tamma Permanently stationed army.

Tangsuq Rare or precious object brought as a gift.

Taqiyya Dissimulation allowed in shi'ism.

Tarkhan Person enjoying certain hereditary privileges, such as exemption from taxes.

Tikishmishi Action of presenting gifts to a ruler.

Tumen Ten thousand; also an army unit of ten thousand.

Turqaq Day guard.

Tuzghu Offering of food to a traveller.

Ulus The subjects of a Mongol prince.

Uruq Family; posterity.

Urtāq Merchant operating with Mongols' financial backing.

Yam Post station.

Yamchi Official in charge of a post station.

Yarghuchi Judge.

Yarligh Decree; rescript.

Yasa(q) The code of Chinggis Khan.

Yosun Mongol customary law, as distinct from the *Yasa* of Chinggis Khan.

Zunnār Kind of belt worn by eastern Christians and Jews.

NOTES

PREFACE

1 See Thomas Allsen's remarkable study (2001).

1 THE SOURCES

2 Juwaynī (1958), p. 107. Text, editor M. Qazwīnī (1916), vol. 1 p. 83.

3 R. Michell and N. Forbes (tr.) (1914), p. 64.

4 Rashīd al-Dīn (2536/1977), pp. 237–41; (1998), pp. xi–xii.

5 Jūzjānī (1343/1964); H. G. Raverty (tr.) (1881).

6 Juwaynī (1912), vol. 1, pp. 6–7; tr. Boyle, pp. 9–10.

7 Juwaynī (1937), vol. III, pp. 114–42; tr. Boyle, pp. 622–40.

8 d'Ohsson, *Hist. des Mongols*, vol. I, pp. vii–viii, cited in E. G. Browne (1984), vol. 3, p. 13.

9 Ayalon (1988), 'The Great Yasa of Chinggis Khan', IVa, p. 133.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 E. G. Browne, *Literary History of Persia*, Cambridge, vol. 2, p. 473.

13 See E. G. Browne's introduction to Juwaynī's *Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā*, pp. LXXXI–XCII.

14 See Morgan (1988a), p. 72; (1982), p. 114.

15 The Turkish generals of Muizz al-Dīn d.1206 ruled in Ghazna and

continued to uphold Ghūrīd policies and traditions in northern India in the Delhi Sultanate where Quṭb al-Dīn had been installed by the Ghūrīds.

16 Jūzjānī, p. 144; Raverty, pp. 1078–9.

17 Rashīd al-Dīn Faḡlallāh Hamadānī (1994).

18 A term used by the satirical poet of Hülegü and Abaqa's reigns, and friend of the Juwaynī brothers, Pūr-i Bahā'. See Minorsky (1964), p. 294.

19 Morgan (1998), pp. 179–88.

20 Banākātī (1348/1969).

21 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1024.

22 Tasī, 'Introduction to *Zij al-Ilkhani*', in Boyle (1977), xxvii, p. 247.

23 Waṣṣāf (1338/1959).

24 Dr Charles Rieu, cited in Browne's *Literary History*, vol. 3, p. 67.

25 Āyatī (1968/1347) and (1372/1993).

26 Qāshānī (Kashani) (1969), p. 240.

27 Qāshānī (Kashani) (1969), intro., p. vii.

28 Khwāndamīr (1353/1974), vol. 3; W. M. Thackston (tr.) Harvard (1994).

29 Cited Minorsky, *The Poetry of Shah Isma'il*, p. 1042, reprinted in *Medieval Iran and its Neighbours* (1982).

30 *aafarnāmah* of Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī, British library MS OR2833; tr. L. J. Ward, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manchester, 1983.

31 Le Strange (1966).

32 Lambton (1953).

33 Lambton (1987).

34 Browne (1915), vol.2, p. 457.

35 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 22; (1999), p. 483 and (1994), p. 985.

- 36 Boyle (1977).
- 37 Minovi and Minorsky (1964).
- 38 See Boyle (1963), pp. 244–54.
- 39 Afshār (1965/1343); (1978); Mohammed Ibrāhīm Bāstānī Pārīzī (2535/1976); Ibn Zarkab (1350/1971); Malik al-Shuarā' Bahā'r (1976).
- 40 Sayfī (1944).
- 41 Herat-based Persian dynasty, 1245–1381.
- 42 Sayfī (1944), '1,747,000 dead after 12 days in Nishapur', p. 63, 'More than 1,600,000 dead in Herat', p. 80; Jūzjānī, 2,400,000 martyred in Herat, vol. 2, p. 121.
- 43 Awliyā Allah Āmulī (1348/1969), p. 178.
- 44 Van Loon (tr.) (1954).
- 45 Awliyā Allah Āmulī (1348/1969), p. 178.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Van Loon (1954), p. 48, text, p. 146.
- 48 Ibid, p. 50, text, p. 148.
- 49 Ibid, p. 51, text, p. 150.
- 50 Āqsarāyī (1944).
- 51 Ibn Bībī (1902); Mashkour (1971).
- 52 Sa'dī Shīrāzī (1363), pp. 1181–3; see also pp. 779, 873, 907 passim.
- 53 Minorsky (1964), pp. 299–305.
- 54 See poem cited in E.G. Browne's *Literary History*, vol. 3, p. 122.
- 55 2 vols, Ṣāliḥ ḡabībī (ed.), (1337 and 1350, 1958 and 1971).
- 56 Gholām Reāā ḡabātabā'ī (ed.) (1376/1997).
- 57 Ibn al-Karbalā'ī (1965/1344), vols I and II.

58 Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Aflākī al-ārifi (1959–61); Redhouse (1881), intro.; (1976); Ḥussein Haydar Khani (ed.) (1375/1996), p. 409; Arberry (1994).

59 Sepahsālār (1983), p. 8.

60 Bar Hebraeus (1976a).

61 Hetoum (1988).

62 Smpad in Sirarpie Der Nersessian (ed., tr.) (1959), pp. 143–68.

63 Grigor of Akanc' (1954).

64 Ibid, p. [75]/343.

65 Kirakos (1986).

66 See Vardan (1989), pp. 125–224.

67 Ibid, p. 221.

68 Orbellian (1864).

69 Brosset (tr.) (1849–58).

70 Ibn al-Fuwatī (1932), p. 350. The authorship of this book is arguable. See Charles Melville, 'Ebn Fawati', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, 1997.

71 Cited in Bertold Spuler (1972a), pp. 29–30; Ibn al-Athīr, *Chronicon, quod perfectissimum inscribitur*, ed. c. J. Tornberg (12 vols, Leiden, 1851–76), XII, pp. 233–4.

72 Shamī (1937).

73 Ḥāfiẓ Abrū (1317/1938).

74 Ibn Taghrī Birdī (1954), *History of Egypt*, tr. William Popper, University of California, 1954.

2 DIVINE PUNISHMENT OR GOD'S SECRET INTENT?

75 Hülegü's year of birth is suggested as AH 612/1224–5 in Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 535.

76 See Jackson (1978).

77 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 14; (1999), p. 479; (1373/1994), p. 977.

78 Regarding claims that the rulers of the Golden Horde *did* make, see al-Umarī, *Masālik al-Abṣār*, ed. Lech (Wiesbaden 1968), Arabic text, pp. 2, 15, 19–20, 102.

79 Juwaynī, iii, p. 90, tr. Boyle, p. 607.

80 Juwaynī, iii, p. 72, tr. Boyle, p. 596.

81 Mustawfī, *aafarnāmah*, f.585A; tr. Ward, vol. II, p. 13.

82 Mustawfī, *aafarnāmah*, f.583B; tr. Ward pp. 5–6.

83 Tabrizī, MS British library, OR 2780, fols. 41–132.

84 Tabrizī, fol. 84.

85 Khwāndamīr (1994), intro., p. x.

86 Khwāndamīr, vol. 3. p. 94, tr. Thackston, p. 53; see also Rashīd al-Dīn for the *bayt*, p. 976.

87 Juwaynī, text, p. 116, tr. Boyle, p. 149.

88 See Allsen (1987), pp. 48–9.

89 Rashīd al-Dīn (1994), p. 975; (n.d.), pp. 12–13; (1999), p. 478.

90 Juwaynī (1937), vol. III. p. 102; (1958), p. 615.

91 See Āqṣarāyī (1944), p. 55; al-Maqrīzī (1837–45), p. 227, cited in Lewis, Bernard (1979), *Islam: Politics and War*, London, pp. 84–5.

92 Hetoum (1988), p. 39.

93 These are Rashīd al-Dīn's dates which differ slightly from Juwaynī's. cf. Juwaynī pp. 610–12, vol. iii, pp. 95–8.

94 Juwaynī (1912), vol.1, p. 75; (1958), p. 96.

95 Juwaynī (1912), vol. 1, p. 84; (1958), p. 108.

- 96 Juwaynī (1937), pp. 97–8; (1958), p. 612.
- 97 Juwaynī (1937), pp. 97; (1958), p. 612.
- 98 Juwaynī (1937), p. 98; (1958), p. 612.
- 99 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 979 (n.d.), p. 16; (1999), p. 480.
- 100 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 983 (n.d.), pp. 19–20; (1999), p. 482.
- 101 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 979 (n.d.), p. 16; (1999), p. 480. RashīDī
101 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 979 (n.d.), p. 16; (1999), p. 480.
- 102 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 977 (n.d.), p. 14; (1999), p. 479.
- 103 Juwaynī, text (1937), pp. 99–100; (1958), p. 613,
- 104 Juwaynī, tr. pp. 613–14, text, vol. 3, p. 100.
- 105 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 980; draft tr., p. 17, tr. Thackston, 1999, p. 480.
- 106 Juwaynī (1937), p. 101; (1958), pp. 614–15; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 980.
- 107 Juwaynī (1937), p. 104; (1958), p. 616.
- 108 Juwaynī (1937), pp. 104–5; (1958), pp. 616–17.
- 109 Juwaynī (1937), p. 103; (1958), p. 616.
- 110 Juwaynī (1937), pp. 103–4; (1958), p. 616.
- 111 Juwaynī (1937), p. 105; (1958), p. 617.
- 112 Ibid.
- 113 See also Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 985 (n.d.), p. 21; (1999), p. 482; after Saīf al-Dīn's execution in 1262, Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī became *Şāḥib Dīwān*, Rashīd al- Dīn, pp. 1045, 1049; (n.d.), pp. 76, 79; (1999), pp. 511, 513.
- 114 Juwaynī (1937), p. 93; (1958), p. 609.
- 115 Ibid.
- 116 Juwaynī (1937), p. 94; (1958), pp. 609–10.

- 117 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 983; (n.d.), pp. 19–20; (1999), p. 482.
- 118 *Tikishmishi*, making obeisance by offering presents or by standing to attention. See tr. Boyle, p. 579, n. 87.
- 119 Jackson and Morgan (eds), (1990), p. 222.
- 120 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 10, text, p. 974; (1999), p. 478.
- 121 Jūzjānī (1995), p. 1196; (1964), p. 182; cf Mustawfī's *aafarnāmah* above.
- 122 Juwaynī, pp. 617–18, vol. 3, p. 106.
- 123 Juwaynī, p. 619, vol. 3, p. 108.
- 124 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 57, text, p. 1024; Thackston omits this full title (1999), p. 501; Mustawfī's *aafarnāmah*, f.589B, p. 35.
- 125 Juwaynī (1958), p. 634; (1937), p. 133.
- 126 Kashani (1366/1987), p. 231.
- 127 According to Kashani, 'He fell in love with one from the girls of the Turks, [and] asked to marry her, [and] on the king's command she was given to him', p. 231.
- 128 Juwaynī, p. 635, vol. 3, p. 134.
- 129 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 26, text, p. 990; (1999), p. 485.
- 130 Juwaynī, p. 720, vol. 3, p. 271.
- 131 Juwaynī, p. 719, vol. 3, p. 270.
- 132 Mustawfī, *aafarnāmah*, f.594A, tr. p. 53.
- 133 Juwaynī, p. 724, vol. 3 p. 277; Rashīd al-Dīn, (n.d.), p. 27, text, p. 991; (1999), p. 486.
- 134 Juwaynī, p. 725, vol. 3, p. 277.
- 135 Mustawfī, *aafarnāmah*, f.589B, p. 35.
- 136 Juwaynī, p. 725, vol. 3, p. 278.
- 137 Juwaynī, p. 638, vol. 3, pp. 138–9.

3 BAGHDAD AND ITS AFTERMATH

138 Juwaynī, p. 152, vol. 3, p. 118.

139 See David Morgan, intro., to Juwaynī (1997), p. xxi.

140 *Tasliyat al-Ikhwān (The Consolation of the Brethren)*, in E. G. Browne's and Qazwīnī's intros. to Juwaynī, *Tārīkh-e Jahān Gushā*, pp. xxxvii, passim and p. 43, passim [*maj*].

141 Boyle (1961), p. 148; reprinted in Boyle (1977), chapter XI, p. 148; see also Wickens (1962), pp. 23–35.

142 Afzal Iqbal (1983), pp. 28–9.

143 Joseph de Somogyi (1933–5), p. 41.

144 All three quotes, Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 977; (n.d.), p. 14; (1999), p. 479.

145 This mode of execution, the usual for royalty, is not specified in either Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī's account nor Rashīd al-Dīn's but it is indicated in Jūzjānī, p. 198; Raverty, pp. 1252–3; Waṣṣāf, p. 40, Āyatī, p. 21; Ibn al-Fuwatī (1932), p. 327.

146 al-Aflākī (1959), vol. 1, pp. 202–3.

147 On the Atabeg of Mosul, see Douglas Patton (1991), pp. 60–1.

148 See Joseph de Somogyi (1933–5), pp. 41–8.

149 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1007.

150 Nakhjavānī (1357/1978), p. 356.

151 Juwaynī (1937), p. 281; Boyle (1961), pp. 151–2; reprinted in Boyle (1977), Chapter XI.

152 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 998; tr. Boyle, p. 32.

153 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 998–9; tr. Boyle, p. 33.

154 Jūzjānī, p. 191; Raverty, pp. 1229–32; see also Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1003.

- 155 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 994–6.
- 156 Mustawfī, *aafarnāmah*, f. 597A, p. 66.
- 157 Mustawfī, *aafarnāmah*, f. 597B, p. 69.
- 158 Juwaynī (1937), p. 288; Boyle (1961), p. 158.
- 159 Wickens (1962), p. 34.
- 160 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1019; (n.d.), p. 53; (1999), p. 499.
- 161 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1020; (n.d.), p. 53; (1999), p. 500.
- 162 See Kohlberg (1992).
- 163 Ibn Fuwatī (1932), p. 329.
- 164 Ibn al-ẓiqṭaqa cited by Etan Kohlberg (1992), p. 10, and also Lambton (1988a), p. 249, n. 119.
- 165 Kohlberg (1992), p. 11.
- 166 Ibn Fuwatī (1932), p. 350.
- 167 Waṣṣāf, p. 36; Āyatī, p. 19; B. Spuler (tr.) (1968), *History of the Mongols Based on Eastern and Western Accounts of the 13th and 14th Centuries*, p. 117; see also Ibn Fuwatī (1932), pp. 330–1, on this story.
- 168 Waṣṣāf, p. 36, lines 13–14.
- 169 See Schmidtke (1991), pp. 10–11.
- 170 Jūzjānī, pp. 195–6; Raverty (1995), pp. 1247–8; cf. Ibn Fuwatī (1932), p. 322.
- 171 Ibn Kathīr, xiii, pp. 200–2, cited in Lewis, B. (ed. and tr.) (1974), pp. 82–4.
- 172 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1015.
- 173 Waṣṣāf, pp. 36–7; Āyatī, p. 19; Spuler, pp. 118–19. Wa ṣṣ
- 174 Waṣṣāf, p. 37, Āyatī, p. 19.
- 175 Cited in Nicholson (1998), pp. 445–6.
- 176 Ibn Fuwatī (1932), p. 322.

- 177 Ibn Fuwatī (1932), p. 326.
- 178 Ibn Fuwatī (1932), p. 330.
- 179 Ibn Fuwatī (1932), pp. 331–2; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1019; tr. Boyle, p. 52.
- 180 Ibn Fuwatī (1932), pp. 333 and 336.
- 181 Nakhjavānī (1357/1978), pp. 357–60.
- 182 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1007; tr. Boyle, pp. 40–1.
- 183 Ibn Bazzāz (1376/1997), pp. 1063–4.
- 184 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1043; tr. Boyle, p. 74.
- 185 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1038; tr. Boyle, p. 70.
- 186 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1048; tr. Boyle, p. 78.
- 187 Shabānkārāī (1363/1984), pp. 167–8.
- 188 See Reuven Amitai-Preiss (1995–7), ‘Hülegü and the Ayyubid Lord of Trans-jordan’, *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, no. 9.
- 189 Amitai-Preiss, op. cit., tr., p. 14.
- 190 From the chronicle of Qirtāy al-Khaznadārī, cited by Ibn al-Furāt ms. pub. by G. Levi Della Vida in *Orientalia*, n.s. iv, 1935, pp. 358–66, cited and translated in Lewis, B. (ed. and tr.) (1974), p. 90.
- 191 Lewis, B. (1974), p. 95.
- 192 Lewis, B. (1974), p. 96.
- 193 See Morgan (1996), pp. 62–76.

4 THE UNEASY BORDERS

- 194 ‘*Somm-e asb-e tātār resīdast*’, Juwaynī (1937), p. 31.
- 195 Waṣṣāf, p. 78; Āyatī, p. 46.

- 196 Jackson (1997); Browne, E. G. *Literary History*, vol. 3, p. 18; Boyle, J. A. (1973), 'The Il-Khans of Persia and the Christian West', *History Today*, xxiii, 8, London, pp. 556–7; Fiey (1975a), pp. 33–43; Runciman (1965), pp. 331–2; MurtaŰavī (1358/1979), pp. 114, 119–21.
- 197 Khwāndamīr, 3, p. 108, tr. Thackston, p. 61; Waṣṣāf, p. 59; Kashani (Qāshānī), (1969), p. 107; Shabānkārā'ī (1363/1984), p. 264.
- 198 Grigor of Akanc' (1949), p. 343.
- 199 On the Alans, see Jackson and Morgan (1990b), p. 102, nn.1, 2; V.I. Abaev, *Enc. Iranica*; Allsen (1987–91).
- 200 Grigor of Akanc' (1949), p. 85.
- 201 Hetoum (1988), p. 44.
- 202 Ibid.
- 203 Kirakos (1986), pp. 334–5, (g398–9).
- 204 Vardan (1989), p. 222 (160).
- 205 Rashīd al-Dīn, Boyle's draft tr. p. 81, text, p. 1052; (1999), p. 514.
- 206 Vardan (1989), p. 222 (160). In fact, she had originally been promised to Hülegü who had died before her arrival.
- 207 Bar Hebraeus (1976a), p. 445.
- 208 See Boase (1978).
- 209 Grigor of Akanc' (1954), p. 47/315.
- 210 'The Journey of Hetum 1, King of Little Armenia, to the Court of the Great Khan Mongke', in Boyle (1977), no. x, p. 181.
- 211 Hetoum (1988), p. 40.
- 212 Bedrosian (1979), p. 37.
- 213 Grigor of Akanc' (1949), p. 75/343.
- 214 Meyvaert (1980), p. 253.
- 215 Hetoum (1988), p. 40.

- 216 Hetoum (1988), p. 46.
- 217 Bar Hebraeus, p. 445; Grigor of Akanc' (1949), p. 89/357; Hetoum (1988), pp. 44–5.
- 218 Bar Hebraeus, p. 447; Grigor of Akanc' (1949), p. 103/371; Hetoum (1988), p. 45; Der Nersessian (1959), p. 165; Vardan (1989), pp. 223/99.
- 219 See Amitai-Preiss (1995), pp. 118–20.
- 220 Bar Hebraeus, p. 448; Hetoum (1988), p. 45.
- 221 See Holt, P. M., *The Age of the Crusades*, p. 90.
- 222 Amitai-Preiss (1994), pp. 14–15.
- 223 Ibid., p. 18.
- 224 Ibid., p. 19.
- 225 Ibid., p. 30.
- 226 Ibid., p. 29. 'King Abaqa should understand that we only authorised the Takfur [Armenian *tagavor*, 'king' or 'prince', applied to Hetoum] to make known to the King, the answer to what Shams al-Din Sunqur al-Ashqar brought to our attention.' i.e. his family still in Mongol hands.
- 227 Smpad in Der Nersessian (1959), p. 166 (p. 254); Hetoum (1988), p. 70.
- 228 Ibid., p. 166 (p. 253).
- 229 Bar Hebraeus, pp. 452–3.
- 230 Bar Hebraeus, p. 453.
- 231 Bar Hebraeus, p. 457.
- 232 Hetoum (1988), p. 46.
- 233 Ibid.
- 234 Ibid., p. 41.
- 235 It was Euthymius who accompanied Maria Palaeologos to her

wedding to Abaqa, Bar Hebraeus, p. 445.

236 Runciman (1965), vol. 3, pp. 306–7.

237 A fire in Turin in 1904 destroyed the only known extant ms. of David of Ashby's report, though a modern abstract exists which dates this visit to January 1260 following shortly after Hülegü's capture of Aleppo; see Schèler (1867), pp. 26–8.

238 Meyvaert (1980), pp. 245–59, text, 252–59.

239 Boyle (1977), p. 556; Lupprian (1981); D'Ohsson (1940, of the Hague, 1834), vol. 3, pp. 410–12; Howorth (tr.) *History of the Mongols*, vol. 3, p. 210.

240 Lupprian, *Beziehungen*, 220–2 (no. 2); tr. in D'Ohsson, *Histoire*, 3: 540–2; tr. H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, vol. 3, p. 279; Boyle (1976), pp. 556–7.

241 Ibid. p. 557. Boyle explains that the second letter was discovered in 1922 but was not published until 1946.

242 Joinville and Villehardouin, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, p. 346.

243 Runciman (1965), p. 335.

244 Edbury (1991), p. 92.

245 Lockhart (1968), pp. 23–4; Amitai-Preiss (1995), p. 98.

246 Lyons, Lyons and Riley-Smith (1971), p. 155.

247 Hetoum (1988), p. 70; see Ibn al-Furāt, p. 159; Smpad in Der Nersessian, (1959), p. 166 (p. 254).

248 de Rachewiltz (1993), p. 153.

249 From a 'Report of the envoys of Abaqa Khan to the Second Council of Lyons' (1274), in Roberg (1973), pp. 241–302, text pp. 298–301. This is intriguing since it is doubtful whether Hülegü would have been in a position to have been so generous with these lands, though the claim is later supported by Hetoum (1988), pp. 40–2.

250 Roberg (1973), text pp. 299–300.

251 Boyle (1976), p. 30; Lockhart (1968), p. 24; tr. in Howorth, p. 280.

- 252 See Lockhart (1968), p. 24.
- 253 Quoted in Howorth, p. 281.
- 254 Jackson and Morgan (eds), (1990), p. 171.
- 255 Amitai-Preiss (1995), p. 102.
- 256 Cleaves and Mostaert (1952), p. 433 (transcription), p. 434 (tr.).
- 257 Ibn al-Furāt, p. 137.
- 258 Qirtay (1655), fol. 98a; Gotha, 1655, cited in Amitai-Preiss, (1955), p. 102.
- 259 Ibn al-Furāt, p. 158.
- 260 Petech (1962), p. 560.
- 261 Jackson (1997), pp. 7–8.
- 262 Laurent (ed.) (1873), p. 120, cited in Jackson (1997), p. 7.
- 263 Bar Hebraeus, pp. 435–6; Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1026–7.
- 264 Kirakos (1986), pp. 322–3, g386–7.
- 265 Bar Hebraeus, p. 433.
- 266 Montgomery (tr.) (1927), pp. 7, 76 (91).
- 267 Jackson and Morgan (1990b), pp. 209–16.
- 268 Grigor of Akanc' (1949), p. 29. See also citations in Bedrosian (1979), pp. 175–8.
- 269 Brosset (tr.) (1849–58), p. 573.
- 270 Grigor of Akanc' (1949), pp. 107–9.
- 271 Orbelian (1864), Chap. LXVI, p. 237; Bedrosian (1979), p. 197.
- 272 Orbelian (1864), Chap. LXVI, p. 236; Bedrosian (1979), p. 188 .
- 273 Brosset (1849–58), p. 540; Bedrosian (1979), p. 186.
- 274 Brosset (1849–58), p. 519; Grigor of Akanc' (1949), pp 334, 307, 309.

- 275 Orbelian (1849–58), Chap. LXVI, pp. 228 and 236; Bedrosian (1979), pp. 187–8.
- 276 Brosset (Year), p. 586; Bedrosian (1979), p. 185.
- 277 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1080.
- 278 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1102.
- 279 Rashīd al-Dīn (1994), p. 977; (n.d.), p. 14; (1999), p. 479.
- 280 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 607; Qazwīnī, p. 90.
- 281 Khwāndamīr, 3, tr. Thackston, pt. 1, p. 53, text, p. 94.
- 282 Ibid. p. 57, text, p. 101.
- 283 From Ibn Abd al-aāhir, cited in Ayalon (1988), IVb, p. 172; cf. Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn Abd al-aāhir (1956), p. 187, text, p. 81. See also Abdul Azīz al-Khowayter (1960), p. 474.
- 284 Izz al-D īn Ibn Shaddād’s *Sirat al-Malik al-aāhir*, cited in Ayalon, (1988), p. 171.
- 285 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle; p. 42, Qazwīnī, I, p. 31.
- 286 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle; p. 42, Qazwīnī, I, p. 31.
- 287 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 994.
- 288 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1008, 1013.
- 289 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 75, text, p. 1044; (1999), p. 511.
- 290 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1013.
- 291 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), pp. 66–7, text, p. 1034; (1999), p. 506; see also Rashīd al-Dīn (1971), pp. 122–3, text, p. 738 (the date given here, 654/1256–7, is obviously erroneous since the princes were with the army at Baghdad).
- 292 Grigor of Akanc’ (1949), p. 340; Kirakos (1986), pp. 331, g394–g395.
- 293 Grigor of Akanc’ (1949), p. 327.
- 294 Ibid. (1949), pp. 327–31.

- 295 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, pp. 738–9; (1971), p. 123.
- 296 Jackson (1978), pp. 186–244.
- 297 Based on the spelling of the seventh-century Persian translation of Nasawī's *Sīrat of Jalāl al-Dīn Mīnkubirni* (1365/1986).
- 298 Bar Hebraeus, p. 394.
- 299 Respectively, Juwaynī, Qazwīnī, I pp. 149–50; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 73; Jūzjānī, II, p. 158.
- 300 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 73.
- 301 Urgunge Onon (tr.) revised by Sue Bradbury (1993), *Chinggis Khan: The Golden History of the Mongols*, The Folio Society, London, pp. 157–8.
- 302 Grigor of Akanc' (1949), p. 303.
- 303 Vardan (1989), p. 85 (144).
- 304 Ibid., p. 88.
- 305 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 73.
- 306 Grigor of Akanc' (1949), p. 303.
- 307 Muḥammad Javad Mashkur (ed.), (1971), 'Mukhtaṣar-i Saljaqnāmah-ye Ibn Bībī', p. 234.
- 308 See Lane (2000).
- 309 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 210
- 310 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 29; text, p. 993; (1999), pp. 486–7.
- 311 cf. Mustawfī, *aqfarnāmah*.
- 312 Bar Hebraeus, p. 429; cf. Rashīd al-Dīn p. 73 where it is claimed Baiju was made commander of a thousand because of his record in Baghdad.
- 313 Jackson (1978), p. 236.
- 314 Ibn Bībī (1971), pp. 247–9.
- 315 'min qibal Batu' cited in Jackson (1978), p. 218.

- 316 Baibars al-Manṣarī, cited in Jackson (1978), p. 218.
- 317 Jackson and Morgan (1990b), p. 34; see also Guzman (1971), pp. 248–9.
- 318 Tr. from Jackson (1978), p. 212 reading from British Library MS which differs slightly from the text, Kabul (1964), p. 176.
- 319 Bar Hebraeus, p. 425.
- 320 Ibid.
- 321 See Grigor of Akanc’ (1949), p. 303; Jackson (1978), p. 219 n.146.
- 322 Juwaynī (1958), p. 521, Qazwīnī (1912), vol. II, p. 258.
- 323 Bedrosian (1979), p. 123; Brosset (tr.) (1849–58), p. 550.
- 324 Kirakos (1986), p. 296, g359.
- 325 Sayfī (1944), p. 76; Āyatī, p. 3; Waṣṣāf, p. 12.
- 326 Sayfī (1944), pp. 122–3.
- 327 Ibid., pp. 124–5.
- 328 Ibid., p. 128.
- 329 Ibid., pp. 127–8 .
- 330 Ibid., p. 127.
- 331 Ibid., p. 134.
- 332 Ibid., pp. 138–9.
- 333 Jūzjānī, p. 218.
- 334 Jūzjānī, p. 218.
- 335 Juwaynī (1912), vol. II, p. 218.
- 336 Sayfī (1944), p. 128.
- 337 Juwaynī (1912), vol. II, p. 270.
- 338 See Jackson (1978), pp. 212–20.

- 339 Juwaynī (1912), vol. II, p. 250.
- 340 Juwaynī tr. Boyle, p. 483, text, ii, pp. 218–19.
- 341 See Abdul Karīm Ali-Zādeh's preface in Nakhjavānī (1976), pp. 43–6.
- 342 Movsis Dasxuranci (1961), pp. 81–8.
- 343 For a fuller study of the role and history of the Qipchaqs, see Halperin (2000), pp. 229–45.
- 344 Hetoum (1988), pp. 84–5, 'The Tatars could not keep their counsel, which thing hath done them often times great harm. The Tatars have such a manner that at first month of January they take counsel of all such things that they have to do in that year. Wherefore, if it fortune that they move war against the Sultan of Egypt, soon after, their counsel is known to all.'
- 345 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 709; Ratchnevsky (1993), pp. 34, 126; Kirakos (1986) quotes Chinggis's assessment of his sons, p. 194 [g232].
- 346 Ibid.
- 347 According to Jūzjānī he was poisoned by his father! pp. 150, 168.
- 348 1227–9, 1241–6, 1248–51.
- 349 Barthold (1968), p. 463.
- 350 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 801–2.
- 351 Onon (1990), pp. 158–9.
- 352 Rashīd al-Dīn (1971), p. 120; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 734.
- 353 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 256–7; Qazwīnī, I, p. 212.
- 354 Cited in Jackson (1978), p. 200.
- 355 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 735, 793 and 809.
- 356 Jackson and Morgan (1990b), p. 167.
- 357 *Tartar Relation*, p. 83.
- 358 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 709

- 359 See Jackson (1978), p. 203 n.68.
- 360 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle; p. 562; Qazwīnī, III, p. 22.
- 361 Rashīd al-Dīn (1971), pp. 212–13, text, p. 837.
- 362 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 585; Qazwīnī, III, p. 53.
- 363 Jackson and Morgan (1990b), p. 169.
- 364 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 559; Qazwīnī, III, p. 18.
- 365 Jūzjānī (1995), p. 1181; (1984), p. 179.
- 366 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 561 n. 21; Qazwīnī, p. 20 n.7. Juwaynī, Qazwīnī,
- 367 Rashīd al-Dīn (1971), p. 200; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 824.
RashīDīRashīDī
- 368 See Jackson and Morgan (1990b), appendix V, p. 282.
- 369 Jackson and Morgan (1990b), p. 146.
- 370 Ibid., p. 180.
- 371 Ibid., p. 256.
- 372 Concerning the date of Batu's death, see Jackson (1978), p. 208 n. 87. Wa §§
- 373 Waṣṣāf, p. 398; Āyatī, p. 241.
- 374 Waṣṣāf, p. 50; Āyatī, pp. 27–8.
- 375 Kashani/Qāshānī (1969), p. 146.
- 376 Jackson (1978), p. 208.
- 377 Waṣṣāf, p. 398; Āyatī, p. 241; on Waṣṣāf's interpretation of the dispute, see Waṣṣāf, p. 50, Āyatī, pp. 37–8.
- 378 Jūzjānī (1995), pp. 1177–9; Habībī, p. 179.
- 379 Excepting, of course, many of the 'sons' of Chaghatai and Ögödei.
- 380 Jūzjānī (1995), p. 1177; Habībī, p. 179.

- 381 See Jackson (1978), p. 208, n. 87.
- 382 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 268; Qazwīnī, I, p. 223; Bartold (1968), p. 484.
- 383 Kirakos (1986), p. 309–10 [g373].
- 384 Vardan (1989), p. 90.
- 385 Jūzjānī also mentions a rumour that it was in fact Möngke who poisoned Sartaq, perceiving in him the potential for sedition! Jūzjānī (1995), p. 1292; Habībī, p. 218.
- 386 Jūzjānī (1995), p. 1291; Habībī, p. 218.
- 387 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 268; Qazwīnī, I p. 223. See Bartold (1968), p. 484; Mustawfī (1362/1983), p. 576.
- 388 Jūzjānī (1995), p. 1292; Habībī, p. 218.
- 389 Cited in Jackson (1978), p. 224.
- 390 Kirakos (1986), pp. 309–10 [g373].
- 391 Jackson and Morgan (1990b), p. 127.
- 392 Ibid.
- 393 Ibid. p. 127, ‘He makes himself out to be a Saracen [*facit se sarracenum*]’.
- 394 Kowayter (1960), vol. ii, p. 474 ‘[The letters] contained greetings and thanks and request for help against Halawan, and informed the Sultan about his [Halawan’s] violation of Chinggis Khan’s [law] and that of his family; and that all he had perpetrated in the way of slaughter was in accordance with his own aggressive policy’; cf. Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn Abd al-aāhir (1956), p. 187.
- 395 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 75, text, p. 1044; (1999), p. 511.
- 396 Khowayter (1960), vol. II, p. 430; cf. Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn Abd al-aāhir (1956), p. 154.
- 397 See DeWeese (1994), p. 86.
- 398 Ibid., pp. 83–4.

- 399 Jūzjānī (1995), pp. 1283–8; Habībī, pp. 213–15.
- 400 al-Nuwayrī, al-Dhahabī, and Mufa..al ibn Abīl-Fa.āil cited in DeWeese (1994), p. 84.
- 401 Ibid.
- 402 Ibid., p. 88.
- 403 Jackson (1978), pp. 237–8.
- 404 Khowayter (1960), vol. II, pp. 486–7. cf. Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn Abd al-aāhir (1956), p. 196; see also Thorau (1992), pp. 124–8.
- 405 According to Rashīd al-Dīn he died of cholera (1971), p. 248, text, p. 871, lines 4–6.
- 406 Bar Hebraeus, p. 439.
- 407 See Allsen, ‘Biography of a Cultural Broker’ *The Court of the Il-Khans 1290–1340*, pp. 7–22.
- 408 Rashīd al-Dīn (1971), p. 250, text, p. 874.
- 409 Ibid., pp. 251 and 253, text, pp. 875 and 877.
- 410 Spuler (1985), pp. 61–2, n.4.
- 411 Rashīd al-Dīn (1971), p. 251, text, p. 875.
- 412 Ibid., p. 260, text, p. 885.
- 413 Ibid., p. 261, text, p. 886.
- 414 Hetoum (1988), pp. 41–2, words updated.
- 415 Shabānkārāi (1363/1984), p. 263.
- 416 Sayfī (1944), pp. 246–8.
- 417 For a discussion of the term Il-Khan, see Jackson (1978), p. 231; Amitai-Preiss (1995), pp. 13–14.
- 418 Lane-Poole, pp. 8ff., cited in Jackson (1978), p. 232; cf. Allsen (1987), pp. 177–8.
- 419 Grigor of Akanc’ (1949), pp. 337–41.

- 420 Rashīd al-Dīn (1971), pp. 255–6, text, p. 880.
- 421 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 78, text, p. 1047; (1999), p. 512.
- 422 Jackson (1978), p. 234; see Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 4, text, p. 965; (1999), p. 473.
- 423 Kirakos (1986), pp. 331–2 [g395].
- 424 Rashīd al-Dīn (1971), p. 258, text, p. 882.
- 425 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 79, text, p. 1049; (1999), p. 513.
- 426 Jackson (1978), p. 235.
- 427 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 75, text, p. 1044; (1999), p. 511.
- 428 Ibid.
- 429 3,000 according to Hetoum (1988), p. 42.
- 430 Vardan (1989), p. 98.
- 431 For these events, see Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), pp. 75–7, text, pp. 1044–6; (1999), pp. 511–12.
- 432 *History of Kartl'i* cited in Bedrosian (1979), p. 131, n. 207; Brosset (tr.) (1849–58), pp. 572–3.
- 433 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1062.
- 434 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1063; Hetoum (1988), p. 62 (*sibe* = ‘palisade’ not a place as Hetoum seems to think).
- 435 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1063.
- 436 Sayfī (1944), p. 272; ‘Ox’s Nose’ in the vicinity of Ghazna, possibly modern day Shashgao, some 24 km north-east of Ghazna on the road to Kabul; see Boyle (1963), ‘Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan’, *Islamic Studies II*, Karachi, p. 247, n. 74.
- 437 Rashīd al-Dīn (1971), p. 123, text, pp. 738–9.
- 438 Malik al-Shuarā’ Bahā’r (1976), p. 326, text, pp. 400–1.
- 439 *Tārīkh-i Sistān*, p. 326, text, p. 401.
- 440 Rashīd al-Dīn, tr. Boyle, p. 137, text, p. 752. In Rashīd al-Dīn

(1971), Möetüken is listed as Chaghatai's second son while in the Tehran 1994 text he is the Khan's first son.

441 Ibid., p. 139, text, p. 755.

442 Ibid., p. 151, text, p. 769.

443 Khwāndamīr, 3, p. 83; (1994), p. 47.

444 Natanzī, p. 104.

445 Natanzī, p. 105.

446 Waṣṣāf, p. 67, lines 2–3; Āyatī, p. 37. Waṣṣāf, Āyatī,

447 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 626, tr. Boyle, p. 23. RashīDī

448 Rashīd al-Dīn, tr. Boyle, p. 27, n. 74.

449 Khwāndamīr, 3, pp. 72–3, tr. Thackston, p. 41; Mīr Khwānd (1996), p. 883.

450 Waṣṣāf, p. 66, lines 22–3; Āyatī, p. 37.

451 Waṣṣāf, p. 66; Āyatī, p. 37; see Biran (1997), pp. 34–6, *passim*.

452 Kashani/Qāshānī, pp. 235–6. On Qāshānī, see Hambly's introduction and MurtaŪavī (1991), pp. 469–542.

453 Citing the Yüan Shi, Biran (1997), pp. 20–1; Allsen (1987), p. 53.

454 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 769 has his death 662–1263/4.

455 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 608; Kashani/Qāshānī, p. 214; Āyatī, p. 37; Waṣṣāf, p. 67.

456 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, pp. 769–80, tr. Boyle, p. 151. For a fuller investigation into the dates and details of Baraq Khan's assumption of power, see Biran (1997), pp. 24–5.

457 Waṣṣāf, p. 68; Āyatī, p. 38; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 769, tr. Boyle, p. 151. The sources are confusing on this matter since elsewhere Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1066, and Mīr Khwānd, (1996), p. 909, Khwāndamīr, 3, p. 84, tr. Thackston, iii, p. 48, have the initial victory going to Baraq and the second confrontation, after Qaidu had received help in the shape of Berkechar and 50,000 men from Möngke Temür of the Golden Horde, going decisively to Qaidu. See also Barthold (1968), p. 492.

- 458 See Biran (2000), pp. 5–6.
- 459 Waṣṣāf, p. 68; Āyatī, pp. 38–9.
- 460 Waṣṣāf, p. 68; Āyatī, p. 39.
- 461 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1066.
- 462 Ibid., p. 1067. Wa ṣṣ
- 463 Waṣṣāf, p. 69; Āyatī, p. 39. See Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 906, tr. Boyle, 278–9, n. 130. cf. Bretschneider (1967), vol. 1, pp. 224–5, n. 576.
- 464 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1067–8.
- 465 Ibid., p. 1068, ‘*sīneh az kīneh-ye dīrīneh pāk gardānīm*’.
- 466 Ibid., p. 1068; Waṣṣāf, p. 69, line 5; Āyatī, p. 39. Mīrkhwand, p. 909. See Biran (1997), p. 26, n. 65.
- 467 See Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 2376 on the translation of this word.
- 468 See Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 2427 concerning the meaning and usage of this word.
- 469 Ibid., p. 1068.
- 470 Ibid., pp. 1068–9.
- 471 See Barthold (1977), pp. 516, n. 225, 518–9, n. 247 on the meaning and usage of the term ‘*hazāreh*’.
- 472 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1069; Mīrkhwand, p. 909. Wa ṣṣ
- 473 Waṣṣāf, p. 69; Āyatī, p. 39.
- 474 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 770, 1069; tr. Boyle, p. 152.
- 475 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 739; tr. Boyle, p. 124. See Amitai-Preiss (1995), p. 89.
- 476 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1069; Waṣṣāf, p. 69, line 12; Mīrkhwand, pp. 909–10. On the term *andā* see Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 2297.
- 477 Waṣṣāf, p. 69, line 18 *arṣa-ye amānīy khālī*’.
- 478 Ibid., p. 69; Āyatī, p. 39; Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 69–70.

- 479 See de Rachewiltz *et al.* (1993), pp. 128–30.
- 480 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1063.
- 481 Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 84, tr. Thackston, iii, p. 48; Āyatī, pp. 39–40, Waṣṣāf, pp. 69–70.
- 482 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, pp. 1063–4. Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 84; tr. Thackston, iii, p. 48; Āyatī, p. 40; Waṣṣāf, p. 70. Āyatī, Waṣṣāf,
- 483 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1071–2.
- 484 Sayfī (1944), p. 310; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1072; Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 85, tr. Thackston, p. 49; Waṣṣāf, p. 71; Āyatī, p. 41.
- 485 Waṣṣāf, p. 71; Āyatī, p. 41.
- 486 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1078; Sayfī (1944), p. 313.
- 487 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1078; Sayfī (1944), p. 314.
- 488 Sayfī (1944), p. 316.
- 489 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1084.
- 490 Zamchī Esfazari (1861), pp. 421–2; Sayfī (1944), p. 358.
- 491 Grigor (1949), pp. 375–7.
- 492 Āyatī, p. 41; Waṣṣāf, p. 72.
- 493 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1070; Sayfī (1944), p. 309. See also, Mustawfī, (1362/1983), p. 591; Brosset (tr.) (1849–58), pp. 576–7.
- 494 Waṣṣāf, p. 72, line 8; Āyatī, p. 42.
- 495 Grigor (1949), pp. 375–7. Brosset (tr.) (1849–58), pp. 577–8.
- 496 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1071.
- 497 The Il-Khans had attempted to elevate Sargis Jaqeli for reputedly saving Hülegü's life during a battle by granting him the city of Karin, an honour blocked by jealous Georgian rivals. According to Armenian sources, Sargis remained a loyal and favourite servant of both Abaqa and Hülegü, eventually earning *inju* status. See Bedrosian (1979), pp. 182–3, 185; Brosset (tr.) (1849–58), pp. 529, 566–8, 573. See also Salia, Kalistrat, *History of the Georgian Nation*, pp. 214–17.

- 498 Bedrosian, (1979), p. 132, n. 208; Brosset (tr.) (1849–58), p. 579.
- 499 Āyatī, p. 42; Waṣṣāf, p. 72.
- 500 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1071. Wa ṣṣ
- 501 Āyatī, p. 42; Waṣṣāf, p. 73.
- 502 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1078.
- 503 Ibid., p. 1101.
- 504 Ibid., pp. 1081–3; Khwāndamīr, iii, pp. 85–6, tr. Thackston, p. 49.
- 505 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1084.
- 506 Ibid., pp. 1086–7; Waṣṣāf, p. 74; Āyatī, pp. 42–3.
- 507 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1087. Wa ṣṣ
- 508 Āyatī, p. 43; Waṣṣāf, p. 75.
- 509 See Faṣīḥī, p. 338, n. 1 and Juwaynī (1997), p. 190, n. 33. Qazwīnī, I, p. 150, n. 2. on this General.
- 510 See Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 2301 on the meaning of this word.
- 511 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1087. See also Āyatī, p. 43; Waṣṣāf, p. 74; Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 86; tr. Thackston, p. 49; Faṣīḥī, p. 338. Mīr Khwānd, pp. 912–13.
- 512 Waṣṣāf, p. 75.
- 513 Cited in Sayfī (1944), p. 330.
- 514 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1088.
- 515 Āyatī, p. 43; Waṣṣāf, p. 76; Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1090.
- 516 Āyatī, pp. 43–4; Waṣṣāf, p. 76.
- 517 Khwāndamīr, iii, text pp. 83 and 87, tr. Thackston, pp. 47 and 49; Āyatī, p. 44; Waṣṣāf, p. 76.
- 518 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1095–6.
- 519 Ibid., p. 1096; for a detailed picture of the Battle of Herat, see Biran (2000).

520 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1099.

521 This according to Āyatī, p. 44 and Waṣṣāf, p. 77, but in Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1098 the suggestion comes from Aqbeg, guardian of a castle on the Āmayeh (Oxus), though Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 87, tr. Thackston, p. 87, states that Aqbeg approached the Il-Khan on Juwaynī's prompting. See also Mīr Khwānd (1996), p. 912.

522 Āyatī, p. 44; Waṣṣāf, p. 77, line 11, '*Takhrīb kardan tā shāghel bi tā*' 'īl'.

523 Azīz Nasafī, *Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq*, ed. A. Dāmghānī, Tehran, p. 3, cited in Ridgeon (1997), p. 8.

524 Waṣṣāf, p. 77, '*Dah hazār ādamī dar shekum-e zamīn manzel-e ābādān geref-tand*' and '*bīran az zadan o bardan o koshtan o raftan o kandan o sakhtan shoghli nadāshtand*'.

525 Āyatī, p. 45, Waṣṣāf, p. 77, see Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 87, tr. Thackston, p. 50.

526 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1099.

527 Ibid.

528 Waṣṣāf, p. 77, lines 23–4. Wa ṣṣ

529 Āyatī, pp. 45–6; Waṣṣāf, pp. 78–9; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1100. See also Mīr Khwānd, pp. 913–14.

530 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1100.

531 Ibid., p. 1093.

532 Ibid., p. 1072.

533 Waṣṣāf, p. 70, line 25.

534 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1076. Prior to these events Abaqa had sent a letter to Sultan Baybars claiming that, indeed, all was stable now between the princes of the 'royal' family. See Amitai-Preiss (1994), p. 18.

535 Barthold (1958), vol. 1, pp. 47–8, 126; Howorth, 1, p. 175.

536 See Biran (1997), chap. 1 for detailed study of the events and implications of these events from Qaidu's perspective.

537 Waṣṣāf, p. 68; Āyatī, p. 38.

538 Grigor (1949), p. 85.

539 Dawlatshāh (1959), p. 170.

540 Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 108; tr. Thackston, p. 61.

541 Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 72; tr. Thackston, p. 41.

542 Waṣṣāf, p. 67; Āyatī, p. 37; *The Travels of Marco Polo*, Everyman Edition, 1908, rpt. 1983, p. 415; tr. Teresa Waugh, *The Travels of Marco Polo*, p. 184.

543 Khwāndamīr, p. 83; tr. Thackston, p. 47.

5 THE PROVINCES

544 See Allsen (2001).

545 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 629–31; (1971), pp. 26–7; tr. Thackston, pp. 309–10; see Rossabi (1988), pp. 104–5.

546 Munshī (1362/1983), p. 70; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, intro., p. 61; Shabānkāra ī (1363/ 1984), p. 201.

547 Khwāndamīr, p. 270; tr. Thackston, p. 156.

548 Also known as Möngke-Timūr.

549 Waṣṣāf, p. 211, line 7.

550 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 658; tr. Boyle, p. 50.

551 Lambton (1988a), p. 277.

552 Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 267; tr. Thackston, p. 154.

553 See Le Strange, ‘The Cities of Kirman in the time of Ḥamd-Allah Mustawfī and Marco Polo’, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1901, pp. 281–90 with regard to Kirman City and Kirman Province.

554 Juwaynī (1997), p. 479. Qazwīnī, II, p. 214; Āyatī, p. 175; Waṣṣāf, p. 287.

555 Juwaynī (1997), p. 479; Qazwīnī, II, p. 214. See also Āyatī, p. 175.

556 Mustawfī, *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, London, 1910, p. 528; (1362/1983), p. 529; Natanzī, p. 22. Natanzī,

557 Munshī (1362/1983), p. 25.

558 Ibid.

559 Ibid., pp. 25–6.

560 *Tārīkh-i Jedid-i Yazd*, p. 69.

561 Munshī (1362/1983), p. 25.

562 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 417–18. Qazwīnī, II, pp. 149–50.

563 In the *Simt al-ula* he is referred to as Rukn al-Dīn Khwāja Jaq, whereas in Juwaynī and Mustawfī he is referred to as Rukn al-Dīn Khwāja Mobārak.

564 Mustawfī, Tehran, pp. 529–30, London, p. 529; Juwaynī, text, II, p. 215; tr. Boyle, p. 480; Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 267; tr. Thackston, p. 154.

565 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 480; Qazwīnī, II, p. 215; Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 154, text, iii, p. 267.

566 Munshī (1362/1983), p. 37.

567 Ibid., p. 36.

568 Ibid., p. 30; Shabānkāra ī (1363/1984), p. 197.

569 Juwaynī, text, II, pp. 216–18; tr. Boyle, pp. 481–2.

570 Munshī (1362/1983), p. 31.

571 Ibid., p. 26; see also Natanzī, p. 23.

572 Munshī, p. 26

573 According to Munshī, he died after a long illness, p. 37, though others claim it was from a hunting accident, *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, intro., p. 52.

- 574 See *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 315 where Jalāl al-Dīn Soyurghatmish is referred to as an ‘adopted son’ in Pārīzī’s notes.
- 575 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 106–7. Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 268; tr. Thackston, p. 155.
- 576 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, intro., p. 52.
- 577 Munshī, p. 38.
- 578 Ibid.; see Rashīd al-Dīn, tr. Boyle, p. 79, text, p. 1049.
- 579 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 112.
- 580 See Lambton (1988a), ch. 8, pp. 258–96.
- 581 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 96.
- 582 Ibid.
- 583 Ibid., p. 97.
- 584 Ibid.
- 585 Āyatī, p. 175; Waṣṣāf, p. 287; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 97–8.
- 586 Āyatī, p. 175; Waṣṣāf, p. 287; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 98
- 587 These events are very confused in the *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 98–9 and appear to avoid mention of Terkān’s union with Baraq.
- 588 Āyatī, p. 175; Waṣṣāf, p. 287; see *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, notes by Pārīzī, pp. 334–5.
- 589 Āyatī, p. 176; Waṣṣāf, p. 288; Natanzī, p. 23.
- 590 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 482; Qazwīnī, II, p. 217.
- 591 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 182.
- 592 Ibid., pp. 182–3.
- 593 Ibid., p. 183.
- 594 Ibid., pp. 183–4.
- 595 Possibly Emīr Qarakhai mentioned in *Simt al-ula*, p. 47

- 596 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 139.
- 597 Ibid.
- 598 Ibid., p. 140; Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1055.
- 599 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 140.
- 600 Ibid.
- 601 Munshī, p. 71.
- 602 Āyatī, pp. 177–8; Waṣṣāf, p. 291; see *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, Tehran, p. 531. See Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 268; tr. Thackston, p. 155.
- 603 Munshī, p. 70; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, intro., p. 61; Shabānkāraī, p. 202.
- 604 Munshī, p. 70; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, intro., p. 60; Shabānkāraī, p. 201.
- 605 Munshī, p. 70; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, intro., p. 61; Shabānkāraī, p. 201.
- 606 Khwāndamīr (1954), p. 271; tr. Thackston, p. 156. *TārīSh ā h ī*,
- 607 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, intro., p. 61.
- 608 Rashīd al-Dīn, tr. Boyle, p. 305, text, p. 934.
- 609 Ibid.
- 610 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, Bastānī Pārīzī's intro., p. 55.
- 611 *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, Tehran, p. 531. Khwāndamīr, iii, pp. 268–9; tr. Thackston, p. 155; Munshī, p. 48; Natanzī, p. 25; Shabānkāraī, p. 199; al-Khwāfī, vol. 2, p. 339.
- 612 *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, tr. pp. 329–30, text p. 405.
- 613 Munshī, p. 49. See note 2, p. 532 in *Tārīkh-i Guzīda* (1362), which suggests that Hajjāj's stay in Delhi was at least 15 years and not ten as stated by Mustawfī and Munshī. He died in 690/1291, see *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, intro., p. 56, n.1. In Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 269; tr. Thackston, p. 155, his death is put in July 1272; see Jackson (1999), p. 80, n.112.
- 614 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 209. *TārīShāhī*,
- 615 Ibid., p. 156.
- 616 Ibid., pp. 156–7; see also Lambton (1988a), p. 86.

- 617 Ibid., p. 276.
- 618 Ibid., p. 192.
- 619 Ibid., p. 192.
- 620 Ibid., pp. 276–7.
- 621 Ibid., p. 315, note by Bastānī Pārīzī.
- 622 Munshī, p. 50. *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 209.
- 623 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 213.
- 624 Munshī, p. 51.
- 625 Ibid.
- 626 Ibid.
- 627 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 134–5.
- 628 Suqunjaq also succeeded Angyānū as governor of Fars in 1271. See Āyatī, p. 113, Waṣṣāf, p. 195.
- 629 Munshī, p. 147.
- 630 Ibid., p. 52.
- 631 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1118.
- 632 Munshī, p. 52.
- 633 Ibid.
- 634 Ibid., pp. 53–4.
- 635 Ibid., p. 54.
- 636 Ibid.
- 637 Ibid.
- 638 Ibid., p. 56; see also *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, intro., pp. 58–9.
- 639 See Aubin (1969), pp. 65–94; Morgan (1986), p. 95; Jackson (1978), pp. 238–44; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 281, 286.

- 640 Munshī, p. 77. For the later history of the Qutlugh Khans, see also Munshī, passim 61–79. Khwāndamīr, iii, pp. 269–272; tr. Thackston, pp. 155–7; Mustawfi (1362/1983), pp. 532–7; Lambton (1988a), pp. 284–7; Lambton (1987), pp. 99–102.
- 641 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 242.
- 642 Ibid.
- 643 Ibid.
- 644 Ibid., p. 244.
- 645 Ibid.
- 646 Ibid., p. 242.
- 647 Cited in *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, intro., p. 71, from *Tārīkh Kirman*, p. 354 as related in the *Tārīkh Siyaq*.
- 648 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 70; see also pp. 114–15, 125–8.
- 649 Munshī, p. 37.
- 650 See Lambton (1988a), pp. 83–90.
- 651 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 503–5; Qazwīnī, II, pp. 239–42.
- 652 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 131–2.
- 653 Ibid., p. 100.
- 654 DeWeese (1994), pp. 84, 86, 101, 357–8.
- 655 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 234–6, 244–7; al-Khwāfī (1341/1962), vol. 2, p. 328.
- 656 Munshī, p. 73.
- 657 Sa’dī Shīrāzī (1964), p. 61 *Sherah Golestan*, p. 104.
- 658 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 638; Qazwīnī, vol. 3, pp. 138–9.
- 659 Sa’dī Shīrāzī (1964), p. 61 *Sherah Golestan* (1363/1984), p. 104. *Kulliyāt-d ī* ,
- 660 *Kulliyāt-i Sa’dī*, ed. ‘Ali Farughī (1368/1989), pp. 912, 922, 953.

661 Āyatī, pp. 91, 92; Waṣṣāf, pp. 156, 157. See also Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 234. Qazwīnī, I, pp. 189–90.

662 Āyatī, p. 92, NB. misprint in Āyatī, p. 92, line 7 ('Atabek Sa'd' should read just 'Atabek' referring to Abū Bakr); Waṣṣāf, p. 157.

663 Mustawfī (1362/1983), p. 505; London, 1910, p. 507.

664 Āyatī, p. 91; Waṣṣāf, p. 155.

665 Āyatī, p. 96; Waṣṣāf, p. 163.

666 Mustawfī (1362/1983), pp. 505–6, London, 1910, p. 507.

667 Ibn Zarkab (1350/1971), p. 85. Mustawfī (1362/1983), p. 506; London (1910), pp. 507–8.

668 See G. Le Strange (1966), pp. 264–5. Mustawfī Qazwīnī, *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, p. 129.

669 Mustawfī (1915 or 1919?), p. 128. text, p. 129.

670 Āyatī, p. 97; Waṣṣāf, p. 164.

671 Āyatī, p. 106; Waṣṣāf, pp. 179–80.

672 Also *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 159–60; Shabānkārahā'i, p. 185.

673 Sa'di Shīrāzī (1363), p. 19, (1964), p. 67.

674 al-Khwāfī (1341/1962), p. 328.

675 Āyatī, p. 106; Waṣṣāf, p. 181.

676 Āyatī, p. 106; Waṣṣāf, p. 181.

677 al-Khwāfī (1341/1962), p. 328; Rashīd al-Dīn, text, pp. 935–6.

678 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 160.

679 Āyatī, p. 107; Waṣṣāf, p. 181.

680 Āyatī, p. 106; Waṣṣāf, p. 181.

681 al-Khwāfī (1341/1962), p. 328; Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 935.

682 Shabānkārahā'i, p. 185.

- 683 Ibn Zarkab, p. 87; al-Khwāfī (1341/1962), p. 329.
- 684 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 160.
- 685 Ibid.
- 686 Ibn Zarkab, p. 88.
- 687 Shabānkārāi, pp. 185–6.
- 688 Ibn Zarkab, p. 88.
- 689 Spuler (1985), p. 119; citing al-Maqrīzī (1837–45), I, 1, 190, 238.
- 690 Amitai-Preiss (1995), pp. 144–5.
- 691 Āyatī, p. 108; Waṣṣāf, pp. 184–5.
- 692 See Āyatī, p. 108; Waṣṣāf, p. 185; Ibn Zarkab, p. 88; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 163, and p. 296 citing Naṣīrī's *Farsnāma*; al-Khwāfī (1341/1962), p. 331; Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 936.
- 693 Rashīd al-Dīn, tr. Boyle, p. 307, text, p. 936.
- 694 Āyatī, p. 108; Waṣṣāf, pp. 185–6; Shabānkārāi, p. 168; for more on the *ghulām* Miyāq, see *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 160–2.
- 695 Āyatī, p. 109; Waṣṣāf, p. 186; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 165.
- 696 Āyatī, p. 109; Waṣṣāf, p. 187.
- 697 Mustawfī has a different interpretation of events. See Tehran, p. 507, London, pp. 508–9. Also Rashīd al-Dīn, tr. Boyle, p. 307, text, p. 936.
- 698 Āyatī, p. 109; Waṣṣāf, p. 187; Natanzī, *Montakhab al-Tavārīkh Muīnī*, Tehran, p. 5.
- 699 Shabānkārāi, p. 186.
- 700 A widely and greatly revered figure and founder of the Kāziranī Ṣafī Order of which the poet, Khwāja Kirmānī (1290–1352), was a well-known adherent. See al-Khwāfī (1341/1962), vol. 2, p. 85.
- 701 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 164.
- 702 See op. cit. Amitai-Preiss.

- 703 Āyatī, p. 110; Waṣṣāf, pp. 188–9; Shabānkārāī, p. 186; Rashīd al-Dīn, tr. Boyle, p. 307, text, p. 936; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 165–6; Ibn Zarkab, p. 89; Spuler, p. 120. See Amitai-Preiss (1995), pp. 109 and 146 concerning Shīrāzīs fleeing to Cairo.
- 704 Āyatī, p. 110; Waṣṣāf, p. 190.
- 705 Possibly ‘*soghdī*’ misprint for ‘*Sa’dī*’ i.e. *ghulām* of the Atabeg Sa’d.
- 706 Spuler, B. *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. 1. p. 210; Lambton (1988a), p. 272.
- 707 Ibn Zarkab, p. 89.
- 708 Rashīd al-Dīn, tr. Boyle, p. 307, text, p. 936.
- 709 See Lambton (1988a), p. 272. al-Khwāfī (1341/1962), p. 334 gives the date of the marriage as 663/1265.
- 710 Āyatī, p. 111; Waṣṣāf, p. 191; see Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 109–15. Qazwīnī, I, pp. 85–90 for the Tarābī revolt.
- 711 For information on the province of Shabānkāra see Mustawfī, *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, pp. 138–9, tr. Le Strange, pp. 137–8; Le Strange (1966), pp. 288–98.
- 712 Āyatī, pp. 111–12; Waṣṣāf, p. 192.
- 713 Āyatī, p. 112; Waṣṣāf, pp. 192–3.
- 714 Āyatī, p. 112; Waṣṣāf, p. 193.
- 715 Āyatī, pp. 112–13; Waṣṣāf, pp. 193–4.
- 716 Lambton (1987), p. 105.
- 717 Āyatī, p. 113; Waṣṣāf, p. 194; see also Ibn Zarkab, p. 90.
- 718 Sa’dī Shīrāzī (1363), pp. 912, 922, 953.
- 719 Ibid., p. 923.
- 720 Ibid., p. 912.
- 721 Āyatī, p. 113; Waṣṣāf, pp. 194–5.
- 722 See Juwaynī, III, pp. 303–4; tr. Boyle, p. 624 n.20. Suqunchaq,

Sughunchaq, or Sunchaq of the Suldus tribe and governor of Mesopotamia. Great Grandson of Sorqan Shira who befriended Chinggis Khan at the time of his captivity among the Tayichi'; al-Khwāfi, p. 333; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 177, on the Suldus clan, pp. 173–8.

723 Alkānī had been employed at Abaqa's *Dīwān* c.1268. See Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1063.

724 See Jean Aubin on Suqunjaq (1995), p. 23.

725 Āyatī, pp. 113–14; Waṣṣāf, p. 195; see also Ibn Zarkab, p. 90.

726 Āyatī, p. 114; Waṣṣāf, pp. 195–6; Ibn Zarkab, pp. 90–1.

727 Āyatī, pp. 114–15 and 130–1; Waṣṣāf, pp. 196 and 223.

728 Waṣṣāf, p. 197; Āyatī, p. 115.

729 See Allsen (1989), pp. 109 passim.

730 Āyatī, p. 115; Waṣṣāf, p. 197; Ibn Zarkab, p. 91. Concerning Tāzīga, see Rashīd al-Dīn, text, pp. 1061, 1108, 1109; *Tārīkh-e Yazd*, pp. 242–4. *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 283–6.

731 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 284–6.

732 *Tārīkh-e Jadīd-e Yazd*, pp. 131–3; *Tārīkh-e Yazd*, pp. 111–14.

733 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 207 and 285–6.

734 Sa'di Shīrāzī (1363), pp. 1183–4; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 285–6.

735 Āyatī, p. 116; Waṣṣāf, p. 198.

736 Āyatī, pp. 115–16; Waṣṣāf, p. 198.

737 Āyatī, pp. 118–19; Waṣṣāf, p. 204.

738 On *dehqān* see Lambton (1988a), p. 132 n.5.

739 Āyatī, p. 119; Waṣṣāf, p. 205; Ibn Zarkab, p. 92.

740 Waṣṣāf, p. 205; Āyatī, pp. 119–20.

741 Āyatī, pp. 119–20; Waṣṣāf, pp. 205–6.

742 See Rashīd al-Dīn (1971), p. 204, n. 32.

- 743 Āyatī, p. 121; Waṣṣāf, p. 207.
- 744 al-Khwāfī, pp. 364, 374.
- 745 Āyatī, p. 121; Waṣṣāf, pp. 207–8.
- 746 For comment on relationships between tribes and ruling élites see, Kôprülü (1992a), pp. 59–60; Sultân Valad (1338/1959), pp. 488–9, 536; Lambton (1986), pp. 82–3.
- 747 Āyatī, pp. 121–3; Waṣṣāf, pp. 208–11; see also Ibn Zarkab, p. 93.
- 748 Āyatī, p. 73; Waṣṣāf, p. 123.
- 749 Āyatī, pp. 123–4; Waṣṣāf, p. 211, line 7.
- 750 *Injū* lands were appanages which belonged to the relatives of the ruler, while *dalay* land was the property of the ruler. See Lambton (1988a), pp. 353 and 356.
- 751 Āyatī, p. 124; Waṣṣāf, pp. 211–12; Ibn Zarkab, pp. 93–4.
- 752 Āyatī, p. 128; Waṣṣāf, pp. 217–18; Ibn Zarkab dates the drought from three years after the Sayyed's death at the end of 1284, p. 95.
- 753 Āyatī, pp. 124–6; Waṣṣāf, pp. 212–14; Ibn Zarkab, pp. 94–5.
- 754 Ibn Zarkab, p. 95; Āyatī, p. 126; Waṣṣāf, p. 215.
- 755 Āyatī, p. 127; Waṣṣāf, p. 216.
- 756 Ibn Zarkab, p. 95.
- 757 Āyatī, p. 127; Waṣṣāf, pp. 216–17.
- 758 Āyatī, p. 128; Waṣṣāf, p. 219.
- 759 Ibn Zarkab, p. 96.
- 760 Āyatī, p. 130; Waṣṣāf, p. 222; see also Iqbāl (2536/1977), p. 395.
- 761 Āyatī, pp. 130–1; Waṣṣāf, p. 223.
- 762 Turcic = *ortaq*, Mongolian = *orto*, Persian = *urtāq*. Merchant who operates with capital from the Mongol court.
- 763 Rashīd al-Dīn, tr. Boyle, p. 307, text, p. 937.

- 764 Āyatī, pp.129–30; Waṣṣāf, p. 224.
- 765 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 605; Qazwīnī, III, p. 87.
- 766 Rashīd al-Dīn (n.d.), p. 52, text, p. 1019; tr. Thackston, p. 499.
- 767 On the spelling of ‘Kart’ see Potter (1992), pp. 29–32.
- 768 Sayfī (1944), p. 297.
- 769 The panegyrist Rabīī of Fashanj, d.1303, praising Malik Fakhr al-Dīn Kart, cited in Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 367; (1994), p. 213. Also cited in Eghbāl, A, Moghul’s *History and Beginning of Taimoorian Days*, p. 367. See also Faṣīḥ Khwāfī, *Mojmal al- tavārikh*, vol. III, p. 102.
- 770 Potter (1992), pp. 32–40.
- 771 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1105.
- 772 Sayfī (1944), p. 80.
- 773 Waṣṣāf, p. 12; Āyatī, p. 3.
- 774 Sayfī (1944), pp. 116 and 122–3.
- 775 See Mustawfī, *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, pp. 220 and 153.
- 776 Sayfī (1944), p. 123.
- 777 Ibid., p. 128, ‘*khāyeb o khāser*’.
- 778 Ibid.
- 779 Ibid., pp. 134–5.
- 780 On Körgüz, see Juwaynī, II, pp. 225–43, tr. Boyle, pp. 489–505.
- 781 Sayfī (1944), pp. 136–9. Sayfī’s chronology is often wrongly dated especially during Möngke’s reign; see Allsen (1987), p. 133.
- 782 Sayfī (1944), pp. 169–70; Zamchī Esfazārī, *Rawżāt al-Janāt*, vol. 1, p. 410.
- 783 See Sayfī (1944), pp. 148–52.
- 784 Ibid., p. 140.
- 785 See Potter, pp. 35–6.

786 Sayfī (1944), pp. 150–1; Zamchī Esfazārī, *Rawżāt al-Janāt*, vol. 1, p. 359; Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 368; (1994), p. 213; Juwaynī, 1 (1912), p. 95; tr. Boyle, pp. 121–2, n. 20; Abbās Eghbāl, p. 367.

787 Sayfī (1944), p. 152; Zamchī, p. 360; Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 368; (1994), p. 213; Waṣṣāf, p. 80; Āyatī, p. 47; Taher Bahā’dur and Qara Noyen had been assigned to Ghaznī by Ögödei, Sayfī, p. 151; on Taher Bahā’dur see, Boyle, J.A., ‘The Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India’, *Islamic Studies II*, Karachi, 1963, p. 240.

788 Sayfī (1944), pp. 139–40.

789 Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, p. 409.

790 Sayfī (1944), p. 156.

791 Mentioned in Jūzjānī, vol. II, pp. 76 and 88; on Sali Noyen see Boyle, J.A., ‘The Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India’, *Islamic Studies II*, Karachi, 1963, p. 239.

792 Sayfī (1944), p. 158.

793 Ibid., pp. 158–9.

794 Ibid., p. 161.

795 Ibid., pp. 159–61; Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, pp. 407–9.

796 Ibid., p. 162.

797 Ibid., p. 205.

798 Ibid., intro., pp. xi–xii; see also Khan Sahib Maulavi ‘Abdul Muqtadir, ‘Notes on a unique History of Herat’, *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Calcutta, new series, vol. XII, 1916, pp. 166–8.

799 Sayfī (1944), pp. 162–3.

800 Ibid., p. 163.

801 Ibid., p. 165, it is not specified how long he stayed but by implication the word ‘*motava tan*’ suggests the sojourn was lengthy.

802 Ibid., ‘killing and killing, and, plunder and terror.’

803 Hetoum (1988), pp. 39, 173 and 175.

804 Sayfī (1944), p. 166; Waṣṣāf, p. 81; Āyatī, p. 47.

805 Sayfī (1944), p. 167.

806 Ibid., pp. 166–7.

807 Ibid., p. 168.

808 Ibid.

809 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 983; tr. Boyle, p. 20.

810 Zamchī Esfazarī, vol. 1, pp. 410–11; Sayfī, pp. 169–70; Juwaynī (1912), vol. II, p. 255; tr. Boyle, pp. 518–19.

811 al-Khwāfī, *Majmal al-Tav ārikh*, vol. 3, pp. 4–9.

812 Sayfī (1944), p. 171.

813 Ibid., p. 170. It is not clear if this first mentioned 50,000 dinars is the same or another gift to the one given during the visit to Tus.

814 Ibid., p. 172; Zamchī Esfazarī, vol. 1, p. 411; Waṣṣāf, p. 81; Āyatī, p. 48.

815 Allsen (1987), p. 71.

816 Juwaynī (1937), pp. 98–9; tr. Boyle, p. 613.

817 Juwaynī (1937), p. 98; tr. Boyle, p. 612.

818 Rashīd al-Dīn p. 979; tr. Boyle, p. 16.

819 Waṣṣāf, p. 81; Āyatī, pp. 48–9; on the killing of Masud of Sistān see Zamchī Esfazarī, vol. 1, pp. 414–15; Sayfī, pp. 227–42. Sayfī interprets this event as the result of Shams al-Dīn's resistance to Jochid attempts to arrest him for failure to pay Batu his dues and Masad acting as Batu's ally was killed in the attempt to arrest the Kart Malik.

820 Sayfī (1944), pp. 186–9; Zamchī Esfazarī, vol. 1, p. 412.

821 Khwāndamīr, iii, pp. 368–9; tr. Thackston, p. 213.

822 Sayfī, p. 201, according to Sayfī 652/1254.

823 Sayfī, pp. 201–5; Zamchī Esfazarī, vol. 1, p. 412.

- 824 Sayfī, pp. 262–3; Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, p. 416.
- 825 Sayfī, pp. 205–7.
- 826 Ibid., pp. 246–7; Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, p. 415.
- 827 Sayfī, pp. 201–2.
- 828 Ibid., p. 264.
- 829 Ibid., pp. 266–7. On Negüdar see Boyle, ‘Mongol Commanders . . .’, p. 242.
- 830 Sayfī, pp. 268–9.
- 831 Ibid., pp. 270–3.
- 832 Rashīd al-Dīn (1971), p. 123, text, pp. 738–9.
- 833 *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, text, p. 401; tr. p. 326.
- 834 *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 398–400; tr. pp. 324–6.
- 835 For a study of the nature of, and differences between, these postings see Ostrowski (1998), pp. 262–77.
- 836 Sayfī, pp. 177–9; Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, p. 411.
- 837 Sayfī, p. 171; Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, p. 411.
- 838 Sayfī, p. 196.
- 839 Ibid., p. 184; Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, p. 411.
- 840 For the actual words of the *yarligh*, see Sayfī, pp. 196–8.
- 841 For the full accounts of this battle against Berke, see Sayfī, pp. 290–301; Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, pp. 4417–21.
- 842 Sayfī, p. 292.
- 843 Ibid., p. 294.
- 844 Ibid., p. 297.
- 845 Ibid., p. 299.
- 846 Ibid.

- 847 Ibid., p. 301.
- 848 Ibid.; Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, p. 419.
- 849 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1061. By which was meant the Herat region.
- 850 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1062–3.
- 851 Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 369; tr. Thackston, p. 213.
- 852 Sayfī, pp. 310–11; Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1076–7.
- 853 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1078.
- 854 Sayfī, pp. 313–14.
- 855 Ibid., pp. 314–16.
- 856 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1078.
- 857 Ibid., p. 1084; Sayfī, pp. 324–5.
- 858 Sayfī, p. 331.
- 859 Ibid., p. 332.
- 860 Ibid., pp. 332–3.
- 861 Ibid., p. 335.
- 862 Ibid., p. 337.
- 863 Ibid., pp. 337–8.
- 864 Ibid., pp. 339–40.
- 865 Ibid., p. 340; this whole episode, pp. 340–3.
- 866 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1106; Waṣṣāf, p. 82; Āyatī, p. 49.
- 867 Waṣṣāf, p. 82; Āyatī, p. 50.
- 868 Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 369; (1994), p. 214; Waṣṣāf, p. 82; Āyatī, p. 51.
- 869 Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 369; (1994), p. 214; Waṣṣāf, pp. 82–3; Āyatī, p. 51.

870 Sayfī, pp. 348–51; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1107.

871 Sayfī, p. 353.

872 Ibid.

873 Ibid., p. 354; Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, p. 421.

874 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1107.

875 al-Khwāfī (1341/1962), vol. 2, p. 345.

876 Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 370; (1994), p. 214; Sayfī, p. 358.

877 Sayfī, pp. 361–2; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1107; Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, pp. 421–2.

878 See the poem of Emīr Khosrow of Delhi; Dawlatshāh al-Samarqandī (1338/1959), p. 186.

879 Maulānā Wajih al-Dīn Nafasī cited in Sayfī, p. 362; Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 370; (1994), p. 214.

880 Sayfī, p. 365.

881 Ibid., p. 366.

882 Ibid., p. 367; Zamchī Esfazārī, vol. 1, pp. 424–6; Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 370; (1994), p. 214; Abbās Eghbāl, p. 370.

6 THE JUWAYNĪS

883 ‘The Great Yasa of Chinggis Khan: a re-examination’, in Ayalon (1988), p. 133.

884 See Morgan’s and Boyle’s introduction to *Genghis Khan: The History of the World-Conqueror*, pp. xxi–xxii, xli–xlvii.

885 Dāya (1982), pp. 39–42, (1370/1991), pp. 41–2.

886 Shabānkārā’ī, p. 264.

887 Juwaynī intro., p. LXXXIV and Qazvīnī intro., p. 119, citing al-Ṣāḥabī’s *Tārīkh al-Islām*. *Tārīlislām*.

- 888 Juwaynī intro., Browne, pp. xix–xx; and Qazvīnī intro., pp. 12–13.
- 889 Mustawfī, *Nuzhat al-Qulub*, p. 174.
- 890 My translation, Juwaynī, intro., Browne, p. xx, Qazvīnī intro., p. 15.
- 891 See Awfī, *Lubābu'l-Albāb*, pt. 1, for biography, pp. 78–90.
- 892 Dawlatshāh (1338/1959), p. 72.
- 893 al-Juwaynī (1329/1950). See also Lambton (1957).
- 894 Dawlatshāh (1338/1959), p. 72; (1901), p. 91; also Juwaynī, ii pp. 9–10; tr. Boyle, p. 283.
- 895 Browne, *Literary History*, iii, pp. 20–1.
- 896 Tārīkh-i Ibn Bībī, p. 331. See Lambton (1988a), p. 66; Mustawfī (1362/1983), p. 597, n. 2.
- 897 Juwaynī, II, pp. 115–17; tr. Boyle, pp. 385–6.
- 898 Bar Hebraeus, p. 394.
- 899 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 484, text, ii, p. 220.
- 900 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 483–4, text, ii, pp. 219–20.
- 901 Rashīd al-Dīn claims him to be sometimes a Qarā Khitāī, p. 660, and elsewhere an Ongut, p. 132.
- 902 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 485; Qazvīnī, ii, p. 221.
- 903 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 487–8; Qazvīnī, ii, pp. 223–4.
- 904 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 487; Qazvīnī, ii, p. 223.
- 905 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 485; Qazvīnī, ii, p. 221.
- 906 See Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 492; Qazvīnī, ii, pp. 228–9.
- 907 See Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 491; Qazvīnī, ii, p. 227.
- 908 See Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 519; Qazvīnī, ii, p. 256.
- 909 See Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 520; Qazvīnī, ii, p. 257.

- 910 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 520–1; Qazvinī, ii, pp. 257–8.
- 911 Bahāʿ al-Dīn’s words. Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 520; Qazvinī, ii, p. 257.
- 912 Sa’dī (1964), pt. 1, story 15, p. 89; Sa’dī, *Golestan*, Tehran (1371/1992), p. 42.
- 913 Juwaynī, Browne, p. lii; Qazvinī intro., p. 66.
- 914 Aq’īlī (1337/1958), p. 276.
- 915 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 8–9; Qazvinī, i, pp. 5–6.
- 916 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 9; Qazvinī, i, p. 6.
- 917 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 10; Qazvinī, i, pp. 6–7.
- 918 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 10; Qazvinī, i, p. 7.
- 919 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 96–7; Qazvinī, i, p. 75.
- 920 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 105; Qazvinī, i, p. 81.
- 921 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 162; Qazvinī, i, p. 127.
- 922 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 160; Qazvinī, i, p. 125.
- 923 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 7; Qazvinī, i, p. 3.
- 924 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 7–8; Qazvinī, i, pp. 4–5.
- 925 cf. Lambton’s citation of Abū Ḥāmid Kirmānī’s complaints against the predominance of unworthy Turks in Lambton (1988a), p. 222.
- 926 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 12; Qazvinī, i, p. 8.
- 927 Disciples of Najm al-Dīn Kobrā (d.1221), martyred by the Mongols after refusing an invitation of safe conduct from Khwārazm.
- 928 Dayā (1982), p. 396; (1370/1991), p. 204.
- 929 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 638; Qazvinī, iii, pp. 138–9.
- 930 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 25; Qazvinī, i, p. 18.
- 931 Sa’dī Shīrāzī (1363), p. 937.

- 932 Sa'di Shīrāzī (1363), p. 902.
- 933 See Juwaynī, I, intro., Browne, pp. liii–liv; Qazvinī intro., pp. 70–2.
- 934 Sa'di Shīrāzī (1363), p. 932.
- 935 Sa'di Shīrāzī (1363), pp. 1178–80.
- 936 Arberry (1960), p. 132.
- 937 Sa'di Shīrāzī (1363), full story, pp. 1181–2, quote, p. 1181.
- 938 Juwaynī, Qazvinī's intro., p. 71.
- 939 Arberry, op. cit. p. 135.
- 940 Sa'di Shīrāzī (1363), p. 901.
- 941 Sa'di Shīrāzī (1363), p. 934.
- 942 Sa'di Shīrāzī (1363), p. 936.
- 943 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 4; Qazvinī, i, p. 2.
- 944 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 22; Qazvinī, i pp. 15–16.
- 945 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 23; Qazvinī, i, p. 16.
- 946 See Aubin (1995).
- 947 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 24; Qazvinī, p. 17.
- 948 Ibid.
- 949 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 25; Qazvinī, p. 17.
- 950 See Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 26.
- 951 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 26; Qazvinī, p. 18.
- 952 Ibid.
- 953 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 13; Qazvinī, p. 9.
- 954 See Jūzjānī (1984); Habībī, ii, pp. 144–6, (1995), pp. 1077–81.
- 955 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 29–30; Qazvinī, i, p. 21.

- 956 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 31; Qazvīnī, i, p. 23.
- 957 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 26; Qazvīnī, i, p. 19.
- 958 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 5; Qazvīnī, i, p. 2.
- 959 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 179; Qazvīnī, i, p. 141.
- 960 Jūzjānī, Raverty, p. 1106; Habībī, p. 151.
- 961 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 152; Qazvīnī, i, p. 118.
- 962 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 589; Qazvīnī, iii, p. 61.
- 963 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 614–15; Qazvīnī, iii, p. 101; Rashīd al-Dīn (1994), p. 980; (n.d.), p. 17; (1999), p. 481.
- 964 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 521–2; Qazvīnī, ii, pp. 258–9.
- 965 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 617; Qazvīnī, iii, p. 105.
- 966 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 623; Qazvīnī, iii, p. 115.
- 967 Vardan (1989), p. 221 (96/159).
- 968 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 623; Qazvīnī, iii, p. 114.
- 969 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 639–40; Qazvīnī, iii, p. 140.
- 970 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 725; Qazvīnī, iii, p. 278.
- 971 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 719; Qazvīnī, iii, p. 270.
- 972 *Sargudhasht-i Sayyidnā* of Ḥasan-i Šabbāḥ. See Farhad Daftary (1990), p. 336; Juwaynī, iii, pp. 187ff., tr. Boyle, pp. 666ff.
- 973 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 719–21; Qazvīnī, iii, pp. 270–3.
- 974 See Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 3, pp. 77–80.
- 975 Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 639; Qazvīnī, iii, p. 139.
- 976 Juwaynī, intro., Browne, pp. xxviii–xxix; Qazvīnī, intro., pp. 29–30.
- 977 Juwaynī, intro., p. lxxxiv; Qazvīnī intro., p. 119.
- 978 Juwaynī, intro., p. lxxxv; Qazvīnī intro., p. 120; see also Ibn al-

Fuwatī (1932), p. 349.

979 Abal-Faraj, (ibn Ibrī), *Tārīkh Mukhtaṣar al-Duwal*, pp. 445–6, tr. Bernard Lewis (1974), p. 81.

980 Waṣṣāf, p. 36; Āyatī, p. 19; Spuler (1972a), p. 117. Rashīd al-Dīn claims that Hülegü dispatched the Emīr Naḥlī Nakhchivānī (1994), p. 1019; (n.d.), p. 53; (1999), p. 499; see also *Tārīkh-i Banākātī*, p. 419.

981 See Qazvīnī's note in Juwaynī (1937), p. 472.

982 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1008, (n.d.), p. 42; (1999), p. 493.

983 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1035, (n.d.), p. 67; (1999), p. 507.

984 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1049, (n.d.), p. 79; (1999), p. 513.

985 Juwaynī, intro., pp. LXXX1–XCII and Qazvīnī intro., I, pp. 116–26.

986 Juwaynī, intro., p. XXIX and Qazvīnī intro., I, p. 31; Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 105; (1994), p. 59.

987 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1049; (n.d.), p. 79; (1999), p. 513; Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 104; (1994), p. 59.

988 Aq'īlī (1337/1958), p. 276.

989 Ibid.

990 Ibid., p. 277.

991 Mustawfī, *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, p. 224.

992 Ibid., p. 221.

993 See Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1108, 1109; Hasan Jafari, *Tārīkh-e Yazd*, pp. 242–4; *Tārīkh-i Shahī*, p. 207.

994 Aḥmad ibn Husein-e Kateb (1978), pp. 131–3; Hasan Jafari, *Tārīkh-e Yazd*, pp. 111–14; Ḥātīm was renowned for his generosity, and Nashīrwān for his justice and wisdom.

995 Waṣṣāf, p. 63; Āyatī, p. 35; Dawlatshāh; (1338/1959), p. 165; (1901), p. 220.

996 Āyatī, p. 35; Waṣṣāf, p. 62; Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 110; tr.

Thackston, p. 62.

997 Daughter-in-law of the last caliph, Mustasim, Rābieh bint Walī-ahd Abū al- Abbās Aḥmad bin al-Mustaṣim.

998 Waṣṣāf, pp. 64–5.

999 Ayati, p. 36; Waṣṣāf, p. 65; Khwāndamīr, iii, text. p. 110; tr. Thackston. p. 62.

1000 Waṣṣāf, p. 64.

1001 Ayati, p. 35; Waṣṣāf, p. 63.

1002 Ibid.

1003 Dawlatshāh (1338/1959), pp. 164–5; al-Jājarmī (1971), vol. II, pp. 824, 826, 1214–5; I, pp. 108, 114, 136, 163.

1004 Mustawfī (1913), pp. 821; (1362/1983), p. 737.

1005 Āyati, p. 37; Waṣṣāf, p. 66.

1006 Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 3, pp. 21–2.

1007 Juwaynī (1912), intro., p. 67.

1008 Sa’dī Shīrāzī, (1363), p. 936.

1009 Minorsky (1964), ‘Pur-i Bahā’ and his Poems’ lines 36 and 41, pp. 299–305.

1010 Mustawfī (1913), pp. 816–17; (1362/1983), p. 725; trans. E .G. Browne, ‘Biographies of Persian Poets’ (reprint of *JRAS*, Oct. 1900 and Jan. 1901), Luzac & Co., London, p. 24.

1011 Mustawfī (1913), p. 819; (1362/1983), p. 733; Browne, *JRAS*, tr., p. 34.

1012 Mustawfī (1913), p. 823; (1362/1983), p. 741; Browne, *JRAS*, tr., p. 46; Khwāndamīr, text, p. 117; (1994), p. 66.

1013 Juwaynī (1912), intro., vol. I, p. L; Qazvīnī intro., p. 64.

1014 Āṣaf was reputedly Solomon’s Grand Wazir. ‘Irāqī (1372/1993), p. 384.

- 1015 ‘Irāqī (1372/1993), intro., p. 25 n. 47.
- 1016 Ibid. pp. 24–5; see also ‘Irāqī (1939), pp. 19–21.
- 1017 Dawlatshāh (1901), p. 218; (1370/1991), p. 164; cf. Humām-i Tabrīzī (1333/ 1954), p. 5.
- 1018 Humām-i Tabrīzī (1333/1954), p. 58, dedication, p. 11.
- 1019 ‘Irāqī (1939), p. 20.
- 1020 Humām-i Tabrīzī (1972), intro., p. 76.
- 1021 Ibid., intro., pp. 46–8.
- 1022 *Tārīkh-i Ibn Bibī*, p. 331; see Lambton (1988a), p. 66.
- 1023 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1131.
- 1024 Khwāndamīr (1317/1938), p. 270, Khwāndamīr, text, p. 107; (1994), p. 60.
- 1025 Juwaynī (1912), vol. I, intro., p. xlviii; Qazvīnī intro., pp. 61–2.
- 1026 Ibid.; Mustawfī (1362/1983), p. 597; Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1162–3.
- 1027 Khwāndamīr, iii, p. 114, tr. Thackston, p. 64.
- 1028 Juwaynī (1912), vol. I, intro., p. xc; Qazvīnī intro., p. 124.
- 1029 Bar Hebraeus, pp. 447–8; see Amitai-Preiss (1995), pp. 149 and 151.
- 1030 Bar Hebraeus, p. 445; Juwaynī (1912), vol. I, intro., p. xxxi; Qazvīnī intro., pp. 33–4.
- 1031 Amitai-Preiss (1995), p. 152.
- 1032 Juwaynī (1912), vol. I, intro., pp. xxxi–ii; Qazvīnī intro., pp. 34–5.
- 1033 This story is recounted in various histories. Rashīd al-Dīn, text, pp. 1110–15. Juwaynī (1912), vol. I, intro., pp. xxxii–xlvi; Qazvīnī intro., pp. 36–58.
- 1034 Waṣṣāf, p. 91; Āyatī, p. 55.
- 1035 Son of Orghotu Noyin from the Durban tribe of Durbay Noyin.

Married Hülegü's sixth daughter, Qutluqan. See Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 598 and 971; Barthold (1968), p. 449.

1036 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1111–12.

1037 Uljay Khatun was the wife of Hülegü, mother of Mangu-Timur, and now following Mongol custom, the wife of Abaqa.

1038 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1114.

1039 Ibid., p. 1115; Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 3, p. 23; Waṣṣāf, p. 95; Āyatī, p. 58; Juwaynī; Qazvīnī, i, intro., pp. xxxvi–vii, Persian, p. 42.

1040 Juwaynī, Qazvīnī, i, intro., p. xxxviii, Persian, p. 44.

1041 This account is recorded in Juwaynī, Qazvīnī, i, intro., pp. 50–1. Browne, pp. xlii–xliii.

1042 A full account and the background to this affair is covered in Amitai-Preiss (1995), pp. 181–3.

1043 Juwaynī, Qazvīnī, i, intro., pp. 53–8.

1044 Ibid., p. 56.

1045 Ibid.

1046 Ibid., pp. 567–8; Waṣṣāf, p. 108; Āyatī, p. 67.

1047 Juwaynī, intro., p. xlvi; Qazvīnī, intro., p. 58; Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 3 p. 24. Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1129.

1048 Waṣṣāf, p. 109; Āyatī, p. 67.

1049 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1127; Khwāndamīr, text, p. 119; (1994), p. 67; Waṣṣāf, p. 119; Āyatī, pp. 71–2; Juwaynī, Qazvīnī, i, intro., p. 59.

1050 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1131.

1051 *Faṣī ḥī*, p. 351.

1052 Mustawfī (1362/1983), p. 595.

1053 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1157.

1054 Khwāndamīr, text, p. 126 (1994), p. 71; see also Waṣṣāf, p. 141;

Āyatī, p. 83.

1055 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1158–60; Waṣṣāf, p. 141; Āyatī, p. 83; see also Humāmi Tabrizī (1333/1954), intro., p. 48.

1056 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1160; see also Shabānkārā’ī, p. 266.

1057 Waṣṣāf, p. 142; Āyatī p. 84.

1058 Khwāndamīr, text, p. 127 (1994), p. 71; Waṣṣāf, p. 142; Āyatī, p. 84.

1059 Shabānkārā’ī, p. 266.

1060 Khwāndamīr, text, p. 127 (1994), p. 72; Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1160.

1061 Cited in Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 3, p. 30.

1062 Ibid., p. 31; Mustawfī (1912), p. 586.

1063 Juwaynī (1997), p. 411; Qazvīnī, II, p. 142. From the *Shāhnāme* in reference to Rustam.

1064 See Teresa Fitzherbert, ‘Portrait of a Lost Leader. Jalāl al-Dīn Khwārazmshāh and Juwaynī’, *The Court of the Il-Khans 1290–1340*, OUP, 1996, pp. 63–78.

1065 See Kirakos cited in Juwaynī (1997), p. 432, n. 26.

1066 Ibid., pp. 459–60; Qazvīnī, II, pp. 190–2.

1067 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1127.

1068 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1127–8.

1069 Juwaynī, Qazvīnī, i, intro., pp. 56–7.

1070 See Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī’s longer introduction to ‘*Zij-i-Ilkhani*’ in Boyle, (1977), pp. 247–52. This has obviously been written for a cosmopolitan audience certainly containing non-Muslim elements and other scholars with little knowledge of Islam.

7 KHWĀJA NAṢĪR AL-DĪN ḡŪSĪ

- 1071 Khwāndamīr (1333/1954), p. 105; (1994), pp. 59–60.
- 1072 Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 2, p. 457.
- 1073 Khwāndamīr (1333/1954), vol. 3, p. 105; (1994), pp. 59–60.
- 1074 Ibid.
- 1075 Dabashi (1996), Chapter 13, in Farhad Daftary (ed.), (1996), p. 227.
- 1076 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 985 (n.d.), p. 22, tr. Thackston, p. 483.
- 1077 *Mukhtasaru'd-Duwal*, cited in Browne's *Literary History*, vol. 3, p. 18.
- 1078 Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, p. 451.
- 1079 See Bar Hebraeus (1919); Lane, (1999).
- 1080 Bar Hebraeus (1919), p. 60.
- 1081 Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, p. 452.
- 1082 Juwaynī (1997), p. 638 'the truth of God's secret intent by the rise of Chingiz Khan has become clear' (Qazvinī), p. 138.
- 1083 žasī, longer introduction to '*Zij-i-Ilkhani*' in Boyle (1977), chapter xxvii, p. 247.
- 1084 Browne's intro *Juwaynī's* . . . , p. xc; Persian intro., p. 123.
- 1085 Waḥīd Dāmghānī, intro., to žasī (1344/1965), p. 14.
- 1086 Vardan (1989), p. 221, para. 97.
- 1087 Mustawfī, *aafarnāmah*, 589B, tr. Ward, pp. 34–5.
- 1088 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 989 (n.d.), p. 25; (1999), p. 485; see also Āqsarāyī (1944), pp. 47–8.
- 1089 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 990–1 (n.d.), p. 27; (1999), pp. 485–6.
- 1090 žasī (1964), p. 24; (1344/1965), p. 18.
- 1091 Ibid.
- 1092 Ibid.

- 1093 Ibn Isfandiyār (1905), p. 259.
- 1094 Juwaynī (1937), p. 264, Boyle, p. 715.
- 1095 Mustawfī, *aafarnāmah*, 589B, tr. Ward, pp. 34–5.
- 1096 These two physicians were relatives of Rashīd al-Dīn who so prominently mentioned their presence with žasī presumably in order to exonerate his family’s association with the Ismailis.
- 1097 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 985; (n.d.), p. 22; (1999), p. 483.
- 1098 Āqsarāyī (1944), pp. 48–9.
- 1099 ‘Moḥammad ibn Moḥammad Naṣīr al-Dīn žasī’, in Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1996), p. 208.
- 1100 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, p. 209.
- 1101 al-Jārjarmī (1350/1971), vol. 2, pp. 834–5.
- 1102 See Seyyed Hossein Nasr on his scientific and mathematical achievements, pp. 208–14.
- 1103 See ‘Nasir al-Dīn žasī on Finance’, in Minorsky (1964), pp. 64–85.
- 1104 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1024 (n.d.), p. 57; (1997), pp. 501–2.
- 1105 Ibid
- 1106 Ibid.
- 1107 See Allsen (2001), pp. 162–5.
- 1108 See žasī’s, longer introduction to ‘*Zij-i-Ilkhani*’ in Boyle (1977).
- 1109 Daftary (1990), p. 409; Badakhchani (1998), intro., pp. 15–19.
- 1110 Minovi and Minorsky (1964).
- 1111 Wickens (tr.) intro., p. 9; cf. Levy (1923), pp. 63–5.
- 1112 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1007; (n.d.), p. 41; (1999), pp. 492–3; see also Āqsarāyī, p. 48.
- 1113 Waṣṣāf, p. 29; Āyatī, p. 16.

- 1114 Waṣṣāf, p. 43; Āyatī, p. 23.
- 1115 Waṣṣāf, p. 43; Āyatī, p. 24, from a letter to the Mamluks penned by ḡasī.
- 1116 Khwāndamīr (1333/1954), vol. 3, p. 106; (1994), p. 61.
- 1117 Waṣṣāf, p. 29; Āyatī, pp. 15–16.
- 1118 It was he who had also revealed ḡasī's link with the caliph.
- 1119 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1019–20.
- 1120 Cited in Boyle (1968), p. 539.
- 1121 The words of Alī ibn Abī ḡālīb according to Waṣṣāf, p. 36; Āyatī, p. 28; see Spuler (1972a), p. 117.
- 1122 Cited in Dabashi (1996); Daftary (ed.), (1966), p. 234. From Al-ḡasī, *Sharḥ al-ishārāt*, Qumm (1404/1983), vol. 2, p. 145.
- 1123 See Daftary (1990), pp. 410–11.
- 1124 Badakhchani, p. 24 and text p. 1.
- 1125 Ibid., p. 29 and text p. 5.
- 1126 Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 343.
- 1127 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 983; (n.d.), p. 20; (1994), p. 482.
- 1128 *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, pp. 39–41.
- 1129 Dabashi, p. 226.
- 1130 Bar Hebraeus (1919).
- 1131 ḡasī (1964), pp. 24 and 18.

8 POETS, SUFIS AND QALANDARS

- 1132 For a full picture of the *Qalandars*, see Ahmet Karamustafa (1994).

- 1133 See Waṣṣāf, p. 52; Āyatī, p. 29; see also Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 341, strangely Ibn al-Fuwatī appears to make a reference to Tasī's suicide! This in fact is a misreading of the word 'complete' *intajaz*, for 'suicide' *intaḥar*.
- 1134 On Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī's lack of patronage of building other than in Sivas and Georgia, see Rogers (1972), p. 273.
- 1135 See Meisami (1987), p. 272.
- 1136 *Qalandar* antinomian Sufis 'I am that drunk whom they call a 'Qalandar'; I have no home, no family, no shelter. My days I spend circling your place; At night I put my head upon the tiles.' Attributed to Bābā ḡāhir and cited in de Bruijn (1997), p. 15; see also pp. 71–6.
- 1137 Lewisohn (1995), p. 55.
- 1138 Browne, *Literary History of Persia*, vol. 3, p. ix.
- 1139 Ibid., pp. 15 and 17.
- 1140 Morgan (1988a), p. 82.
- 1141 'Persian Historians and the Mongols', in Morgan (1982), p. 110.
- 1142 Hodgson (1997), vol. 2, pp. 484–93.
- 1143 Meisami (1987), pp. 272–3, n. 48.
- 1144 Spuler (1994), p. 25.
- 1145 Barthold, *Mussulman Culture*, tr. from the Russian by Shāhid Suhrawardy, Calcutta, 1934, pp. 112. Cited in 'The Mongols, the Turks, and the Muslim Polity', in Lewis, B. (1993), p. 190.
- 1146 Lewis, B. (1993), p. 196.
- 1147 Seyyed Hossein Nasr in the preface to 'Irāqī (1982), p. ix.
- 1148 Iqbāl (2536/1977), p. 479.
- 1149 Juwaynī, Jalāl al-Dīn Ramī, and Par-e Bahā' are only the most obvious examples.
- 1150 Effective ruler of the Saljuq Sultanate of Rum from 1256–77.
- 1151 Ramī (1993a), p. 23; (1362/1983), p. 11.

- 1152 Ramī (1993a), p. 17; (1362/1983), p. 5.
- 1153 Lewisohn (1995), p. 56.
- 1154 Dāya (1982), pp. 1–2.
- 1155 Arberry (1967), *Aspects of Islamic Civilisation*, Ann Arbor, p. 16.
- 1156 Ridgeon (1997), p. 5.
- 1157 Alī Rajāʾī Bukhārāʾī (1364/1985), *Farhang-i ashʿār-i Ḥāfīz*, 2nd edn, Tehran, pp. 454–5, cited in Lewisohn (1995), p. 57.
- 1158 See Ernst (1996).
- 1159 Seyf al-Dīn Bākharzī has been associated with Berke’s conversion and the son of Sa’d al-Dīn Hamaya with Ghazan’s.
- 1160 See Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 2, pp. 509–11 on the dating of his death.
- 1161 Ṣādiq Gauharīn (ed.), (1348/1969), *Mantiq al-tayr*, 2nd edn.
- 1162 Awfī (1903), vol. I, intro., p. 7.
- 1163 Hodgson (1977), vol. 2, p. 202.
- 1164 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 516; see also Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 2, pp. 491–4.
- 1165 Khwāndamīr (1954), III, pp. 36–7; (1994), p. 21.
- 1166 See Iqbāl (2536/1977), pp. 499–500.
- 1167 Hamid Algar (tr. and intr.) in Dayā (1982), pp. 8, 43, 261, 454; (1370/1991), pp. 42, 140, 239; (1352/1973), pp. 20, 258, 492.
- 1168 Dayā (1370/1991), p. 41; (1973), p. 19; (1982), p. 39.
- 1169 Dayā (1370/1991), p. 42; (1973); p. 19; (1982), p. 42.
- 1170 Sa’dī Shīrāzī (1371/1992), chap. 1, story 16, p. 44, cited in Dayā (1982), p. 42.
- 1171 Dayā (1370/1991), pp. 40–3; (1973), pp. 16–20; Dayā (1982), pp. 39–43.
- 1172 Najm al-Dīn Rāzī, *Marmazāt-e Asadī dar mazmarāt-e Dāʾadī*, p. 5;

Dayā (1982), pp. 39–43.

1173 For a detailed account of this period and the likely chronology of events, see Ramī (1375/1996), intro., pp. 23–9.

1174 Ramī (1375/1996), p. 409; Ramī (1993a), p. 181.

1175 al-Aflākī Ārifī (1959–61), story 53, pp. 49–52; Redhouse (1976), story 5, pp. 5–6.

1176 See, Ramī (1990 and 1996), vol. iv, pp. 351–2, lines 1439–43, vol viii, commentary, pp. 161–2, text; (1375/1996), vol. 4, p. 363.

1177 Nicholson, vol. ii, p. 343, line 2358, commentary, vol. vii, p. 235, text, vol. ii, p. 377.

1178 Ramī (1362/1983), p. 240.

1179 al-Aflākī Ārifī (1959); selected tr. in intro., Ramī (1881); Redhouse (1976).

1180 Ramī (1362/1983), p. 5.

1181 Ibid., p. 240.

1182 Ibid., p. 11, Ramī (1993a), p. 23.

1183 Ramī (1362/1983), pp. 64–5; (1993a), pp. 75–6.

1184 Ramī (1881), intro., p. 32; al-Aflākī Ārifī (1959), pp. 94–5.

1185 See Lewis, F. (2000), pp. 275–85.

1186 See Aubin (1995), p. 23 on Suqunjaq.

1187 Juwaynī (1912), vol. I, p. 4; tr. Boyle, p. 7.

1188 See Abbās Iqbāl, Parvīz Aṭābekī (1342/1963), (ed.), *Kulliyāt-e ‘Ubayd Zākānī*, Baniyad Nashr-e Ketāb, Tehran.

1189 See Minorsky (1964); Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 3, pp. 111–15; Abbās Iqbāl (2536/1977), p. 536; Dawlatshāh (1901), pp. 136–8; Sayfī (1944), pp. 345–6; *Encyclopedia of Islam*.

1190 Minorsky (1964), pp. 298, 299–305.

1191 Minorsky, *Iranica*, ‘Pūr-i Bahā’ and his Poems’, pp. 299–305

[lines 36 and 41].

1192 See 'Pūr-i Bahā' and his Poems', in Minorsky (1964), p. 294.

1193 Browne (tr.) *Literary History*, vol. 3, p. 115; al-Khwāfi (1341/1962), p. 340.

1194 See 'Pūr-i Bahā' and his Poems', in Minorsky (1964).

1195 Waṣṣāf, p. 109; Āyatī, p. 67. After his execution, Majd al-Mulk was torn limb from limb and the parts of his body sent to various parts of the kingdom for public display and auction.

1196 Dawlatshāh (1959), pp. 137.

1197 See Martinez (1987–91), pp. 130–52.

1198 Minovi and Minorsky (1964).

1199 Browne, E. G., *Literary History*, vol. 3, p. 114.

1200 Pūr-i Bahā' (1339), pp. 5–22.

1201 See Minorsky (1964), pp. 299–305.

1202 Ibid., pp. 299 and 303 [4].

1203 Ibid., pp. 301 and 304 [22].

1204 Ibid., pp. 301 and 305 [34].

1205 Ibid., p. 277.

1206 Ibid., pp. 277–9 and 287–91.

1207 Ibid., p. 297.

1208 al-Jājarmī (1350/1971), vol. 2, pp. 897 and 902.

1209 On 'Irāqī, see 'Irāqī (1372/1993); (1939); (1982); Dawlatshāh, pp. 161–3; Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 3, pp. 124–39.

1210 Text, see 'Irāqī (1939), pp. 6–7, tr. pp. xiii–xiv.

1211 See 'Irāqī (1372/1993), intro., pp. 2–3.

1212 Text, see 'Irāqī (1939), p. 11, tr. p. xvii.

1213 For an edited tr. of the correspondence between ‘Irāqī and Sa‘dr al-Dīn Qunawī, see ‘Irāqī (1982), pp. 46–9.

1214 See ‘Irāqī (1939); (1982).

1215 Text, see ‘Irāqī (1939), p. 19, tr. p. xix.

1216 Hetoum (1988), p. 46.

1217 ‘Irāqī (1939), pp. 20–1; (1982), pp. 58–9.

1218 Great sage, supposedly the wazir of Solomon.

1219 ‘Irāqī (1372/1993), intro., p. 25 n. 47, p. 384.

1220 al-Khwāfi, *Mojmal al-Tavārikh*, vol. 3, p. 22, where it is claimed the poet was 116 on his death! See also Humām-i Tabrizī (1972), intro., pp. 35–7.

1221 Humām-i Tabrizī (1972), intro., pp. 47 and 73.

1222 Ibn al-Karbalā’ī (1965), vol. I, p. 106.

1223 Dawlatshāh, p. 153; Humām-i Tabrizī (1972), intro., p. 66; (1333/1954), p. 4.

1224 Mustawfī Qazvinī (1362/1983), p. 756; (October 1900 and January 1901), poet no. 84.

1225 Dawlatshāh p. 164.

1226 Humām-i Tabrizī (1972), intro., pp. 72–7.

1227 For full text of this letter see Waṣṣāf, p. 141; Āyatī, p. 83; Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1158–9; Humām-i Tabrizī (1333/1954), p. 58; tr. E.G. Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 3, pp. 27–8.

1228 Humām-i Tabrizī (1972), intro., pp. 77–9; see Humām-i Tabrizī (1333/1954), pp. 11–12 and 62.

1229 Humām-i Tabrizī (1972) intro., pp. 69–72.

1230 On Ṣadr al-Dīn Hamaya, see Elias (1995), p. 43; Lewisohn (1995), pp. 126–8.

1231 Meisami (1991), p. 190.

- 1232 Lewisohn (1995), p. 106.
- 1233 Hodgson (1977), vol. 2, pp. 213–14.
- 1234 Shabistārī (1371/1992), p. 87; (1982), p. 109.
- 1235 Lewisohn (1995), p. 107.
- 1236 Dawlatshāh (1959), p. 167; see also Awḥadī Iṣfahānī, (1375/1996), intro.
- 1237 Dawlatshāh (1959), pp. 163–4; cf. Humām-i Tabrizī (1333/1954), p. 5.
- 1238 Yaḥyā Bākharzī d.1335, in his *Foṣuṣ al-ādāb* (tr. Muḥammad Isa Waley), ‘Yahya Bākharzī on Service in the Khānqāh’, *SUFI; A Journal of Sufism*, Issue 20, 1993, p. 12.
- 1239 See Lewis, F. (2000), pp. 309–13.
- 1240 Ibn Battuta (1983), p. 89.
- 1241 Ibid., p. 91.
- 1242 Hodgson (1977), vol. 2, p. 218.
- 1243 Mustawfī Qazvīnī (1362/1983), pp. 670–8.
- 1244 Lewisohn (1995), p. 115.
- 1245 al-Aflākī Ārifī (1959), pp. 188–90.
- 1246 Ramī (1996a), vol. 6, lines 3856–9.
- 1247 Ibid., vol. 2, lines 514–84; see also Lewis, F. (2000), pp. 320–6.
- 1248 Ramī (1996a), vol. 2, line 534; Nicholson, vol. II, p. 249.
- 1249 Shabistārī (1371/1972), p. 100, line 976.
- 1250 Kāshānī (1946), p. 151; tr. and cited in Lewisohn, p. 117.
- 1251 Mustawfī Qazvīnī (1362/1983), p. 679.
- 1252 On Ibn Bazzāz, see Roger Savory, ‘Ebn Bazzāz’, *Encyclopedia Iranica*; Ibn Bazzāz Ardib‘ilī (1376/1977), pp. 16–17; cf. Ibn al-Karbalā‘ī (1344/1965), vol. I, pp. 222–73.

1253 Ibn Bazzāz Ardib‘īlī (1376/1977), p. 898.

1254 Ibid., p. 941; cf. Intro. p. 7; the widespread claim that Rashīd al-Dīn financed the *Khanqāh* of Ardabil was based on the now discredited *Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn*; see Morton (1999), pp. 155–99.

1255 Ibn Bazzāz Ardib‘īlī (1376/1977), p. 899.

1256 Ibid.

1257 Ibid., p. 908.

1258 Ibid., p. 82.

1259 Pūr-i Bahā‘ (1960), pp. 11, 17. Ls. 106, 243–5.

1260 Ibn Bazzāz Ardib‘īlī (1376/1977), pp. 217–19. It is not clear who this person, Ḥassan Mangolī is or what his connection with ‘Abdulrahman might have been. He is mentioned in Stephannos Orbelian’s history (1864), p. 238 as a confidant of Aḥmad; mention of Ḥassan Mangolī can also be found in Rashīd al-Dīn (1994), pp. 1129–30.

1261 ‘Shaykh’ according to Orbelian’s history, p. 238.

1262 Bar Hebraeus, p. 474; see also Amitai (2001a), pp. 20–2.

1263 The following few paragraphs concerning *Qalandars* and hashish have appeared in a slightly edited version in Marks (2001), pp. 69–72.

1264 See Karamustafa, p. 21.

1265 Anon poet writing against hashish, quoted and translated in Franz Rosenthal (1971), p. 170.

1266 The date is disputed some saying 1155. See Rosenthal, p. 49.

1267 Ibid., p. 51.

1268 Ibid., p. 52.

1269 Ibid.

1270 Moḥammad al-Abbādī (ed.), *Lisān al-Dīn ibn al-Khatīb, Nufādat al-jirāb*, Cairo, 1968, intro., p. 20f; text, p. 183; cited Rosenthal, p. 55.

1271 al-Is‘irdī, tr. by Rosenthal, p. 165.

1272 Köprülü (1993), p. 12.

1273 For a contemporary picture of a Haydari *Qalandar*, see Pūr-i Bahāʾ (1339/ 1960), pp. 11–13, 17. See also Karamustafa, pp. 52–3, 57–8, 67–70.

1274 See Amitai (1999), pp. 38–9.

1275 Ibid., pp. 28–9.

1276 See Mazzaoui (1972), p. 41.

1277 Ibn al-Karbalāʾī (1344/1965), vol. I, pp. 116–17. On Karbalāʾī, see DeWeese, ‘Kubrawi Hagiographical Traditions’, Lewisohn (1992), pp. 133–6.

1278 This is a generalisation and this view has been criticised. See Holbrook, ‘The Diffusion of Rumi’s Order’, *The Legacy of Medieval Sufism*, ed. L. Lewisohn (1992), p. 107.

1279 On Shams al-Dīn Tabrizī, see Lewis, F. (2000), pp. 134–202; Tabrizī (1990).

1280 This view is convincingly challenged in Lewis, F. (2000).

1281 Sultān Valad (1316/1937), p. 71.

1282 al-Aflākī Ārifī, pp. 625–6 (18/4).

1283 Tabrizī (1999), p. 10.

1284 al-Aflākī Ārifī, p. 412 (355/3).

1285 Ramī (1996a), Book I, lines 259–64.

1286 al-Aflākī Ārifī, vol. 1, p. 468 (440/3), p. 215 (123/3).

1287 Sultān Valad (1338/1959), pp. 488–9.

1288 Köprülü (1992a), pp. 58–60.

1289 Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 343.

1290 *Kulayāt Ubayd Zākānī*, pp. 172–3.

1291 Ibn al-Karbalāʾī, vol. I, p. 296.

1292 Ibid., p. 297.

- 1293 Ibid., p. 296.
- 1294 Ibn al-Karbalā'ī, vol. II, p. 10.
- 1295 On Kujujānī, see Lewisohn (1995), pp. 128–34; Ibn al-Karbalā'ī, vol. II, pp. 9–38.
- 1296 Ibn al-Karbalā'ī, vol. II, p. 418.
- 1297 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1253.
- 1298 Correspondence between the two is reproduced in Ibn al-Karbalā'ī, vol. I, pp. 146–54.
- 1299 Two dates are given for his death: Ibn al-Karbalā'ī, vol. I, p. 155; al-Khwāfī, pp. 379–80.
- 1300 See Amitai (1999), pp. 35, 37.
- 1301 Ibid., p. 32.
- 1302 On Simnānī, see Khwāndamīr, III, p. 220, tr. Thackston, p. 125; Elias (1995); Ibn al-Karbalā'ī, vols. I and II.
- 1303 Morgan (1988a), p. 69.
- 1304 Elias (1995), pp. 15–22; al-Khwāfī, II, p. 358.
- 1305 Sa'dī (1964), p. 61; (1363/1984), p. 104.
- 1306 *Tārīkh-i Ruyān*, p.178; *Tārīkh-i Shaikh Uwais*, pp. 48–51, text, pp. 146–50.

9 RETURN OF A KING

- 1307 Mustawfī, *aafarnāmah*, f. 585A (line 12), tr. p. 17.
- 1308 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1049.
- 1309 For a description and explanation of this 'church', see Bowman and Thomson, (1966), pp. 35–61. For an alternative view as to the nature of these caves, see Ball (1976), pp. 103–63; 'The Imamzadeh Ma'sum at Vardjovi. A rock-cut Il-Khanid complex near Maragheh', *Archaeologische Mitteilungen aus Iran*, 12 (1979), pp. 329–40.

- 1310 *Chronicum Ecclesiasticum*, III, p. 443; cited in H. Teule's introduction to Bar Hebraeus (1993), p. xi, n.12.
- 1311 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1048.
- 1312 See Ayalon's criticism of Juwaynī, in 'The Great 'Yāsa' of Chingiz Khan', *Studia Islamica* xxxiii (1971), p. 133.
- 1313 Mustawfī, *aafarnāmah*, f. 583A, p. 3.
- 1314 Ibid., f. 589B, p. 34.
- 1315 Ibid., f. 595A, p. 59.
- 1316 Ibid., f. 645A, p. 263.
- 1317 Ibid., f. 647B, p. 274.
- 1318 Ibid., f. 664B-665A, pp. 348–50.
- 1319 Ibid., f. 736B, p. 671.
- 1320 Ibid., f. 737A, p. 672.
- 1321 Rashīd al-Dīn, text, p. 1489; tr. Thackston, p. 736.
- 1322 al-Ḥosseini (1362/1983), p. 908.
- 1323 Āyatī, p. 109; Waṣṣāf, p. 186; *Tārīkh-i Shāhī*, p. 165.
- 1324 See Michael Rogers, MS, 'Patronage in Saljuk Anatolia, 1200–1300', Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford, 1972, p. 223; see also special reference to wife and son, Atabeg Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1159.
- 1325 Kirakos, p. 327, g391.
- 1326 Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1049.
- 1327 Waṣṣāf, pp. 193–4; Āyatī, pp. 112–13.
- 1328 See Allsen (1997).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note: Dates in square brackets refer to the original date of publication.
Dates of 2500 + refer to the Shāhī calendar used briefly in Iran post-1975.

Abdel-Latif, Ḥassan Maḥmad, 'Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tasī and his Tajrīd al-Itiqād', Ph.D. thesis, SOAS, London, 1977

Abdul Hakim, Khalifa, *The Metaphysics of Ramī*, The Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1965

al-Fidā, Sultan of Ḥamāh (tr. intro., P. M. Holt), *The Memoirs of a Syrian Prince*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1983 Ab

Adams, Robert, *Land Behind Baghdad*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1965 al-Aflākī Ārifī, Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad, *Manāqib al-ārafīn*, vols I, II, Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Ankara, 1959

Afshār, Īraj (ed.) *Tārīkh-e Yazd*, Persian Text Series, BTNK, Tehran, 1965 [1343]

Aghilī, Sayf al-Dīn Hājī bin NeOām Ās-ār *al-Vazarā'*, Inteshārāt Dāneshgāh-ye Tehrān, Tehran, 1958 [1337]

Aḥmad ibn Husein Kāteb (ed. Īraj Afshār) *Tārīkh-e Jadīd-e Yazd*, Publications de Farhang-e Īrān Zamīn, Tehran, 1966 [1345], 1978 [2537]

Allen, W. E. D., *A History of the Georgian People*, Kegan Paul, London, 1932

Allsen, Thomas, 'Guard and Government in the Reign of the Grand Qan Mongke 1251–59', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 46, issue 2 (December), pp. 495–521, 1986

— *Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Mongke 1251–1259*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1987

— 'Mongols and North Caucasia', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 7,

- ‘Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners 1200–1260’, *Asia Major*, 3rd series, vol. II, part 2, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989
- ‘Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran’, in G. Seamans and Daniel Marks, *Rulers From the Steppe: State Formation on the Euroasian Periphery*, Ethnographic Press, Los Angeles, 1991
- *Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire. A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997
- *Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001

Amitai, *see* Amitai-Preiss

- Amitai-Preiss, Reuven, ‘Northern Syria between the Mongols and Mamluks’, in D. Power and N. Standen (eds), *Frontiers in Question. Eurasian Borderlands, 700–1700*, pp. 128–52, Macmillan, London, 1991
- ‘The Mongols and Karak in Trans-Jordan’, *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 8, pp. 5–10, 1992–4
- ‘An exchange of letters in Arabic between Abaqa Ilkhan and Sultan Baybars (667/1268–9)’, *Central Asiatic Journal*, 38, 1, 1994
- *Mongols and Mamluks. The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War 1260–1281*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995
- ‘Ghazan, Islam and Mongol Tradition: A View from the Mamluk Sultanate’, *BSOAS*, vol. LIX, 1996a
- ‘Review: The Fall and Rise of the Abbāsīd Caliphate’, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 116, 3, pp. 487–94, 1996b
- ‘Sufis and Shamans: Some Remarks on the Islamisation of the Mongols in the Il-Khanate’, *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. XVII, Part I, pp. 27–47, 1999
- ‘The Conversion of Tegüder Ilkhan to Islam’, *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, 25, pp. 15–43, 2001a
- ‘Al-Nuwayrī as a Historian of the Mongols’, in Hugh Kennedy (ed.), *The Historiography of Islamic Egypt (c. 950–1800)*, pp. 23–36, Brill,

Leiden, 2001b Iq t

- ‘Turco-Mongolian Nomads and the Iqtā’ System in the Islamic Middle East (ca. 1000–1400 AD)’, in Anatoly Khazanov and Andre Wink (eds), *Nomads in the Sedentary World*, pp. 152–71, Curzon Press, Richmond, 2001c
- and Morgan, David (eds), *The Mongol Empire and Its Legacy*, Brill, Leiden, 1999
- and Amitai-Preiss, Nitzan, ‘Two Notes on the Protocol on Hülegü’s Coinage’, *Israel Numismatic Journal*, 10, 1988–89
- Aq’ili, Sayf al-Dīn Ḥājī bin NiOām, *Āthār al-Vazarā*’, Entashâ rât Dâneshgâh, Tehran, 1958 [1337]
- Āqsarāyī, al-Karīm (ed. O. Turan), *Musāmarat al-Akhbār Tārīkh-i Salājuqeh*, Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Ankara, 1944
- Arberry, A. J., *Classical Persian Literature*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1958
- *Shiraz: Persian City of Saints and Poets*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 1960
- Ashtor, E., *Histoire des prix et des salaries dans l’Orient medieval*, SEVPPEN, Paris, 1969
- *A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages*, Collins, London, 1976
- Attār, Farīd al-Dīn (ed. Ṣādiq Gauharīn), *Mantiq al-ḡayr*, 2nd edn, Tehran, 1969 [1348]
- (tr. C. S. Nott), *The Conference of the Birds (Mantiq al-ḡayr)*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974
- *Tadhkirat al-Auliā*’, Ketābkhāneh ye-Javar, Tehran, 1976 [2535]
- (tr. A. J. Arberry), *Muslims, Saints and Mystics: Episodes from the Tadhkiratal-Auliā*’, Penguin, Arkana, 1990 Aubin, Jean, ‘L’Ethnogenese des Qaraunas’, *Turcica*, Vol. 1, 1969
- *Emirs, Mongols et Vizirs Persans dans Les Remous de L’Acculturation*, Studia Iranica Cahier 15, Association pour l’avancement des etudes Iraniennes, 1995

- Awfi, Mohammed (ed. Edward Browne), *Lubāb' l-Albāb*, vol. I (1–7), vol. II (8–12), Luzac, London, Brill, Leiden, 1903, 1906
- ḥadī (Iṣfahānī) Marāghī (ed. Saīd Nafisī) *Kulliyāt-e Awḥadī Iṣfahānī maraf be Marāghī*, Inteshārāt Amīr Kabīr, Tehran, 1996 [1375] Aw
- ḥdī Kirmānī, Abu Ḥamid Aḥmad (ed. Bernd Manuel Weischer, tr. Peter Lamborn Wilson and Bernd Manuel Weischer), *Heart's Witness: The Sufi Quatrains of Awhaduddin Kirmani*, Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, Tehran, 1978 Aw
- Awliya Allah Āmulī (ed. Manachehr Setadeh), *Tārikh-i Rayān*, Inteshārāt-i Baniyād-i Farhang, Tehran, 1969 [1348]
- Ayalon, David, *Outsiders in the Lands of Islam: Mamluks, Mongols and Eunuchs*, Variorum Reprints, Aldershot, 1988
- *Islam the Abode of War*, Variorum Reprints, Aldershot, 1994
- Āyatī, Abdul Moḥammad (ed.), *Taḥrīr-e Tārikh-e Waṣṣāf* (abridged), Ministry of Culture and Education, Tehran, 1967 [1346], 1993 [1372]
- Badakhshani, S. J. (tr. and ed.) *Naṣīr al-Dīn ḡasī's Contemplation and Action: The Spiritual Autobiography of a Muslim Scholar*, I. B. Taurus with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, London, 1998
- Ball, Warwick, 'Two Aspects of Iranian Buddhism', *Bulletin of the Asia Institute of Pahlavi University*, nos. 1–4, 1976
- 'The Imamzadeh Masum at Vardjovi', *Archaeologische Mitteilungen Aus Iran*, Tehran, Band 12, 1979
- Banākatī, Dāvud (ed. Jafar Sheār), *Tārikh-e-Banākatī*, the Society of National Monuments, Tehran, 1969
- Bar Hebraeus, Gregorius (tr. A. J. Wensinck), *Book of the Dove and Ethikon*, Brill, Leiden, 1919
- (tr. Ernest A. Wallis Budge) *The Chronography of Gregory Abu'l-Faraj Bar Hebraeus, Political History of the World*, Part I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1932
- (tr. E. A. Wallis Budge), *The Chronography of Gregory Abu'l-Faraj BarHebraeus*, APA – Philo Press, Amsterdam, 1976a
- (tr. E. A. Wallis Budge) *The Laughable Stories*, AMS Press, New York;

- reprint of Luzac, London, 1976b [1897]
- (tr. Herman Teule), *Ethicon (Memra I)*, Peeters, Leuven, 1993
- Barthold, V. V., *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, 4 vols, Brill, Leiden, 1958
- (tr. V. and T. Minorsky), *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, Luzac, London, 1968
- Bedrosian, Robert, *The Turco-Mongol Invasions and the Lords of Armenia in the 13th–14th Centuries*, Sources of the Armenian Tradition, Long Branch, New Jersey, <http://rbedrosian.com/hsrces.html>, 1979
- (tr.) *The Georgian Chronicles. Juansher's Concise History of the Georgians*, Sources of the Armenian Tradition, Long Branch, New Jersey <http://rbedrosian.com/hsrces.html> 1986
- Biran, Michal, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia*, Curzon Press, Richmond, 1997
- *A Fight between the Mongols: The Battle of Herat (1270)*, Institute of Advanced Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Spring 2000
- “‘Like a mighty wall’: the armies of the Qara Khitai”, *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, 25, 2001
- Birge, John Kingsley, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*, Luzac Oriental, London, 1994
- Blair, Sheila S., *The Ilkhanid Shrine Complex at Natanz, Iran*, Harvard Middle East Papers, Classical Series no. 1, Cambridge, Mass., 1986
- Bloch, E. (tr. Cicely M. Binyon), *Musulman Painting XII–XVII Century*, Methuen, London, 1929
- Boase, T. S. R. (ed.), *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia*, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1978
- Bosworth, C. E., *The Islamic Dynasties*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1967
- (ed.), *Iran and Islam*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1971
- *The Medieval History of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia*, Variorum Reprints, London, 1977

- *The New Islamic Dynasties*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1996
- Bowman, John and Thomson, J. A., 'The Monastery-Church of Bar Hebraeus at Maragheh in West Azerbaijan', *Abr-Nahrain*, vol. V, 1964–5, Dept of Semitic Studies, University of Melbourne, Brill, Leiden, 1966
- Boyle, J. A. (intro. and tr.), 'The Death of the Last 'Abbasid Caliph. A Contemporary Muslim Account', *Journal of Semitic Studies*, VI, Manchester, pp. 145–61, 1961
- (intro. and tr.), 'The Longer Introduction to the *Zij al-Ilkhānī* of Naṣīr-ad- Din ḡasī ', *Journal of Semitic Studies*, VIII, Manchester, 1963
- *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. V, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968
- 'The Il-Khans of Persia and the Princes of Europe', *Central Asiatic Journal*, vol. XX, 1976
- *The Mongol World Empire 1206–1370*, Variorum Reprints, Aldershot, 1977
- (ed.), *Persia. History and Heritage*, The British Institute of Persian Studies, Henry Helland, London, 1978
- Brand, Charles M., 'The Turkish Element in Byzantium, 11–12th Centuries', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, no. 43, 1989
- Bretschneider, E., *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources*, vols I, II, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967 [1910]
- Brook, Kevin Allen, *The Jews of Khazaria*, Jason Aronson, Northvale, New Jersey, 1999
- Brosset, Marie (tr.), *Histoire de la Georgie [The Georgian Chronicle]*, St Petersburg 1849–58, reprinted 1969 d ī ,
- Browne, Edward G., *A Literary History of Persia. From Firdawsi to Sa'dī*, vol. 2, T. Fisher Unwin, London 1915 [1906]
- *Persian Literature under Tartar Domination 1265–1502*, vol. 3, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1920 de Bruijn, J. T. P., *Persian Sufi Poetry: An Introduction to the Mystical Use of Classical*

- Poems*, Curzon Press, Richmond, 1997
- Burman, Edward, *The Assassins: Holy Killers of Islam*, Crucible, London, 1987
- Cahen, Claude (tr. J. Jones-Williams), *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1968
- (tr. and ed. P. M. Holt), *The Formation of Turkey*, Longman, London, 2001
- Carpini, Giovanni DiPlano (tr. Erik Hildinger), *The Story of the Mongols Whom We Call the Tartars: Historia Mongalorum*, Branden Publishing, Boston, 1996
- Chambers, James, *The Devil's Horsemen*, Book Club Associates, London, 1979
- Chaudhuri, K. N., *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean. An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985
- Ch'en Yüan (tr. and annotated by Ch'ien Hsing-hai), *Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols*, Monumenta Serica Monograph XV, University of California, Los Angeles, 1966
- Chittick, William C., *Faith and Practice of Islam*, Suny series in Islam, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1992
- Ciggaar, K., Davids, A. and Teule, H. (eds), *East and West in the Crusader States*, Peeters, Leuven, 1996
- Cleaves, Francis Woodman, 'The Expression Dur-a Qocarulcaju in the Letter of Oljeitu to Phillippe le Bel', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 11, issue 3/4 (December), pp. 441–55, 1948
- 'The Mongolia Names and Terms in the Nation of the Archers by Grigor of Akanc', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 12, issue 23/4 (December), 1949
- 'The Mongolian Documents in the Musée de Téhéran', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 16, 1953
- 'Aqa Minu', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 24, 1962–3
- and Mostaert, Antoine, 'Trois Documents Mongols des Archives Secrètes Vaticanes', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 15, 1952

- Conrad, L., 'On the Arabic Chronicle of Bar Hebraeus: His Aims and Audience', Papers read at the IVth Conference on Christian Arabic Studies, Cambridge, September 1992, published in *Parole de l'Orient*, vol. XIX, Université Saint Esprit, Kaslik, Lebanon, 1994
- Cowe, S. Peter, 'A Hitherto Unrecognized Chronicle to the Year AD 1272', *Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies*, vol. 3, 1987
- Dabashi, Hamid, 'The Philosopher/Vizier: Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Taṣī and the Ismā'īlīs', in F. Daftary (ed.), *Mediaeval Ismā'īli History and Thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996
- Daftary, Farhad, *Mediaeval Ismā'īli History and Thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1966
- *The Ismā'īlīs: Their History and Doctrines*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990
- 'Persian Historiography of the Early Nizārī Ismā'īlīs', *Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies*, vol. XXX, London, 1992
- *The Assassin Legends: The Myths of the Ismā'īlīs*, I. B. Taurus, London, 1994
- Dāneshvarī, Abbās, *Medieval Tomb Towers of Iran*, Mazda Publishers, Lexington, Kentucky, 1986
- Dasxuranci, Movses (tr. C. J. F. Dowsett), *The History of the Caucasian Albanians by Movses Dasxuranci*, London Oriental Series, no. 8, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961
- Dawlatshāh bin Alā al-Dawla Bakhtīshāh al-Ghāzī al-Samarqandī (ed. E.G. Browne), *Tadhkirat al-Sharā'*, Brill & Luzac, London, 1901
- (ed. Moḥammad Ramaḡānī), *Ta.kirat al-Sharā'*, Chāpkhāneh-ye Khāvar, Tehran, 1959 [1338]
- Dawson, Christopher (ed.), *The Mongol Mission, translated by a Nun of Stanbrook Abbey*, Sheed & Ward, London and New York, 1955
- Dayā, Najm al-Dīn Rāzī (ed. Ḥusein Ḥuseinī al-Nimatallāhī), *Merṣād al-ibād min al-mabda' ilā 'l-maād*, Enteshārāt-i as, Tehran, 1933 [1312]
- (tr. Hamid Algar), *The Path of God's Bondsmen from Origin to Return*, Caravan Books, New York, 1982

- (ed. Moḥammad Amīn Rīāhī), *Guzīda-e Merṣād al-ibād*, Enteshārāt-i as, Tehran, 1991 [1370]
- DeWeese, Devin, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde*, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1994
- Doerfer, Gerhard, *Türkische und Mongolische elemente im NeuPersischen*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1963
- Edbury, Peter W. (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement*, University College Cardiff Press, Cardiff, 1985
- *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191–1374*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991
- Elias, Jamal J., *The Throne Carrier of God: The Life and Thought of Alā 'ad-Dawla as-Simnānī*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995
- Endicott-West, Elizabeth, 'Imperial Governance in Yüan Times', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 46, no. 2 (December), pp. 523–49, 1986
- Ernst, Carl W., *Razbihān Baqlī*, Sufi Series, Curzon Press, London, 1996
- Eslami, Kambiz (ed.), *Iran and Iranian Studies: Essays in Honour of Iraj Afshar*, Zagros Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1998
- Farhādi, A. G. Ravān, *Abdullāh Anṣārī of Herāt*, Sufi Series, Curzon Press, London, 1996
- Fiey, J. M., *Chrétiens Syriaques sous Les Mongols*, Louvain, Secretariat Du Corpus SCO, Waversebaan, 49, 1975a
- 'Iconographie Syriaque Hülegü, Dokuz Khatun . . . et Six Ambons', *Le Museon*, vol. 88, pp. 59–64, 1975b
- Fischel, Walter J., *Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Mediaeval Islam*, Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1937
- Fletcher, Joseph, 'The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 11–50, 1986
- Galstyan, A. G. (tr. R. Bedrosian), 'The Conquest of Armenia by the Mongol Armies', *The Armenian Review*, vol. 27, nos. 4–108 (April), 1975

— ‘The First Armeno-Mongol Negotiations’, *The Armenian Review*, vol. 29, nos. 1–113 (Spring), 1976

Gibb, H. A. R., Kramer, J. H., Schacht, J. and Levi-Provençal, F. (eds), *The Encyclo-paedia of Islam New Edition*, Luzac, London, and Brill, Leiden, 1960 Gilbert, Martin, *The Dent Atlas of Jewish History*, J. M. Dent, London, 1993 Godard, Andre, ‘Notes Complimentaires sur les Tombeaux de Maragheh’, *Athar-e Iran*, vol. 1, 1936

Golden, Peter B., *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1992

Grigor of Akanc’ (ed. and tr. Robert P. Blake and Richard N. Frye), ‘History of the Nation of Archers’, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 12, pp. 269–399, 1949

Grousset, Rene (tr. Naomi Walford), *The Empire of the Steppes*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1991 [1970]

Gumilev, L. N., *Searches for an Imaginary Kingdom. The Legend of the Kingdom of Prester John*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987

Guzman, Gregory G., ‘Simon of Saint-Quentin and the Dominican Mission to the Mongol Baiju: A Reappraisal’, *Speculum*, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 232–49 (April), 1971

— ‘The Encyclopedist Vincent of Beauvais and His Mongol Extracts from John of Plano Carpini and Simon of Saint-Quentin’, *Speculum*, vol. 49, no. 2 (April), pp. 287–307, 1974

Ḥāfiẓ Abrū, Lutfallah (tr. K. Bayani), *Chronique des Rois Mongols en Iran*, Libraire D’Amerique et D’Orient, Adrien-Maisonneuve, Paris, 1936

— *Ḥail Jāmi al-Tawārīkh-i Rashīdi*, Sherkat Taxamani Elmi Tehran, 1938 [1317]

— (ed. Felix Tauer), *Panj risalah-i tarikhi dar barah-i ḥavadiṣ-i dawran-i Amrīr Timur-i Gurgan – Cinq opuscules de ḤafiO-i Abru concernant l’histoire de l’Iran au temps de Tammerlan/édition critique de Felix Tauer*, Éditions de l’Academie Tchecoslovaque des Sciences, Prague, 1959

— (tr. Dorothea Krawulsky), *Tarih-e Ḥāfiẓ-e Abrū*, L. Reichert, Wiesbaden, 1982

- *Zubdat al-Tawārikh*, Nashr-i Nay Tehran, 1993 [1372]
- (ed. Šādeq Ajjādī), *Joghrafiyā-ye Ḥāfiẓ Abrū*, Bonyan, Tehran, 1997
- Hairapetian, Srbouhi, *A History of Armenian Literature*, Caravan Books, New York, 1995
- Halperin, Charles J., 'Russia in the Mongol Empire in Comparative Perspective', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 46, no. 2 (June), pp. 239–61, 1983
- 'The Kipchak Connection: The Ilkhans, the Mamluks and Ayn Jalut', *BSOAS*, vol. 63, part 2, 2000 de Hartog, Leo, *Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World*, I. B. Taurus, London, 1989
- *Russia and the Mongol Yoke: The History of the Russian Principalities and the Golden Horde, 1221–1502*, British Academic Press, I. B. Taurus, London and New York, 1996
- Heidemann, Stefan, *Das Aleppiner Kalifat (AD 1261): Vom Ende des Kalifates in Baghdad über Aleppo zu den Restaurationen in Kairo*, Islamic History and Civilisation, vol. 6, Brill, Leiden, 1994
- Hetoum (ed. Glenn Burger), *A Lytell Cronycle*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, London, 1988
- Heywood, Colin (tr.), 'Some Problems in the Numismatic Evidence for the Reigns of Nogay Khan and Chaka', Ulus Djuchi Conference, Kazan (22–26 June), 1998
- 'Filling the Black Hole: The Emergence of the Bithynian Atamanates', *Yeni Türkiye Dergisi*, Ankara, 1999
- Hillmann, Michael C., *Unity in the Ghazals of Ḥāfiẓ*, Bibliotheca Islamica, Minneapolis and Chicago, 1976
- Hitti, Philip K., *History of the Arabs*, Macmillan, London, 1986
- Hodgson, Marshall G. S., *The Order of the Assassins. The Struggle of the Early Nizārī Ismā'īlīs against the Islamic World*, Mouton, Gravenhage, The Hague, 1955
- *The Venture of Islam*, vols 1, 2, 3, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1977
- Al-Ḥosseinī, Majd al-Dīn Moḥammad, *Zinat al-Majālis*, Tehran, 1983 [1362]

- Houtsma, M., Wensinck, A., Gibb, H.A.R., Heffing, W. and Levi-Provençal, F., (eds), *The First Edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1913–36*, Brill, Leiden, 1987
- Howorth, Henry H., *History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century*, 4 vols, Burt Francis, New York, 1965
- Humphreys, R. Stephen, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1977
- Hutt, Antony and Harrow, Leonard, *Islamic Architecture: Iran 1* Scorpion Publications, London, 1977
- Ibn al-Arabī, Muhyiddīn (tr. Reynold A. Nicholson), *The Tarjumān al-Ashwāq: The Interpreter of Desires*, Theosophical Publishing House, London, 1978
- Ibn al-Furāt (tr. U. and M. C. Lyons, intro. J. S. C. Riley-Smith), *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders: Selections from Tāriḫ al-Duwal wa'l-Muluk*, W. Heffer, Cambridge, 1971
- Ibn al-Fuwatī, Kamāl al-Dīn, Abū 'l-Faẓl, *al-Ḥawādith al-Jāmi'a wa'l-Tajārib al-nāfi'a fi'l-mī'a al-sābi'a*, Carmel Press, Baghdad, 1932
- Ibn al-Karbalāi, Ḥāfeẓ Ḥoseyn, Karbalāi Tabrizi, *RauOāt al-Jenān va Jannāt al-Janān*, parts I and II, BTNK, Tehran, 1965 [1344], 1970 [1349]
- Ibn Battuta, *Travels in Asia and Africa 1325–1354*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1983
- (tr. H. A. R. Gibb), *The Travels of Ibn Battuta AD 1325–1354*, vols I, II, III, Munsharim, New Delhi, 1999
- Ibn Bazzāz Ardib'ili (ed. zabātabāi, Majd), *Safawat al-Safā*, Enteshārāt Zariyat, Tabriz, 1997 [1376] Ibn
- Ibn Bibī (ed. M. Houtsma), 'Saljaqnāmeḥ-ye Ibn Bibī', in M. Makhkour, *Akhbāre Salājuqeh-ye Ram*, Enteshārāt-i Ketābfarashi, Tehran, 1971
- Ibn Isfandiyār (tr. Edward G. Browne), *Ibn Isfandiyār's History of ḡabaristān*, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Trust, Brill, Leiden, 1905 Ibn
- (ed. Abbās Iqbāl), *Tāriḫ i-ḡabaristān Persian Text*, vols 1, 2, Tehran 1941 [1320]

- Ibn Yamīn (ed. and tr. E. H. Rodwell), *Ibn Yamīn*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, London, 1933
- Ibn Zarkab Shīrāzī (ed. Ismā'īl Wāi'ū Javādī), *Shīrāz-nāmeḥ*, Inteshārāt Baniād Farhang, Tehran, 1971 [1350]
- Ipsiroglu, M. S. (tr. E. D. Philips), *Painting and Culture of the Mongols*, Thames and Hudson, London, 1967
- Iqbal, Abbās, *Tārīkh-i Moghal*, Inteshārāt-i Emīr Kabir, Tehran, 1977 [2536]
- Iqbal, Afzal, *The Life and Work of Jalāl-ud-dīn Rumi*, The Octagon Press, London, 1983
- ‘Irāqī, Fakhr al-Dīn (tr. Arthur Arberry), *The Song of Lovers: 'Ushshāq-nāma*, Islamic Research Association no. 8, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1939
- (tr. William Chittick and Peter Lamborn), *Fakhruddin 'Iraqi Divine Flashes*, SPCK, London, 1982
- (ed. Nasrīn Moḥtesham Khazāī), *Mojmaeḥ Āṣār: Collected Works*, Inteshārāt Zovār, Tehran, 1993 [1372]
- Irwin, Robert, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages. The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250–1382*, Southern Illinois Press, Carbondale, Illinois, 1986
- *The Age of Calamity AD 1300–1400*, Time-Life Books, Amsterdam, 1989
- *Islamic Art*, Lawrence King, London, 1997
- Ishaque, M., *Four Eminent Poetesses of Iran*, Iran Society, Calcutta, 1950
- Jackson, Peter, ‘The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire’, *Central Asiatic Journal*, 32, 1978
- ‘Jalāl al-Dīn, the Mongols, and the Khwarazmian Conquest of the Panjāb and Sind’, *Iran: Journal of Persian Studies*, 1990a
- (tr. and ed. with David Morgan), *The Mission of William of Rubruck*, Hakluyt Society, London, 1990b
- ‘Hülegü and the Christians’, paper read at the Symposium on the

- Ilkhanate held at the Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford, 24 May 1997
- *The Delhi Sultanate*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999
- 'The State of Research: The Mongol Empire, 1986–1999', *Journal of Mediaeval History*, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 189–210, 2000
- al-Jājarmī, Muḥammad ibn Badr (ed. Mīr Šāliḥ ṣābiḥī), *Mhd Qazwīnī, Manis al-Ahrār fī daqā'iq al-ashār*, vols 1, 2, Tehran, 1958 [1337], 1971 [1350]
- Jürgen, Paul, 'Some Mongol Inshā Collections: The Juvaini Letters', *Proceedings of the Third European Conference of Iranian Studies* (ed. Charles Melville), Cambridge, 11–15 September 1995, part 2, *Mediaeval and Modern Persian Studies*, pp. 277–85, Wiesbaden, 1999
- Juwaynī, Aṭā Malik (ed. Moḥammad Qazwīnī), *Tārīkh-i-Jahān Gushā*, vols I, II, Leyden & Brill, Luzac, London, 1912
- (ed. Moḥammad Qazwīnī), *Tārīkh-Jahān Gushā*, vol. III, Leyden & Brill, Luzac, London, 1937
- (tr. John Andrew Boyle, intro. David Morgan), *The History of the World Conqueror*, 2 vols, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1997 [1958]
- al-Juwaynī, Muntajab al-Dīn (ed. A. Iqbāl), *Ketāb-e Atabat al-kataba*, Tehran, 1950
- Jūzjānī, Minhāj al-Dīn (ed. Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī), *Tabak.āt-i-Nāširi*, 2 vols, Donyāi Ketāb, Tehran, 1984 [1964]
- (tr. Major H. G. Raverty), *Tabaqāt-i Nāširi*, 2 vols, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1995
- Kai Kaus b. Iskandar (tr. Reuben Levy), *A Mirror for Princes. The Qabus Nama*, The Cresset Press, London, 1951
- Kaīkāvas b. Iskandar b. Qābas (ed. Gholām Ḥussein Yasefī), *Qābas-nāmeḥ*, Sherkat Enteshārāt Ilmī va Farangī, Tehran 1996 [1375]
- Karamustafa, Ahmet, *God's Unruly Friends*, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, 1994
- Kārang, Abdul Alī, *Abniyeh va Āsār Tārīkhī-e Marāgheh*, The Office for

- Culture and Crafts of East Azerbaijan, Tabriz 1971 [1350]
- Kāshānī, Izz al-Dīn Maḥmad (ed. J. Humāī), *Meṣbāḥ al-ḥidāya*, Tehran, 1946
- Kashani/Qāshānī, Abdul Qasem Ibn Ali Ibn Moḥammed (ed. Mahin Hambly), *Tārīkh-i Ūljāyta: The History of Ūljāyta*, Persian Texts Series, BTNK, Tehran, 1969
- (ed. Mhd. Taghī Dāneshpazhah), *Zobdat al-Tawārīkh Fatimids and Nizārīs Comp. 700AH*, Institute of Study & Cultural Research, Tehran, 1987 [1366]
- Khazanov, Anatoly M., *Nomads and the Outside World*, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1994 KhowaytRau .
- al-Khowayter, Abdul Aziz, ‘The English Translation of al-Rau. al-Zāhir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-aāhir’, Ph.D. thesis, SOAS, 1960
- al-Khwāfī, Faṣīḥī (ed. Maḥmad Farrukhī), *Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī. (A Compendium of History until 845 AH)*, 3 vols, Ketābforashī Bāstān, Tus, Mashhad, 1962 [1341] Khwāndamīr Ghiyath al-Dīn ibn Humām al-Dīn, *Dastar al-Vazarā'*, Chap Mahfooz, Khwāndamī Tehran, 1938 [1317]
- *Tārīkh-i Ḥabīb al-Siyar*, 4 vols, Ketābkhāneh Khayam, Khīābān-i Naṣīr Khosrow, Tehran, 1954 [1333]
- (tr. W. M. Thackston), *Habib's-Siyar*, vol. 3, *The Reign of the Mongol and the Turk Genghis Khan – Emīr Temur*, Dept. of Near Eastern Languages and Civilisations, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1994
- Kirakos Ganjaketsi (tr. Robert Bedrosian), *Kirakos Ganjaketsi's History of the Armenians*, Sources for the Armenian Tradition, New York, <http://rbedrosian.com/kg1.htm>1986 Kohlberg, Etan, *A Medieval Muslim Scholar at Work: Ibn Tawus and His Library*, Brill, Leiden, 1992
- Kolbas, Judith Grace, ‘Mongol Money: The Role of Tabriz from Chingiz Khan to Ūljāyta’, Ph.D., New York University, 1992
- Koprulu, Mehmed Fuad (tr. Gary Leise), *The Seljuks of Anatolia. Their History and Culture According to Local Muslim Sources*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 1992a

- *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1992b
- *Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion (Prolegomena)*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 1993
- Krader, Lawrence, *Peoples of Central Asia*, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1966
- Kramarovsky, Mark G., ‘The Culture of the Golden Horde and the Problem of the “Mongol Legacy”’, in G. Seamans and Daniel Marks (eds), *Rulers From the Steppe: State Formation on the Euroasian Periphery*, Ethnographics Press, Los Angeles, 1991
- Kutubī, Maḥmad (ed. Abdal Ḥusayn Navāī), *Tārīkh-i Al-MuḤaffar*, Inteshārāt-i Emīr Kabir, Tehran, 1985 [1364]
- Lambton, A. K. S., ‘The Administration of Sanjar’s Empire as Illustrated in the *Atabat al-Kataba*’, *BSOAS*, XX, 1957
- *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969
- *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government*, Variorum Reprints, London, 1980
- ‘Mongol Fiscal Administration in Persia’, *Studia Islamica*, vol. 64–5, 1986–7
- *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia. Aspects of Administrative, Economic, Social History in 11th–14th Century Persia*, I. B. Taurus, London, 1988a
- ‘Changing Concepts of Justice and Injustice from 11th Century–14th Century’, *Studia Islamica*, 1988b
- *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, London Oriental Series, vol. 36, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991
- ‘Awqaf in Persia: 6th–8th/12th–14th Centuries’, *Islamic Law and Society*, vol. 4, no. 3, 1997
- Lane, George, ‘An Account of Bar Hebraeus Abu al-Faraj and His Relations with the Mongols of Persia’, *Hugoye: Journal of Syriac Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2 (July), 1999
- ‘Arghūn Aqa: Mongol Bureaucrat?’ *Iranian Studies*, vol. 32, no. 4

- (December), 2000
- Laurent, J. C. M. (ed.), *Peregrinatores medii aevi quattuor*, 2nd edn, Leipzig, 1873
- Le Strange, Guy, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, Frank Cass, London and Liverpool, 1966
- Leroy, Jules, *Les Manuscrits Syriaques a Peintures conserves dans les Bibliotheques D'Europe et D'Orient*, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1964
- Levy, R., *Persian Literature*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1923
- Lewis, Bernard, *The Assassins. A Radical Sect in Islam*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1968
- (ed. and tr.), *Islam*, vol. I, *Politics and War*, Macmillan, London, 1974
- (ed. and tr.), *Islam*, vol. II, *Religion and Society*, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1987a
- *The Jews of Islam*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1987b
- *Islam in History: Ideas, Peoples, and Events in the Middle East*, Open Court Publishing, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois, 1993
- Lewis, Franklin, *Rumi: Past and Present, East and West*, Oneworld, Oxford, 2000
- Lewisohn, Leonard (ed.) (foreword Javad Nurbakhsh, intro. S. N. Nasr), *The Legacy of Medieval Persian Sufism*, Khaniqahi Nimatullahi Publications, New York and London, 1992
- *Beyond Faith and Infidelity*, Sufi Series, Curzon Press, London, 1995
- Li Chih-Chang (tr. A. Waley), *Travels of an Alchemist*, George Routledge & Sons, London, 1931
- Lockhart, L., 'The Relations between Edward I and Edward II of England and the Mongol Il-Khans of Persia', *Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies*, vol. xxviii, 1968
- Luckens Swietochowski, Marie and Carboni, S., *Illustrated Poetry and Epic Images: Persian Painting of the 1330s and 1340s*, The

- Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 1994
- Lupprian, K.-E., *Die Beziehungen der Päpste zu islamischen und mongolischen Herrschern im 13. Jahrhundert anhand ihres Briefwechsels*, Tehran, Vatican City, 1981
- Maalouf, Amin (tr. Jon Rothschild), *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, al-Saqi Books, London, 1984
- Majdi, Majd al-Dīn Moḥammed al-Husseini, *Zaynat al-Majalis*, Ketābkhānūh-ye Sanā'ī, 1983 [1362]
- Malik al-Shuarā Bahā'r (ed.), *Tārīkh-e Sīstān*, Farīdin, Tehran, 1935 [1314]
- (tr. Milton Gold), *Tārīkh-e Sīstān*, Persian Heritage Series, Istituto Italiano per Il Medio ed Estremo Oriente and The Royal Institute of Translation and Publication of Iran, Tehran, 1976
- al-Maqrīzī (tr. Marc E. Quatremère), *Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks de l'Egypte*, Paris, 1837–45
- Marks, Howard (ed.), *The Book of Dope Stories*, Vintage, London, 2001
- Martinez, A. P., 'Some notes on the Īl-Xānīd army', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 6, 1986
- 'Changes in Chancellery Languages and Language Changes in General in the Middle East, with particular reference to Iran in the Arab and Mongol Periods', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 7, 1987–91
- Mashkour, Muḥammad Javād (ed.), *Akhbār-e Salājeqe-ye Ram. The Historical Texts about the Seljuks in Asia Minor*, Enteshārāt-I Ketābfarashī, Tehran, 1971
- Mazzaoui, Michel M., *The Origins of the Safawids*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1972
- Meisami, Julie Scott (tr.) *Medieval Persian Court Poetry*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1987
- *The Sea of Precious Virtues: Bahār al-Favā'id*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 1991
- *Persian Historiography: To the end of the Twelfth Century*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1999
- Melville, Charles (ed.), *Pembroke Papers 1: Persian and Islamic Studies in Honour of P.W. Avery*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990a

- ‘Pādeshāh-i Islam: The Conversion of Sultan Ghazan Khan’, *Pembroke Papers 1*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990b
- ‘The Itineraries of Sultan Oljeitu, 1304–16’, *Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies*, vol. xxviii, London, 1990c
- “‘Sometimes by the Sword, Sometimes by the Dagger’: The role of the Ismā‘īlis in Mamluk–Mongol relations in the 8th/14th Century’, in Farhad Daftary (ed.), *Mediaeval Ismā‘īlī History and Thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996
- ‘Ḥamd Allah Mustawfī’s Zafarnamah and the Historiography of the Late Ilkhanid Period’, *Iran and Iranian Studies: Essays in Honour of Iraj Afsar*, Zagros Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1998
- *The Fall of Emīr Chupan and the Decline of the Ilkhanate, 1327–37: A Decade of Discord in Mongol Iran*, Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Bloomington, Indiana, 1999
- Meyvaert, Paul (ed.), ‘An Unknown Letter of Hülegü, Il-Khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France (10 April 1262)’, *Viator*, XI, pp. 245–59, text, pp. 252–9, 1980
- Michell, R. and Forbes, Nevill (tr.), *The Chronicle of Novgorod 1016–1471*, Camden Third Series, vol. XXV, London, Offices of the Society, 1914
- Minorsky, Vlademir, *Iranica Twenty Articles*, Publications of the University of Tehran, vol. 775, 1964
- *The Turks, Iran and the Caucasus in the Middle Ages*, Variorum Reprints, London, 1978
- *Medieval Iran and Its Neighbours*, Variorum Reprints, London, 1982
- Minovi M. and Minorsky, V., ‘Nasir al-Dīn on Finance’, *Iranica*, vol. 775, pp. 64–85, 1964
- Mirkhwand, Muḥammad ibn Khāvandshāh Balkhī (ed. Abbās Zariyāb), *Raw. at al-Ṣafā*, Inteshārāt Ilmī, Tehran, 1996 M ī
- Montgomery, James A. (tr.) *The History of Yaballaha, Nestorian Patriarch and his Vicar Bar Sauma*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1927
- Moosa, Matti, *Extremist Shi’ites: The Ghulat Sects*, Syracuse University

- Press, New York, 1988
- Morgan, D. O., 'Cassiodorus and Rashīd al-Dīn on Barbarian Rule in Italy and Persia', *BSOAS*, vol. XL, pp. 302–20, 1977a
- 'Aspects of Mongol Rule in Persia', Ph.D. thesis, SOAS, June 1977b
- 'The Mongol Armies in Persia', *Der Islam*, 56, 1979
- (ed.), *Worlds*, School of Oriental
- (ed.), *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian Worlds*, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1982
- *The Mongols*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986
- *Medieval Persia, 1040–1797*, Longman, London and New York, 1988a
- 'Review: Mongol Imperialism', *MESA Bulletin*, vol. 22, 1988b
- 'Rashīd al-Dīn and Gazan Khan', *Bibliothèque Iranienne* 45, Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, Tehran 1997
- 'Mongol or Persian: The Government of Il-Khan Iran', *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review*, vol. 3, pp. 1–2, 62–76, 1996
- Morton, A., 'The Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn: Il-Khanid Fact or Timurid Fiction?' in D. Morgan and R. Amitai (eds), *The Mongol Empire and Its Legacy*, Brill, Leiden, 1999
- 'The Munis al-aḥrār and its Twenty-ninth Chapter', in M. L. Lukens Swietochowski and S. Carboni (eds), *Illustrated Poetry and Epic Images*, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 1994
- al-Mufa..al, ibn Abil-Faza'il (ed. and tr. E. Brochet), *Histoire des sultanes mamlouks Patrologia Orientalis*, t. 12, fasc. 3; t. 20, fasc. 1, Paris, 1919–28
- ḥyī al-Dīn Ibn Abd al-aāhir (ed. and tr. Dr Syedah Fatima Sa'deque), *Baybars I of Egypt: al-Rau. al-Zāhir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-aāhir*, Oxford University Press, Dacca, 1956
- Muīn al-Dīn Natanzī (ed. Jean Aubin), *Muntakhab al-Tawārīkh-i Muīnī*, Tehran, 1957 [1336] Mu
- Munshī, Nāṣir al-Dīn (ed. Abbās Iqbāl), *Tārī kh-i Qarākhītā'īān-i Kermān Simt al-ulā*, Inteshārāt Esatir, Tehran, 1983 [1362]

- Murtaʿavī, Manachehre, *Masā'il-e Asr Il-Khānān*, Maasasah-ye Inteshārāt Āgāh, Tabriz, 1991
- Mustawfī Qazvinī, Ḥamdallah (tr. Edward G. Browne), 'Biographies of Persian Poets: Tārīkh-I-Guzīda "The Select History"', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, October 1900 and January 1901
- (tr. Edward G. Browne), *Tārīkh-I-Guzīda 'The Select History'*, Luzac, London, 1913
- (ed. G. Le Strange), *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, Brill, Leiden, and Luzac, London, 1915
- (tr. G. Le Strange), *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, Brill, Leiden, and Luzac, London, 1919
- (ed. Moḥammed Dabīrsyaghī), *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, part 3, Tehran 1958 [1336]
- *Tārīkh-i-Guzīda*, Emīr Kabir, Tehran, 1983 [1362] *aaḡarnāmah*,
- see L. J. Ward, *aaḡarnāmah*, British Library, MS OR2833, 1983
- Nakhchavānī, Moḥammed b. Hindashāh (ed. Abdul Karīm Alī zādeh), *Dastar al-Kāteb fī tayīn al-marātib*, 3 vols, Moscow, 1964, 1971, 1976
- Nakhjavānī, Hindashāh b. Sanjar b. Abdullah Sāḡebī, *Tajārab al-Salaf*, Ketābkhāneh Tehvori, Tehran, 1978 [1357]
- Nasawī, Khurandizī Zeydarī (Persian translation, ed. M. Minovi), *Sīrat-i Jalāl al-Dīn Mīngbirnī*, Chapkhāneh elamī, Tehran, 1965 [1344]
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein (ed.), Mehdi Amin Razavi, *The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Persia*, Curzon Press, London, 1996
- Nersessian, Sirapie Der, 'The Armenian Chronicles of Constable Smpad or The Royal Historian', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 13, pp. 141–68, 1959
- Netton, Ian Richard, *A Popular Dictionary of Islam*, Curzon Press, London, 1992
- Nicholson, Reynold A., *A Literary History of the Arabs*, The Kegan Paul Arabia Library, vol. 4, London and New York, 1998
- Nicolle, David, *Saracen Faris 1050–1250*, Reed International Books, London, 1994

- Nizām al-Mulk (tr. Hubert Darke), *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1960
- (ed. Jafar Sheār), *Siyārsat-nāma (siyar al-Mulak)*, Sherkat-e Sahāmi-ye Ketābhāye, Tehran, 1985 [1364]
- NiOāmī Arazi Samarqandī (tr. Edward Browne), *Chahār Maqāla (The Four Discourses) of Nidhāmī-I-'Ara.ī-I-Samarqandī*, Gibb Memorial, Luzac, London, 1921
- (ed. Moḥammad Moīn), *Chahār Maqāla*, Enteshārāt Amīr Kabīr, Tehran, 1998 [1377] NiŪarī Qohestānī, Hakīm (ed. Maḥmad Rafī'i), *Dīwān Hakīm NiŪarī Qohestānī*, Inteshārāt Ilmi, University of Tehran, 1992 [1371]
- Nuwayrī, Shihab al-Din Aḥmad, Saīd Āshar, M. Muṣṭafā Ziyādah, Fuād Abd al-
- tī aṣ-Ṣayyād (eds), *Nihāyat al-arab fī funan al-adab*, Cairo, 1985
- ‘Obeyd-e Zākānī (tr. Ḥasan Javādī), *The Ethics of the Aristocrats and Other Satirical Works*, Jahan Books, Piedmont, California, 1985
- (ed. Abbās Eghbāl), *Kulliyāt*, Banyād Nashr-i ketāb, Tehran, 1963 [1342]
- d’Ohsson, A. C. M., *Histoire des Mongols*, four volumes, La Hay et Amsterdam Les Fères Van Cleef, 1834–5
- Onon, Urgunge, *The History and the Life of Chinggis Khan: The Secret History of the Mongols*, Brill, Leiden, 1990
- Orbelian, Stepannos (tr. M. Brosset), *Histoire de la Siounie*, Premier Livraison, St Petersburg, 1864
- Ostrowski, Donald ‘The tamma and the dual administrative structure of the Mongol Empire’, *BSOAS*, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 262–77, 1998
- Patton, Douglas, *Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu Atabeg of Mosul 1211–1259*, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 1991
- Petech, L., ‘Les Marchands Italien dans l’Empire Mongol’, *Journal Asiatique*, 250, pp. 549–74, 1962
- Petrosyan, Yuri, Akimushkin, Oleg, Khalidov, Anas B. and Rezvan, Efim A., *Pages of Perfection*, ARCH Foundation, Electa, Milan, St Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian

- Academy of Sciences, 1995
- Petrushevsky, I. P., 'Rashīd al-Dīn's Conception of the State', *Central Asiatic Journal*, vol. xiv, 1970
- *Islam in Iran*, Athlone Press, London, 1985
- Potter, Lawrence Goddard, 'The Kart Dynasty of Herat: Religion and Politics in Medieval Iran', Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1992
- Prawer, Joshua, *The History of the Jews in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988
- Pūr-i Bahā' (Tāj al-Dīn Nasā'ī) 'Kārnāmeḥ-ye Awqāf', *Farhang-e Īrān Zamin*, vol. viii, Tehran, 1960 [1339]
- Qābas b. Vashamgīrziār, Kiykāvas b. Iskandar (ed. Ghulāmhussayn Yasefi), *Qābas-nāma*, Sherkat Enteshārāt 'Ilmī va Farhangī, Tehran, 1996 [1375]
- Qāshānī, Abdul Qasem Ibn 'Ali Ibn Moḥammed, *see* Kashani
- Qirtay [Qirtāy] al-Izzī al-Khaznadārī, *Ta'rikh al-nawādir mim mā jāra li'l-awā'il wa'lawākhir*, MS, Gotha, 1655 *Rash ī*
- Quatremere, Étienne (ed. and tr.) *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse (part of Rashīd al-Dīn's Jāmial-Tavārikh)*, Oriental Press, Amsterdam, 1968
- de Rachewiltz, Igor, Hok-Lam Chan, Hsiao Chi-Ching and Geier, Peter W. (eds), *In The Service of The Khan. Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period 1200–1300*, Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, AF 121, 1993 Rashīd al-Dīn Talib Faḡlallah Abul-Khair Hamadanī (ed. K. Jahn), *Histoire des Francs*, Brill, Leiden, 1951
- *Jāmi al-Tavārikh. Ismā'īli History*, BTNK, Tehran, 1960a
- (ed. Ahmed Ates), *Cami' al-Tavarih. 5. cuz, Selçuklular Tarihi*, Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Ankara, 1960b
- (tr. Étienne Quatremere), *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse*, Oriental Press, Amsterdam, 1968
- (tr. John Andrew Boyle), *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1971
- (ed. Mytabā Mīnovī and Iraj Afshār), *Vaqfnāma-i Rab'-i Rashīdī*, Tehran, 1977 [2536]

- *Jāmi al-Tawārikh*, Tehran, 1994 [1373]
- (tr. W. M. Thackston), *Rashīduddīn Fazlullāh: Jami 'u' t-Tawārikh, Compendium of Chronicles Parts I, II, III*, Sources of Oriental Languages and Literature 45, Central Asian Sources, Harvard, 1998, 1999
- (tr. John Andrew Boyle), 'The History of Hülegü Khan' (draft translation), draft manuscript, Manchester, n.d.
- and Jahn, Karl, *History of India and Collected Essays*, Mouton, The Hague, 1965
- Ratchnevsky, Paul, *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993
- Rayfield, Donald, *The Literature of Georgia: A History*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994
- Rāzī, Shaykh Najm al-Dīn *see* Dayā Najm al-Dīn Rāzī *Mirṣād al-Ibād*, Tehran, 1973 [1352]
- Razzāq Samarqandī, Abdul (ed. M. Shafī), *Matlaal-Sa'dayn*, 2 vols, Tehran 1993 [1371]
- Redhouse, James (tr.), Idries Shah, Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad, el-Eflaki, *Legends of the Sufis: Selections from Menaqibu' L'Arifin*, Theosophical Publishing House, London, 1976
- Reid, James J., 'The Jeun-i Qurban Oirat Clan in the 14th Century', *Journal of Asian History* 18/2, 1984
- Ridgeon, Lloyd, 'Aziz Nasafi', Curzon Press, London, 1997
- Ridley, F. A., *The Assassins*, Socialist Platform, London, 1988
- Riley-Smith, J. S. C., Lyons, U. and Lyons, M. C., *Ayyubids, Mamlukes, and Crusaders: Selections from Tārīkh al-Duwal wa'l-Muluk*, W. Heffer, Cambridge, 1971
- Roberg, B., 'Die Tartaren auf dem 2. Konzil von Lyon. Report of the envoys of Abaqa Khan to the Second Council of Lyon (1274)', *Annuaire Historiae Conciliorum*, V, pp. 241–302, text pp. 298–301, 1973
- Rogers, Michael, 'Patronage in Saljuk Anatolia, 1200–1300', Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford, 1972

- Rossabi, Morris, *Khubilai Khan*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988
- *Voyager from Xanadu*, Kodansha International, New York, 1992
- Rosenthal, Franz, *The Herb: Hashish versus Mediaeval Muslim Society*, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1971
- Ramī, Jalāl al-Dīn (tr. James Redhouse), *The Mesnevi. With a Collection of Characteristic Anecdotes from El-Eflaki el-'Arifi*, Trübner, London, 1881
- (tr. and ed. Reynold Nicholson), *Ramī: Poet and Mystic 1207–1273, Selected Writings*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1973
- (ed. Ferazenfar), *Kitāb Fiyeh Māfiyeh*, Inteshārāt Emīr Kabir, Tehran, 1983 [1362]
- (ed. B. Ferazenfer), *Kolliyat-i Dīwān-i Shams-i Tabrizī*, Chapkhānū Sapeher, Tehran, 1984 [1363]
- (tr. and ed. R. A. Nicholson), *The Mathnawi of Jalāluddīn Ramī*, translation and commentary, E. J. W. Gibb, Memorial Series, Luzac, London, 1990 and 1996
- (tr. A. J. Arberry), *The Discourses of Ramī*, Curzon Press, London, 1993a
- (tr. and ed. A. J. Arberry), *Tales from the Mathnawī*, Curzon Press, London, 1993b
- (tr. Shahram T. Shiva), *Rending the Veil*, Hohm Press, Prescott, Arizona, 1995 *Ḥussein M ā fiyeh* ,
- (ed. Ḥussein Haydār Khānī), *Fiyeh Māfiyeh*, Inteshārāt Senāi, Tehran, 1996 [1375]
- (ed. R. Nicholson), *Mathnavi Ma'navi*, vols 1–6, Inteshārāt Tus, Tehran, 1996a
- (tr. Reynold A. Nicholson), *Selected Poems from the Divani Shamsi Tabrizī*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1898. Reprinted Curzon Press, London, 1999a
- (tr. W. M. Thackston), *Signs of the Unseen: The Discourses of Jalāluddīn Ramī*, Shambhala, Boston and London, 1999b

- Runciman, Steven, *A History of the Crusades*, 1, 2, 3, Penguin, London, 1965
- Rypka, Jan, *History of Iranian Literature*, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1968
- Sa'di Shīrāzī, Shaykh Moṣṣalāḥ al-Dīn, *Kulliyāt-i Sa'di*, Tehran, 1363
- (tr. E. Rehatsek, intro. M. Wickens), *The Gulistan or Rose Garden of Sa'di*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1964 *astān dī*,
- (tr. G. M. Wickens), *Morals Pointed and Tales Adorned. The Bastān of Sa'di*, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1975
- Ṣadrolslāmī, Fakhr al-Dīn, *Maraghe and Ajabshir*, Ohadi Publications, Tehran, 2000
- Sayfī, Ibn Yaḡaq al-Harawī (intro. M. Zubayr as-Siddiqī), *Tārīkh-Nāma-i-Harāt, The History of Harat*, Calcutta, 1944
- Schéler, A. 'Notices et extraits de deux manuscrits français de la bibliothèque royale de Turin', *Le Bibliophile Belge*, 3rd series, ii, part 3, 1867
- Schmidtke, Sabine, *The Theology of al-'Allama al-Hilli (d.726/1325)*, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin, 1991
- Sebeos (tr. R. Bedrosian) *Sebeos' History*, Sources for the Armenian Tradition, New York, 1986
- Sepahsālār, Farīdan bin Aḥmad (ed. Saīd Nafīsī), *Zendegīnāmeḥ-ye Mowlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Mowlavī*, reprint, Eqbāl, Tehran, 1983
- Setton, Kenneth M., *A History of The Crusades*, 5 vols, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1969
- Seyyed Hossein Nasr (ed. Mehdi Amin Razavi), *The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Persia*, Curzon Press, Richmond, 1996
- Shabānkārāī Moḥammad b. Alī b. Moḥammad, *Majma-'Ansāb*, Tehran, 1984 [1363]
- Shabistārī, Sa'd al-Dīn Maḥmad ibn Amīn al-Dīn Abd al-Karīm (ed. Aḥmad Mojāḥed and Dr Moḥsen Kīānī), *Gulshan-i Rāz (The Secret Garden)*, 'Mā' & Manachehrī, Tehran, 1992 [1371]
- (tr. Asadullah ad-Dhaakir Yate), *The Secret Garden (Gulshan-i Rāz)*, Zahra Publications, Blanco, 1982

- Shamī, NiOām al-Dīn (ed. Felix Tauer), *aafar-nāmeḥ*, Intisharat-i Muassasah-i Sharqiyah-i Chikusalavaki, Prague, 1937
- Shirley, Janet (tr.), *Crusader Syria in the 13th Century. The Rothelin Continuation with part of the Eracles or Acre text*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999
- Siddiqi, Husain Iqtidar, 'Historical Information in Persian Poems', *Studies in Islam*, vol. xix, nos. 1–2 (January and April), 1982
- Sinor, Denis, *Studies in Medieval Inner Asia*, Variorum Reprints, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1997
- Skelton, R. A., Marston, T. E. and Painter, George D. (new intro. George Painter), *The Vinland Map and The Tartar Relation*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1995
- Smith, John Mason, 'Ayn Jalut: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 44, no. 2, 1984
- Smpad (ed. and tr. S. Der Nersessian), 'The Armenian Chronicles of Constable Smpad or The Royal Historian', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 13, pp. 141–68, 1959
- de Somogyi, Joseph, 'A Qasida on the Destruction of Baghdad', *BSOAS*, vol. II, 1933–35
- Sprachman, Paul, *Suppressed Persian: An Anthology of Forbidden Literature*, Mazda Publishers, California, 1995
- Spuler, Bertold, *History of the Mongols*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972a
- (tr. Maḥmad Mīrāftāb), *Tārikh-i Moghal dar Īrān*, BTNK, Tehran, 1972b
- *Die Mongolen in Iran*, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1985
- *History of the Muslim World: The Mongol Period*, Marcus Wiener, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994
- Steingass, F., *A Comprehensive Persian–English Dictionary*, Asian Educational Services, New Delhi, 1992
- Sultān Valad (ed. Jalāl Humā ī), *Valad-nāmah or Masnavi-i Valadī*, Tehran, 1937 [1316]

— (ed. and intro. Saïd Nafisî), *Dîwān-i Sultān Valad ibn Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥam-mad, Ramī*, Tehran, 1959 [1338] ḥ*Chinggiznāmeḥ Sh ā hansh ā hnāmeḥ*,

Tabrizī, Aḥmad, *Chinggiznāmeḥ or Shāhanshāhnāmeḥ*, British Library, OR 2780, fols. 41–132

Tabrizī, Humām-i (ed. Rachīd Eyvazī), *Dîwān-e Humām-e Tabrizī*, Faculte des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Tabriz, Institut d'Histoire et de Civilisation Iraniennes, Tabriz, August 1972

— (ed. Movīd Šābatī), *Dîwān-e Humām-e Tabrizī*, Tehran, 1954 [1333]

Tabrizī, Shams al-Dīn (ed. Moḥammad Alī Movaḥhed), *Maqālāt-e Shams al-Dīn Tabrizī*, Sahāmī, Tehran, 1990

— (ed. Jafar Modarress Sādeqī), *Maqālāt-e Shams al-Dī n Tabrizī. Discourses of Shamsoddin Muhammad Tabrizi (in the years he was in Konya: AD 1244–1248/AH 642–645)*, Nashr-e Markaz, Tehran, 1999

Takahashi, Hidemi, 'Simeon of Qala Rumaita, Patriarch Philoxenus Nemrod and Bar Ebroyo', *Hugoye: Journal of Syriac Studies*, vol. 4, no. 1 (January), 2001

Tao-Chung Yao, 'Chiu Chu-chi and Chinggis khan', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 46, no. 1 (June), 1986

Tapper, Richard, *Frontier Nomads of Iran*, Cambridge Middle East Studies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997

Tārīkh-e Sīstān (ed. Malik al-Shuarā Bahā'r), Farīdin, Tehran, 1935 [1314]

— (tr. Milton Gold), Persian Heritage Series, Istituto Italiano per Il Medio ed Estremo Oriente and The Royal Institute of Translation and Publication of Iran, 1976

Tārīkh-e Yazd (ed. Īraj Afshār), Persian Text Series, BTNK, Tehran, 1965 [1343]

Tārīkh-i-Banākātī, Banākātī, Dāvud (ed. Jafar Sheār), Tehran, 1969 [1348]

Tārīkh-i Jadīd-e Yazd, Aḥmad ibn Husein Kāteb (ed. Īraj Afshār), Publications de Farhang-e Īrān Zamīn, Tehran, 1966 [1345], 1978 [2537]

- Tārīkh-i Rayān*, Awliya Allah Āmulī (ed. Dr Manachehr Setadeh), Inteshārāt-i Baniyād-i Farhang, Tehran, 1969 [1348]
- Tārīkh-i Shāhi*, anonymous (ed. Moḥammed Ibrāhīm Bāstānī Pārīzī), Inteshārāt Baniyād Farhang Iran, Tehran, 1976 [2535]
- Tārīkh-i Shaikh Uwais* (ed. and tr. J. B. Van Loon), The Hague, 1954
- Taylor, Otis Ellery, *Architecture of North-West Persia under the Il-Khan Mongols*, University of Chicago Libraries, Chicago, Illinois, 1940
- Teule, H., 'The Crusaders in Bar Hebraeus' Syriac and Arabic Secular Chronicles', in *East and West in the Crusader States*, Peeters, Leuven, 1996
- Thackston, Wheeler M., *A Century of Princes*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989
- *A Millennium of Classical Persian Poetry*, Iran Books, Bethesda, Maryland, 1994
- (tr. and ed.), *Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor* (advance proof), Oxford University Press, New York, 1995
- Thomson, Robert W., *Studies in Armenian Literature and Christianity*, Variorum Reprints, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1994
- Thorau, Peter (tr. P. M. Holt), *The Lion of Egypt. Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the 13C*, Longman, London, 1992
- Tihirānī, Abū Bakr-i, *Kitab-i Diyarbakriyya Ak-Koyunlular Tarihi*, 2 vols, Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Ankara, 1962, 1964.
- Tasī, Naṣīr al-Dīn (ed. W. Ivanhow), *Two Early Ismaili Treatises: Haft-babi Baba Sayyid-na and Matlubu'l-mu'minin by Tasī*, Islamic Research Association, no. 2, Baptist Mission Press, Bombay, 1933
- (tr. W. Ivanow), *Taṣawwurāt or Raw. at al-Taslim*, Ismaili Society, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1950
- (intro. and tr. J. A. Boyle), 'The Death of the Last Abbasid Caliph. A Contemporary Muslim Account', *Journal of Semitic Studies*, VI, Manchester, pp. 145–61, 1961
- (ed. and tr. J. A. Boyle), 'The Longer Introduction to the *Zij al-Ilkhānī* of Naṣīr-ad-Din ḡasī', *Journal of Semitic Studies*, VIII, Manchester, 1963

- (tr. G. M. Wickens), *The Naṣīrean Ethics*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1964
- (ed. Ibrāhīm Waḥīd Dāmghānī), *Akhḫlāq-i Nāṣerī*, Tehran, 1965 [1344]
- (tr. S. J. Badakhchani), *Contemplation and Action: The Spiritual Autobiography of a Muslim Scholar*, I. B. Tauris and The Institute of Ismā‘īlī Studies, London, 1998
- Usamah ibn Munqidh (tr. Philip K. Hitti), *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1987
- Van Loon, J. B. (tr. and ed.), *Tārīkh-i Shaikh Uwais*, Mouton, The Hague, 1954
- Vardan (tr. R. W. Thomson), ‘The Historical Compilation of Vardan Arewelcl’, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 43, pp. 125–226, 1989
- Vernadsky, George, *The Mongols and Russia*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1953
- Vivian, Katherine (tr.) and S. Qaukhchishvili (ed.), *The Georgian Chronicle: The Period of Giorgi Lasha*, Adolf M. Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1991
- Voegelin, Eric, ‘The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245– 1255’, *Byzantion*, vol. 15, pp. 378–413, 1941 Vryonis Jr, Speros,
- Vryonis Jr, Speros, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from 11th Century Through 15th Century*, University of California, Los Angeles, 1971
- Waley, Muḥammad Isa (tr.), ‘Yahya Bakharzi on Service in the Khanaqah’, *Sufi: A Journal of Sufism*, no. 20, 1993
- Wallis Budge, E. A. (tr.), *The Monks of Kublai Khan, Emperor of China*, The Religious Tract Society, London, 1928
- Ward, L. J., ‘aafarnāmah of Mustawfi’, Ph.D. thesis, Manchester University, 1983
- Waṣṣāf, Shihab al-Dīn Abd Allah Sharaf Shirāzī (ed. M. M. Iṣfahānī), *Tārīkh-i Waṣṣāf or Tajziyat al-amṣār wa tazjiyat al-aṣār*, Ketābkhāneh

- Ibn Sīnā va Ketābkhāneh Ja'far' Tabrīzī, Tehran, 1959 [1338]
- Wickens, G. M., 'Naṣīr al-Dīn Tasī on the Fall of Baghdad: A Further Study', *Journal of Semitic Studies*, VII, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1962
- Wickens, G. M. Naṣīr al-Dīn ṣasī's *The Naṣīrean Ethics*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1964
- Wiencek, Henry, Lowry, Glen D. with Heller, Amanda, *Storm Across Asia: Genghis Khan and the Mongols. The Mogul Expansion*, Cassell, London, 1980
- Wilber, Donald N., *The Architecture of Islamic Iran: The Il-Khanid Period*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1955
- William of Rubruck (tr. and ed. Peter Jackson with David Morgan), *The Mission of William Rubruck*, Hakluyt Society, London, 1990
- Wright, William, *A Short History of Syriac Literature*, Adam & Charles Black, London, 1894
- Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.), *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and New York, 1987, <http://www.iranica.com/~iranica/articles>
- Yergin, Daniel, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power*, Touchstone Books, Simon & Schuster, New York, London, 1991/2
- Yule, Sir Henry, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, 3 vols, Hakluyt Society, [1914, 13]. Reprinted Kraus Reprint, Millwood, New York, 1967
- Zakeri, Mohsen, 'The Ayyārān of Khurasan and the Mongol Invasion', *Proceedings of the Third European Conference of Iranian Studies*, part 2, Mediaeval and Modern Persian Studies (ed. Charles Melville), Cambridge, 11–15 September 1995, Wiesbaden, pp. 269–76, 1999
- Zamchī Isfizārī, Muīn al-Dīn Muḥammad (tr. M. Barbier de Meynard), 'Extraits de La Chronique Persane d'Herat', *Journal Asiatique*, June 1861; (ed. Muḥammed KāOem Imām) *Rau.at al-Jannāt fī waṣf-e Madānūt-e Herāt*, Tehran University Publications, Tehran, 1959–60 [1338–9].